Sharma, Nityanand et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 9, 2020

13442915 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 9, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/442,915 04/10/2012 Nityanand Sharma 20120009 9176
168881 7590 06/09/2020
VERIZON - SCLC
VERIZON PATENTING GROUP
1300 I STREET NW
SUITE 500 EAST
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
EXAMINER
BYRD, UCHE SOWANDE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/09/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
VZPatent168881@verizon.com
docket@snyderllp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte NITYANAND SHARMA, SUTAP CHATTERJEE, MANOJ
THANKAPPAN, and MAXY SEBASTIAN1
____________________

Appeal 2019-004747
Application 13/442,915
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1 through 20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). According to Appellant, Verizon Communications Inc. is the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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INVENTION
The invention relates generally to generating an asset processing
order. Abstract. Claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A method comprising:
executing, by a device, a software that includes an
interactive user interface configured to generate an asset
processing order for assets, wherein the software includes one
or more inbound transport profiles that indicate how the assets
are to be ingested by an asset processing system, one or more
work flow identifiers that identify one or more work flows
applied to the assets by the asset processing system, and one or
more outbound transport files that indicate how the assets are to
be distributed by the asset processing system;
receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface,
a user selection of an asset to be processed by the asset
processing system;
receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface,
a user selection of a type of the asset processing order to be
generated, wherein the type of asset processing order includes
an ingestion type order, a transformation type order, and a
distribution type order;
identifying and prompting a user, by the device, for types
of data to be obtained to generate the asset processing order,
based on the selected type of asset processing order to be
generated, wherein the identifying and the prompting further
comprises:
receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface,
order data that includes account data of the user of the device
for a service provided by the asset processing system;
receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface,
a user selection of one of the one or more work flow identifiers;
receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface,
asset data that includes an asset identifier that identifies the
asset and asset characteristic data that indicates one or more
characteristics of the asset; and
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receiving, by the device via the interactive user interface,
ingest data, transform data, and distribution data,
wherein the ingest data includes one of the one or more
inbound transport files that indicates how the asset is to be
ingested and where the asset is located,
wherein the transform data includes an edit decision list
that specifies transform instructions to be applied to the asset
based on timecode data of the asset, and
wherein the distribution data includes one of the one or
more outbound transport files that indicates where the asset is
to be distributed;
generating, by the device, the asset processing order
based on the order data, the asset data, the ingest data, the
transform data, the distribution data, and the one of the one or
more work flow identifiers;
transmitting, by the device, the asset processing order
and the asset to the asset processing system; and
processing, by the asset processing system, the asset in an
automated manner according to the asset processing order.

Appeal Br. 22–23 (Claims App.).
EXAMINER’S REJECTION2
The Examiner rejected claims 1 through 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–6.

2 Throughout this Decision we refer to the Appeal Brief filed January 11,
2019 (“Appeal Br.”); Reply Brief filed May 28, 2018 (“Reply Br.”) Final
Office Action mailed September 24, 2018 (“Final Act.”); and the
Examiner’s Answer mailed April 18, 2018 (“Ans.”).
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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
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rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. See 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52–56.
DISCUSSION
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
The Examiner determines the claims are not patent eligible because
they are directed to a judicial exception without reciting significantly more.
Final Act. 2–6. Specifically, the Examiner determines the claims recite
several steps of receiving data related to asset management, and generating
an order; and that these steps are directed to collecting information and
analyzing it, which is similar to concepts found abstract in Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and CyberSource Corp.
v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Final Act 3–4
(determining the claims recite a mental process), Answer 5.
Additionally, the Examiner considers the claimed “generating an asset
order” to recite a method of organizing human activity as it relates
“commercial interactions relating behaviors and business relations, as well
as, managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between
people.” Answer 5–6. Further, the Examiner finds that the additional
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limitations of the claims recite generic computer components and functions
that are well- understood, routine, and conventional, and thus, do not amount
to significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 5–6, (citing para 20
of Appellant’s Speciation), Answer 7–8 (citing paras. 27, 70, 72 of
Appellant’s Specification, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
838 F.3d 1307, 1321(Fed. Cir. 2016), In re TLI Communications 823 F3d
607, 610 (Fed Cir 2016), OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d
1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015), buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014), DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d
1245, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
Patent eligibility under § 101 is a question of law that may contain
underlying issues of fact. “We review the [Examiner’s] ultimate conclusion
on patent eligibility de novo.” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896
F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d
1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Whether a claim is drawn
to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo.”).
We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief, the
Examiner’s rejections, and the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s
arguments. We concur with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in the
Final Rejection and the Answer. Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded
us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of all the claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 and we address them as they apply to the 2019 Revised Guidance.
The Judicial Exception
Appellant argues the Examiner has overgeneralized the claims as
corresponding to an abstract idea of collecting information, analyzing it, and
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displaying it. Appeal Br. 13–15. Appellant agues the Examiner ignores the
limitations directed to “executing,” “the interactive user interface,”
“generating,” “transmitting” and “processing” which are not merely
organizing data found by the Examiner. Appeal Br. 13, Reply Br. 1.
Further, Appellant argues that the Examiner has misapplied the holding of
Electric Power Group, and Cybersource as the claims recite do not recite
analyzing and displaying data, as in Electric Power Group or comparing
data as in Cybersource. Appeal Br. 14–15, Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant argues
that the claims recite generating an asset processing order which is different
from analyzing or comparing data; as such Appellant asserts the Examiner
has failed to establish the claims recite an abstract idea. Appeal Br. 18–19.
We concur with the Examiner that the claims recite a concept of
gathering data, and analyzing the data, which is similar to the idea held to be
abstract in in Electric Power Group. The claims at issue in Electric Power
Group recited several steps of receiving data from various sources, detecting
and analyzing the data, and displaying the data. Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d
at 1351–52. The court stated “we have treated collecting information,
including when limited to particular content (which does not change its
character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas.” Id. at 1353.
In this case, representative claim 1 recites steps of receiving by a the
device, via the interactive user interface, user selection of an asset to be
processed and a type of asset processing to be performed (a series of data
gathering steps), identifying and prompting a user, for types of data to be
obtained to generate the asset process order based on the selected type of
asset processing order (a data gathering step (prompting the user) and an
analysis step (the prompting being based upon an inputted order type)); the
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prompting comprising several more steps of receiving by a the device, via
the interactive user interface, various data such as order data including
account data, work flow identifiers, asset identifier ingest data, transform
data and distribution data (all of which are data gathering steps), generating
the asset processing offer based upon the input data (a step of aggregating
the collected data). These steps can be performed in the human mind or with
pen and paper as they are merely gathering data, and generating a document
with the data. They are very similar to the standard process of filling out a
questionnaire.
Thus, we do not consider the Examiner to have overgeneralized the
claims in determining they recite an abstract concept and we agree with the
Examiner that the claims recite an abstract concept (a mental process)
similar to that at issue in Electric Power Group, and. See also Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (claim to collecting and comparing known information determined to
be steps that can be practically performed in the human mind); In re TLI
Communications 823 F3d 607, 613 (Fed Cir 2016) (finding claims the
claims to classifying and storing digital images as an abstract as reciting an
abstract idea) Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank,
Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The concept of data
collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known. Indeed,
humans have always performed these functions.”); October 2019 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility 7 (discussing Electric Power Group and mental
processes), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf.
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Further, we concur with the Examiner that the limitations
“generating” an asset order and “processing” the order recites a method of
organizing human activity as it relates commercial interactions relating
behaviors and business relations. Representative claim 1 recites the asset
processing order is based upon inputted the order data including account
data (e.g billing data, see specification para. 13) and transform data
specifying the instructions to be applied to the asset and distribution,
identifying where the asset is to be distributed. Thus, the “generated” asset
processing order is a document that includes information for the billing,
actions to be taken (transformation) and distribution, i.e. when construed in
light of Appellant’s Specification it’s an order for sale of media content,
transformed (configured for a particular type of device) and delivery a
commercial interaction (see specification paras 1-2, 13, 22). Further, the
recitation of “processing the asset in an automated manner according to the
asset processing order,” which does not identify any specific steps
performed in the processing of the order, is merely providing the asset
ordered (the product sold).
Thus, we consider representative claim 1 to recite elements of two
abstract ideas: a mental process and a certain methods of organizing human
activity, such as a fundamental economic practice. Merely combining
several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less abstract.
RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea . . . does not
render the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric
Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining the
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pending claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas). Thus, we
conclude representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
Further, Appellant argues that the claims “are directed to an
improvement in computer capabilities by providing an interactive user
interface of an asset provider device that generates an asset processing order
for an asset according to a shared communication layer with the asset
processing system.” Appeal Br. 16. Reply Br. 5–6. Appellant argues that
the claimed user interface:
[I]mproves the usability and accurate selection of data and
instructions for generating an asset processing order, and in
turn, improves the use and allocation of network resources of
asset processing systems that do not have to support disparate
asset processing orders from numerous asset processing devices
that operate with disparate frameworks and specifications.
Appeal Br. 17 (citing Specification 1, 2, and 11)
We are not persuaded of error by these arguments. Initially, we note
Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate with the scope of
representative claim 1, which does not recite “asset processing orders from
numerous asset processing devices that operate with disparate frameworks
and specifications” or a “shared communication layer.” Further, the cited
paragraphs of Appellant’s Specification similarly do not mention processing
orders from numerous asset processing devices that operate with disparate
frameworks and specification.
As identified by Appellant, representative claim 1 recites a user
interface that allows a user generate an asset processing order which as
discussed above is an abstract concept, mental process and a fundamental
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economic practice. We do not consider the use of a user interface to
improve the operation of the machine. Rather, similar to several cases by
our reviewing court we consider it to be insufficient to transform the abstract
concept to patent eligible subject matter. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and FairWarning
IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he
use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface do
not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject
matter.”) (Citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245,
1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
Further, representative claim 1’s recitation of an interface is unlike
the claimed user interface in Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG
Electronics Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In Core Wireless the court
held that claims which recited an interface were patent eligible as the claims
recited specific limitations of the interface such as: an application summary
that can be reached through a menu, the data being in a list and being
selectable to launch an application, and additional limitations directed to the
actual user interface displayed and how it functions. Core Wireless, 880
F.3d at 1363. The court found that the claims were directed to an improved
user interface and not the abstract concept of an index as the claim
“limitations disclose a specific manner of displaying a limited set of
information to the user, rather than using conventional user interface
methods to display a generic index on a computer.” Id.; see also Trading
Techs. Int’l Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(nonprecedential) (holding that a user interface with a prescribed
functionality directly related the interface’s structure that is addressed to and
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resolves a problem in the art is patent eligible). Furthermore, “merely
selecting information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and
display” has been found not to provide significantly more for purposes of
finding patent eligibility. Electric Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1355.
Here the claim does not recite any specific manner of displaying the
data or functionality of the interface, rather the claim just recites receiving a
user selection. Further, as discussed above the step of “processing the asset
in an automated manner according to the asset processing order” does not
identify any specific steps performed in the processing of the order. Thus,
the claimed processing recites the asset processing system providing the
ordered asset (media). We consider these limitations to be merely reciting
use of a computer as a tool to implement a concept of collecting information,
analyzing the data to generate an order for an asset and provide the ordered
asset, a mental process (an abstract idea) and fundamental economic
principle. See, e.g., RecogniCorp LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Unlike Enfish, [the claim] does not claim a software
method that improves the functioning of a computer . . . [but] claims a
‘process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked
merely as a tool.’”) (Citation omitted). Our reviewing court said the “‘mere
automation of manual processes using generic computers’ . . . ‘does not
constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.’” Trading
Techs. Int’l v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting
Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2017)). USPTO examination procedure also requires that “the claim must
include more than mere instructions to perform the method on a generic
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component or machinery to qualify as an improvement to an existing
technology.” MPEP § 2106.05(a).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
rejection, by Appellant’s argument that the claimed use of a user interface to
gather data and generate an asset processing order, is an solution to a
technical problem and we do not consider representative claim 1 to recite a
practical application of the abstract concept.
Significantly More than the Abstract Idea
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, if a claim: (1) recites a judicial
exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Appellant argues the Examiner has not presented proof that the claim
elements are a combination of well-understood, routine, and conventional
elements as is required by Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2018). Appeal Br 18–19, Reply Br. 7–8. Specifically, Appellant argues:
In this regard, while a technological solution may use generic
components, these generic components can operate in an
unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer
functionality. Amdocs Ltd v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d
1288, 1300-1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the claims require
identifying data and instructions to obtain, based on the type of
asset processing order of the shared communication layer, and
generating the asset processing order that enables the asset
processing system to process the asset processing order in an
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automated manner - the processing including the ingestion, the
transformation, and the distribution of the asset.
Appeal Br. 19.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in
considering the claims to not recite significantly more than the abstract idea.
The Examiner cites to several portions of Appellant’s Specification, the
MPEP and several cases as evidence of the type required to show the claims
do not recite claim specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is
not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. Answer 7–8. We
concur.
As discussed above, representative claim 1 recites limitations directed
to gathering data, analyzing the data, generating an order and processing the
order which recite an abstract idea. Representative claim 1 recites the
additional limitation that the steps of receiving the data are via an interactive
user interface, transmitting the asset processing order and processing the
asset processing order. As discussed above, our reviewing court has often
considered a user interfaces to be a generic computer element. See
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) and FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Further, as identified by the Examiner on pages 7
and 8 of the Answer, the act of transmitting data is considered a generic
computer function, See MPEP § 2106.05(d) II (iv), OIP Techs., Inc., v.
Amazon.com, Inc. at 1093 (sending messages over a network); buySAFE,
Inc. v. Google, Inc., at 1355, (computer receives and sends information over
a network). Further, Appellant’s Specification does not identify any
particular machine for “processing” the asset according to the asset but
rather describes them as “computational devices (e.g., computers).”
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Specification 23. Thus, Appellant’s Specification does not demonstrate that
a specific computer is required to implement the method. Further, in as
much at the limitation directed to processing the asset order involves
providing the ordered asset (displaying the media) steps of providing
displays of data is conventional. See Electric Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355.
In summary, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner’s determination that representative claim 1 recites an abstract
idea, a mental process and organizing human activity as it relates
commercial interactions relating behaviors and business relations. Further,
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in
finding that the claim is not directed to an improvement in the functioning of
the computer or to other technology or other technical field; directed to a
particular machine; directed to performing or affecting a transformation of
an article to a different state or thing; or directed to using a judicial
exception in some meaningful way beyond linking the exception to a
particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more
than a drafting effort to monopolize the judicial exception.
For these reasons, we are unpersuaded that the claims recite additional
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, nor
do the claims add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is
not “well-understood, routine, conventional.” See 2019 Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
representative claim 1, and claims 2 through 20 grouped with claim 1, under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, that is
not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive
concept.
Appeal 2019-004747
Application 13/442,915

18
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 through 20 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
In summary:
Claim
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED