Sandra J. Workman-Stewart, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 14, 2008
0120070098 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 14, 2008)

0120070098

08-14-2008

Sandra J. Workman-Stewart, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Sandra J. Workman-Stewart,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120070098

Hearing No. 220-2005-00240X

Agency No. 4C-440-0322-04

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the agency's September 7, 2006 final

order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant

worked as a Supervisor, Customer Service at the agency's Brooklyn

Branch facility in Cleveland, Ohio. On February 4, 2005, complainant

filed an EEO complaint alleging that she was discriminated against on

the bases of race (African-American), religion (Apostolic Pentecostal),

and color (dark complexion). The agency accepted the following claims

for investigation.1

1. The agency failed to communicate with complainant regarding

'objective setting' for core requirements;

2. The agency failed to give complainant mid-year and end-of-year

evaluations; and

3. The agency issued complainant an improper score rating and pay.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested

a hearing. The AJ assigned to the case granted the agency's motion for

a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on

August 30, 2006.

In his decision, the AJ found that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of race, color or religious discrimination. Specifically,

complainant failed to identify any similarly situated employees, not in

her protected classes who were treated any better than she was. The AJ

noted that complainant did not establish that her supervisor was aware

of her religious beliefs. The AJ therefore found no discrimination on

any basis had occurred as alleged.

The agency subsequently issued a final order fully implementing the

AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove that she was subjected to

discrimination as alleged.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding

a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling

is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without

a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed

material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and

(4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary.

According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary

judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the

opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the

administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount

of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision

without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an

administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving

an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

In the instant case, we find the AJ properly found that the material

facts were not in dispute and that a decision without a hearing should

be issued. We find, as did the AJ, that complainant does not claim her

supervisor, S1, was aware of her religious beliefs. We therefore find

that complainant has not established a prima facie of discrimination

based on religion with respect to any of her claims.

Similarly, we note that complainant did not establish any connection

between her race or color and the alleged discriminatory acts. Assuming

for arguments' sake that complainant established a prima facie case of

race or color discrimination, we find the agency provided legitimate,

non-discriminatory explanations for its actions that complainant has not

shown to be pretext. Complainant has not shown that other employees

negotiated their performance goals. Complainant also not shown that

the ratings and score she received were improper. We concur with the AJ

that the evidence supports the agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for the pay-for-performance raise that complainant received.

We find nothing in the record indicates that discrimination motivated

the agency's actions with respect to her core requirements or pay as

alleged.

Based on a thorough review of the record we AFFIRM the agency's final

decision, finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0408)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 14, 2008

__________________

Date

1Complainant's complaint included an additional 13 claims. The agency

dismissed the additional claims pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1)

(for failure to state a claim) and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(2) (for

untimely EEO Counselor contact). The agency's dismissals were upheld by

the Administrative Judge and complainant does not specifically address the

dismissed claims on appeal. We find no reason to disturb the dismissal

of these claims and find they were properly dismissed.

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0120070098

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120070098