Sarah Andrews et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 3, 2020

2020001605 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 3, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/337,703 12/27/2011 Sarah L. Andrews 113027.000070US1 4627
79804 7590 09/03/2020
Duncan Galloway Egan Greenwald, PLLC
9625 Ormsby Station Road
Louisville, KY 40223
EXAMINER
SCHEUNEMANN, RICHARD N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/03/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
carnold@dgeglaw.com
kduncan@dgeglaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JIZHU LU and MICHAEL P. PERRONE
Appeal 2020-001605
Application 13/337,703
Technology Center 3600
Before JASON V. MORGAN, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and
NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
KHAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–19, 21–42, and 44–46, which
constitute all the claims pending in this application. Claims 20 and 43 have
been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Refinitiv
US Organization, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant describes the claimed invention as follows:
The present invention provides a News/Media Analytics
System (NMAS) adapted to automatically process and “read”
news stories and content from blogs, twitter, and other social
media sources, represented by news/media corpus, in as close to
real-time as possible. Quantitative analysis, techniques or
mathematics, such as green scoring/composite module and
sentiment processing module are processed to arrive at green
scores, green certification, and/or model the value of financial
securities, including generating a green score, green compliance
certification, and a composite environmental or green index. The
NMAS automatically processes news stories, filings, new/social
media and other content and applies one or more models against
the content to determine green scoring and/or anticipate behavior
of stock price and other investment vehicles. The NMAS
leverages traditional and, especially, social media resources to
provide a sentiment-based solution for scoring the “greenness”
of companies.
Abstract.
Claim 1, reproduced below with annotations, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A computer implemented method for near real-time
processing of data to derive one or more outputs for action by a
user for integrating server-based information processing services
in a client-side application, the method comprising:
(a) integrating a set of server-based tools on a computer by
an information integration and tools framework into an
application on a client access device, wherein the server-based
tools are presented in the application on the client access device
in a web-based interface accessed through corresponding toolbar
plug-ins in the application;
(b) identifying by the computer an entity to which a green
score will be assigned;
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(c) identifying and collecting by the computer a set of
social media information related to the identified entity from a
plurality of data sources over a network connection;
(d) performing by the computer a sentiment analysis on
the set of social media information related to the identified entity,
the sentiment analysis including a text based sentiment analysis
of the first set of social media information;
(e) providing a set of risk-indicating patterns on a
computing device;
(f) identifying by the computer within the set of social
media information a set of potential risks associated with the
entity by using a risk-identification-algorithm based, at least in
part, on the set of risk-indicating patterns and a filler sequence
corresponding to a set of wildcards in the set of risk indicating
patterns;
(g) determining by the computer a sentiment score based
at least in part on the performed sentiment analysis including the
text based sentiment analysis and in part on the identified set of
potential risks;
(h) calculating by the computer the green score based at
least in part upon the determined sentiment score and a predictive
model as applied to the determined sentiment score, and wherein
the green score represents a green sentiment score;
(i) transmitting by the computer the green score to the
client access device for presentation in the web-based interface
in the application on the client access device;
(j) subsequently performing by the computer a sentiment
analysis on a second set of social media information related to
the identified entity, the sentiment analysis including a text based
sentiment analysis of the first set of social media information;
(k) determining by the computer a second sentiment score
based at least in part on the performed sentiment analysis
including the text based sentiment analysis; and
(1) calculating by the computer an adjusted green score
based at least in part upon the determined second sentiment score
and a predictive model as applied to the determined second
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sentiment score, and wherein the adjusted green score represents
an adjusted green sentiment score, wherein the adjusted green
score is transmitted to the client access device for presentation in
the web-based interface in the application on the client access
device, and wherein at least one user-selectable element,
associated with a server-based tool adapted to enter a user-
directed command related to the adjusted green score, is
presented in the web-based interface.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Ouimet et al. (“Ouimet”) US 2008/0243716 A1 Oct. 2, 2008
Cohen et al. (“Cohen”) US 2008/0082542 A1 Apr. 3, 2008
Holtzman et al. (“Holtzman”) US 2007/0124432 A1 May 31, 2007
Wennberg US 2006/0129427 A1 June 15, 2006
Redlich et al. (“Redlich”) US 2004/0193870 A1 Sept. 30, 2004
Roberts US 2009/0171722 A1 July 2, 2009
Beldock US 6,490,565 B1 Dec. 3, 2002
Lawrence et al. (“Lawrence”) US 2006/0004878 Jan. 5, 2006
Wilson US 2009/0271325 Oct. 29, 2009
Hoogs et al. (“Hoogs”) US 2005/0071217 Mar. 31, 2005
REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1–19, 21–42, and 44–46 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to unpatentable subject matter. Final Act. 3–5.
2. Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) as being of
improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the
claim upon which it depends. Final Act. 6.
3. Claims 1, 4, 6, 10, 14–17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 29, 33, 37–40, 42,
44, and 45 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Ouimet, Cohen, Holtzman, Wennberg, and Redlich Final Act. 6–25.
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4. Claims 2 and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Ouimet, Cohen, Holtzman, Wennberg, Redlich, and
Roberts. Final Act. 25–27.
5. Claims 3, 7, 13, 26, 30, and 36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Ouimet, Cohen, Holtzman, Wennberg,
Redlich, and Official Notice. Final Act. 27–29.
6. Claims 5 and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Ouimet, Cohen, Holtzman, Wennberg, Redlich, and
Beldock. Final Act. 29–31.
7. Claims 8, 9, 31, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Ouimet, Cohen, Holtzman, Wennberg, Redlich, and
Lawrence. Final Act. 31–33.
8. Claim 11, 12, 34, and 35 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Ouimet, Cohen, Holtzman, Wennberg,
Redlich, and Wilson. Final Act. 33–36.
9. Claim 18 and 41 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Ouimet, Cohen, Holtzman, Wennberg, Redlich, and
Hoogs. Final Act. 36–37.
10. Claim 23 and 46 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Ouimet, Cohen, Holtzman, Wennberg, Redlich, Beldock,
and Roberts. Final Act. 38–39.
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OPINION
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Legal Principles
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to
mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
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(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
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“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Prong One of Step 2A”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Prong Two of Step 2A”).3
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
Prong One of Step 2A
Under prong one of step 2A, we first look to whether the claim recites
any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e.,
mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities, or
mental processes). 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54.
We start by analyzing the limitations of claim 1 to determine whether
any recite an abstract idea. Limitations (b), (c), and (d) of claim 1 require
identifying an entity for which a green score will be assigned, identifying
and collecting social media information related to the entity, performing a
sentiment analysis, including a text based sentiment analysis, on the social
media information. These limitations can each be performed mentally, by
reviewing social media information about a particular entity and evaluating
the sentiment behind the social media information, for example, by
determining whether the social media information reflect positively or
negatively on the entity. Limitations (e) and (f) require identifying a set of
potential risks associated with the entity within the social media information
using a risk-identification-algorithm based on risk-indicating patterns and a
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filler sequence corresponding to a set of wildcards in the risk indicating
patterns. A human could analyze social media information by searching for
patterns in the information matching certain keywords or phrases that
indicate whether the information describes the entity positively or
negatively. Limitations (g) and (h) require determining a sentiment score
based on the sentiment analysis and the set of potential risks, and calculating
a green score based on the sentiment score and a predictive model. A human
could also calculate scores based on a model once the information and
analysis was complete. Finally, limitations (j), (k), and (l) recite performing
a sentiment analysis, determining a second sentiment score, and calculating
an adjusted green score based on a second set of social media information
related to the entity. These limitations essentially require repeating the
process recited in limitations (b)–(h) except with a second set of social
media information. As such, these limitations can also be performed
mentally.
Mental processes, such as those recited in the limitations identifying
above, are a category identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance as
constituting an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52. Thus, under prong one of step 2A we determine the claims recite an
abstract idea.
Prong Two of Step 2A
Under prong two of step 2A of the Guidance we determine whether
the claim as whole integrates the recited abstract idea into a practical
application of the abstract idea. A claim that integrates a judicial exception
into a practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception
in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such
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that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
judicial exception. To evaluate whether the claims integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application, we identify whether there are any additional
elements recited beyond the abstract idea, and evaluate those additional
elements individually and in combination.
Some exemplary considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit indicative that an additional element integrates an abstract
idea into a practical application include (i) an improvement in the
functioning of a computer or to another technological field, (ii) an
application of the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine,
(iii) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or
thing, or (iv) a use of the judicial exception in some other meaningful way
beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment. See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Reviewing claim 1 as a whole, we note that it includes several
limitations that we did not identify above as reciting an abstract idea,
including limitations (a), (i), and portions of limitation (l). Limitation (a)
recites “integrating a set of server-based tools on a computer by an
information integration and tools framework into an application on a client
access device, wherein the server-based tools are presented in the application
on the client access device in a web-based interface accessed through
corresponding toolbar plug-ins in the application.” With respect to this
limitation, Appellant argues “Claim 1 solves . . . the technical problem of
enabling a server to provide a set of tools stored and processed on a server to
a client access device via a specifically configured web-based interface.”
Appeal Br. 14; see also Appeal Br. 17 (“the claimed invention provides a
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technological improvement . . . specifically an improvement to client-side
integration of server-based tools and APIs through an information
integration and tools framework.”) Appellant further argues “the claim
solves the technical problem of identifying and extracting specific
information from a large corpus of social media information and displaying
that information and tools for using it in a manner that will provide timely
and useful output.” Appeal Br. 14–15.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument. Reviewing the
Specification we find that instead of solving a technical problem, the
invention provides a solution to the problem of analyzing information,
including social media information related to environmental impact of an
entity, based on attributes such as sentiment, and transforming such analysis
into a score or number that is more readily analyzable by users. See Spec.
¶ 6. The Specification explains that the current “green analytics” space is
growing and that there currently are several green analytics solutions. Spec.
¶ 12. However, these solutions suffer from shortcomings due to redundancy
stemming from the fact that they all use the same sources of information
from which to derive their metrics. Spec. ¶ 13. The invention, unlike these
prior art solutions, analyzes trends from non-traditional sources, such as
social media information. Spec. ¶ 15. Thus, the invention is intended to
provide “a system capable of automatically processing or ‘reading’ news
stories, filings, new/social media and other content available to it and
quickly interpreting the content to arrive at a higher understanding of
assessing the environmental impact of an entity (private or public).” Spec.
¶ 17. The problem described in these passages relate to solving the abstract
idea of collecting and interpreting social media information to determine the
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sentiment reflected in that information towards a company and its
environmental impact and providing a metric or score that can then be used
for investing purposes. Thus, we do not agree that the invention provides a
technical solution to a technical problem.
The invention uses a client-side toolbar plug-in for a web browser
used to interface with a web-server for performing the extra-solution activity
of presenting the green score calculated using the aforementioned sentiment
based social media information analysis. Spec. ¶ 61. The claim, nor the
Specification, indicates that the invention improves web-based interfaces, or
toolbar plug-ins. Rather these elements are used merely as tools to perform
the abstract limitations of the claim.
Appellant analogizes the claimed invention to that in McRO, Inc. v.
Bandai Namco Games Amer. Inc, 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and argues
that “[l]ike the rules in McRO, the limitations of the claim invention enable a
computer to perform a function that it could not previously perform and do
so in a manner that is unlike any manual method, such as the one provided
by Examiner.” Appeal Br. 15. In McRO, the rules were “rendered in a
specific way: as a relationship between sub-sequences of phonemes, timing,
and the weight to which each phoneme is expressed visually at a particular
timing . . . .” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315. It was the “structure of the limited
rules” that were “limited to a specific process for automatically animating
characters using particular information and techniques” that led the Federal
Circuit to conclude that the claims were “directed to a patentable,
technological improvement.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316. Here, Appellant
fails to identify any limited rules structured to reflect a specific
implementation that differs from a process a human could use or that
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improves technology. Furthermore, we disagree that the limitations of the
claim could not be performed manually with pen and paper. As we explain
in our analysis of prong one, several steps, including performing a sentiment
analysis of social media information using pattern matching and calculating
a green score based on that analysis could be performed mentally. The
claims do not require that a large amount of information be analyzed so that
the analysis could not be practically done by the human mind or specify a
specific type of risk-identification algorithm that could not be performed
mentally.
Appellant also analogizes the claim to Example 42 from “Subject
Matter Eligibility Examples: Abstract Ideas” released January 7, 2019 and
argues that like Example 42, “the present application recites a practical
application as a result of the combination of additional elements that
provides an improvement over prior art systems.” Appeal Br. 15. The
claimed invention in Example 42, however, was intended to solve the
problem of format inconsistencies in medical records that are stored locally
at various medical offices preventing the records from being shared easily
from one office to another. The format inconsistencies of the medical
records is a technical problem that the claimed invention of Example 42
solves by converting the various medical records into a standardized format.
Unlike Example 42, the claimed invention does not solve a technical
problem. Rather, as explained above, the problem the invention is intended
to solve is to collect and analyze social media information to determine the
sentiment reflected towards a company and its environmental impact for
purposes of providing a metric or score to investors. This problem is not
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technical in nature. For reasons explained above, we determine limitation
(a) does not practically apply the recited abstract idea.
Limitation (i) recites “transmitting by the computer the green score to
the client access device for presentation in the web-based interface in the
application on the client access device.” This limitation is directed to extra-
solution activity of presenting the green score and thus, does not indicate
that the claim integrates the recited abstract idea into a practical application.
See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[M]erely selecting information, by content or source, for collection,
analysis, and display does nothing significant to differentiate a process from
ordinary mental processes, whose implicit exclusion from § 101 undergirds
the information-based category of abstract ideas”). Thus, we determine
limitation (i) does not practically apply the abstract idea.
Finally, limitation (l) recites “the adjusted green score is transmitted
to the client access device for presentation in the web-based interface in the
application on the client access device, and wherein at least one user-
selectable element, associated with a server-based tool adapted to enter a
user-directed command related to the adjusted green score, is presented in
the web-based interface.” Like limitation (i), this limitation transmits and
presents the green score and presents a user-directed command in the web-
based interface. We conclude this limitation is also directed to the extra-
solution activity of presenting the green score to the user (once the score is
calculated) and presenting the user with the opportunity to enter a command
in response to the score. Thus, we determine limitation (l) does not
practically apply the abstract idea.
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Step 2B of the Guidance
Under step 2B of the Guidance we analyze the claims to determine
whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional
elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).
Considerations that are evaluated with respect to step 2B include
determining whether the claims as a whole add a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field.
Appellant argues “[t]he manner which the claimed invention
integrates server-based tools with an application on a client access device by
an information integration and tools framework is not well understood,
routine, and conventional activity.” Appeal Br. 16. Appellant further argues
“[t]he inventive concept can be found in the unconventional and non-generic
combination of known elements including the presentation of the server-
based tools within the application as a web-based interface. For example,
the claimed system solves the technical problem of integrating server-side
tools within a client access device environment and does so in a novel and
non-obvious manner that provides for a technical improvement over prior art
systems.” Appeal Br. 17.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments. First, although the
second step in the Alice/Mayo framework is termed a search for an
“inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-
obviousness, but rather a search for “‘an element or combination of elements
that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”’ Alice, 573 U.S. at
217–18. A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is,
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nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. Second Appellant
does not adequately rebut the Examiner’s finding that the integration of
server based tools with a client application via a toolbar plug-in is a well
understood or conventional combination of software elements, other than to
state that they are not.
The client access device is described in the Specification as a
“personal computer, workstation, personal digital assistant, mobile
telephone, or any other device capable of providing an effective user
interface with a server or database.” Spec. ¶ 60. The device includes “a
typical combination of hardware and software.” Spec. ¶ 63. The client
access device, therefore, is described as constituting a well-understood
device. The central system that includes the servers is described as
including “a network of servers, computers and databases” which can be
connected by “[A]ny of several suitable communication links.” Spec. ¶ 64.
“Software to perform functions associated with system 201 may include
self-contained applications within a desktop or server or network
environment and may utilize local databases, such as SQL 2005 or above or
SQL Express, IBM DB2 or other suitable database, to store documents,
collections, and data associated with processing such information.” Spec.
¶ 64. This description of both the server and client side elements are given
at a fairly high level and indicate that these elements are well understood and
utilized in a routine manner in the invention.
For reasons explained above, we determine the various additional
limitations beyond the recited abstract idea do no more than require a
generic implementation of generic components, and do not provide
significantly more than the abstract idea.
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Conclusion
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–19, 21–
42, and 44–46 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112(D)
The Examiner rejects claim 21 as being in improper dependent form
because the Examiner finds claim 21 depends from itself. 4 Final Act. 6.
Appellant “does not accede to the specific grounds of rejection set forth in
the Office Action but accepts the Examiner’s assumption that claim 21 is
intended to depend from independent claim 1.” Appeal Br. 20. Because
Appellant does not explicitly dispute the Examiner’s findings and
conclusions, we summarily sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(d).
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103(A)
The Examiner relies on Ouimet for teaching many of the limitations
of claim 1, including “integrating a set of server-based tools on a computer
. . . into an application on a client access device,” “identifying . . . a set of
social media information related to the identified entity” and “performing
. . . a sentiment analysis on the set of social media information related to the
identified entity.” Final Act. 7–8 (citing Ouimet ¶¶ 34, 49). The Examiner
relies on Cohen as teaching that the “server-based tools are presented . . . in
a web-based interface accessed through corresponding toolbar plug-ins in
the application.” Final Act. 7 (citing Cohen ¶ 15). The Examiner relies on
Wennberg as teaching “identifying within a set of social media information a

4 Claim 21 recites “The method of claim 21 further comprising . . . .”
Appeal Br. 35.
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set of potential risks associated with the entity by using a risk-identification-
algorithm based, at least in part, on the set of risk-indicating patterns.” Final
Act. 8 (citing Wennberg ¶ 9, 53). The Examiner relies on Redlich as
teaching “a filler sequence corresponding to a set of wildcards in the set of
risk indicating patterns.” Final Act. 9 (citing Redlich ¶ 17).
Appellant argues “none of the cited references disclose identifying by
the computer within the set of social media information a set of potential
risks associated with the entity by using a risk identification-algorithm
based, at least in part, on the set of risk-indicating patterns and a filler
sequence corresponding to a set of wildcards in the set of risk indicating
patterns as claimed.” Appeal Br. 22.
In particular, Appellant argues “the system and method of Wennberg
does not specifically disclose the use of the claimed filler sequence.”
Appeal Br. 23. Appellant further argues “Wennberg does not disclose any
system or method for identifying a risk from a tokenized sentence in a
textual corpus. The system and method of Wennberg does not disclose
applying any of a risk-identification-algorithm, risk-identifying pattern, or
filler sequence to a textual corpus to extract risk. Specifically, Wennberg
does not disclose using a set of wildcards in a set of risk-indicating patterns
to identify and extract all instances of risk.” Appeal Br. 23.
According to Appellant, Redlich does not cure the deficiencies of
Wennberg. Appellant acknowledges that Redlich “may use ‘wild card
patterns and wild card words’” but argues that Redlich “does not specifically
disclose how the ‘wild card patterns and wild card words’ function or how
they are used to obtain its ‘data objects.’” Appeal Br. 23. Instead, according
to Appellant, Redlich “only generally mentions the term ‘wild card’ in a
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Application 13/337,703
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single paragraph and provides no further explanation as to how they are used
in its system and method.” Appeal Br. 23.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner relies
on Wennberg to teach identifying a set of potential risks using a risk-
identification-algorithm based on a set of risk-indicating patterns. Final Act.
8 (citing Wennberg ¶¶ 9, 53). The Examiner acknowledges however that
Wennberg’s risk-indicating patterns do not include a filler sequence
corresponding to a set of wildcards. Final Act. 9. Thus, the Examiner turns
to Redlich for teaching the use of wild card patterns and wild card words to
find certain security sensitive words and data objects within a data stream.
See Redlich ¶ 17. Although fairly brief, we find this description in Redlich
would suffice in teaching one of ordinary skill in the art that Wennberg’s
risk-indicating patterns could include wildcards. Appellant’s argument that
Redlich does not disclose how these wildcard patterns are used is
incommensurate with claim 1, which only requires the risk indicating
patterns to include wildcards without further requiring the wildcards to be
used in any particular way.
Appellant next argues that “none of the cited references disclose the
integration of server-based tools within an application on a client access
device.” Appeal Br. 24. Specifically, Appellant argues Ouimet and
Holtzman only disclose generic user interfaces but do not disclose the
information integration and tools framework-based approach of the claimed
invention. Appeal Br. 24. Cohen, according to Appellant, does not cure the
deficiencies of Ouimet and Holtzman because Cohen “does not disclose the
specific web-based user interface and does not specifically provide for the
set of server-based tools as claimed.” Appeal Br. 24.
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We are unpersuaded. The Examiner finds Ouimet’s disclosure of a
computational architecture where the user interfaces with a web server via
the user’s web browser as teaching “integrating a set of server-based tools
on a computer by an information integration and tools framework into an
application on a client access device.” Final Act. 7 (citing Ouimet ¶ 49).
The Examiner further relies on Cohen as teaching that the server-based tools
are on a client access device in a web-based interface accessed through
corresponding toolbar plug-ins. Final Act. 7 (citing Cohen ¶ 15). We agree
with Examiner. Cohen teaches a client side application in the form of a
plug-in that interacts with host applications such as web browsers. Cohen
¶ 15. This plug-in is disclosed as being “a toolbar extension application that
displays a toolbar as part of the user interface of a host Web browser.”
Cohen ¶ 15. When combined with Ouimet’s teaching of a client side
application that interfaces with a webserver, Cohen’s toolbar extension
would teach:
integrating a set of server-based tools on a computer by an
information integration and tools framework into an application
on a client access device, wherein the server-based tools are
presented in the application on the client access device in a web-
based interface accessed through corresponding toolbar plug-ins
in the application
as recited in claim 1.
Finally, Appellant argues “there is no teaching, suggestion, or
motivation in Ouimet, Cohen, Holtzman, Wennberg, or Redlich that would
enable one having ordinary skill in the art to arrive at the claimed
invention.” Appeal Br. 24. Appellant argues “[n]one of the cited references,
alone or as a combination, teaches each and every claimed limitation” and
that a person of ordinary skill could not have combined the systems of the
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prior art references “to arrive at the method for near real-time processing of
data to derive one or more outputs for action by a user for integrating server-
based information processing services in a client-side application of the
claimed invention.” Appeal Br. 25.
The Examiner provides reasons to combine Ouimet with Cohen,
Wennberg, Holtzman, and Redlich that are rational on their face, and are
supported by evidence drawn from the record, i.e., the references
themselves. See Final Act. 7–10. Appellant has not presented any
particularized arguments as to why the Examiner’s reasoning is incorrect.
Rather, Appellant acknowledges the Examiner has articulated a reason to
combine the references (see Appeal Br. 25) but does not explain why this
reason does not suffice, other than to state that the references do not teach
the limitations of the claims and that “it would not have been within the
knowledge of one having ordinary skill in the art to fill in the gaps in the
cited references.” Appeal Br. 25. As explained above, however, we find
that the prior art references do teach the limitations of claim 1 and do not
agree that the cited references leave gaps in the required limitations.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1 and claim 24 which the Appellant argues together. See Appeal Br.
26. For the same reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4,
6, 10, 14–17, 19, 21, 22, 27, 29, 33, 37–40, 42, 44, and 45 which depend
from either claim 1 or 24.
Remaining Claims
Appellant argues claims 2, 3, 5, 7–9, 11–13, 18, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30–32,
34–36, 41, and 46 separately from claims 1 and 24 but does not rely on any
new arguments for these claims, other than to argue that the additional relied
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upon references do not “does not cure the deficiencies argued for the
independent claims.” See Appeal Br. 27–29.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated with respect to claim 1, we sustain
the obviousness rejection of claims 2, 3, 5, 7–9, 11–13, 18, 23, 25, 26, 28,
30–32, 34–36, 41, and 46.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–19, 21–42,
44–46
101 Eligibility 1–19, 21–42,
44–46

21 112(d) Improper
dependent form
21
1, 4, 6, 10,
14–17, 19,
21, 22, 24,
27, 29, 33,
37–40, 42,
44, 45
103(a) Ouimet, Cohen,
Holtzman,
Wennberg,
Redlich
1, 4, 6, 10,
14–17, 19,
21, 22, 24,
27, 29, 33,
37–40, 42,
44, 45

2, 25 103(a) Ouimet, Cohen,
Holtzman,
Wennberg,
Redlich, Roberts
2, 25
3, 7, 13, 26,
30, 36
103(a) Ouimet, Cohen,
Holtzman,
Wennberg,
Redlich, Official
Notice
3, 7, 13, 26,
30, 36

5, 28 103(a) Ouimet, Cohen,
Holtzman,
Wennberg,
Redlich, Beldock
5, 28
8, 9, 31, 32 103(a) Ouimet, Cohen,
Holtzman,
Wennberg,
8, 9, 31, 32
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Redlich,
Lawrence
11, 12, 34,
35
103(a) Ouimet, Cohen,
Holtzman,
Wennberg,
Redlich, Wilson
11, 12, 34,
35

18, 41 103(a) Ouimet, Cohen,
Holtzman,
Wennberg,
Redlich, and
Hoogs
18, 41
23, 46 103(a) Ouimet, Cohen,
Holtzman,
Wennberg,
Redlich, Beldock,
Roberts
23, 46
Overall
Outcome
1–19, 21–42,
44–46

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED