Satyan Ranganath

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 22, 2019

13316877 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 22, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/316,877 12/12/2011 Satyan Ranganath P55930 2427
157693 7590 07/22/2019
JPMorgan Chase / Greenblum & Bernstein
1950 Roland Clarke Place
Reston, VA 20191
EXAMINER
BRANDENBURG, WILLIAM A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3681
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/22/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
gbpatent@gbpatent.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte
SATYAN RANGANATH1
____________________

Appeal 2018-001210
Application 13/316,877
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, ERIC S. FRAHM, and MICHAEL T. CYGAN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–21, 25, 26, and 29–32, which constitute all
the claims pending in this application. Claims 22–24, 27, and 28 are
canceled (see Final Act. 2; App. Br. 4). We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellant identifies JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as the real party in
interest (App. Br. 2).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Disclosed Invention and Exemplary Claim
Appellant’s disclosed invention relates to an interactive rewards
computing system for facilitating usage of rewards points for obtaining
rewards, such as products or services (Spec. ¶ 8). The system includes a
computer memory storing a digital rewards magazine, the digital rewards
magazine including multiple interactive rewards pages including rewards for
purchase with rewards points, the reward pages further including a reward
description and at least one additional link containing reward information
specific to the reward displayed on the reward page (Spec. ¶ 8). Rewards
can be selected by users of digital devices via “at least one interactive image
available for tactile manipulation” (claims 1, 11). Appellant describes “an
interactive touch screen display” (Spec. ¶ 38) for use in navigating rewards
in the rewards magazine, which may include user interface components
capable of “tactile or touch input and voice input,” and “[t]he input may also
be keyboard input, motion input, and for the purpose of security monitoring,
may include retinal input or thumbprint input” (Spec. ¶ 43). Exemplary
independent claim 1 under appeal, with emphases and bracketed lettering
added to key portions of the claim at issue, reads as follows:
1. An interactive rewards computing system facilitating
usage of rewards points for obtaining rewards by a system user,
the system comprising:
a computer memory storing a digital rewards magazine,
the digital rewards magazine comprising;
a personalized introductory account page
providing access to a number of rewards points available
and a listing of multiple accessible rewards available for
the number of rewards points; and
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[A] multiple interactive reward pages including
rewards available for purchase with rewards points, each
of the multiple interactive reward pages including;
a reward description,
at least one additional link within each
interactive reward page of the digital rewards
magazine, the additional link providing access to a
product page including reward information
specific to the reward displayed on the interactive
reward page, and
a purchasing option accessible through a
purchasing link, allowing the system user to utilize
rewards points to purchase the reward described
on the interactive reward page; and
computer processing components accessing the computer
memory and executing stored instructions for performing steps
including;
detecting a system user log in from a digital user device
to an account and displaying the personalized introductory
account page in response to detection of the user login;
providing the digital rewards magazine including the
personalized introductory account page and the multiple
interactive reward pages over the Internet to the digital user
device;
[B] updating the digital rewards magazine including the
multiple interactive reward pages and the introductory account
page implementing a magazine maintenance engine, wherein
updating the multiple interactive reward pages includes adding
or deleting one or more of the multiple interactive reward
pages and updating the introductory account page by updating
points and the listing of multiple accessible rewards;
[C] processing selection of the at least one additional
link provided on the reward page by displaying reward
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information related to the selected reward as at least one
interactive image available for tactile manipulation by system
users implementing digital devices; and
[D] processing a transaction request submitted over the
Internet from the digital user device in response to selection of
the purchasing option through the purchasing link on the
interactive reward page to purchase the selected reward from
one of the multiple interactive reward pages of the digital
rewards magazine.
The Examiner’s Rejections
(1) Claims 1–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (abstract idea).
Final Act. 3–11; Ans. 14–45.
(2) Claims 1–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Cohagan et al. (US 2011/0035269 A1;
Feb. 10, 2011) (“Cohagan”). Final Act. 12–37; Ans. 2–14.
Appellant’s Contentions
(1) Appellant contends (App. Br. 19–34; Reply Br. 4–8) that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Specifically, Appellant contends the claims are not directed to a law
of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea (App. Br. 19–23; Reply
Br. 4–6) and the claimed invention amounts to significantly more than an
abstract idea (App. Br. 23–34; Reply Br. 6–8). Appellant primarily presents
arguments as to system claim 1 (App. Br. 19–34; Reply Br. 4–8), and asserts
that claims 2–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 include similar limitations as claim 1
and are, therefore, patent eligible for the same reasons. Therefore, with
regard to the patent-eligibility rejection, we select claim 1 as representative
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of the group of claims 1–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 pursuant to our authority
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
(2) Appellant contends (App. Br. 11–19; Reply Br. 2–4) that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a). Specifically, Appellant contends Cohagan (App. Br. 12– 19) does
not teach or suggest limitations [A], [B], [C], and/or [D] as recited in claim
1. Appellant primarily presents arguments as to system claim 1 (App. Br.
12), and asserts that claims 2–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 include similar
limitations as claim 1 and are, therefore, patentable for the same reasons
(App. Br. 19). Therefore, with regard to the obviousness rejection, we select
claim 1 as representative of the group of claims 1–21, 25, 26, and 29–32
pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Principal Issues on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 11–34)
and Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–8), the following principal issues are presented
on appeal:
(1) Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–21,
25, 26, and 29–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter, because representative claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea that is not patent eligible, without significantly more?
(2) Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–21,
25, 26, and 29–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because Cohagan fails to teach
or suggest limitations [A], [B], [C], and/or [D] as recited in representative
claim 1?

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ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection (Final Act. 3–11; Ans.
14–45) in light of Appellant’s contentions (App. Br. 19–34; Reply Br. 4–8)
and the evidence of record. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s
contentions that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–21, 25, 26, and 29–
32 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter, without significantly more.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
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in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first
look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (Step 2A, Prong 1); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, 2018) (Step 2A, Prong 2).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. (Step 2B.)
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Even if the claim recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains
the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept:
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”). Rather, the “directed to”
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of
the specification, based on whether “their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).

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Step 1
Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we
determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories
of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
In the instant case on appeal, claim 1, and claims 2–10, 21, 25, and 31
depending therefrom, recite “[a]n interactive rewards computing system”
including “a computer memory” and “computer processing components.”
Therefore, we agree with Appellant’s contention (App. Br. 19)2 that claim 1,
as well as claims 2–20, 21, 25, and 31 depending therefrom, as system
claims, recite at least one of the enumerated categories (e.g., a machine
and/or manufacture) of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 11, as well as claims 12–20, 26, 29, 30, and 32 depending
therefrom, recite “[a] computer-implemented interactive rewards method”
which is “enabled by an interactive rewards computing device” including “a
computer memory” and “a computer processor,” and performs series of acts,
for example, “storing” and “accessing.” Therefore, we agree with
Appellant’s contention (App. Br. 19)3 that claim 11, and claims 12–20, 26,
29, 30, and 32 depending therefrom, as method claims, recite at least one of
the enumerated categories (e.g., process) of eligible subject matter in 35
U.S.C. § 101.
As a result, as to claims 1–21, 25, 26, and 29–32, we continue our
analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance to determine whether the

2 See also Final Act. 4 determining “the claims herein are directed to a
system and method, which would be classified under one of the listed
statutory classifications”).
3 See supra, fn. 2.
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claims (1) recite a judicial exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon,
or subject matter within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above);
and (2) are patent-eligible.
Step 2A, Prong 1
At a high level, representative claim 1 recites an interactive rewards
computing system for processing rewards in a “card rewards program” for
“banking customers” (Spec. ¶ 2). See also Final Act. 3 (finding that the
claims “are directed to an inventive concept of providing a digital rewards
magazine for facilitating usage of rewards points for obtaining rewards”
which is a fundamental economic practice). This is in agreement with
Appellant’s assertions and/or disclosures that the invention relates to (i) “an
interactive rewards computing system for facilitating usage of rewards
points for obtaining rewards” (Abstract); (ii) “systems and methods for
facilitating an interactive digital rewards experience” (Spec. ¶ 1); (iii)
“systems in customizing transmitted content and responding to user requests
and interactions relating to rewards” (App. Br. 25 citing Spec. ¶¶ 2–
11)(emphasis added); and (iv) a “system using specific data structures and
processes for providing interactive rewards system that facilitate the usage
of rewards points [sic] for obtaining rewards by a system user” (App. Br.
27).
We determine that the limitations of the claim 1 are focused on, and
generally relate to, advertising and commercial activities, i.e., a rewards
program, sales, and/or business relations between people (e.g., a banking
customer and a bank, rewards provider, or other business entity). As such,
the claimed invention recites certain methods of organizing human activity,
which is an abstract idea. See e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital
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One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (targeted marketing
is a form of “tailoring information based on [provided] data,” which has
been previously held by the Federal Circuit to be an abstract idea, and a
concept that is a “fundamental practice” that dates back to newspaper
advertisments); Morsa v. Facebook, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1014 (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (finding that both “targeting advertisements to certain consumers,
and using a bidding system to determine when and how advertisements will
be displayed” are abstract ideas), aff’d per curiam, 622 F. App’x 915 (Fed.
Cir. 2015); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (determining that using an advertisement as an exchange or currency
is an abstract idea).
In view of the foregoing, we conclude claim 1 recites providing a
digital rewards magazine for facilitating usage of rewards points for
obtaining rewards, including processing a request from a user to purchase a
selected reward, which is a method of organizing human activity, such as a
commercial interaction, sales/marketing interaction, and/or business relation
between people. Because we conclude claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we
proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to determine whether claim 1 is
“directed to” the judicial exception, by determining whether additional
elements of the claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Such additional elements may reflect an improvement to a technology or
technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Step 2A, Prong 2 – Practical Application
Under Step 2A, Prong 2, we determine whether the recited judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception by (a)
identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
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beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional
elements individually and in combination to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application. If the recited judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim is not directed
to the judicial exception.
Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of a “computer
memory,” “computer processing components,” and a “digital user device.”
Considering claim 1 as a whole, none of the additional elements applies or
uses the abstract idea in a meaningful way such that the claim as a whole are
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
Contrary to Appellant’s assertions (App. Br. 23–34; Reply Br. 6–8),
Appellant has not shown claim 1 recites additional elements that integrate
the judicial exception into a practical application. In particular, Appellant
has not shown the additional elements of a computer memory and processing
components integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
We further note that the steps of storing a digital rewards magazine
and providing the magazine “over the Internet to the digital user device” are
merely insignificant extra-solution activities. The claimed invention
receives, processes, and displays data – this is merely conventional data
gathering and analysis. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); OIP Techs., Inc., v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Electric Power
Group LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As such,
based on the record before us, we determine that the claimed invention is not
integrated into a practical application.
Appellant’s arguments that (i) “the claims are confined to [the]
problem of accurately, efficiently, and effectively targeting user devices and
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customizing user interface devices over a network based upon user device
behaviors and user interests and actions” (App. Br. 32); (ii) claim 1 recites a
particular machine that “is a specifically programmed interactive rewards
system tailored to the objective of facilitating usage of rewards points for
obtaining rewards by a system user” (App. Br. 33–34); and (iii) “[t]he
claimed invention employs a unique algorithm to solve a problem in
conventional industry practice” (Reply Br. 6) because the claims include an
algorithm (Reply Br. 6–8), are unpersuasive. Merely adding a programmed
computer to perform generic computer functions does not automatically
overcome an eligibility rejection. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358-59 (2014). Furthermore, the use of a general
purpose computer to apply an otherwise ineligible algorithm does not
qualify as a particular machine. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772
F.3d 709, 716-17 (Fed. Cir. 2014); TLI Communications LLC v. AV
Automotive LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation of
concrete or tangible components is not an inventive concept); Eon Corp. IP
Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(noting that Alappat’s rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or
software could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer
to the claim was superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice
Corp. decisions).
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1
(and claims 2–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 grouped therewith) invokes generic
computer components merely as a tool in which the computer instructions
apply the judicial exception and, thus, the abstract idea is not integrated into
a practical application.
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Because claim 1 recites a judicial exception (i.e., the abstract idea of a
method of organizing human activity) that is not integrated into a practical
application, in accordance with the Guidance, we conclude claims 1 and
claims 2–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 grouped therewith, are directed to an
abstract idea under Step 2A, and the eligibility analysis with regard to claims
1–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B – Inventive Concept
Having determined claim 1 and claims 2–21, 25, 26, and 29–32
grouped therewith are directed to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a
practical application, we now evaluate whether the additional elements add a
specific limitation that is not well-understood, routine, or conventional
activity in the field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the abstract idea. See Guidance. Thus, we determine whether
the claims “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology” or are “directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea
and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In the instant case on appeal, the additional elements recited in claim
1 do not “contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
221 (internal quotation marks omitted), or “include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
Instead, claim 1 merely requires generic computer implementation and fail
to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Id.
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Here, the Examiner determines, and we agree, that the only elements
beyond the abstract idea are generic computer components used to perform
generic computer functions (Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 18–19, 43–45) — a
determination that is supported by Appellant’s Figures 1 and 2 and the
accompanying descriptions found in the Specification (see, e.g., Figs. 1, 2;
Spec. ¶¶ 13–15, 23–39, 41, 43, 67–69, 73–75, 77–80). Specifically, the
recited digital user devices “may include for example, handheld devices . . .
or larger display type devices including computing devices” (Spec. ¶ 23),
and such “[m]obile devices may include various known mobile computing
devices, which also may be referenced as handheld devices, handheld
computers or simply handhelds” (Spec. ¶ 30), or may include public devices,
where the “[p]ublic devices may include any publicly available computing
devices, such as large touch screens available, for example, in hotel lobbies
and train stations” (Spec. ¶ 31). The user interface components of the digital
devices are described as taking various forms including “tactile or touch
input and voice input,” “keyboard input, motion input, and for the purpose of
security monitoring, may include retinal input or thumbprint input” (Spec. ¶
43). Finally, the computing components of the disclosed and recited
interactive rewards computing system are described in generic terms and
perform generic computing functionality (see generally Spec. ¶¶ 67–69, 73–
75, 77–80).
Thus, Appellant’s Specification only describes well-understood,
routine, conventional computer components (e.g., a computing system,
computer memory, and computing processor components) in a manner that
indicates the components and the functions they perform were well known in
the art. See Hybritech Inc., 802 F.2d at 1384 (explaining that “a patent need
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not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”); see
also Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 850 F.3d at 1331 (“The claimed mobile
interface is so lacking in implementation details that it amounts to merely a
generic component (software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the
performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific
resources.”). We further note that, when generically claimed, storing and
retrieving and operating on information in memory and displaying
information are computer functions that have been recognized as either
insignificant extra-solution activity or well-understood, routine,
conventional functions. MPEP 2106.05(d)(II)(i) (citing Versata Dev. Grp. v.
SAP Am., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
The Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has “repeatedly
recognized the absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility” where claims
have been defended as involving an inventive concept based “merely on the
idea of using existing computers or the Internet to carry out conventional
processes, with no alteration of computer functionality.” Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring). As seen
from the discussion above, Appellant’s claim 1, as well as claims 2–21, 25,
26, and 29–32 grouped therewith, recite nothing more than the
implementation of a combination of abstract ideas using existing
computers/servers and components with no alteration of computer
functionality.
As a result, we are not persuaded that the operations recited in claim 1
are anything beyond generic computer functions as opposed to an
improvement to a fundamental economic practice and/or method of
organizing human activity. Considering the elements of claim 1 individually
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and as an ordered combination, claim 1 does no more than simply instruct
the practitioner to implement the abstract idea on a generic computer or
processer. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an
abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render [a] claim patent
eligible.”).
Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments (App. Br. 32–
34) that claim 1 is rooted in computer technology; rather, claim 1 merely
recite the use of a computing system, computer memory, computer
processing components, and digital devices with known user interfaces as
tools to implement a method of organizing human activity involving a
fundamental economic principle (i.e., an abstract idea). See, e.g.,
RecogniCorp LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“Unlike Enfish, [the claim] does not claim a software method that
improves the functioning of a computer . . . [but] claims a ‘process that
qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool.’”).
As discussed supra, claim 1 neither explicitly recites (i) improving the
efficiency or speed of the computing system, computer memory, computing
processor components, display/input device, and digital user device, nor (ii)
reducing needed memory storage space. Instead, claim 1 merely recites
computer elements performing generic computer functions. Thus, the
computing system recited in Appellant’s claim 1 does not exhibit the type of
activity that distinguishes inventions having significantly more than the
abstract idea from those claims that do no more than generically link the use
of the method to a particular technological environment, that is, by
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computers, memories, processors, input devices, or communication
interfaces. Alice, 573 U.S. at 226.
Appellant does not persuasively argue any specific limitation is not
well-understood, routine, or conventional in the field. Nor does Appellant
persuasively argue the Examiner erred in that aspect. In particular,
Appellant’s attorney argument that “the invention as set forth in the claims is
not simply a generic computer to perform well understood conventional
activities” (App. Br. 33–34) is unpersuasive, because it is not supported by
competent evidence. See Geisler, 116 F.3d at 1470; Meitzner, 549 F.2d at
782. As a result, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred with
respect to the Guidance’s Step 2B analysis. See Guidance, Step 2B.
Claim 1 recites an interactive rewards computing system for
processing a selection of a reward using an “interactive image available for
tactile manipulation by system users implementing digital devices.” Claim 1
only positively recites “[a]n interactive rewards computing system”
including “a computer memory” and “computer processing components.”
Claim 1 functionally recites that (i) the computing system interacts “over the
Internet” with a system user’s digital device by displaying reward
information as an “interactive image available for tactile manipulation by
system users” using their digital devices; and (ii) the “computer processing
components” act to “implement[] a magazine maintenance engine.”
Notably, claim 1 does not specifically recite the digital device of the
system user, nor does claim 1 specify what type of digital device or user
interface is used, other than to require “tactile manipulation” (claim 1). In
addition, claim 1 does not positively recite a magazine maintenance engine,
instead, the computer processing components act to “implement[] a
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magazine maintenance engine” (claim 1) (emphasis added). In other words,
when seen as a whole, claim 1 is drawn to an interactive rewards computing
system that is located at the server or intermediary, not the user/client side
which includes the user’s digital device (which includes the keyboard,
screen, or user interface for allowing rewards selections interactively, using
tactile manipulation).
We agree with the Examiner that the additional limitations are not
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. See Final
Act. 6–11. Namely, as the Examiner explains, “[t]he claim recites the
additional elements of ‘computer memory’ , ‘computer processing
components’ ” and ‘a digital user device’ ” (Final Act. 7). “The additional
elements are recited at a high level of generality and are recited as
performing generic functions routinely used in computer applications” (Final
Act. 7). Generic computers performing generic functions, do not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. The Examiner goes on to
determine, and we agree, that “the additional elements of the claim do not
add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because they would be
generic computer functions in any computer implementation” (Final Act. 7).
And, lastly, the Examiner concludes, and we agree, that “[t]here is no
indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of the
computer or improves any other technology” (Final Act. 8). See Electric
Power Group LLC, 830 F.3d at 1354 (finding that use of “conventional
computer, network, and display technology for gathering, sending, and
presenting the desired information” does not add significantly more to the
claimed abstract idea); Content Extraction & Transmission, LLC v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing that data
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collection, recognition, and storage is well-known); CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decision, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
incidental use of a computer to perform the [claimed process] does not
impose a sufficiently meaningful [limitation] on the claim’s scope.”).
Claim 1 recites an abstract idea (i.e., a fundamental economic practice
such as business relations and/or commercial practices), and does not
include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). Instead, claim 1 merely requires generic computer
implementation and fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. Id. Claim 1, as whole, is focused on an easier and more efficient
process for offering and selecting rewards using a rewards magazine,
invokes generic computer components, and does not serve to improve the
computing system/components. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am.
Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the
claims as a whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the
relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is
the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”). In
other words, the focus of claim 1 is to improve the customer’s/user’s
experience of the rewards delivery and selection process, not to improve the
efficiency of the computing components or other technology used in the
implementation of the interactive rewards computing system. As stated by
Appellant in the Specification, “[e]mbodiments of the invention are related
to systems and methods for facilitating an interactive digital rewards
experience” (Spec. ¶ 1), “such that merchants are able to target users and
account holders are able to easily locate valuable rewards information”
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(Spec. ¶ 7). As a result, Appellant’s arguments that “[e]mbodiments of the
disclosed invention improve the speed, accuracy and effectiveness of the
systems in customizing transmitted content and responding to user requests
and interactions relating to rewards” (App. Br. 25, 29–30) (citing Spec. ¶¶
2–11), are not persuasive.
Moreover, as noted above, the steps of storing a digital rewards
magazine having an introductory account page and multiple interactive
reward pages, detecting a system user log in, and displaying reward
information are merely insignificant extra-solution activity. Namely, the
claimed invention receives, processes, and displays data (rewards
pages/information) – this is merely conventional data gathering and analysis.
See MPEP § 2106.05(g); OIP Techs., Inc., 788 F.3d at 1363; Electric Power
Group, 830 F.3d at 1354.
Therefore, based on the record before us, we are not persuaded of
error in the Examiner’s determination that the appealed claims are directed
to patent ineligible subject matter, without significantly more. Accordingly,
we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims as directed to patent
ineligible subject matter.
Novelty/Nonobviousness
Appellant’s argument that (i) no prior art references have been shown
to anticipate or render obvious the claimed subject matter (App. Br. 32); and
(ii) “therefore contain multiple steps that are not routine or conventional in
the field” (App. Br. 32), and therefore the claims are confined to a particular
useful application, is unpersuasive. As addressed above, the claim
limitations in claim 1 other than the abstract idea merely recite well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities of computers and digital
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devices. In addition, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or
even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the
subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
patentable subject matter.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981).
Our reviewing court further emphasizes that “[e]ligibility and novelty are
separate inquiries.” Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns,
LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) (holding that
“[e]ven assuming” that a particular claimed feature was novel does not
“avoid the problem of abstractness”).
Preemption
Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 25–28) that the claims do not
preempt “Any Field Of Human Behavior” (App. Br. 25) and/or “all systems
relating to rewards systems” (App. Br. 27), are unpersuasive. Preemption is
not the sole test for patent eligibility, and any questions on preemption in the
instant case have been resolved by the Examiner’s Alice analysis. As our
reviewing court has explained: “questions on preemption are inherent in and
resolved by the § 101 analysis,” and, although “preemption may signal
patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does
not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the
claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price
optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract.”).
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In view of the foregoing, we determine claim 1 does not recite an
inventive concept because claim 1 simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the abstract idea.
Summary
Therefore, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility Guidance,
informed by our governing case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant
has not shown the Examiner erred in concluding claims 1 and claims 2–21,
25, 26, and 29–32 grouped therewith are directed to a judicial exception, i.e.,
an abstract idea, without significantly more, and thus are patent-ineligible
under § 101. In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner's § 101
rejection of claims 1–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter.

Issue (2): Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Appellant contends that Cohagan fails to teach or suggest “multiple
interactive reward pages including rewards available for purchase with
rewards points, each of the multiple interactive reward pages including; a
reward description, at least one additional link within each interactive
reward page of the digital rewards magazine, the additional link providing
access to a product page including reward information specific to the reward
displayed on the interactive reward page, and a purchasing option accessible
through a purchasing link, allowing the system user to utilize rewards points
to purchase the reward described on the interactive reward page” (limitation
[A]) (App. Br. 12–15). Specifically, Appellant contends “Cohagan includes
no disclosure or any particular method for redeeming rewards from a catalog
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containing multiple interactive reward pages, and further fails to disclose
any particular feature of the pages of a catalog” and “there is no teaching or
suggestion of the claimed ‘a purchasing link’ that appears in each one of the
multiple interactive reward pages” (App. Br. 13–15). Appellant has not
persuaded us of Examiner error. The Examiner finds, and we agree,
Cohagan (citing ¶¶ 59, 62–68, 80–87) teaches limitation [A] (see Final Act.
14–15). Below, we discuss Cohagan’s descriptions of an interactive rewards
computing system for facilitating usage of rewards points and obtaining
rewards by a system user.
Cohagan describes a system 100 including an interactive online
environment made available through a consumer terminal 118 in which a
consumer may view potential awards in which the consumer may obtain in
exchange for various numbers of points (Cohagan ¶¶ 59, 83). Cohagan
describes a customized online catalog for selective presentation to the
consumer for relevant rewards, allowing the consumer to sort the rewards by
an indicia of relevance, by selecting an icon or button using a pointer in
connection with a drop-down menu (Cohagan ¶ 84). Cohagan also describes
rewards are recommended to the user for redemption according to user
profile data, past purchasing history, user geographic location, total accrued
points, etc., including rewards of products, services, entertainment/theme
packages (Cohagan ¶¶ 52, 84).
As described above, Cohagan’s description of selective presentation
of rewards by relevance (multiple links, sorted and presented to consumer),
description of the particular rewards (reward description), and having the
ability to exchange or redeem reward points (purchasing option) for an
award through the interactive online environment teaches or suggests
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limitation [A], as set forth in independent claim 1 (see Final Act. 14–15;
Ans. 4–10).
Appellant also contends that Cohagan fails to teach or suggest
limitations [B] and [D] as set forth in independent claim 1 (see App. Br. 16–
17). Specifically, Appellant contends “the Examiner fails to address where
and how Cohagan teaches or suggest every element of each of these
limitations” (App. Br. 16). Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner
error. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Cohagan’s “online reward
catalog can be customized to a particular user based on user data and only
present the most relevant catalog items to the user and displaying the most
updated accrued reward point total”, “redeem accrued reward points to
purchase the rewards”, and “user can use user terminal to receive
information on marketing promotions and redeemable rewards by viewing
catalog using navigation techniques and button selection” (citing Cohagan
¶¶ 62–68, 80–87) teaches or suggests the claimed, “updating the digital
rewards magazine . . .” (limitation [B]) and “processing a transaction request
. . .” (limitation [D]) (see Final Act. 16–19; Ans. 10–12).
Furthermore, Appellant has not adequately rebutted or otherwise
shown the Examiner’s explanation of the teachings and suggestions of
Cohagan made in the Final Rejection (see Final Act. 16–19), to be in error.
Notably, the Examiner (Final Act. 16–19) relies upon Cohagan (¶¶ 62–68,
80–87, 94) as teaching or suggesting limitations [B] and [D]. Appellant’s
responses (see App. Br. 16–17; Reply Br. 2–4) to the Examiner’s findings
fail to specifically address the Examiner’s citations of Cohagan, and are thus
unpersuasive.
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With respect to limitation [C], the Examiner finds, “Cohagan does not
explicitly disclose displaying reward information related to the select award
as at least one interactive image available for tactile manipulation by system
users implementing digital devices” (Final Act. 20; Ans. 2–3). The
Examiner finds the claimed “available for tactile manipulation by system
users implementing digital devices” is an intended use limitation and does
not patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art because
there is no structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior
art (Final Act. 20; Ans. 3–4). As a result, the Examiner determines claim 1
“fails to require any actual tactile manipulation but merely allows for such a
possibility, therefore this limitation can be given little to no patentable
weight” (Final Act. 22). Nonetheless, the Examiner concludes “[i]t would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention to modify Cohagan to include displaying content that is capable of
being manipulated in a tactile fashion,” “a tactile-type interaction as claimed
would be obvious to implement as per KSR ‘obvious to try’ rationale,
particularly because the consumer terminal taught in Cohagan is one of a
mobile phone variety,” and “implementing tactile interfaces is applying a
known technique to a known device, method or product to yield predictable
results” (Final Act. 21; see also Ans. 13–14).
Appellant contends, “all claim limitations are positively recited. Even
if the claims were to contain statements of ‘intended use’, the Examiner
must show that the prior art structure is capable of performing the recited
use” (App. Br. 12). Appellant also contends that Cohagan “never expressly
discloses that its invention could be implemented using a mobile telephone
that includes tactile manipulation as presently claimed” (App. Br. 17).
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Appellant further contends, “[t]o the extent the Examiner’s obviousness
finding is based upon ‘common knowledge,’ such a conclusion is improper,
as the Examiner, in such cases, must show concrete factual support in the
evidentiary record and cannot merely cite its own undocumented
understanding of what the prior art shows or suggests, which the Examiner
has not done in the instant case” (App. Br. 17–18; Reply Br. 3). Appellant
has not persuaded us of Examiner error.
When construing claim terminology (such as “tactile manipulation by
system users implementing digital devices”) during prosecution before the
Office, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the specification as it would be interpreted by one of
ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Construing claims broadly during prosecution is not
unfair to the applicant . . . because the applicant has the opportunity to
amend the claims to obtain more precise claim coverage.” Id. The
Specification is the best guide to the meaning of a disputed term. Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Appellant’s Specification describes “an interactive touch screen
display” (Spec. ¶ 38) for use in navigating rewards in the rewards magazine,
which may include user interface components capable of “tactile or touch
input” (Spec. ¶ 43). Appellant’s Specification describes user input
implementing digital devices including interactive displays or interfaces as
follows:
“The user interface components 240 may provide the user with
the visual tools to experience the magazine and may further
operate to process user input in order to conduct transactions.
The input may take various forms and preferably includes
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tactile or touch input and voice input. The input may also be
keyboard input, motion input, and for the purpose of security
monitoring, may include retinal input or thumbprint input. The
user interface components 240 are operational to sense any
input that may be provided from user interface tools on any
devices connected within each user system.”
(Spec. ¶ 43) (emphases added).
“A user interface may be in the form of a dialogue screen for
example. A user interface may also include any of a mouse,
touch screen, keyboard, voice reader, voice recognizer,
dialogue screen, menu box, list, checkbox, toggle switch, a
pushbutton or any other device that allows a user to receive
information regarding the operation of the processing machine
as it processes a set of instructions and/or provide the
processing machine with information. Accordingly, the user
interface is any device that provides communication between a
user and a processing machine.”
(Spec. ¶ 79) (emphases added).
Cohagan teaches various exemplary consumer terminal devices 118,
including a “cellular phone” (¶ 83). Cohagan also discloses “a display
device/input device 608, such as a keyboard or pointing device in
combination with a monitor, may be provided for receiving data from and
outputting data to a user of the system” (¶ 97). And, notably, Cohagan also
discloses “[t]he parties may interact with the system via any input device
such as a keyboard, mouse, kiosk, personal digital assistant, handheld
computer (e.g., Palm Pilot®), cellular phone and/or any suitable
communication or data input modality” (¶ 142) (emphasis added). In view
of these teachings in Cohagan, of using a cellular phone or other suitable
handheld device, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that
“Cohagan never expressly discloses that its invention could be implemented
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using a mobile telephone that includes tactile manipulation as presently
claimed” (App. Br. 17).
Claim 1 recites an interactive rewards computing system for
processing a selection of a reward using an “interactive image available for
tactile manipulation by system users implementing digital devices.” We
conclude claim 1 only positively recites “[a]n interactive rewards computing
system” including “a computer memory” and “computer processing
components.” Claim 1 functionally recites that the computing system
interacts “over the Internet” with a system user’s digital device by displaying
reward information as an “interactive image available for tactile
manipulation by system users” using their digital devices.
Notably, claim 1 does not specifically recite the digital device of the
system user, nor does claim 1 specify what type of digital device or user
interface is used, other than to require “tactile manipulation” (claim 1).
Even giving this limitation the patentable weight as Appellant proposes, we
agree with the Examiner that the mobile phone disclosed by Cohagan (see
e.g., Cohagan ¶ 83 describing the use of a “cellular phone” for consumer
terminal 118; ¶ 84 describing consumer selection of rewards using consumer
terminal 118 “by any means known and practiced in the art, such as by using
a pointer in connection with a drop-down menu, a plurality of icons, or a
plurality of ‘buttons’ for example”) would provide buttons for tactile
manipulation, and thus be encompassed by the claim language, “for tactile
manipulation by system users” (claim 1). Furthermore, any image provided
on a phone, even one with physical buttons, would be an “interactive image”
since the user looks at the image and then interacts with the digital device by
pressing buttons to make selections. In this light, we agree with the
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Examiner (Final Act. 12–19; Ans. 9–13) that Cohagan’s paragraphs 59, 62,
63, and 82–84 teach or suggest interactively selecting rewards at a user
device, under the broadest reasonable interpretation of limitation [C] in light
of the Specification, as discussed above.
Inasmuch as Appellant’s Specification describes various forms of user
input as tactile or touch, we are not persuaded the Examiner has failed to
meet the required burden of proof to show that limitation [C] of independent
claim 1 is taught or suggested by Cohagan, even if we were to agree with
Appellant the Examiner erred in giving the limitation no patentable weight
based on intended use. Independent claim 1 merely requires the interactive
image being “available for tactile manipulation by system users
implementing digital devices.” As discussed above, Cohagan (see ¶¶ 83, 97,
142) teaches various devices, including cellular phones, with displays having
input functionality for interacting with an image. Therefore, Cohagan
reasonably teaches or suggests limitation [C] as set forth in independent
claim 1.
To the extent that Appellant contends the Examiner’s obviousness
finding is improperly based upon common knowledge (see App. Br. 17–18;
Reply Br. 2–4), we are not persuaded of Examiner error, because, as
expressed above, we find Cohagan teaches or suggests the use of a cellular
phone and user interface that meets the requirement of limitation [C] of
being “available for tactile manipulation.”
In view of the foregoing, Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred
in rejecting claims 1–21, 25, 26, and 29–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
because Cohagan fails to teach or suggest limitations [A], [B], [C], and/or
[D] as recited in representative claim 1. Therefore, we sustain the
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obviousness rejection of representative claim 1, as well as claims 2–21, 25,
26, and 29–32 grouped therewith, as being obvious over Cohagan.

CONCLUSIONS
(1) Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–
21, 25, 26, and 29–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter.
(2) Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–
21, 25, 26, and 29–32 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Cohagan.

DECISION
As explained above, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–21, 25, 26,
and 29–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED