01A02773_r
04-26-2002
Sandra F. Clay, Complainant, v. Glenn L. McCullough, Jr., Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, Agency.
Sandra F. Clay v. Tennessee Valley Authority
01A02773
April 26, 2002
.
Sandra F. Clay,
Complainant,
v.
Glenn L. McCullough, Jr.,
Chairman,
Tennessee Valley Authority,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A02773
Agency No. 0901-98103B
DECISION
In correspondence with the agency dated July 30, 1998, complainant
alleged that the agency breached an October 8, 1997 settlement agreement.
Subsequently, in correspondence dated August 20, 1998, complainant
contended that the agency breached the agreement by prolonging her
assignments with a transition project beyond the stated ninety-day
period specified in the agreement. Failing to receive any response from
the agency, on February 23, 2000, complainant filed a timely appeal
to the Commission alleging that the agency breached the October 8,
1997 settlement agreement. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. �
1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Subsequent to the filing of
complainant's appeal, the agency determined that the agreement was void
and unenforceable.
The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:
(1) Management agrees that complainant will be reassigned to work on
other projects in Nuclear EMPAC. This is to provide her an opportunity
for career growth and skill development. Complainant will transition
work on CEMSRW, ATW, and Water Chemistry to resources identified by
the department manager. Complainant will be expected to respond to
any CEMSRW, ATW, and Water Chemistry emergency work identified by the
department manager during the transition. The transition period should
be complete in 90 days;
In its final decision of May 23, 2000, the agency concluded that the
agreement was vague and ambiguous and lacked consideration. Specifically,
the agency found that it was unable to determine the work structure and
organization of complainant's organizations, the meaning of the word
�transition� in the agreement, as well as the interpretation of various
other matters in the agreement. The agency noted that complainant had
two pending EEO complaints, and indicated that complainant could add
claims that are like or related to the matters raised in those pending
complaints. Moreover, the agency determined that �the purpose here is
for complainant to meet and talk with the EO Counselor to ascertain the
specific issue(s) . . . of discrimination which . . . were the foundation
for the settlement agreements.� and that �[T[he issue(s) will then be
added into the ongoing complaint(s).� Consequently, the agency found
the agreement void and reinstated complainant's underlying complaint.
The sole correspondence in the record from complainant following the
issuance of the final agency decision dated May 23, 2000, discussed above,
is a letter dated June 6, 2000, to an agency EEO official. Therein,
complainant requested that various pending complaints, including the
complaint that was the subject of the subject settlement agreement,
be amended to include various remedies. Complainant did not dispute
the agency's decision of May 23, 2000.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules
of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
The final agency decision of May 23, 2000, found the subject settlement
agreement void for various reasons and reinstated complainant's underlying
complaint. The Commission notes that after the issuance of this decision,
complainant submitted correspondence to the agency, but submitted nothing
that challenged the propriety of the agency's actions. We therefore
determine that the agency's action in finding the settlement agreement
void and reinstating the underlying complaint yielded an equitable
result that apparently satisfied complainant's earlier breach claim.
Accordingly the agency's determination that the settlement agreement
was void and unenforceable is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
____April 26, 2002_____________
Date