Shawn Traylor et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 28, 2019

12902219 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/902,219 10/12/2010 Shawn Traylor 28849/09291 1693
27530 7590 08/28/2019
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
IP Department
One Wells Fargo Center
301 South College Street, 23rd Floor
Charlotte, NC 28202
EXAMINER
GATTEW, ASTEWAY T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2173
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/28/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ip@nelsonmullins.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte SHAWN TRAYLOR, DANIEL ENGLISH, JOAO MALHINHA,
LINDA DOZIER, and CHRITOPHER JOHN LEHNERT
____________________

Appeal 2017-010750
Application 12/902,2191
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before HUNG H. BUI, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 15–17, which are all the claims
pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Oral arguments were heard on June 10, 2019. A transcript of that hearing
will be added to the record in due time.
We AFFIRM.2

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Cricket Media, Inc.
App. Br. 4.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed April
26, 2017; Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed August 16, 2017; Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.”) mailed June 16, 2017; Final Office Action (“Final Act.”)

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to “dynamic collaboration in a social
networking environment,” i.e., “giving owners of user groups in social
networking contexts the ability to invite one another to create [and join] a
distinct [new or preexisting] collaboration group [or project] that exists
outside of each of the constituent groups” (Spec. ¶¶ 3, 6) and “facilitate
collaboration by the groups[, for example, Group A and Group B,] within
the new collaboration group or project.” (Spec. ¶¶ 36–38).
Claims 15, 16, and 17 are independent. Claim 15 is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter, as reproduced below with disputed limitations in
italics:
15. A method for facilitating collaboration by a first group
comprising at least two members and a second group comprising
at least two members, the method comprising the steps of:
creating a collaboration group based at least in part on a
request related to the first group, wherein a processing device
stores data representative of the collaboration group in a memory
operatively connected to the processing device;
[1] linking the first group of at least two members to the
collaboration group based at least in part on the request, wherein
the processing device stores data in the memory representative
of the link between the first group and the collaboration group;
[2] linking the second group of at least two members to the
collaboration group, wherein the processing device stores data
in the memory representative of the link between the second
group and the collaboration group in the memory;
[3] facilitating collaboration by the first and second
groups, wherein a first structure of the first group remains
unchanged by the collaboration and a second structure of the

mailed March 24, 2016; and original Specification (“Spec.”) filed October
12, 2010.

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second group remains unchanged by the collaboration, wherein
the first group is created to comprise one or more members and
at least a first owner, and the second group is created to comprise
one or more other members and at least a second owner; and
notifying the second owner of an invitation from the first
owner to join the collaboration group, wherein the linking of the
second group to the collaboration group is based at least in part
on the notifying or on an indicated acceptance of the invitation
by the second owner.
App. Br. 19 (Claims App’x) (bracketing added).

EXAMINER’S REJECTIONS & REFERENCES
(1) Claim 15 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Day et al. (US 6,684,212 B1; issued Jan. 27, 2004;
“Day”), Iyer (US 2001/0037367 A1; published Nov. 1, 2001), and Friedrich
et al. (US 2004/0104933 A1; published June 3, 2004; “Friedrich”). Final
Act. 2–8.
(2) Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Day, Iyer, and Moser et al. (US 7,676,542 B2; issued Mar.
9, 2010; “Moser”). Final Act. 8–13.
(3) Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Day and Bjoernsen et al. (US 2004/0174392 A1;
published Sept. 9, 2004; “Bjoernsen”). Final Act. 14–21.

ANALYSIS
In support of the § 103(a) rejection of claims 15–17, the Examiner
finds Day teaches Appellants’ claimed “method for facilitating collaboration
by a first group comprising at least two members and a second group
comprising at least two members” including [1] “linking the first group of at

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least two members to the collaboration group”; [2] “linking the second group
of at least two members to the collaboration group”; and [3] “facilitating
collaboration by the first and second groups.” Final Act. 2–5 (citing Day
3:25–53, 4:15–20, 4:35–65, 5:11–26, 10:7–16, 111–5, 13:29–47; Figs. 1–5,
21; Abstract). The Examiner then relies on Iyer, Friedrich, Moser, and
Bjoernsen for teaching several secondary features to support the conclusion
of obviousness. Final Act. 7 (citing Iyer ¶ 12; Friedrich ¶¶ 22, 30, 31, 35,
36), 13 (citing Moser 1:25–29, 4:30–41), and 18 (citing Bjoernsen ¶ 12).
Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s factual findings regarding
Iyer, Friedrich, Moser, and Bjoernsen. Nor do Appellants challenge the
Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness. Instead, Appellants only dispute the
Examiner’s factual findings regarding Day. In particular, Appellants argue
Day does not teach or suggest three disputed limitations: [1] “linking the
first group of at least two members to the collaboration group”; [2] “linking
the second group of at least two members to the collaboration group”; and
[3] “facilitating collaboration by the first and second groups” as recited in
claim 15 and similarly, in claims 16–17. App. Br. 13–17; Reply Br. 2–6.
According to Appellants, Day only teaches a virtual team environment
including multiple teams, as shown in Figure 21, where “team members”
from diverse teams (i.e., groups or organizations) are linked and can
collaborate and share information and data, but “there is no teaching in Day
that groups (of at least two members) are linked to a collaboration group and
that the linked groups collaborate in the collaboration group.” App. Br. 13
(emphasis in original).

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Day’s Figure 21 is reproduced below with additional markings for
illustration:

Day’s Figure 21 shows virtual team room environment 351 of team
rooms 352–360 to support online real time meetings of team members 366–
368 with real time collaboration on documents or information.

Appellants argue Day’s Figure 21 shows collaboration between team
members, but not between teams (groups) themselves. App. Br. 13–15
(citing Day 10:50–54, 10:64–66). In other words, “only single team
members collaborate” but “the teams themselves do not collaborate.” Reply
Br. 5.

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In the Reply Brief, Appellants further argue:
First, it must be understood that the pending claims require
that at least three groups exist in the system – a first group of at
least two members; a second group of at least two members; and
a separate collaboration group of undefined membership
numbers. Second, the entire first group and the entire second
group must be “linked” to the collaboration group. Third, and
importantly, collaboration must be “facilitated” between the first
and second groups.

Reply Br. 3. According to Appellants,
Day simply does not link an entire first group and an entire
second group to a separate collaboration group, and Day does not
allow collaboration between the linked first and second groups
. . . . There is nothing in Day that teaches that individual team
members collaborate with individual members of other teams,
and there is nothing in Day that says a separate collaboration
group is established.

Id. (emphasis added).
We do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive. Rather, we find the
Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to Appellants’ arguments
supported by a preponderance of evidence. Ans. 2–3. Therefore, we adopt
the Examiner’s findings and explanations provided therein. Id. For
additional emphasis, we note claim terms, during prosecution, are given their
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. In re
Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under
the broadest reasonable interpretation, claim terms are given their ordinary
and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in
the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

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The term “collaboration group” is not defined in Appellants’
Specification. However, that term is described by Appellants’ Specification
“in the context of a distinct collaboration – that is, around an event or a
project” (Spec. ¶ 19) and can be organized “by topic, such as [, for example,]
‘animal preservation[s],’ corresponding or relating to a topic or interest of
the collaboration group” (Spec. ¶ 27). According to Appellants’
Specification, when a new collaboration group or project is created within a
graphical user interface (GUI) 500, shown in Figures 3A–3B, “the first and
second users co-owners of the new collaboration group” send “a message to
each owner confirming the creation of the group” “that includes a hyperlink
1404 [as shown in Figure 140] to the newly created collaboration space, as
well as one or more hyperlinks 1406 to help the co-owners get started” and
“to facilitate collaboration by the groups within the new collaboration group
or project.” (Spec. ¶¶ 36–38).
As implicitly recognized by the Examiner in the manner consistent
with Appellants’ own Specification, the term “collaboration group” recited
in Appellants’ claims 15–17 can be broadly, but reasonably, interpreted to
encompass Day’s “virtual team room environment (i.e., linked to a
collaboration environment/group)” [shown in Figures 4 and 5], where
“multiple teams (i.e., first and second groups) with multiple team member[s]
(i.e., at least two members) are defined” to “facilitate the sharing of
information and the linking of data for divers [sic, diverse] groups of user.”
Ans. 2.
Day’s Figures 4 and 5 are reproduced with additional markings for
illustration:

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Day’s Figures 4 and 5 show team room entity 30 including multiple
teams (different organizations) 1–N (each team 40 including sub-teams
42–57) operable in a virtual team room environment (typically as a web
page, shown in Figure 6) provided with team room functions 58 to support a
large project or smaller sub-projects. Day 5:10–26, 5:64–6:10.

As shown in Figure 5, “each team member is given access to a virtual
team room environment supporting the project or sub-project associated with
that team and that the team member is involved with.” Ans. 2 (citing Day
5:23–26). As correctly recognized by the Examiner, when “each team
member of the multiple teams [(Group 1 and Group 2)] have access to the
virtual team environment, the teams/groups are linked to the collaboration
environment and are involved in a collaboration.” Ans. 2–3.

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Day’s Figure 6 shows the virtual team room environment, shown in
Figures 4–5, in the context of web page 60, as reproduced with additional
markings for illustration:

Day’s Figure 6 shows virtual team room environment as web page 60
including links 68–70 to different teams or groups, for example, Group 1
and Group 2 to allow users to link and view content of the team room.
Day 6:11–55.

As shown in Figure 6 and as recognized by the Examiner, Day’s
virtual team room environment (i.e., web page 60) allows (1) linking team
members of a first team (Group 1) and a second team (Group 2) to the
virtual team room environment (i.e., collaboration group) and (2) “members
of a first team [(Group 1)] to collaborate through the virtual team room

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environment with members of a second team [(Group 2)], and vice versa,
and thus, linking the first team and the second team with the virtual team
environment to facilitate collaboration by the first and second team” in the
manner recited in Appellants’ claims 15–17. Ans. 3.
Lastly, Appellants’ argument that Day’s Figure 21 only shows
collaboration between team members, but not between teams (groups)
themselves (App. Br. 13–15; Reply Br. 5) is not persuasive because (1) the
phrase “facilitating collaboration by the first and second groups” recited in
Appellants’ claims 15–17 can be broadly, but reasonably, interpreted to
encompass Day’s collaboration between members of different teams
(groups) as shown in Figure 21; and (2) such an interpretation is consistent
with Appellants’ own Specification which describes the claimed
“collaboration by the first and second group” in the context of the
collaboration between members of different teams (groups). Spec. ¶¶ 25,
28, 30–33, 36–38; Fig. 15.

CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellants have not
demonstrated the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 15–17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).

DECISION
As such, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 15–17 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

AFFIRMED