Sammie L. Truelove, Complainant,v.Thomas E. White, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 13, 2003
01A30475_r (E.E.O.C. May. 13, 2003)

01A30475_r

05-13-2003

Sammie L. Truelove, Complainant, v. Thomas E. White, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Sammie L. Truelove v. Department of the Army

01A30475

May 13, 2003

.

Sammie L. Truelove,

Complainant,

v.

Thomas E. White,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A30475

Agency No. AREUHQ02JUNE00001

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from the final

agency decision dated September 26, 2002, dismissing his complaint of

unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.,

Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. , and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

In his formal EEO complaint, filed on March 25, 2002, complainant

alleged that he was subjected to harassment on the bases of race, color,

disability, and age when:

(a) A Director of Logistics and a Chief, Supply & Services continuously

moved complainant's subordinates out from under his control.

Communicating directly with them without going through complainant, while

complainant was the Chief of Transportation beginning in 1999, until he

left that position temporarily to be a member of the restationing team

on March 5, 2001;

(b) The Director of Logistics did not select complainant to be the

Acting Director of Logistics in his absence even though complainant's

job description stated that he will serve as the acting DOL in the

absence of the Chief of DOL. Two other employees were appointed the

acting position. An agency employee was appointed Acting DOL, August

1999 through June 2000; and the Chief, Supply & Services was appointed

Acting DOL, July 2000 through August 2000;

(c) in November 1999, complainant's subordinate was insubordinate to

complainant. When complainant tried to discipline her, complainant's

supervisor overruled him;

(d) in June 2000, the Director of Logistics recommended that complainant

receive a one-year extension, rather than a two-year extension that

complainant had requested;

(e) complainant did not receive his performance appraisal fo the rating

period of October 1, 1999 through October 31, 2000, thus causing him not

to receive a QSI Award for that rating period. His performance appraisal

was not returned to him for the rating period until September 23, 2001;

(f) in January 2001, the Director of Logistics told complainant that

the Chief, Supply & Services was ostracizing him within the 104th ASG

organization;

(g) when complainant returned from leave, he learned that his personal

belongings had been removed from his office without his knowledge and the

locks changed to his office at the direction of the Director of Logistics

and Chief, Supply & Services, after he had received approval by an

agency Colonel to be assigned to the restationing team on March 5, 2001;

(h) The Director of Logistics accused complainant of being AWOL, in

failing to report to his position on the restationing team on March 5

and 6, 2001;

(i) complainant was treated disparately when he was not reappointed as

the Chief of Plans and Operations at the end of his temporary assignment.

His temporary assignment to the restationing team began on March 5,

2001 and was to end in 120 days; however, it did not end until January

2002; and

(j) complainant was denied a two-year extension by an agency Colonel in

August 2001, even though he had not been in his position for 5 years;

the person replacing him as the Chief of Plans and Operations, [agency

employee], had been in Europe for at least 10 years.

The agency dismissed claims (a) through (h) and (j) on the grounds that

complainant initiated contact with an EEO Counselor in an untimely manner.

Specifically, the agency determined that the last alleged discriminatory

event occurred in August 2001, but that complainant did not initiate EEO

Counselor contact until October 22, 2001, beyond the forty-five (45)

day limitation period.<1> The agency dismissed claim (i) for failure

to state a claim. The agency found that complainant had not established

that he was an aggrieved employee after being returned to his position of

record after his detail ended. Further, the agency determined that claims

(a) through (j) are not part of a continuing violation. Furthermore,

the agency dismissed age as a basis. The agency noted that complainant

was only 37 years of age at the time of the alleged discriminatory

actions which are the subject of this complaint. Therefore, the agency

concluded that complainant's allegation of age discrimination relative

to this case does not meet the criteria contained in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.103.

On appeal, complainant through counsel, asserts that his EEO contact

occurred in April 2001 when he sought the assistance of a Colonel by

taking advantage of his �open door� policy. Specifically, complainant

asserts that he made several trips to the Hanau EEO office concerning

issues he had with his supervisor but that the Hanau EEO office was not

operating due to the departure of an EEO Officer. Complainant states

that following several unsuccessful trips to the Hanau EEO office, he

went to the Colonel's office in April 2001. Complainant further argues

that his allegations of discrimination should not have been investigated

by an investigator assigned by the Colonel, but instead should have been

referred to the EEO office. Complainant argues that claim (e) is timely

because he did not receive his performance appraisal until September 2001.

Further, complainant contends that his complaint should be evaluated in

terms of a continuing violation.

In response, the agency argues that claims (a) through (h) were untimely

raised with an EEO Counselor because complainant failed to contact the

EEO office concerning these claims until October 2001, well beyond the

forty-five (45) day limitation period. The agency further argues that

complainant chose to first pursue these matters in another forum, and

that he only contacted the EEO office in October 2001, after his concerns

were determined to be unfounded in the chosen forum. With respect to

claim (e), the agency argues that the date of incident occurred as early

as April 2001, rather than September 21, 2001, as stated by complainant.

As to claim (i), the agency determined that a fair reading of this claim

reflects the following circumstances. Complainant was to be returned to

his position of record after his detail ended in January 2002; however,

complainant requested a new detail. The agency submits documents

reflecting the expiration of the detail in January 2002, complainant's

request for an extension of the detail, and the agency's granting of

that request. The agency further determined that the decision to grant

complainant a new detail at his own request, instead of returning to

his position of record, cannot be construed to have caused complainant

a personal harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege

of his employment.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of

discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the

matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel

action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action.

The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed

to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45)

day limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Request No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation

is not triggered until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination,

but before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have

become apparent.

EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend

the time limits when the individual shows that he was not notified of the

time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that he did not know

and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or

personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence he was prevented

by circumstances beyond his control from contacting the Counselor within

the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency

or the Commission.

To satisfy the forty-five day contact requirement, the Commission has

consistently required complainants to contact an EEO Counselor or official

logically connected with the EEO process and "exhibit an intent to begin

the EEO process." EEOC Management Directive (MD-110), 2-1 (November 9,

1999)(citing Kinan v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05990249

(May 6, 1999); see Cox v. Department of Housing and Urban Development,

EEOC Request No. 05980083 (July 30, 1998); Allen v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05950933 (July 9, 1996).

Regarding claims (a) through (d), (f) through (h) and (j), the record

in the instant case reveals that complainant contacted an EEO Officer

in May 2001, concerning issues he had with his supervisor. The record

contains an EEO Officer's statement dated August 13, 2002, wherein she

stated that in May 2001, complainant informed her that he did not want

to file a complaint and that he preferred to use the Colonel's chain of

command to resolve his issues. According to the EEO Officer, she then

informed complainant of the forty-five-day time limit in case he decided

to file a complaint concerning his claims. The record also contains the

Colonel's statement. Therein, the Colonel indicated that in late April or

early May 2001, complainant shared his concerns involving his supervisor.

The Colonel stated that he specifically mentioned the possibility of

using the EEO process, as complainant's documents made reference to his

civil rights. The Colonel further stated that complainant indicated that

he did not �want to use them� but that he instead wanted the Colonel

to investigate these matters. At complainant's request, the Colonel

appointed an �AR 15-6 investigator� to look into complainant's concerns.

The record contains a copy of the Colonel's letter dated May 14, 2000, to

an investigator listing claims (a) through (d), (f) through (h) and (j).

Complainant did not contact the EEO office again until October 25,

2001. Therefore, the Commission finds that he did not contact an

EEO Counselor with the intent to pursue the EEO complaint process

until October 25, 2001. Complainant's informal attempts to resolve

his claims, through an agency Colonel, do not toll the time limit.

Moreover, as none of the claims occurred within forty-five days of

complainant's initial EEO Counselor contact, a continuing violation

analysis is not necessary. Complainant has presented no persuasive

arguments or evidence warranting an extension of the time limit for

initiating EEO Counselor contact. Therefore, the Commission finds that

the agency properly dismissed claims (a) through (d), (f) through (h)

and (j) for untimely Counselor contact.

Moreover, regarding when the matter in claim (e) purportedly occurred,

complainant contends he suffered discrimination when his performance

appraisal for the rating period of October 1, 1999 through October 31,

2000, was not returned to him until September 23, 2001. The record shows,

however, that complainant raised the issue of the lack of his performance

appraisal when he met with the agency Colonel in April 2001. We note that

the agency, in response to complainant's appeal, argued that back in April

2001, complainant knew his performance appraisal was ready but refused

to pick it up. In support of its arguments, the agency submits a copy of

the investigative report wherein the investigator found that complainant's

performance appraisal for rating period November 1, 1999 through October

31, 2000 existed. We do not find that complainant has provided sufficient

justification for extending or tolling the forty-five-day time limit.

Therefore, we find that the agency's dismissal of claim (e) for untimely

EEO Counselor contact was proper.

The regulation set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1) provides, in

relevant part, that an agency shall dismiss a complaint that fails to

state a claim. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved

employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.103,

.106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long defined

an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss with

respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which

there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request

No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).

Regarding claim (i), the Commission finds the agency properly dismissed

claim (i) for failure to state a claim. The record indicates that when

his detail was to expire in January 2002, complainant requested another

detail, which request was granted. We find that the matter raised in

this claim does not address a personal loss or harm regarding a term,

condition, or privilege of his employment.

With regard to the basis of age, the Commission determines that the

agency properly dismissed this basis. A review of the file reveals

that in the EEO Counselor's Report, complainant identified himself as

thirty-seven years old. However, as the ADEA clearly provides, only

those individuals who are at least forty years of age are protected from

age discrimination. As such, the agency's decision to dismiss age as a

basis was appropriate.

Accordingly, the agency decision to dismiss claims (a) through (h) and

(j) for untimely EEO Counselor contact; the agency's decision to dismiss

claim (i) for failure to state a claim; and the agency's decision to

dismiss age as a basis was proper, and is hereby AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 13, 2003

__________________

Date

1The record in the instant case contains

the EEO Counselor's Report, wherein the EEO Counselor stated that

complainant's initial EEO contact was on October 25, 2001, not October

22, 2001, as stated in the agency's final decision. This disparity in

dates does not affect our disposition of this case.