Shelly Johnson, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 26, 2002
01984295 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 26, 2002)

01984295

02-26-2002

Shelly Johnson, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Shelly Johnson v. U.S. Postal Service

01984295

02-26-02

.

Shelly Johnson,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01984295

Agency No. 1G708206293

Hearing No. 270-95-9127X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on

the basis of disability (degenerative joint disease in right knee) in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1> For the reasons stated

herein, the agency's FAD is affirmed.

According to the record, complainant was employed as a Flat Sorter

Machine Operator, PS-6 at a Louisiana facility of the agency. In May

1992, complainant suffered a work-related injury, which required her to

take a leave of absence from May 1992 through July 1992. During that

time, complainant's personal physician diagnosed her with arthritis

in her right knee and recommended that she avoid repetitive stooping,

squatting, and climbing. Complainant filed a claim for benefits with

the Office of Workers' Compensation which was denied in August 1992.

Complainant was then considered a �light duty <2>� employee and she

worked light duty from September 1992 through April 1993 under the

medical restrictions of no climbing and only intermittent lifting,

carrying, standing, walking, kneeling, bending, stooping, or twisting.

We specifically note that complainant was limited to standing for only

one hour, intermittently, each day. In May 1993, complainant, based

on a medical certificate issued by her physician, asked to continue

on light duty as well as to use a lumbar back support chair.<3> Both

requests were denied so complainant was unable to work. Believing she

was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and,

subsequently, filed a complaint alleging that the agency discriminated

against her when she was not allowed to work.

The agency stated that complainant was not allowed to work because the

agency provided her with light duty for approximately eight months and

it does not have permanent light duty status, a lumbar back support

chair was not appropriate for her position, and there were no positions

available which would allow for complainant's restrictions.

An investigation was conducted and complainant was informed of her right

to choose either a hearing before an EEOC administrative judge (AJ)

or an immediate FAD. Complainant chose the former. After a hearing,

the AJ issued a decision finding no discrimination. Specifically,

the AJ found that complainant failed to show that she was an individual

with a disability because she did not show that she was substantially

limited in a major life activity<4>. In addition, the AJ found that

assuming complainant was an individual with a disability, she failed to

show that the reasonable accommodation she requested was related to her

claimed disability. The agency issued a FAD concurring with the AJ's

finding of no discrimination.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings

by an Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National

Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted).

A finding that discriminatory intent did not exist is a factual finding.

See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

The Commission has reviewed the full administrative record and we find

that the AJ's factual findings support her ultimate factual conclusion

of no discrimination based on disability. The Rehabilitation Act of

1973 prohibits discrimination against qualified disabled individuals.

In order to establish disability discrimination, complainant must show

that: (1) she is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29

C.F.R. � 1630.2(g); (2) she is a qualified individual with a disability

pursuant to 29 C.F. R. � 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency failed to provide a

reasonable accommodation. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation

and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (1999).

Initially, we must reach a determination as to whether complainant falls

within the protection of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. One bringing

a claim of disability discrimination must first establish that she is a

member of the class of persons protected by the Rehabilitation Act, i.e.,

a individual with a disability. An individual with a disability is one

who: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits

one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment,

or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g).

The Commission has defined �substantially limits� as �[u]nable to perform

a major life activity that the average person in the general population

can perform� or �[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition,

manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular

major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration

under which the average person in the general population can perform

that same major life activity.� 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(j)(i) and (ii).

Major life activities include such functions as caring for one's self,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,

learning, and working. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).

Complainant has arthritis in her right knee, which, during the period

in question, restricted her to lifting or carrying no more than 25

pounds, no climbing, and only intermittent standing, walking, kneeling,

bending, stooping or twisting.<5> Specifically, complainant stated

that her arthritis has substantially limited her walking, running and

working because she has excruciating pain and swelling in her right

knee when she works. She indicated that her knee problem inevitably

leads to pain in her back from limping to relieve the pain in her knee.

Complainant further stated that she has problems with her back when she

does repetitive or heavy lifting and that her knee causes her to walk

slower than normal.

Viewing the evidence of record in total, the Commission finds that the

credibility of some of the evidence regarding complainant's impairment

is questionable. For approximately ten months, complainant submitted

medically-certified Temporary Light Duty Requests (TLD Request)

indicating the restrictions previously mentioned. The last TLD

Request was submitted in August 1993. The following month, however,

in September 1993, complainant submitted a Return to Work Certification

releasing her to full duty without restrictions. Complainant did return

to work and it appears she did so without incident. Complainant failed

to provide a persuasive reason regarding how she was able to return to

full duty from the aforementioned restrictions in such a short period

of time. In her affidavit, complainant stated that she had financial

difficulties so, in September 1993, she consulted with a new doctor

who was unfamiliar with her job requirements and who released her to

full duty after an examination. Complainant speculated that the new

doctor would have imposed the same restrictions as her previous doctors

if he was aware of her job requirements. Further, there is additional

medical evidence that also places the condition, manner and duration of

complainant's impairment in question. We note in this regard that at

the EEO hearing, complainant presented a medical report dated January

30, 1996 indicating that complainant suffered with pain in both knees,

which began from a November 1994 car accident. Said medical report gave

an assessment of �Patellofemoral arthritis� but stated that �[x]-rays

of both knees obtained do not show much in the way of arthritis but

there is joint line narrowing between the patella and trochlea.� It

stated further that �both knees have full range of motion with normal

stability. . . . No swelling, warmth, redness, or effusion.�

For the same reasons, we further find that complainant failed to

establish that she has a record of an impairment which substantially

limits her in a major life activity. Finally, we find no credible

evidence that the agency regarded her as having such an impairment. Thus,

complainant failed to establish that she falls within the protection of

the Rehabilitation Act. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the agency's

decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

__02-26-02________________

Date

1Complainant withdrew the bases of race (African-American) and age

(over 40 years of age) during the hearing stage of the complaint.

2At the Postal Service, �light duty� is the duty provided to an employee

who has physical limitations, identified by a qualified physician,

resulting from an off-the-job injury/illness. It differs from �limited

duty,� which is duty provided to an employee who has physical limitations,

identified by a qualified physician, resulting from an on-the-job

injury/illness.

3The agency scheduled complainant for a Fitness for Duty Examination

(FFDE) in June 1993 and the FFDE physician agreed with the May 1993

recommendations of complainant's physician.

4The AJ's decision erred in not recognizing �standing� as a major life

activity. See Franklin v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 07A00025

(January 10, 2001)(citing Henry v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal

No. 01965235 (May 13, 1999)).

5The Commission notes that, in September 1993, complainant was released

to return to duty without restriction.