Sharon K. Mitchell, Complainant,v.Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 20, 2000
01991574 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 20, 2000)

01991574

06-20-2000

Sharon K. Mitchell, Complainant, v. Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Sharon K. Mitchell, )

Complainant, )

)

v. )

) Appeal No. 01991574

Togo D. West, Jr., ) Agency No. 97-1999

Secretary, )

Department of Veterans Affairs, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant filed an appeal with this Commission from an agency's decision

pertaining to her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1> The Commission accepts

the appeal in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to

be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). For the following reasons, the

Commission AFFIRMS the agency's decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether complainant has established, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency discriminated against

her on the bases of disability (unspecified) and reprisal.

BACKGROUND

During the relevant time, complainant was an EEG Technician at the

agency's Clement J. Zablocki Medical Center in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

In July 1996, complainant allegedly lost duties with regard to the Sleep

Clinic and EMGs, was required to page a supervisor when others were not,

and was shunned by co-workers and supervisors. Believing she was a

victim of discrimination based on disability and reprisal, complainant

filed formal complaint dated August 12, 1996.

Following an investigation, complainant was informed of her right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively,

to receive a final decision by the agency. When complainant failed to

respond within the time period specified in 29 C.F.R. �1614, the agency

issued a final decision on July 20, 1998.

In its decision, the agency concluded that the record did not substantiate

complainant's claims of discrimination based on disability or reprisal.

Specifically, with respect to her claim of disability discrimination, the

agency indicated that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case.

According to the agency, there was �no evidence that complainant had or

was regarded as having had a disability....� Regarding complainant's

reprisal claim, the agency decision noted that the extent to which

complainant's supervisor was aware of complainant's prior complainant's

was unclear. However, even if a prima facie case had been established,

the decision stated that the agency articulated a legitimate reason

for its actions. The agency explained that complainant was absent

from the work area more often or longer than other employees and that

her responsibilities as the only EEG Technician required that she

be available. The decision also noted that there was no evidence

of pretext.

On appeal, complainant argues that she requested a hearing and did not

want an agency decision. In addition, complainant describes additional

incidents of alleged harassment.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As an initial matter, we note that complainant was notified of her

right to request a hearing. The record reflects that on February

4, 1998, the notice was served on complainant by a process server.

The notice informed complainant that if she wanted a hearing she had to

advise the agency within thirty calendar day of receipt of the notice.

Complainant failed to respond within the time limit.<2>

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the

agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the

ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of

the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Here, complainant contends that she suffered discrimination based on her

disability<3> and in reprisal for her prior EEO activity. The agency

determined that the record contained no evidence that complainant had

or was regarded as having a disability. Moreover, the agency found that

the record was unclear as to whether complainant's supervisor was aware

of her prior EEO activity.

Without commenting on the propriety of the agency's finding that

complainant was not disabled, and assuming, arguendo, that she established

a prima facie case under all of her alleged bases, we find that the agency

has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

According to the affidavits gathered during the investigation, complainant

did not have work taken away from her. Co-worker A, who was also an EEG

Technician at the time, stated that there was not enough work for both

complainant and herself, and she therefore spoke to the administrator.

Co-worker A had an interest in sleep disorders and she was therefore

offered work in the sleep clinic. Regarding complainant's alleged

higher degree of accountability, namely the requirement that she page

her supervisor while away from the work area, the RMO explained that she

was located on the 10th floor while complainant worked on the 6th floor.

The record revealed that complainant was the only employee involved

with patient care, and therefore needed to be located when a patient

was coming. Moreover, the RMO noted that she had received several

complaints regarding instances where complainant was away from the work

area and could not be located. With respect to complainant's claim that

she was shunned, her co-workers denied the allegation. One co-worker

explained that she did find complainant to be confrontational and

therefore limited her interactions with her to avoid such situations.

We find that the record supports the agency's reasons for its actions.

The burden then returns to complainant to demonstrate that the agency's

articulated reasons are unworthy of belief. In the instant case, however,

complainant has not provided evidence of pretext. Accordingly, we find

complainant has not established that she was discriminated against based

on disability and reprisal.

After a careful review of the record, including complainant's contentions

on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence not

specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 20, 2000

____________________________

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 We note that in February 1997, complainant made a generalized request

for hearings on her EEO complaints. We do not find this earlier statement

to be a satisfactory response to the agency's February 1998 notification

of the right to a hearing, following the investigation of the instant

complaint.

3We note that complainant has not alleged a particular disability nor

is a specific impairment revealed by the record.