01A32332
06-29-2004
Sandra A. Yancy, Complainant, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Agency.
Sandra A. Yancy v. Department of Justice
01A32332
June 29, 2004
.
Sandra A. Yancy,
Complainant,
v.
John Ashcroft,
Attorney General,
Department of Justice,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A32332
Agency No. I-00-H063
Hearing No. 270-A1-5119X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.,
and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to
29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission affirms
the agency's final order.
The record reveals that complainant, formerly a Site Assistant Manager,
GS-0301-07, at the agency's Integrated Card Production Facility in Corbin,
Kentucky, filed a formal EEO complaint on August 15, 2000, alleging that
the agency had discriminated against her on the bases of sex (female),
disability (herniated discs, nerve damage, arthritis, heart valve defects,
hypertension), and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when on July 15,
2000, management terminated her from her term appointment.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the
investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative
Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding no
discrimination.
The AJ concluded that assuming complainant established a prima facie case
of race, disability, and reprisal discrimination, the agency nonetheless
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her
appointment as Site Assistant Manager. Specifically, the AJ found
that complainant was employed in a temporary �term� position, with an
appointment that could be renewed on a yearly basis for up to four
years. (Hearing Transcript, 410). The AJ further found that agency
management officials stated that when it became clear that there was
not enough work available at the facility to support the number of staff
members that were employed, it was decided not to renew complainant's term
appointment for an additional year. (HT, 77; 80; 115-116; 510; 521).
The AJ also found that after complainant was terminated, the agency did
not hire anyone else to fill the vacated position. (HT, 511). The AJ
concluded that complainant failed to show that the agency's articulated
reasons for not extending her term appointment were a pretext for
sex, disability or reprisal discrimination. The agency's final order
implemented the AJ's decision. Complainant makes no new contentions on
appeal, and the agency requests that we affirm its final order.
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a
de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record
and that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and
referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. To prevail
in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must satisfy the
three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). She must generally establish
a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse
employment action under circumstances that would support an inference
of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case,
however, since the agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reasons for its conduct. See United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department
of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997).
To ultimately prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097
(2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981);
Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842
(November 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request
No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).
Here, assuming, arguendo, complainant established a prima facie case
of sex, disability and reprisal discrimination, the agency nonetheless
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.
The record reflects that agency management officials testified at the
hearing that there was not enough work available at the facility at
issue to justify keeping two employees in the position of Site Assistant
Manager. (HT, 115-119). The record reflects that the other Site Assistant
Manager was employed in a permanent position, whereas complainant was a
temporary employee. The record further reflects that after complainant
was removed from employment, the position was not refilled. Accordingly,
we find that complainant has failed to establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory
or retaliatory animus. We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, we affirm the agency's
final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 29, 2004
__________________
Date