Satzger, Wilhelm et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardApr 21, 202014359657 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 21, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/359,657 06/09/2014 Wilhelm Satzger 6570-P50143 6538 13897 7590 04/21/2020 Abel Schillinger, LLP 5929 Balcones Drive Suite 300 Austin, TX 78731 EXAMINER JENNISON, BRIAN W ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3761 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/21/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): hmuensterer@abel-ip.com mail@Abel-IP.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte WILHELM SATZGER, SIEGFRIED SIKORSKI, THOMAS HESS, KARL-HEINZ DUSEL, and HANS-CHRISTIAN MELZER ____________________ Appeal 2019-0052431,2 Application 14/359,657 Technology Center 3700 ____________________ Before PHILLIP J. KAUFFMAN, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 The citations herein refer to the Specification filed June 9, 2014 (“Spec.”), Final Office Action mailed August 3, 2018 (“Final Act.”), Appeal Brief filed December 28, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”), Examiner’s Answer mailed May 1, 2019 (“Ans.”), and Reply Brief filed June 28, 2019 (“Reply Br.”). 2 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies MTU Aero Engines AG as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-005243 Application 14/359,657 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 31–36, 38, 40, 42, 44–48, and 50.3 We have jurisdiction under § 6(b). We AFFIRM IN PART. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claims 31 and 47 are independent. Appeal Br., Claims App. Independent claim 31, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter. 31. A method for the generative production of a component from a material, wherein the method comprises at least one of (i) bonding material selectively together within a layer cross section, (ii) bonding material to a layer beneath the material and (iii) bonding material to a substrate, and wherein the method further comprises exposing the material before, during and after the bonding to radiation from a first, pulsed laser to at least one of generate structure-borne sound waves in the material and sublime a part of the material. Id. 3 The Examiner lists claim 39 as rejected. Final Act. 1. Although the Examiner objects to claim 39 (id. at 2), none of the Examiner’s rejections includes claim 39. Accordingly, we understand claim 39 is not subject to a rejection, and, therefore, not before us on appeal. See In re Hengehold, 440 F.2d 1395, 1403 (CCPA 1971) (“There are a host of various kinds of decisions an examiner makes in the examination proceeding—mostly matters of a discretionary, procedural or nonsubstantive nature—which have not been and are not now appealable to the [B]oard.”). Furthermore, our understanding of the claims on appeal is consistent with that of Appellant. Appeal Br. 6–19. Appeal 2019-005243 Application 14/359,657 3 REJECTIONS Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis 44, 484 112, ¶ 2 Indefiniteness 31–36, 38, 40 103(a) Clark,5 Yang6 42, 44–46 103(a) Clark, Yang, Chen7 47, 48, 50 103(a) Clark, Yang, Bostanjoglo8 ANALYSIS Indefiniteness Claim 44 The Examiner determines that claim 44 is indefinite because there is insufficient antecedent basis for “the same laser device.” Final Act. 5. More specifically, the Examiner determines it is unclear whether “the same laser device” refers to the previously recited first, second, or third laser, or to a fourth laser. Id. The Examiner also determines it is unclear whether a second and third laser would be present in claim 44, or whether Appellant is 4 The Examiner also rejects claims 37, 41, 43, and 49 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite. Final Act. 3. The Examiner, however, has withdrawn these claims from consideration. Id. at 1. Consequently, claims 37, 41, 43, and 49 are not before us on appeal, which is consistent with Appellant’s understanding of the claims on appeal. Appeal Br. 7. Furthermore, the heading of the rejection does not list claim 48 among the rejected claims, but the Examiner considers the claim in the body of the rejection. Final Act. 3, 6. Accordingly, we treat claim 48 as rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, which is consistent with Appellant’s understanding of the claims subject to this rejection. Appeal Br. 9. 5 Clark et al., US 2007/0176312 A1, published Aug. 2, 2007 (“Clark”). 6 Yang et al., US 2005/0288813 A1, published Dec. 29, 2005 (“Yang”). 7 Chen, US 2007/0095800 A1, published May 3, 2007. 8 Bostanjoglo et al., US 2005/0268998 A1, published Dec. 8, 2005 (“Bostanjoglo”). Appeal 2019-005243 Application 14/359,657 4 attempting to claim an embodiment with a single laser performing the functions of the second and third lasers. Id. Appellant argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “the same laser device” recited in claim 44 is used as the previously recited first, second, and third lasers. Appeal Br. 8. According to Appellant, claim 44 recites a laser device, as opposed to a laser, and the Specification makes clear that a laser device can function as a first, second, and/or third laser. Id. (citing Spec. 4:9–21, 5:18–23, 7:17–23); Reply Br. 2. Appellant’s argument is persuasive. Claim 44 recites “wherein the same laser device is alternately employed as the first, second, and third laser.” Appeal Br., Claims App. (emphasis added). From the claim language itself, there is a difference between a laser device and a laser, whereby a laser device is an alternative to a plurality of individual lasers. Moreover, the Specification describes an embodiment that uses a plurality of individual lasers to perform different functions, as well as an alternate embodiment that uses a single laser device to perform different functions. Spec. 4:9–21, 5:18–23, 7:17–23. For example, the Specification describes: A laser arrangement comprises a bonding laser 2 and at least one of the two additional lasers 1A, 1B. For a more compact representation of embodiments described in more detail hereinbelow, these two are represented together in one figure, it being possible in variants which are not shown for the laser arrangement to have only the lasers 1A and 2, only the lasers 1B and 2 or only the laser 2, which is then alternately operated as the laser for bonding and as the laser for the additional exposure. Spec. 5:18–23 (emphasis added). Accordingly, in view of the claim language and the Specification, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim 44 requires that the first, second, and third lasers are Appeal 2019-005243 Application 14/359,657 5 combined into the same laser device. More simply put, “the same laser device” recited in claim 44 is a device that includes the previously recited first, second, and third lasers. The Examiner, therefore, has not shown sufficiently that the meaning of “the same laser device” is unclear, and we do not sustain the rejection of claim 44. Claim 48 The Examiner determines that claim 48 is indefinite because there is insufficient antecedent basis for “a second laser which is capable of bonding.” Final Act. 6. More particularly, the Examiner determines it is unclear whether “a second laser which is capable of bonding” refers to the prior recited bonding device. Id.; Ans. 5. Appellant contends it is clear that the second laser device corresponds to the previously recited bonding device. Appeal Br. 9. We disagree. Claim 48 depends from independent claim 47, and recites “wherein the device further comprises a second laser which is capable of bonding the material.” Appeal Br., Claims App. (emphasis added). Independent claim 47, however, recites two devices, namely, a “device for the generative production of a component” and a “bonding device.” Id. Although both the bonding device in independent claim 47 and the second laser of claim 48 are capable of bonding material, it remains unclear whether the second laser is part of the device for the generative production of a component or the bonding device. In light of this uncertainty, Appellant does not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s rejection, and we sustain the rejection of claim 48. Appeal 2019-005243 Application 14/359,657 6 Obviousness Based on Clark and Yang Appellant contends Clark fails to teach or suggest “exposing the material before, during and after the bonding to radiation,” as recited in independent claim 31. Appeal Br. 10–13; Reply Br. 2–4. According to Appellant, Clark discloses exposing the material to radiation only after bonding. Appeal Br. 10–11. Appellant’s argument is persuasive. Clark discloses a method for forming objects, including depositing layers of material, consolidating one layer upon another layer to form the object, and non-destructively testing the formed object. Clark ¶ 4. As shown in Figure 1, reproduced below, Clark’s deposition apparatus 1 includes both consolidation device 5 and non-destructive testing device 8. Clark’s Figure 1 is a schematic depiction of deposition apparatus 1 including device 2 for depositing a layer of material 3, consolidation device 5, and Appeal 2019-005243 Application 14/359,657 7 non-destructive testing device 8. Id. ¶¶ 33, 42–43, 45. Consolidation device 5, via laser beam 7, interacts with the layer of material 3 to consolidate that material and other layers of material subsequently laid thereupon to create object 6. Id. ¶ 43. During the consolidation process, malformation may occur, resulting in impurities, inclusions, or cracks within the profile of object 6. Id. ¶ 44. Non-destructive testing device 8 analyzes object 6 for malformations and uses a number of processes, including ultrasound inspection. Id. ¶ 45. Non-destructive testing device 8, through analytical interrogation beam 9, generally acts at inspection site 10, which is about a consolidation zone 11. Id. ¶ 46, Fig. 1. More specifically, as shown in Figure 1, inspection site 10 is displaced a few centimeters from consolidation zone 11 so that consolidation is essentially complete prior to inspection. Id. By appropriate positioning of inspection site 10 and consolidation zone 11, deposition apparatus 1 allows for continuous non-destructive testing and analysis of object 6 as it is formed by consolidation of layers 3. Id. ¶ 47. The Examiner finds Clark’s non-destructive testing discloses the disputed limitation, i.e., “exposing the material before, during and after the bonding to radiation.” Final Act. 7 (citing Clark ¶ 47). The Examiner acknowledges Clark discloses consolidating one area of material while testing another area. Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 5. The Examiner, however, determines that the claim term “material” means the material as a whole and is not limited to only the instant area being bonded. Final Act. 7; Ans. 5, 7. According to the Examiner, Clark discloses operating consolidation device 5 and non-destructive testing device 8 simultaneously and continuously, Appeal 2019-005243 Application 14/359,657 8 thereby exposing the material as a whole to radiation from non-destructive testing device 8 before, during, and after bonding. Final Act. 8; Ans. 5–6. The Examiner’s broad interpretation of “material” to encompass different areas, however, renders other claim terms in the disputed limitation meaningless. See, e.g., Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[C]laims are interpreted with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim.”). The disputed limitation recites “exposing the material before, during and after the bonding to radiation.” Appeal Br., Claims App. (emphasis added). This limitation refers to the material and bonding recited in the prior limitation, namely “at least one of (i) bonding material selectively together within a layer cross section, (ii) bonding material to a layer beneath the material and (iii) bonding material to a substrate.” Id. In light of the reference to the prior recited material and bonding, we agree with Appellant that the disputed limitation requires the same material to be both bonded and exposed to radiation before, during, and after the bonding thereof. Appeal Br. 13 (“One of ordinary skill in the art reading the instant specification will understand that the material that is exposed to radiation from a first pulsed laser before, during and after bonding . . . is not just any part of the material but is the material at the site of bonding.” (citing Spec. 3:1–4:14)). Simply put, “the material” recited in the disputed limitation refers to the bonded material. As set forth above, the Examiner acknowledges Clark discloses consolidating one area of material while testing another area. Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 5. As shown in Clark’s Figure 1, the area being consolidated, i.e., bonded, by consolidation device 5 in consolidation zone 11 is different from the area being tested, i.e., exposed to radiation, by non-destructive Appeal 2019-005243 Application 14/359,657 9 testing device 8 in inspection site 10. Clark further discloses that the spacing between consolidation zone 11 and inspection site 10 allows continuous inspection of object 6 after consolidation. Clark ¶¶ 46–47. As Clark discloses exposing the bonded material to radiation after bonding, the Examiner has not shown that Clark discloses “exposing the material before, during and after the bonding to radiation,” as independent claim 31 requires. In view of the foregoing, the Examiner has not demonstrated that the subject matter of independent claim 31 would have been obvious over the combination of Clark and Yang. We, therefore, do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 31 and claims 32–36, 38, and 40 depending therefrom. Obviousness Based on Clark, Yang, and Chen Claims 42 and 44–46 depend from independent claim 31. Appeal Br., Claims App. The Examiner does not rely on Chen in any manner that cures the deficiency in the rejection of independent claim 31, and the rejection of claims 42 and 44–46 suffers from the same deficiency as the rejection of independent claim 31. Final Act. 8–9. Thus, we similarly do not sustain the rejection of claims 42 and 44–46. Obviousness Based on Clark, Yang, and Bostanjoglo Independent claim 47 and claim 48 Appellant argues independent claim 47 and claim 48 as a group. Appeal Br. 18–19. We select independent claim 47 as representative, and claim 48 stands or falls with independent claim 47. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2019-005243 Application 14/359,657 10 In rejecting independent claim 47, the Examiner finds Clark discloses the invention substantially as claimed. Final Act. 9–10. The Examiner acknowledges that it is not clear whether Clark discloses the material undergoing sublimation. Id. at 10. The Examiner finds Yang teaches sublimation of material during a generative production process, and determines it would have been obvious to adapt Clark in view of Yang to provide the sublimation for forming a porous structure. Id. The Examiner also acknowledges Clark does not disclose a container, as recited in the claim. Id. The Examiner finds Bostanjoglo discloses a material container, and concludes it would have been obvious to adapt Clark’s disclosure to include Bostanjoglo’s container for containing the material to be bonded. Id. At the outset, we note independent claim 47 does not include the limitation at issue for independent claim 31. Rather, independent claim 47 recites “irradiating the material before, during and/or after the bonding.” Appeal Br., Claims App. Unlike independent claim 31, which requires exposing the bonded material to radiation before, during, and after the bonding, independent claim 47 encompasses exposing the bonded material to radiation before, during, or after the bonding. As set forth above with respect to independent claim 31, Clark discloses testing, i.e., irradiating, an object after consolidation. Clark ¶¶ 46–47. Consequently, the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 47 does not suffer from the same deficiency as the rejection of independent claim 31, and we turn to Appellant’s remaining argument. Appellant argues that the Examiner has not articulated an adequate reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have added a container to Clark’s disclosed device. Final Act. 18–19. Appellant’s argument does not Appeal 2019-005243 Application 14/359,657 11 apprise us of error in the rejection. “[A] combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Similarly, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” Id. at 417. As the Examiner explains, a container is known to hold or transport something, thereby providing the benefit of containment. Ans. 10. The Examiner’s proposed combination is simply the combination of Clark’s device with Bostanjoglo’s container to yield the predictable and beneficial result of containing the material to be bonded. Being unapprised of error in the Examiner’s rejection, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 47, with claim 48 falling therewith. Independent Claim 50 Independent claim 50 includes all of the limitations of independent claim 31. Appeal Br., Claims App. The rejection of claim 50 suffers from the same deficiency as the rejection of independent claim 31. Final Act. 10. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above for independent claim 31, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 50. CONCLUSION We do not sustain the rejection of claim 44 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, but we sustain the rejection of claim 48 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. We do not sustain the rejection of claims 31–36, 38, and 40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Clark and Yang, Appeal 2019-005243 Application 14/359,657 12 nor do we sustain the rejection of claims 42 and 44–46 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Clark, Yang, and Chen. We sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) premised on Clark, Yang, and Bostanjoglo with respect to claims 47 and 48, but not with respect to claim 50. DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 44, 48 112, ¶ 2 Indefiniteness 48 44 31–36, 38, 40 103(a) Clark, Yang 31–36, 38, 40 42, 44–46 103(a) Clark, Yang, Chen 42, 44–46 47, 48, 50 103(a) Clark, Yang, Bostanjoglo 47, 48 50 Overall Outcome 47, 48 31–36, 38, 40, 42, 44–46, 50 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED IN PART Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation