Sharonda M.,1 Complainant,v.Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 24, 20170120170106 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 24, 2017) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Sharonda M.,1 Complainant, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency. Appeal No. 0120170106 Hearing No. 510-2014-00114X Agency No. ATL-13-0565 DECISION On September 22, 2016, Complainant filed an appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s August 17, 2016, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order finding no discrimination. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a GS-8 Service Representative at the Agency’s District Office facility in Pensacola, Florida. Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American) and age when, on March 18, 2013, she was not promoted to a Social Insurance Specialist/Claims Representative position in the Pensacola office. The record indicates that at the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant requested a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ, after a hearing, issued a decision finding no discrimination because Complainant had not established 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120170106 2 that the Agency’s articulated reasons for its actions were pretextual. The Agency issued a final order adopting the AJ’s decision. On appeal, Complainant contends that the Agency erred on the issue of pretext because the AJ failed to draw an adverse inference concerning the destruction of notes taken by the selecting official and recommending official or to properly consider testimonial evidence of favoritism shown towards the selectee by the selecting official. Finally, Complainant asserts that her qualifications were superior to the selectee because of her work history and job knowledge and had in fact trained the selectee when the selectee initially became a Service Representative. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ’s credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, at § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015). In this case, Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination; however, the AJ determined that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for promoting selectee. The AJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. As the AJ observed, where there are two equally desirable candidates competing for the same position the selecting official may exercise her prerogative in choosing between the candidates, and absent discrimination, a trier of fact should not substitute his judgment. Here, the recommending official, the immediate supervisor of Complainant and the selectee, testified that she “generally recommended” Complainant and “highly recommended” the selectee for the position at issue. The recommending official explained that she gave a higher ranking to the selectee because the selectee was a “stellar employee” who went “over and above” in her work, and on her own initiative, performed the work of absent employees to prevent backlogs. The selecting official agreed with the recommending official’s assessment and the appointing official decided that the selection recommendation was based on a fair consideration of all the applicants. Even if the selecting official’s alleged favoritism towards the selectee played a role in the decisional process, such action would not violate Title VII or the ADEA since the Complainant did not produce any evidence indicating that the preferential treatment was based on race or age. 0120170106 3 Further, while Complainant is correct that the recommending official did not initially testify about every one of Complainant’s special projects and extra tasks she performed, that oversight was corrected on cross-examination and the additional information did not establish that Complainant was obviously more qualified than the selectee or that the reasons proffered for the selection were pretextual. Indeed, even Complainant’s own witness, a former supervisor, testified that he would not have chosen Complainant for the promotion. Finally, the AJ correctly drew no adverse inference from the selecting official or recommending official’s destruction of their notes relating to the selection criteria or process. The recommending official testified that destroying such documents is a practice routinely followed by the Pensacola office for years, and Complainant has offered no evidence that contradicted this testimony. Moreover, Complainant points to no evidence that would suggest that the destroyed documents contained information that was unfavorable to the Agency or supports the conclusion that Complainant was a victim of discrimination due to her race or age. Substantial evidence supports the AJ’s finding that the selection criteria and process were not a pretext for race or age discrimination and the conclusion that Complainant’s nonselection was not motivated by unlawful discrimination. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, the Agency’s final order finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED because the AJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0416) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment 0120170106 4 Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the 0120170106 5 time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations January 24, 2017 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation