SABIC GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES B.V.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 12, 2020

14938023 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/938,023 11/11/2015 Liping Zheng 10PLAS0050-US-DIV 1050
95329 7590 02/12/2020
CANTOR COLBURN LLP - SABIC EXATEC
20 Church Street
22nd Floor
Hartford, CT 06103
EXAMINER
STACHEL, KENNETH J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1787
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/12/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usptopatentmail@cantorcolburn.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LIPING ZHENG, STEVEN M. GASWORTH,
JAMES E. PICKETT, HAIYING WANG, ZHEN LIU, QIJIA FU,
YANG DONG, and HONGXIA XI

Appeal 2019-003308
Application 14/938,023
Technology Center 1700
Before CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN, BRIAN D. RANGE, and
LILAN REN, Administrative Patent Judges.
RANGE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–10, 12, and 21. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as SABIC
GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES B.V. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER2
Appellant describes the invention as relating to, for example, a coating
for automobile windows that is transparent, absorbs infrared radiation, and
resists abrasion. Spec. ¶¶ 2–7. Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A composition, comprising:
a coating matrix, comprising a partial condensate of a
silanol of the formula RnSi(OH)4-n, where n equals 1 or 2, and
wherein R is selected from a C1-3 alkyl radical, a vinyl radical, a
3,3,3-trifluoropropyl radical, a gamma-glycidoxypropyl radical,
and a gamma-methacryloxypropyl radical, wherein the silanol
comprises greater than or equal to 70 wt% of CH3Si(OH)3;
colloidal silica; and
ITO having a mean particle size of less than or equal to
60 nm as determined by dynamic light scattering.

REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the prior art below in rejecting the claims
on appeal:
Name
Factor et al. (“Factor”)
Patel
Iacovangelo
Anderson
Kumon et al. (“Kumon”)
Dave
Kodaira et al. (“Kodaira”)
Liu et al. (“Liu”)
Reference
US 4,863,520
US 4,990,376
US 6,261,694 B1
US 2010/0080983 A1
US 2010/0227159 A1
US 2012/0040179 A1
US 2013/0071669 A1
CN102153948

Date
Sept. 5, 1989
Feb. 5, 1991
July 17, 2001
Apr. 1, 2010
Sept. 9, 2010
Feb. 16, 2012
Mar. 21, 2013
Aug. 17, 2011

2 In this Decision, we refer to the Final Office Action dated May 14, 2018
(“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed October 15, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”), the
Examiner’s Answer dated January 24, 2019 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief
filed March 22, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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Application 14/938,023

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REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains (Ans. 3) the following rejections on appeal:
A. Claims 1–10, 12, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as failing to comply
with the written description requirement. Final Act. 3–5.
B. Claims 1–10, 12, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as indefinite.
Id. at 5–6.
C. Claims 1, 3–7, and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Liu (as
evidenced by Kodaira), Kumon (as evidenced by Anderson), and
Iacovangelo. Id. at 6.
D. Claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Liu (as evidenced by
Kodaira), Kumon (as evidenced by Anderson), and Iacovangelo
further in view of Patel. Id. at 12.
E. Claims 8–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Liu (as evidenced
by Kodaira), Kumon (as evidenced by Anderson), and Iacovangelo
and further in view of Factor. Id. at 14.
F. Claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious Liu (as evidenced by
Kodaira), Kumon (as evidenced by Anderson), and Iacovangelo and
further in view of Dave. Id. at 15–16.

OPINION
Rejection B, indefiniteness. We first address indefiniteness because
evaluation of the written description and obviousness rejections depends
upon properly construing the claims.
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as indefinite. Final Act. 5–6. During
prosecution, “[a] claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose
meaning is unclear.” Ex parte McAward, Appeal No. 2015-006416, at 11
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(PTAB Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential) (quoting In re Packard, 751 F.3d
1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curium)). Our reviewing court has
emphasized that claim language should be “as precise as the subject matter
permits” and has explained that the USPTO has an important role in
ensuring that patent claims are clear and unambiguous. In re Packard, 751
F.3d at 1313; accord Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898,
899 (2014) (“Section 112’s definiteness requirement must take into account
the inherent limitations of language,” yet mandates clarity to the extent
possible under the circumstances). Importantly, 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 2
“puts the burden of precise claim drafting squarely on the applicant.” In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Halliburton Energy
Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ( “[T]he patent
drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims,
and it is highly desirable that patent examiners demand that applicants do so
in appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during
prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation.”).
Here, the Examiner rejects claim 1 as unclear because the claim has
two reasonable interpretations. Final Act. 5–6. The Examiner maintains that
Claim 1 could be read as reciting “[a] composition” (recited in the preamble)
that comprises three things: (1) “a coating matrix, comprising a partial
condensate . . . CH3Si(OH)3;” (2) “colloidal silica;” and (3) “ITO having . . .
light scattering.” Alternatively, claim 1 could be read as reciting “[a]
composition” comprising “a coating matrix” where the “coating matrix”
comprises three things: (1) “a partial condensate . . . CH3Si(OH)3;” (2)
“colloidal silica;” and (3) “ITO having . . . light scattering.” Id.
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Appellant argues that claim 1’s “meaning is clear by the punctuation
and spacing of the claim, where each of the three components is indented
and have semi-colons separating the respective components.” Appeal Br. 6–
7. This argument persuades of Examiner error. The preamble’s recitation of
“[a] composition, comprising:” ends with a colon. In typical claim drafting
style, the colon is often used to indicate an upcoming list where items in the
list are then often separated by semicolons. The colon here, therefore,
indicates that the preamble’s “composition” comprises the list of things
(each separated by a semicolon) following the colon. In contrast, the
recitation “a coating matrix, comprising a partial . . .” does not include any
punctuation after “comprising.” The “a coating matrix, comprising a partial .
. .” recitation, therefore, does not indicate that the recited “coating matrix”
would comprise all elements of the list separated by semicolons.
Accordingly, we determine that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim
1 for indefiniteness. We construe claim 1 as requiring “[a] composition”
(recited in the preamble) that comprises three things: (1) “a coating matrix,
comprising a partial condensate … CH3Si(OH)3;” (2) “colloidal silica;” and
(3) “ITO having . . . light scattering.” Likewise, claims depending from
claim 1 are not indefinite merely due to their dependence on claim 1.
The Examiner separately rejects claims 3, 4, and 21 as indefinite and
provides additional rationales as to why these dependent claims are unclear.
Final Act. 5–6. Appellant does not dispute these rejections (Appeal Br. 6–7),
and we, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims for the
Examiner’s stated reasons.
We must also assess whether indefiniteness hinders our ability to
assess the Examiner’s other rejections of claims 3, 4, and 21. The Examiner
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rejects claims 3 and 4 as indefinite because the recited “the coating
composition” lacks an antecedent basis. To resolve other patentability issues
before us and to avoid piecemeal appellate review, it is possible to make a
reasonable, conditional interpretation of claims 3 and 4. In the interest of
administrative and judicial economy, this course is appropriate wherever
reasonably possible. See Ex parte Saceman, 27 USPQ2d 1472, 1474 (BPAI
1993); Ex parte Ionescu, 222 USPQ 537, 540 (Bd. App. 1984). We,
therefore, conditionally interpret claims 3 and 4 as follows: the recited
“coating composition” refers to the composition recited as “[a] composition”
in claim 1 and in the preamble of claims 3 and 4.
Claim 21, however, is too ambiguous for us to conditionally interpret.
It is entirely unclear what claim 21’s recited “the infrared radiation
absorbing coating mixture” refers to. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862
(CCPA 1962).
Rejection A, written description. The Examiner rejects all claims on
appeal as lacking adequate written description. Final Act. 3–4. In particular,
the Examiner determines that the recited “composition” (appearing, for
example, as “[a] composition” in the preamble of claim 1) provides a broad
genus and that the written description only indicates invention of, for
example, the narrower genus of “a coating composition. Id. at 3. Appellant
argues that this rejection is in error because the Specification, as filed,
conveys that Appellant possessed the invention defined by the claim. Appeal
Br. 4–6.
Appellant’s argument identifies error. Appellant identifies, for
example, paragraphs 9 and 28 as describing the recited composition. Appeal
Br. 2. Paragraph 9, for example, refers to a “silicone coating composition,”
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and claim 1 is directed to a “composition” that comprises, among other
things, colloidal silica. The word “coating” in the Specification indicates an
intended use for the composition; the Examiner has not adequately explained
why a “coating composition” would be physically different than a
“composition” in this context such that the Specification merely indicates
the inventor’s possession of a subset of the claim 1’s recited “composition.”
We, thus, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 (and claims
depending on claim 1) based on lack of written description.
The Examiner provides a second and distinct rationale as to why
dependent claim 21 lacks adequate written description support. Final Act. 4–
5. Because the scope of claim 21 is unclear (as explained above),
comparison of the claim to the Specification’s disclosure requires undue
speculation. As a formal matter, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 21 without assessing the merits of the rejection. Cf. In re Steele, 305
F.2d at 862 (“[W]e do not think a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 should be
based on such speculations and assumptions.”).
Rejection C, obviousness of claims 1, 3–7, and 12. The Examiner
rejects claims 1, 3–7, and 12 as obvious over Liu, Kodaira, Kumon,
Anderson, and Iacovangelo. The Examiner finds that Liu teaches a thermal
insulation material for automotive glass comprising an organic silica sol
solution. Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner finds that “Liu does not expressly
disclose that the indium tin oxide and silane slurry has hydrolysis and
condensation or polymeric dispersant or catalyst.” Id. at 8. The Examiner
finds that Kumon teaches a coating formed from hydrolysis and determines
that a person of skill would have combined the hydrolysis teachings of
Kumon with the coating of Liu. Id. at 10.
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The Examiner finds that modified Liu does not expressly disclose use
of silanol that is 70% by weight CH3Si(OH)3. Final Act. 10. The Examiner
finds, however, that Iacovangelo teaches that its silicone hardcoat
composition has silanol comprising 70% by weight CH3Si(OH)3. Id. at 10–
11. The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to use a
composition with 70% by weight CH3Si(OH)3 with Liu in order to “have an
infrared radiation reflecting and ultraviolet radiation absorbing coating
formed over a polymeric substrate with a silicone hardcoat.” Id. at 11.
In addressing this rejection, Appellant’s argument groups the claims
as follows: claim 1 (Appeal Br. 7–10), claims 3 and 4 (id. at 10–11), and
claims 6 and 7 (id. at 11). Appellant does not argue claim 12 separately. In
our discussion below, we group claims 1 and 12 together, group claims 3
and 4 together, and group claims 6 and 7 together. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2013).
With respect to claim 1, Appellant first argues that the silica sol of Liu
is not necessarily a colloidal silica as claim 1 recites. Appeal Br. 8. The
preponderance of the evidence does not support Appellant’s position. We
agree with the Examiner’s finding that Liu teaches, for instance in its
Example 1, that compounding chemicals such as ethanol are added to its
silicon to form silica sol. Ans. 10; Liu 5 (identifying ethanol as an excellent
dispersant), 11 (“add the pre-dispersion to nanometer silicone resin stirred at
a high speed slowly, then add other compounding chemicals [i.e., ethanol] . .
. and nanometer silica sol are dispersed”). Also, the Examiner cites
persuasive evidence that silica sols are colloidal by definition. Ans. 10–11
(citing Ullmann’s Encyclopedia of Industrial Chemistry, Vol. 32, 421, 455–
456 (2012)).
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Appellant next argues that a person of skill in the art would have no
reason to reach a coating mixture comprising a partial condensate of silanol
that comprises greater than 70 wt% of CH3Si(OH)3. The Examiner, however,
finds that Liu teaches an automobile silica coating with “ultrahigh film
hardness” (Final Act. 7 (citing Liu)) and finds that Iacovangelo teaches that
a typical silicone hardcoat includes silanol with 70 wt% CH3Si(OH)3. Ans.
15–16. In other words, the Examiner finds that Liu teaches a silicone
hardcoat, and Iacovangelo suggests what is typical for such a silicone
hardcoat. The Examiner’s position is supported by the preponderance of the
evidence. See, e.g., Liu 1 (teaching silica hardcoat); Iacovangelo 3:63–4:7
(“Typically, at least 70 weight percent of the silanol comprises
CH3Si(OH)3.”).
Appellant also argues that a person of skill in the art would not have
reason to add Iacovangelo’s adhesion layer to Liu and that adding an
additional layer to Liu would be outside the scope of claim 1. Appeal Br. 8–
10; Reply Br. 4–6. These arguments are unpersuasive because they do not
squarely address the Examiner’s rejection. The Examiner relies on
Iacovangelo as teaching what is typical for a silicone hardcoat; the
Examiner’s rejection does not depend on bodily incorporating Iacovangelo’s
adhesion layer into Liu. Ans. 16. Because Appellant’s arguments do not
identify error, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 12.
Claims 3 and 4 recite the composition of claim 1 where, for example,
the composition comprises either “less than or equal to 0.05 parts by mass
polymeric dispersant” (claim 3) or “0 parts by mass polymeric dispersant”
(claim 4). Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.). The Examiner finds that Kumon
discloses a silicone coating composition with no polymeric dispersant that is
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useful for a heat ray shielding vehicle glass that generates no abnormal noise
by friction due to up-and-down movement. The Examiner determines that a
person of skill in the art would have considered it obvious to combine the
teachings of Kumon with the teachings of Liu in order to have “heat ray
shielding glass or resinous substrate usable as a vehicle glass [with] no
abnormal frictional noise and movement of the coated substrate up-and-
down.” Final Act. 8–10; see also Ans. 20–21 (further explaining rationale to
combine teachings of Kumon and Liu).
Appellant argues that a person of skill in the art concerned with
agglomeration would not consider modifying Liu with Kumon. Appeal Br.
10–11. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because it does not refute the
rationale for combining the teachings of Liu and Kumon stated by the
Examiner (for example, to reach a vehicle glass that lacks abnormal
frictional noise). Moreover, Appellant does not provide evidence that
agglomeration concerns would have dissuaded a person of skill in the art
from pursuing such a combination. Appeal Br. 10–11; cf. Estee Lauder Inc.
v. L’Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 595 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments of
counsel cannot take the place of evidence lacking in the record.” (quoting
Knorr v. Pearson, 671 F.2d 1368, 1373 (CCPA 1982))).
Appellant also argues that Appellant surprisingly discovered that
agglomeration can be avoided without using a polymeric dispersant. Appeal
Br. 10–11. Our reviewing court has explained that “an applicant may
overcome a prima facie case of obviousness by establishing that the
[claimed] range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range
achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range.” In re Peterson,
315 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
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Evidence of unexpected results must be reasonably commensurate with the
scope of the claims. In re Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330–31 (explaining that
showing of unexpected results “must be commensurate in scope with the
claims which the evidence is offered to support” (internal quotes and citation
omitted)). “If an applicant demonstrates that an embodiment has an
unexpected result and provides an adequate basis to support the conclusion
that other embodiments falling within the claim will behave in the same
manner, this will generally establish that the evidence is commensurate with
scope of the claims.” In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
Here, we have carefully considered Appellant’s evidence and
arguments, but the proffered evidence of unexpected results is unpersuasive.
In particular, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Appellant has not
provided evidence to establish unexpected results for ITO that has not been
aged. Ans. 20. In particular, claim 1 is open to aged or non-aged ITO, and
Appellant does not establish unexpected results for both instances. We also
note that Appellant does not present evidence that its preferred results are
unexpected. Superior results alone are not sufficient to show that results are
unexpected. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (“[A]ny superior property must be unexpected to be considered as
evidence of non-obviousness.”). Appellant, thus, has not established
unexpected results commensurate in scope with claims 3 and 4. We sustain
the rejection of claims 3 and 4.
Claims 6 and 7 recite that “greater than or equal to 90% of ITO
[indium-doped tin oxide (Spec. ¶ 6)] particles have a diameter of less than
61 nm” and “greater than or equal to 95% of ITO particles have a diameter
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of less than or equal to 71 nm” respectively. The Examiner finds that Liu
teaches mean diameter of ITO particles of less of 20–50 nm. Final Act. 7
(citing Liu 7); see also Ans. 22.
Appellant argues that a mean diameter of 20 to 50 nm does not mean
that 90% of the particles are less than 61 nm or that 95% of the particles are
less than 71 nm. Appeal Br. 11. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive
because a “reference must be considered not only for what it expressly
teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.” In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (internal quotes and citation omitted). By teaching a mean
diameter of 20 to 50 nm, Liu fairly suggests that a low percentage of
particles should be significantly larger than the mean average. Liu thus
suggests the recitations of claims 6 and 7, and we sustain the rejection of
claims 6 and 7.
Rejection D, obviousness of claim 2. Claim 2 recites, “[t]he
composition of Claim 1, wherein the colloidal silica comprises an
ammonium-stabilized colloidal silica or an acid-stabilized colloidal silica.”
Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.). The Examiner rejects claim 2 as obvious over
Liu, Kodaira, Kumon, Anderson, and Iacovangelo further in view of Patel.
Final Act. 12–14. The Examiner finds that Patel teaches ammonium-
stabilized colloidal silica for use in a silica-containing curable coating
composition. Id. The Examiner determines that a person of skill in the art
would have combined the ammonium-stabilized colloidal silica teachings of
Patel with the teachings of Liu in order “to have a crack free coating.” Id. at
14.
Appellant argues that there would be no reason to combine the
teachings of Patel and Liu. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant does not, however,
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persuasively refute the Examiner’s stated reason to combine or otherwise
cite evidence as to why a reason to combine is lacking.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that it is Patel’s small particle
size that reduces cracking and that Liu teaches a different particle size.
Reply Br. 8. Appellant raises this argument for the first time on reply, the
argument is not responsive to a new issue raised by the Examiner in the
Answer, and Appellant does not identify good cause for first raising this
argument on reply. Accordingly, we decline to consider the argument. 37
C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (2011).3 We sustain this rejection.
Rejection E, obviousness of claims 8–10. Appellant argues claims 8–
10 as a group (Appeal Br. 12–13), and we choose claim 8 as representative.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2013). Claim 8 recites, “[t]he composition of
Claim 1, further comprising a quaternary ammonium salt of a carboxylic
acid.”
The Examiner finds that claims are obvious over Liu, Kodaira,
Kumon, Anderson, and Iacovangelo and further in view of Factor. Final Act.
14. The Examiner finds that Factor teaches an improved method for forming
a protective silica coating on a substrate that makes use of a quaternary
ammonium salt of a carboxylic acid. Id. at 14–15. The Examiner determines
that a person of skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Factor

3 Consideration of new argument raised in reply is contrary to the cited
regulation. We also note that consideration of arguments raised for the first
time on reply would lead to procedurally imbalanced and unfair adjudication
because the Examiner has no opportunity to address arguments raised in the
reply brief.
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and Liu “to achieve a desired amount of hardness . . . while avoiding
inducing microcracking.” Id. at 15.
Appellant argues that Appellant surprisingly discovered a reduction of
Taber delta haze with the addition of the quaternary ammonium salt of
carboxylic acid. Appeal Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 8. The Examiner, however,
identifies many reasons why Appellant’s evidence is not commensurate in
scope with the claims. Ans. 24–25. We agree with the Examiner’s stated
reasoning as to why the evidence is lacking. Appellant argues that a person
of skill would understand that “improvements would occur over the range of
cure catalysts and amounts provided in the claims” (Reply Br. 8), but this
argument is unpersuasive because Appellant does not cite evidence to
support this point. We also note that Appellant lacks evidence that the cited
superior results are unexpected. We, thus, sustain this rejection.
Rejection F, obviousness of claim 21. Claim 21 is too ambiguous for
us to engage in an obviousness analysis. Therefore, as a formal matter, we
reverse the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 21 without assessing
the merits of this rejection. In re Steele, 305 F.2d at 862 (“[W]e do not think
a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 should be based on such speculations and
assumptions.”).

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–10, 12, 21 112 Written Description 1–10, 12,
21
1–10, 12, 21 112 Indefiniteness 3, 4, 21 1, 2, 5–10,
12
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–7, 12 103 Liu, Kodaira, Kumon,
Anderson, Iacovangelo
1, 3–7, 12
2 103 Liu, Kodaira, Kumon,
Anderson, Iacovangelo,
Patel
2
8–10 103 Liu, Kodaira, Kumon,
Anderson, Iacovangelo,
Factor
8–10
21 103 Liu, Kodaira, Kumon,
Anderson, Iacovangelo,
Dave
21
Overall
Outcome
1–10, 12,
21

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED