01A03969_r
04-30-2002
Scott P. Meyer, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Scott P. Meyer v. United States Postal Service
01A03969
April 30, 2002
.
Scott P. Meyer,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A03969
Agency No. 4C-440-0025-99
Hearing No. 220-99-5214X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal
is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleges he
was discriminated against on the basis of sex (male) when: on October
2, 1998, complainant became aware of a female employee who had been
assigned to Madison Post Office without being subjected to the eighteen
(18) month rule as complainant was when he sought reassignment.
The record reveals that complainant, a carrier at the agency's Madison
facility, filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency on March 2, 1999,
alleging that the agency had discriminated against him as referenced
above. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a
copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,
finding no discrimination.
The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case
of sex discrimination. Specifically, the AJ stated that complainant
failed to identify a similarly situated female letter carrier who was
voluntarily transferred to the Madison office after less than eighteen
months of service in her prior installation by Postmaster A and Person B
of the agency's Human Resources Department. The AJ found that Employee
G was not an appropriate comparison because she was not a voluntary
transfer to Madison, but rather she was hired directly from the PTF
register by Postmaster A. The AJ stated that Employee C was not a
comparison because she was not a voluntary transfer. Further the AJ
noted that neither Postmaster A nor Person B was involved in Employee
C's reassignment. The AJ stated that the record reflects that Postmaster
B and Person D of Human Resources facilitated Employee C's reassignment
while Postmaster A and Person B of Human Resources were responsible for
complainant's reassignment.
The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.
On appeal, complainant argues that Employee C requested to be transferred
and was not involuntarily transferred as stated in the AJ's decision.
Complainant produces a statement from Person S, which she signed in
front of a witness, stating that she initiated her transfer from Euclid
to Madison. Further complainant states that although his complaint named
all agents of the Postal Service who were involved in the transfers,
Person D was the one responsible for authorizing all transfers.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1 st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case
can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment
is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,
an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
Upon review, we find that there are no genuine issues of material
fact in this case, and that the AJ properly issued a summary judgment
decision without holding a hearing. With regard to complainant's claim
that Employee C was voluntarily transferred, we find that this fact is
not material to the ultimate determination in this case. Specifically,
we note that complainant does not dispute that Postmaster A and Human
Resources Person B were responsible for his transfer and that Postmaster
B and Human Resources Person D were responsible for Employee C's transfer.
Accordingly, we find that summary judgment was appropriate in this case.
Applying the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Commission concurs with the AJ's finding that
complainant did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based
on sex because he failed to demonstrate that an employee outside of his
protected class was treated more favorably under similar circumstances.
The Commission agrees with the AJ's conclusion that the two comparatives
cited were not similarly situated to complainant. We also find that
complainant failed to present any other evidence from which an inference
of discrimination could be drawn. Accordingly, the agency's final order
finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
April 30, 2002
__________________
Date