Samuel M. Rizzitelli, Jr., Complainant,v.John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 18, 2002
01A03145 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 18, 2002)

01A03145

12-18-2002

Samuel M. Rizzitelli, Jr., Complainant, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.


Samuel M. Rizzitelli, Jr. v. Department of Justice

(Federal Bureau of Prisons)

01A03145

December 18, 2002

.

Samuel M. Rizzitelli, Jr.,

Complainant,

v.

John Ashcroft,

Attorney General,

Department of Justice

(Federal Bureau of Prisons),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A03145

Agency No. P-95-8779

Hearing No. 160-98-8534X

DECISION

The complainant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) from final agency decisions of

the Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons) (agency), concerning

his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The primary issue on appeal is whether the agency's final decision

properly determined that the complainant was entitled to payment of

$390.00 in pecuniary damages and $3,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages

pursuant to a finding of race and sex discrimination. In addition,

another issue raised is whether the complainant has established that

the agency failed to comply with its FAD dated January 26, 1999.

The record reveals that the complainant, then a Correctional Officer

at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut (FCI

Danbury), applied for a Case Manager opening in June 1995. In July

1995, the Warden selected another Correctional Officer (a Black female)

for the vacancy. In August 1995, the complainant sought counseling.

Thereafter, the complainant filed a formal EEO complaint on September

27, 1995, alleging that the agency had discriminated against him on the

basis of his disability (back injury) when he was not selected for a

Case Manager position in July 1995. On October 13, 1995, the agency's

EEO Office appointed an EEO investigator to conduct an investigation

into the complainant's claim. As relief, the complainant requested

�disciplinary action against officials and expectancy damages.�

When interviewed by the EEO Counselor, the Warden said that his selection

was based on Affirmative Action principles. During the subsequent

investigation, the Warden testified:

The selection was based upon who I considered the best qualified for the

position, as well as our EEO concerns. Part of our EEO concerns here

at Danbury, since we are a female facility, is trying to get females as

well as minorities, as [the selectee] in the positions of supervision

and management.

Following the investigation, the complainant was provided a copy of

the investigative record and informed of his right to elect a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or alternatively, to receive

an immediate final decision from the agency. On May 20, 1996, the

complainant requested a hearing before an AJ. The complainant resigned

from the agency in December 1996.

On August 13, 1997, the complainant filed a motion to amend his complaint,

to include the bases of his race (White) and sex (male) when he was not

selected for the Case Manager position. A hearing was held before an AJ

on August 14th and September 16, 1998. Thereafter, the AJ issued his

Findings and Conclusions, recommending a finding of discrimination on

November 20, 1998. The AJ found that the agency discriminated against

the complainant on the bases of his race (White) and gender (male)

when the complainant was not selected for the position of �Correctional

Treatment Specialist� a/k/a �Case Manager,� on or about July 7, 1995.

The AJ ordered the following relief: 1) reinstatement retroactive to July

7, 1995; 2) mitigated back wages since July 7, 1995 and seniority and

other employee emoluments from the date of his nonselection; 3) costs

and expenses; 4) reasonable attorney's fees; 5) compensatory damages;

6) notice to all employees at the agency's Danbury Prison facility of

their right to be free of discrimination; and 7) appropriate remedial EEO

training to personnel staff members who are responsible for the creation

and implementation of the agency's Danbury Affirmative Action Plan.

On January 26, 1999, the agency issued a final decision in this

matter that found the record supported the AJ's determination that the

complainant was discriminated against as described above. The decision

concluded that the Warden's comments constituted direct evidence that

he considered race and sex when he picked the selectee in July 1995.

The decision awarded the complainant mitigated back pay and interest for

the period between July 7, 1995, the date of the selectee's selection

as Case Manager, and December 31, 1996, the date the complainant

resigned from the agency, compensatory damages for the harm the agency's

discriminatory action caused, and reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

The decision concluded that the complainant was not entitled to

reinstatement (which he did not request) or back pay beyond the date

of his resignation because such relief is available only in cases of

constructive discharge, and the record in this case did not indicate

that the complainant's December 1996 resignation was the result of a

constructive discharge. The complainant was directed to submit any claim

for compensatory damages to the agency's EEO Officer and the Complaint

Adjudication Officer.

Upon receipt of the decision, the complainant requested $300,000.00

in compensatory damages, and supported his claim with his affidavit,

affidavits from his wife, two former coworkers and a friend, and an

analysis of the complainant's �lower standard of living� conducted by

an economist (February 23, 1999, letter from complainant).

On March 8, 2000, the agency issued a final decision on the compensatory

damages. The agency awarded the complainant $390.00 in pecuniary

damages and $3,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages. On March 20, 2000,

the complainant filed an appeal from the final agency decision regarding

compensatory damages.

Legal Standards for an Award of Compensatory Damages

Pursuant to section 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a

complainant who establishes his or her claim of unlawful discrimination

may receive, in addition to equitable remedies, compensatory damages

for past and future pecuniary losses (i.e., out of pocket expenses)

and non-pecuniary losses (e.g., pain and suffering, mental anguish).

42 U.S. C. � 1981a(b)(3). For an employer with more than 500 employees,

such as the agency, the limit of liability for future pecuniary and

non-pecuniary damages is $300,000. Id.

Objective evidence of compensatory damages can include statements from

the complainant concerning his or her emotional pain or suffering,

inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to

professional standing, injury to character or reputation, injury

to credit standing, loss of health, and any other nonpecuniary

losses that are incurred as a result of the discriminatory conduct.

Statements from others, including family members, friends, health

care providers, other counselors (including clergy) could address the

outward manifestations or physical consequences of emotional distress,

including sleeplessness, anxiety, stress, depression, marital strain,

humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self-esteem, excessive fatigue,

or a nervous breakdown. Lawrence v. United States Postal Service, EEOC

Appeal No. 01952288 (April 18, 1996).

Evidence from a health care provider or other expert is not a mandatory

prerequisite for recovery of compensatory damages for emotional harm.

A complainant's own testimony, along with the circumstances of a

particular case, can suffice to sustain his or her burden in this regard.

The more inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant's action is,

the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation

or distress from that action; consequently, somewhat more conclusory

evidence of emotional distress will be acceptable to support an award

for emotional damages. Nevertheless, the absence of supporting evidence

may affect the amount of damages appropriate in specific cases. Id.

The particulars of what relief may be awarded, and what proof is necessary

to obtain that relief, are set forth in detail in the Commission's

Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under

Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July

14, 1992) (Enforcement Guidance). Briefly stated, the complainant must

submit evidence to show that the agency's discriminatory conduct directly

or proximately caused the losses for which damages are sought. Id. at

11-12, 14; Rivera v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157

(July 22, 1994). The amount awarded should reflect the extent to which

the agency's discriminatory action directly or proximately caused harm

to the complainant and the extent to which other factors may have played

a part. EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at 11-12. The amount of non-pecuniary

damages should also reflect the nature and severity of the harm to

the complainant, and the duration or expected duration of the harm.

Id. at 14.

A. Pecuniary

Pecuniary losses are out-of-pocket expenses that are incurred as a result

of the employer's unlawful action, including job-hunting expenses,

moving expenses, medical expenses, psychiatric expenses, physical

therapy expenses, and other quantifiable out-of-pocket expenses. Id.

Past pecuniary losses are losses incurred prior to the resolution

of a complaint through a finding of discrimination, the issuance of

a full-relief offer, or a voluntary settlement. Id. at 8-9. Future

pecuniary losses are losses that are likely to occur after resolution

of a complaint. Id. at 9. For claims seeking pecuniary damages,

such objective evidence should include documentation of out-of-pocket

expenses for all actual costs and an explanation of the expense, e.g.,

medical and psychological billings, other costs associated with the injury

caused by the agency's actions, and an explanation for the expenditure.

Id. at 9. The complainant requested $3,463.00 in past pecuniary

compensatory damages. However, the agency found that the complainant

was only entitled to $390.00 in past pecuniary damages. Specifically,

the agency determined that the complainant was entitled to $300.00 for

the hours necessary to prepare the analytical report, $30.00 for mileage

to attend the two-day hearing, and $60.00 in witness fees. The agency

also found that the complainant's claims for costs regarding copies,

mailing/postage, research materials, office supplies, long distance phone

calls/fax, and borrowed money (loans) from family members were denied

inasmuch the complainant did not provide any evidence to support these

charges. Taking into account the evidence of pecuniary damages submitted

by the complainant, we find the complainant's request to be excessive.

Therefore, the Commission finds the agency's award of $390.00 in past

pecuniary damages was appropriate. This amount takes into account past

out-of pocket expenses incurred as a result of intentional discrimination.

Regarding future pecuniary damages, the complainant asserted that he

is entitled to pecuniary damages, alleging that the non-selection has

caused him to be unable to earn a similar salary in his current position

as he would have received a promotion in 1995. The agency determined

that the complainant was not entitled to any future pecuniary damages.

Case law on the ability to recover future pecuniary damages states that

a complainant must show, �evidence suggesting that [an individual's]

injuries have narrowed the range of economic opportunities available

to him.� Gorniak v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 889 F.2d 481, 484

(3rd Cir. 1989). The evidence presented must show that �his injury

caused a diminution in his ability to earn a living.� id.

There is nothing in the record that remotely suggest that the

complainant's ability to earn a living has been affected by the

non-selection in 1995. First and foremost, the complainant voluntarily

resigned from the agency in December 1996, choosing to leave the field

of Corrections. Second, the complainant attended law school, and is now a

practicing attorney representing Bureau of Prisons employees in employment

discrimination cases, and as he states in his brief, is employed by

the Hartford Insurance Company. His economic opportunities are in

no way diminished from his non-selection for a Case Manager position.

There is absolutely no evidence that this non-selection destroyed his

development or his ambition as he stated in his brief to the Commission.

Therefore, we find that the complainant is not entitled to an future

pecuniary damages.

B. Non-pecuniary

We must now review whether or not the agency's award of $3,000.00 was

appropriate. There are no precise formulae for determining the amount

of damages for nonpecuniary losses. Nonpecuniary damages must be limited

to the sums necessary to compensate the injured party for actual harm,

even where the harm is intangible. See Carter v. Duncan-Higgins. Ltd.,

727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1994). An award of compensatory damages for

nonpecuniary losses, including emotional harm, should reflect the extent

to which the respondent directly or proximately caused the harm and

the extent to which other factors also caused the harm. Id. 11-12. An

award of compensatory damages for nonpecuniary losses should also

reflect the nature and severity of the harm and the duration or expected

duration of the harm. Id. at 14. The Commission notes that for a proper

award of nonpecuniary damages, the amount of the award should not be

"monstrously excessive" standing alone, should not be the product of

passion or prejudice, and should be consistent with the amount awarded

in similar cases. See Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848

(7th Cir. 1989); Androvich v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal

No. 01950533 (July 12, 1996).

In Carle v. Department of the Navy, the Commission explained that

�objective evidence� of non-pecuniary damages could include a

statement by the complainant explaining how he or she was affected

by the discrimination. EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993).

Statements from others, including family members, friends, and health

care providers could address the outward manifestations of the impact

of the discrimination on the complainant. Id. The complainant could

also submit documentation of medical or psychiatric treatment related to

the effects of the discrimination. Id. Non-pecuniary damages must be

limited to the sums necessary to compensate the injured party for the

actual harm and should take into account the severity of the harm and

the length of the time the injured party has suffered from the harm.

Carpenter v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July

17, 1995).

In support of his claim, the complainant submitted five sworn affidavits

from himself, his wife, two coworkers and a friend. No medical evidence

was submitted by the complainant. As a result of his nonselection,

the complainant complained of humiliation, frustration, loss of

self-confidence, headaches, nausea, stress, and that he could not

perform sexually in the same manner as before. He also claimed that

after non-selection that he and his family were forced to live �just

above the poverty line� and that his family �did not engage in any of

life's luxuries such as drinking and smoking, eating steak and lobster,

or going out for evening entertainment,� and that he could not afford

necessities such as diapers or baby formulas, milk and eggs.

Several Commission decision have awarded compensatory damages in cases

somewhat similar to the complainant's. See, e.g., Pryor v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01961884 (February 5, 1998)

($5,000.00 in nonpecuniary damages based on the complainant's statement

and testimony from his treating physician that he experienced anxiety and

stress resulting in tremors and a mild heart attack, sleep disturbances,

weight loss, and difficulty communicating with his adult children when he

was rejected for a position with the agency due to his mental disability);

Loving v. Department of Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01955789 (August 29,

1997) ($3,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages where the complainant stated

that she became emotionally upset, suffered numbness, hair loss, and

severe headaches, and had four sessions with a psychologist as a result

of six episodes of race discrimination, noting that the award amount was

affected in part by the �weakness in proof... and lack of detail� in the

evidence the complainant provided); Turner v. Department of Agriculture,

EEOC Appeal No. 01964759 (September 24, 1998) ($2,000.00 in non-pecuniary

damages based on the complainant's testimony and statements from two

coworkers and treating physician that the complainant suffered emotional

distress, humiliation, and embarrassment as a result of a rejection and

two low performance ratings prompted by discriminatory animus, noting

that the complainant presented �scant amount of evidence concerning

his emotional distress and related symptoms, and the lack of objective

evidence supporting the alleged harm to his relationships with family

members and friends); and Harris v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC

Appeal No. 01966746 (December 11, 1998) ($2,000 in non-pecuniary damages

where the complainant stated that she suffered stress, low self-esteem,

fatigue, depression, and mental anguish, noting that no medical evidence

was presented connecting the emotional distress to the discriminatory

action and that other factors, including a difficult pregnancy contributed

to the emotional distress.

In the above referenced cases, the complainants in Pryor, Loving and

Turner submitted medical evidence to support their claims, whereas the

complainant in this matter has not provided any medical documentation to

support his assertions. While lack of medical evidence in and of itself

does not preclude damages see Carpenter v. Department of Agriculture,

EEOC No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995), the absence of supporting evidence may

affect the amount of non-pecuniary damages deemed appropriate in specific

cases. Lawrence v. United States Postal Service, EEOC No. 01952288 (April

18, 1996). Given the evidence that was presented by the complainant,

and in comparing his case to other cases decided by the Commission,

we find that the agency's award of $3,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages

was appropriate.

Other Matters

The complainant also informed the Commission that he has not received

any of the relief that was awarded in the final agency decision dated

in January 1999 and that none of the remedies that had been ordered by

the AJ and the agency in the prior decisions have been complied with.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a), when a complainant believes that the

agency has failed to comply with its final action, the complainant shall

notify the agency EEO Director, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance

within 30 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of the

alleged noncompliance. There is no evidence in the record that the agency

has responded to the complainant's claim for relief; therefore, we have

considered the matter pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504. Regarding the

complainant's request for reinstatement and the AJ's recommendation

that the complainant be reinstated, it is well-settled that an agency

is not required to reinstate an employee as part of make-whole relief

where the employee has retired in the interim and there has been no

finding of constructive discharge. See Uyehara v. Dept. of the Navy,

EEOC Appeal No. 01933721 (May 9, 1994); Horton v. Dept. of Transportation,

EEOC Request No. 05880192 (July 5, 1988); Major v. Dept. of Defense, EEOC

Appeal No. 01851860 (July 8, 1987); Smith v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC

Appeal No. 01841575 (February 8, 1985). In this case, the complainant

testified at his hearing that he retired from the agency in December 1996.

Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that the complainant

has filed an EEO complaint alleging constructive discharge nor has

he ever raised the issue with his EEO counselor, thus precluding the

Commission from addressing the issue. Therefore we find that the agency's

determination that the complainant is not entitled to reinstatement or

back pay beyond the date of his resignation was appropriate. Moreover,

we have determined that there is insufficient information in the record

to discern whether the agency has complied with its FAD dated January

26, 1999. Accordingly, we incorporate the agency's order below and

direct the agency to provide our Compliance Officer with evidence of

its actions in compliance with the Order.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including arguments

and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission

AFFIRMS the final agency decision finding that the complainant is entitled

to $3,390.00 in compensatory damages.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action within sixty

(60) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, unless

otherwise noted:

The agency shall award the complainant mitigated back pay and interest

between July 7, 1995, when he should have been selected as Case Manager,

and December 31, 1996, when the complainant resigned from employment with

the agency.<1> Documentation showing that such payments have been made,

and the manner of calculation of such payments, must be submitted to

the Compliance Officer, as referenced below.

The agency shall pay reasonable attorney's fees incurred in accordance

with the paragraph below entitled, �Attorney Fees.�

The agency shall post a notice of the finding of discrimination in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled, �Posting Order.�

The agency shall consider taking disciplinary action against the

responsible management official. The agency shall report its decision

regarding the disciplinary action to the Commission. If the agency

decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken.

If the agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set

forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline.

The agency shall conduct EEO training for the responsible management

official cited in the complaint at issue herein. Such training shall

include, but not be limited to, training on the agency's obligations

under Title VII.

Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date on which this decision

becomes final, the agency shall tender to the complainant past pecuniary

damages in the amount of $390.00.

Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date on which this decision

becomes final, the agency shall tender to the complainant nonpecuniary

damages in the amount of $3,000.00.

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled �Implementation of the Commission's

Decision.� The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of backpay and other benefits due the complainant,

including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G0900)

The agency is ordered to post at its Federal Correctional Institution

in Danbury, Connecticut, copies of the attached notice. Copies of the

notice, after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative,

shall be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the

date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60)

consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where

notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take

reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced,

or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be

submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph

entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10)

calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 18, 2002

__________________

Date

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dated

which found that a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. has occurred at the Department of

Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons).

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee

or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,

SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing,

promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of

employment.

The Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons) supports and will

comply with such Federal law and will not take action against individuals

because they have exercised their rights under law.

The Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons) was found to

have unlawfully discriminated against the individual affected by the

Commission's findings on the basis of race and sex when he was not

selected for the Case Manager position in July 1995. The agency shall

therefore remedy the discrimination by immediately paying mitigated back

wages, reasonable attorneys fees, and compensatory damages. The facility

will ensure that officials responsible for personnel decisions and

terms and conditions of employment will abide by the requirements of

all Federal equal employment opportunity laws.

The Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons) will not in any

manner restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual

who exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by,

or who participates in proceedings pursuant to, Federal equal employment

opportunity law.

______________________________

Date Posted:

Posting Expires:

29 C.F.R. Part 1614

1The AJ's order instructed that the complainant be reinstated to the Case

Manager position retroactive to July 7, 1995. However, the complainant

is not entitled to reinstatement because the record does not indicate

that his resignation from the agency in December 1996 was the result of

constructive discharge.