Sharps Compliance, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 6, 2020

14533381 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 6, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/533,381 11/05/2014 David P. Tusa SHARPS.002002 7645
100183 7590 07/06/2020
Adolph Locklar
Michael Locklar
4615 S.W. Freeway
Suite 630
Houston, TX 77027
EXAMINER
WEISS, PAMELA HL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1796
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/06/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@adolphlocklar.com
docket@al-ip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DAVID P. TUSA, KHAIRAN ALADWANI,
GREG C. DAVIS, and JAN HARRIS1
____________

Appeal 2019-006012
Application 14/533,381
Technology Center 1700
____________

Before CATHERINE Q. TIMM, CHRISTOPHER C. KENNEDY, and
BRIAN D. RANGE, Administrative Patent Judges.

KENNEDY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1, 4, 5, 24, 28, 30, 31, 33, and 37–44. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal relates to systems that comprise
containers for collecting waste pharmaceutical materials. E.g., Spec. ¶ 2;

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Sharps Compliance, Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
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Claim 1. Claim 1 is reproduced below from page 24 (Appendix A) of the
Appeal Brief:
1. A system comprising:
a collection subsystem comprising:
a plurality of collection apparatuses, each of the apparatuses
including:
(a) an outer container having:
(i) at least one door hinged to the outer container, and
(ii) at least one lock mounted on the at least one door to
engage a side of the outer container to lock and unlock
the at least one door,
(b) a single manually operated unidirectional depositing member
disposed in an exterior surface of the outer container, and
(c) a single transportable inner container contained within the
outer container,
wherein:
the single unidirectional depositing member comprises a
manually rotatable member having an opened interior and a
handle so that rotating the rotatable member with the handle
allows used, unused, and/or waste pharmaceutical containing
materials to be deposited into the interior and manually rotating
the rotatable member back deposits the used, unused, and/or
waste pharmaceutical containing materials into the single inner
container, while restricting withdrawal of the used, unused, and/
or waste pharmaceutical containing materials from the single
inner container,
the at least one lock is selected from the group consisting of
combination locks, shielded combination locks, pad locks,
shielded pad locks, ring locks, key locks, or biometric locks, and
the at least one lock are locked during use so that the
unidirectional depositing member provides the only access for
the used, unused, and/or waste pharmaceutical containing
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materials to be deposited into the single transportable inner
container.
REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
The claims stand rejected as follows:
1. Claims 1, 4, 5, 24, 28, 30, 31, 33, and 37–44 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, ¶ 2 as indefinite. Final Act. 3–4.
2. Claims 1, 4, 5, 24, 28, 30, 31, 33, and 37–44 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Mallett ’140 (US 2007/0278140 A1, published
Dec. 6, 2007). Final Act. 9.
3. Claims 1, 4, 5, 24, 28, 30, 31, 33, and 37–44 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Mallett ’140. Final Act. 9.2
4. Claims 1, 4, 5, 24, 28, 30, 31, 33, and 37–44 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Mallett ’640 (US 2005/0065640 A1, published
Mar. 24, 2005). Final Act. 18.
5. Claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Mallett ’640 optionally in view of Poadiama (US 2009/0043253 A1,
published Feb. 12, 2009), optionally further in view of Madruga (US
2012/0004761 A1, published Jan. 5, 2012). Final Act. 40.3

2 The Examiner characterizes Rejections 2 and 3 as “alternative” rejections,
i.e., anticipated by, or alternatively obvious over, Mallett ’140. Final Act. 9.
For clarity, we have listed the Examiner’s alternative rejections as two
separate rejections.
3 In the header setting forth this rejection, the Examiner also lists claim 24 as
being anticipated under § 102(b) by Mallett ’640. Final Act. 40. Because
the Examiner already included a rejection of claim 24 as anticipated by
Mallett ’640 as part of Rejection 4, the anticipation component of the
Examiner’s header for Rejection 5 appears to be redundant of Rejection 4,
and we have omitted it here for clarity.
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ANALYSIS
After review of the cited evidence in the appeal record and the
opposing positions of the Appellant and the Examiner, we determine that the
Appellant has not identified reversible error in the Examiner’s rejections.
Accordingly, we affirm the rejections for reasons set forth below, in the
Final Action dated June 19, 2018, and in the Examiner’s Answer dated
February 8, 2019.
Rejection 1
In the Appeal Brief, the Appellant fails to acknowledge, address, or
otherwise assert error in the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
¶ 2. See generally Appeal Br.
In the Answer, the Examiner observes that “[t]he appellant has not
responded to the rejections under section 112 in the appeal brief[;] as such
no further comment is made as to these rejections. Said rejections are
maintained.” Ans. 4.
Although the Appellant files a Reply Brief, the Appellant again fails
to acknowledge, address, or otherwise assert error in the rejection under
§ 112, ¶ 2, notwithstanding the fact that, as set forth above, the Examiner
expressly maintains the rejection in the Answer. See generally Reply Br.
We summarily affirm the Examiner’s rejection under § 112, ¶ 2
because the Appellant fails to assert error in that rejection. See Ex parte
Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (cited with
approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long
been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error
in the examiner’s rejections.”)).
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Rejection 2
The Appellant argues the claims as a group. We select claim 1 as
representative of the claims subject to Rejections 2 and 3. The remaining
claims will stand or fall with claim 1.
We begin with a discussion of claim interpretation. Claim 1 recites a
“system” that comprises a “subsystem” that itself comprises “a plurality of
collection apparatuses.” Appeal Br. 24. Thus, claim 1 is an apparatus claim.
“[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.”
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
Claim 1 includes recitations concerning structure and
function/intended use. As to structure, claim 1 recites that each collection
apparatus includes “an outer container.” Appeal Br. 24. The “outer
container” includes “at least one door hinged to the outer container,” and it
includes “at least one lock mounted on the door to engage a side of the outer
container.” Id. The “outer container” also includes “a single manually
operated unidirectional depositing member disposed in an exterior surface of
the outer container.” Id. The “unidirectional depositing member comprises
a manually rotatable member having an opened interior and a handle.” Id.
The “outer container” also includes “a single transportable inner container
contained within the outer container.” Id.
As to the functional language of claim 1, to the extent that it implies
required structure, it “may be used to add limitations to an apparatus claim.”
See Textron Innovations Inc. v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 498 F. App’x 23, 28
(Fed. Cir. 2012); see also K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 1999). Claim 1 recites that the function of the “lock” is “to lock
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and unlock the at least one door.” Appeal Br. 24. That functional recitation
does not further specify the structure of the term “lock.”
Claim 1 recites that the function of the “unidirectional depositing
member” is to “allow[] . . . materials to be deposited into the interior” of the
depositing member when the rotatable member is rotated in one direction,
and to then “deposit[] the . . . materials into the single inner container” when
the rotatable member is rotated “back,” while restricting withdrawal of
the . . . materials from the single inner container.” Id. That functional
language implies that the unidirectional depositing member must be
structurally capable of rotating to open and closed positions, and that it must
be structurally capable of receiving material and depositing the material into
the inner container.
As to language concerning intended use, claim 1 recites that the lock
is “locked during use so that the unidirectional depositing member provides
the only access for the . . . materials to be deposited into the single
transportable inner container.” Id. That language does not appear to further
limit the structure of the apparatus.
With that understanding of the structure required by claim 1, we turn
to the Examiner’s rejection. The rejection appears at pages 9–18 of the Final
Action. The Examiner finds, inter alia, that Mallett ’140 discloses waste
sorting stations that comprise outer containers with single transportable inner
containers. Final Act. 9–11 (citing, e.g., Mallett ’140 ¶¶ 12, 20–26). The
Examiner reproduces Figure 32 of Mallett ’140 as exemplary of
Mallett ’140’s sorting stations. Ans. 12. Figure 32 of Mallett ’140 is
reproduced below.
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Figure 32, above, depicts wheeled cart 60g with lids 82 and levers 66.
Mallett ’140 ¶¶ 140–141. The lids 82 “rotate” to open and closed positions.
Id. The lids 82 may be caused to automatically open by “electronics, a
solenoid, and a spring,” and “the user closes the lid 82 by applying hand
pressure to a lever 66.” Id. ¶ 141. The Examiner determines that “[i]t is
obvious that the apparatus is capable of manual operation as to the opening,
closing, locking, etc. as one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention would know that handles, doors, lids, lock with keys, etc. may be
operated by hand/manually.” Final Act. 10.
The Appellant first argues that “Mallet [’140] includes no disclosure
and describes no embodiment that includes a single inner container . . . and a
single unidirectional depositing member.” Appeal Br. 14. According to the
Appellant, Mallett ’140 “relates expressly and exclusively to sorting
apparatuses that include an electronic system to identify waste material and a
plurality of inner containers.” Id.
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That argument is not persuasive of reversible error. Claim 1 recites “a
plurality of collection apparatuses” that each includes “an outer container”
and “a single transportable inner container.” Id. at 24. The Examiner finds,
and the Appellant does not persuasively dispute, that the claim language
encompasses “multiple outer containers with inner containers (i.e. a series of
containers).” Ans. 6–7. Consistent with the Examiner’s findings,
Mallett ’140 discloses “a plurality of container compartments, with each
container compartment configured to receive a removable container.”
Mallett ’140 ¶ 20.
Mallett ’140 depicts a variety of embodiments that appear to
constitute “a plurality of collection apparatuses,” as recited by claim 1, that
each include “an outer container” and “a single transportable inner
container.” For example, Figure 3 is reproduced below.

Figure 3, above, depicts unit 60a with “apertures 78 configured to reveal
openings to respective containers 80.” Id. ¶¶ 130–131. In the Answer, the
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Examiner finds that Figure 3 shows “a single container [80] inside an outer
compartment.” Ans. 12. The visual impression given by Figure 3, which is
consistent with the textual disclosures of Mallett ’140, is that a “plurality of
container compartments,” i.e., three side-by-side compartments (not
identified by a reference numerals), each house individual inner removable
containers 80, which each have individual depositing members 78. See, e.g.,
Mallett ’140 ¶ 20, Fig. 3. In other words, consistent with the Examiner’s
discussion, e.g., Ans. 6–7, Figure 3 depicts a series of containers (i.e., “a
plurality of collection apparatuses” as recited by claim 1): three outer
containers side-by-side, each having its own inner container 80, which each
has its own depositing member 78.
Figure 32, also relied on by the Examiner and reproduced above, is
similar. Although neither the Examiner nor the Appellant identifies an
interior or “open” view of Figure 32, a person of ordinary skill in the art
reasonably would have inferred that each lid 82 would be associated with its
own inner container, as depicted in Figure 3 and contemplated by ¶ 20,
because that is consistent with Mallett ’140’s goal of sorting waste. See
Mallett ’140 Fig. 32.
Particularly under the claim construction standard applicable to this
proceeding (broadest reasonable construction consistent with the
specification, see In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2007)), we are not persuaded that Mallett ’140 fails to teach or
suggest an outer container having a single inner container and a single
depositing member. The plain language of the claim is broad enough to
encompass the side-by-side arrangement of outer containers each having
individual inner containers shown and described above.
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The Appellant also argues that Mallett ’140 is limited to apparatuses
in which depositing members open automatically, and, therefore, that all of
Mallett ’140’s embodiments fall beyond the scope of the term “manually
operated unidirectional depositing member.” Appeal Br. 16–19.
That argument is not persuasive. As the Appellant acknowledges,
Mallett ’140 discloses embodiments in which it does not expressly specify
whether opening is automatic or manual. See Appeal Br. 16 (citing
Mallett ’140 ¶ 22). Paragraph 22 of Mallett ’140 describes three
embodiments: (1) an embodiment in which “the control system may be
configured to indicate the appropriate container by opening a door,” (2) an
embodiment in which “the control system may be configured to indicate the
appropriate container by illuminating a light,” and (3) an embodiment in
which “the control system may be configured to indicate the appropriate
container by both opening a door and illuminating a light.” Mallett ’140
¶ 22. A person of ordinary skill in the art would immediately recognize that
those three embodiments, in combination, imply that a door in embodiment
(2) may be manually opened, given that embodiments (1) and (3) specify
that the control system opens a door, but embodiment (2) specifies only
indicating a container by illuminating a light.
Moreover, there is no dispute that Mallett ’140 discloses manually
closing a lid. Appeal Br. 17 (acknowledging that Mallett ’140 “does
disclose manually closing a lid to a container”). Nor is there any dispute that
Mallett ’140 discloses structures in which the lid has a “lever.” See
Ans. 10–11; Mallett ’140 Fig. 32 (depicting lever 66). It appears that lid 82
(which the Examiner finds corresponds to a rotatable unidirectional
depositing member as claimed, Final Act. 13) is structurally capable of being
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manually opened by lever 66, regardless of whether Mallett ’140 expressly
states as much.
Finally, we observe that, in the Answer, the Examiner finds that the
claim does not recite a depositing member that must be manually opened,
but, rather, that it recites a “manually operated” depositing member.
Ans. 10. The Examiner determines that “a single step of manual operating
will meet this limitation (i.e. manually closing).” Id.
In the Reply Brief, the Appellant argues that “manual” means
“operated by hand without the use of a mechanical or electrical device.”
Reply Br. 3.
Even accepting that definition as accurate, the Appellant’s argument
fails to show that Mallett ’140’s lid 82 falls beyond the scope of the term
“manually operated unidirectional depositing member.” As noted above,
there is no dispute that Mallett ’140 discloses that its lid 82 may be manually
closed by hand without the use of a mechanical or electrical device. See
Mallett ¶ 141; see also id. Fig. 34C (depicting manual closing by applying
pressure with a finger). Additionally, claim 1 recites that the rotatable
member is “manually rotat[ed]” to close it, but as to opening, claim 1 recites
only that the rotatable member is “rotat[ed],” i.e., the word “manually” is
omitted. See Appeal Br. 24 (claim 1). The fact that claim 1 specifies
“manually” rotating the rotating member to close the depositing member, but
omits the word “manually” when referring to opening the depositing
member, supports the Examiner’s interpretation of the term “manually
operated unidirectional depositing member” as being broad enough to
encompass only manual closing.
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Particularly under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, and
in the absence of persuasive argument as to why “manually operated” should
be interpreted to require both manually opening and manually closing, we
are not persuaded that Mallett ’140 fails to teach or suggest a “manually
operated unidirectional depositing member.”
The Appellant does not meaningfully raise any other arguments
concerning the disclosures of Mallett ’140. Thus, we are not persuaded of
reversible error in the Examiner’s determination that Mallett ’140 teaches
each limitation of claim 1. However, that does not fully resolve the issues
raised by the Appellant with respect to this rejection because, in the “Legal
Standard” section of the Appeal Brief (but not in the “Argument” section of
the brief), the Appellant appears to take issue with the fact that the Examiner
relies on different embodiments of Mallett ’140 in issuing the anticipation
rejection. Appeal Br. 12. In the Answer, the Examiner responds to that
concern by citing Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d
1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Ans. 6. Kennametal states that “a reference
can anticipate a claim even if it does not expressly spell out all the
limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the
art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement
or combination.” See Kennametal, 780 F.3d at 1381 (some internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Examiner’s reliance on
Kennametal indicates that the Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill
in the art would have “at once envisaged” that different embodiments of
Mallett ’140 could be combined as desired, e.g., that the rotating lids 82 of
Figure 32 could be used instead of the apertures of Figure 3, resulting in a
structure that falls within the scope of claim 1. See Ans. 6. That finding is
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consistent with Mallett ’140’s express statement that “many aspects of the
methods and devices shown and described in the present disclosure may be
differently combined.” Mallett ’140 ¶ 306.
In the Reply Brief, the Appellant argues that, even under an “at once
envisage” analysis, Kennametal requires a single prior art reference to
disclose each and every claim limitation. See Reply Br. 2 (citing Nidec
Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1270 (Fed.
Cir. 2017)). The Appellant argues that Kennametal’s “at once envisage”
rationale is inapplicable here because Mallett ’140 is missing required claim
elements (i.e., a “single” inner container and a “single” manually operated
unidirectional depositing member). Reply Br. 2. The Appellant, however,
does not argue that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not “at once
envisage” combining different embodiments of Mallett ’140. See id. at 2–3.
We agree with the Appellant that Kennametal does not permit the
Examiner to supply limitations that are missing from a reference. See Nidec,
851 F.3d at 1274–75 (“Kennametal does not permit the Board to fill in
missing limitations simply because a skilled artisan would immediately
envision them.” (emphasis added)). As set forth above, however, we are not
persuaded by the Appellant’s arguments that Mallett ’140 is missing any
elements of claim 1. Even were we to agree with the Appellant that
Mallett ’140 does not disclose a single embodiment that itself includes each
and every limitation, as noted above, the Appellant has not argued that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would not “at once envisage” combining
different embodiments of Mallett ’140. Accordingly, the Appellant’s
argument concerning different embodiments of Mallett ’140 does not
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persuade us of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection under § 102(b).
See Jung, 637 F.3d at 1365.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under § 102(b).
Rejection 3
As to the § 103(a) basis for the Examiner’s rejection over
Mallett ’140, the Examiner relies on the findings concerning Mallett ’140 as
described above, and, in the Answer, the Examiner further determines that
combining different embodiments of Mallett ’140 is simply “[t]he selection
of a known material based on its suitability for its intended use.” Ans. 8.
Thus, the Examiner concludes that, even if Mallett ’140 does not anticipate
claim 1, the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious in view of
Mallett ’140.
The Appellant does not meaningfully distinguish between the
Examiner’s § 102(b) and § 103(a) analyses. See generally Appeal Br.
Beyond the arguments discussed above, which we find unpersuasive, the
Appellant argues that “commercial success, long felt need, and copying”
weigh in favor of a conclusion of nonobviousness.4 See Appeal Br. 20–21.
The burden of showing that objective indicia support a conclusion of
nonobviousness rests with the Appellant. In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139
(Fed. Cir. 1996).

4 Objective indicia of nonobviousness cannot overcome rejections based on
anticipation. See, e.g., In re Malagari, 499 F.2d 1297, 1302 (CCPA 1974).
Thus, even were we to find the Appellant’s arguments concerning objective
indicia to be persuasive, we would affirm the Examiner’s rejection on the
basis of the § 102(b) rejection.
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The Appellant has not carried that burden in this case at least because
the Appellant’s assertions concerning objective indicia are not adequately
developed to meaningfully weigh in favor of the Appellant’s position. In
particular, we note that, although the Appellant refers to a declaration, the
Appeal Brief does not provide citations to the declaration or otherwise
identify specific pages or paragraphs that might support the contentions
made in the Appeal Brief. See Appeal Br. 20–21. The relevant declaration
is attached to the Appeal Brief as Appendix C. The declaration and
supporting attachments are more than 30 pages long. The Appellant argues,
for example, that the declaration includes attachments showing “that the
system satisfied a long felt and unanswered need.” Appeal Br. 21. No
further explanation or argument is provided. See id. Nor does Appellant
provide citations to the allegedly relevant portions of the declaration or the
attachments. See id. The Appeal Brief includes similar conclusory
allegations, also lacking citations, concerning copying and commercial
success. See id. We decline to attempt to locate, in the first instance,
support in the declaration and attachments for the Appellant’s arguments.
See In re Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 719 (CCPA 1974) (explaining that “[i]t
was appellant’s burden to explain the content of” the relied upon evidence).
On this record, we determine that the Appellant has not carried its burden of
showing that objective indicia support a conclusion of nonobviousness.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of reversible error in
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under § 103(a).
Rejections 4 and 5
Rejection 4 is similar to Rejection 2 but relies on Mallett ’640 instead
of Mallett ’140. Compare Final Act. 9–18 (rejection based on Mallett ’140),
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with Final Act. 18–40 (rejection based on Mallett ’640). Rejection 4 is
based on § 102(b) alone and does not include an alternative rejection based
on § 103(a). Final Act. 18. Rejection 5 concerns only claim 24 and also
involves Mallett ’640 as the primary reference, alone or in combination with
other references. Id. at 40.
Neither the Examiner nor the Appellant specifically identifies any
noteworthy differences between Mallett ’140 and Mallett ’640, and the
Appellant largely groups the two Mallett references together and argues
against them collectively. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 14–15, 18–19 (stating that
“Mallett [’640] is substantially similar to Mallett [’140],” and raising the
same arguments against Mallett ’640 as were raised against Mallett ’140,
i.e., that it fails to teach a “single” inner container and manually opening a
depositing member).
Because we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of all claims on appeal
as set forth above in our discussion of Rejections 1, 2, and 3, and because
our discussion of Mallett ’140 also provides the Appellant with guidance as
to the rejections based on Mallett ’640, we decline to reach a decision as to
Rejections 4 and 5.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 5, 24,
28, 30, 31,
33, 37–44
112, ¶ 2 Indefiniteness
1, 4, 5, 24, 28,
30, 31, 33, 37–
44

1, 4, 5, 24,
28, 30, 31,
33, 37–44
102(b) Mallett ’140
1, 4, 5, 24, 28,
30, 31, 33, 37–
44

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Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 5, 24,
28, 30, 31,
33, 37–44
103(a) Mallett ’140
1, 4, 5, 24, 28,
30, 31, 33, 37–
44

1, 4, 5, 24,
28, 30, 31,
33, 37–44
102(b) Mallett ’640
24 103(a)
Mallett ’640,
Poadiama,
Madruga

Overall
Outcome
1, 4, 5, 24, 28,
30, 31, 33, 37–
44

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED