Sandor Gubi, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 22, 2005
01a54097 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 22, 2005)

01a54097

11-22-2005

Sandor Gubi, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Sandor Gubi v. United States Postal Service

01A54097

November 22, 2005

.

Sandor Gubi,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A54097

Agency No. 1A-078-0015-03

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the

following reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as an Electronics Technician at the agency's West Jersey P&DC

facility in Whippany, New Jersey. Complainant sought EEO counseling and

subsequently filed a formal complaint on September 11, 2003, alleging

that he was discriminated against on the bases of religion (Jewish),

disability (diabetes)<1>, and reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

(1) in March 2003 he was ordered to undergo a fitness for duty

examination (FFD);

on March 10, 2003 he was issued a Notice of Fourteen Day Suspension;

on December 16, 2002, he was issued a Notice of Seven Day Suspension;

in November 2002, his manager (RMO: religion and disability unkown)

made inappropriate religion-based comments;

in November 2002, complainant was required to work on Thanksgiving Day;

on an unspecified date his request for Family and Medical Leave Act

leave was denied;

on an unspecified date he was threatened with removal; and

on an unspecified date his request for a reasonable accommodation

was denied.

In December 8, 2003, the agency dismissed claims 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and

8, and accepted claims 1 and 3 for investigation. Specifically, the

agency found that: claim 2 had been the subject of a previous settlement

agreement; regarding claims 4 and 5, complainant had failed to timely

contact an EEO Counselor; and regarding claims 6, 7 and 8, the claims

were insufficiently precise. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge

(AJ). The AJ subsequently dismissed complainant's hearing request due

to complainant's failure to respond to a Scheduling Order, and remanded

the case to the agency for the issuance of a Final Agency Decision (FAD).

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant failed to establish

a prima facie case of disparate treatment because he failed to identify

otherwise similarly situated employees outside of complainant's classes

who were treated differently. The agency further found that complainant

failed to establish that he was an individual with a disability under

the Rehabilitation Act, and failed to establish a nexus between his prior

EEO activity and the agency's actions. Finally, the agency found that,

assuming arguendo that complainant established a prima facie case,

the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions and that complainant failed to establish pretext. Specifically,

the agency found that complainant was scheduled for a FFD because he

was having difficulty seeing and was demonstrating irrational behavior,

and that he was issued a seven-day suspension for being AWOL on three

occasions.

On appeal, complainant contends that the AJ erred in dismissing his

hearing request on the grounds that his admitted failure to respond to the

AJ's Scheduling Order does not amount to contumacious conduct. However,

complainant raises no new arguments addressing the agency's findings.

The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

Regarding the AJ's dismissal of complainant's hearing request, we note

that an AJ may deny a complainant's hearing request as a sanction

for failure to cooperate pursuant to the provisions of 29 C.F.R. �

1614.109(f)(3). See Hale v. Department of Justice, EEOC Appeal

No. 01A03341 (December 8, 2000). Complainant cites Reed v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A05039 (January 3, 2001),

for the proposal that a complainant's failure to be available for a

pre-hearing conference does not amount to contumacious conduct. We note,

however, that in the present case the AJ merely dismissed complainant's

hearing request, remanding the matter back to the agency for a decision

on the merits. Reed, on the other hand, involved an AJ dismissing

a complainant's entire complaint, with no adjudication on the merits

by the agency. While we recognize that the AJ's Order may be open to

confusion because it states both that the complaint was being dismissed as

well as stating that the hearing request was being dismissed, it is clear

from the record that it was merely the latter that the AJ intended, and

complainant did in fact receive a decision on the merits from the agency.

Regarding claims 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, we find such claims were correctly

dismissed for the reasons provided by the agency above.

Regarding claims 1 and 3, we find that we need not address whether or not

complainant established a prima facie case because we find the agency

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

See United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460

U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983). RMO averred that he requested a FFD for

complainant �based on his irrational behavior. . . . [Complainant]

had recently received two letters of suspension within four months.

[He] has acted in a violent manner . . . [and] was removed from the

facility. A coworker . . . [reported] fearing [complainant]. And last,

[complainant] has difficulty seeing. For his safety and those around him

I did not want him working on moving machinery.� Report of Investigation

(ROI) Affidavit B, p. 2. Complainant does not dispute such statements

and we thus find the FFD to have been job-related and consistent with

business necessity. See 29 C.F.R. � 1630.14(c) and EEOC Policy Guidance:

Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under

the Americans With Disabilities Act (July 27, 2000), pp. 15-16.

Regarding the seven-day suspension, the suspension notice states that

complainant was charged with being AWOL on three occasions, and with

unacceptable conduct when he called in and left a telephone message on

Thanksgiving Day explaining why he was late, and subsequently changed

his explanation when he was confronted with the evidence on the recorded

telephone message. See ROI, Exhibit 7. RMO averred that background

noise on the telephone message indicated that complainant was not stuck

in traffic as he claimed, but was at a party. Affidavit B, pp. 2-3.

Complainant has failed to present evidence that more likely than not,

the agency's articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext

for discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, we note that

complainant does not deny any of the charges alleged in the seven-day

suspension notice. Instead, he states that the seven-day suspension was

discriminatory because he was suspended �for a mistake in not ensuring

that the RCR was turned on.� ROI, Affidavit A, p.2. Complainant further

avers that similarly situated co-workers who made allegedly similar,

if not more egregious, work-related errors received more lenient

treatment. Id. Even assuming arguendo the truth of such statements,

complainant has not established pretext because he was not disciplined

for a work-related error but for being AWOL and for unacceptable conduct.

Regarding the FFD, complainant merely states that the examination did

not include a full examination of his eyesight. Id. p. 1.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__________________

Date

1For purposes of this decision the Commission

assumes without finding that complainant is an individual with a

disability. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g)(1).