Russell O. Mobley, Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 9, 2011
0120080173 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 9, 2011)

0120080173

08-09-2011

Russell O. Mobley, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast Area), Agency.




Russell O. Mobley,

Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Southeast Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120080173

Agency No. 4H-335-0340-98

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from an Agency

determination dated August 30, 2007, finding that it was in compliance

with the terms of the September 17, 1998 settlement agreement into which

the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.402;

29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405. For the following

reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s determination.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the Agency violated the terms of the

September 17, 1998 settlement agreement.

BACKGROUND

On September 17, 1998, during a REDRESS mediation, Complainant and the

Agency entered into a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement

was signed by Complainant, his attorney, two management officials (M1,1

M2), a union representative, and the mediator. The settlement agreement

provided, in pertinent part, that:

1. Complainant … agrees to withdraw and not pursue EEO complaint

#4H-335-0340-96 … by accepting the modified carrier position offered

to him.

2. [M1] agrees to pay [Complainant] his regular salary beginning

September 12, 1998.

By PS Form 2564-A, Information for Pre-Complaint Counseling filed on

July 17, 2007, Complainant alleged that the Agency was in breach of the

settlement agreement. Complainant listed the Postmaster (PM) and the

Manager, Customer Service Operations (M3) of the Tampa, Florida Post

Office as the responsible management officials. Although the form did

not specify the nature of the alleged breach, the record reflects that

Complainant believed the Agency breached the settlement agreement when

it discontinued its practice of giving him two hours of Administrative

Leave (AL) a week.

In its August 30, 2007 determination, the Agency concluded that no

breach of the settlement agreement occurred. Although Complainant

began receiving two hours of AL a week after the settlement agreement in

1998, the Agency found that there was no mention of the practice in the

settlement agreement. The Agency cited the following statements by M3:

(a) PM asked him to research leave usage and provide an explanation; (b)

when he asked why Complainant was receiving two hours of AL a week, he

was told that it was part of the September 17, 1998 settlement agreement;

(c) further investigation revealed that there was no mention of the AL

in the settlement agreement; and (d) he informed Complainant in a July

2007 meeting that the Agency would be discontinuing its practice of

giving him two hours of AL a week.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal,2 Complainant contended that M1 verbally awarded him two hours

of AL a week during the REDRESS mediation. In addition, Complainant

asserted that, when previously questioned by upper management about his

AL, M2 consistently stated that the AL was part of his REDRESS settlement.

Finally, Complainant argued that, in order to determine whether the

Agency breached the settlement agreement, the Commission should ask the

individuals present at the REDRESS mediation what they heard M1 say to

him about the AL.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached

at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract

between the employee and the Agency, to which ordinary rules of contract

construction apply. See Herrington v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Request

No. 05960032 (Dec. 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that it

is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not some

unexpressed intention, that controls the contract’s construction.

Eggleston v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(Aug. 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

EEOC Request No. 05910787 (Dec. 2, 1991). This rule states that if the

writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning

must be determined from the four corners of the instrument without

resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator

Co. v. Bldg. Eng’g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

Upon review of the record, we find that the Agency did not breach the

September 17, 1998 settlement agreement when it discontinued its practice

of giving Complainant two hours of AL a week. In the instant case, the

Agency agreed in the settlement agreement to pay Complainant his regular

salary beginning September 12, 1998 in exchange for Complainant’s

withdrawal of his EEO complaint and acceptance of the modified carrier

position offered to him. There is no language in the settlement agreement

referencing an obligation by the Agency to provide Complainant with two

hours of AL a week. On appeal, Complainant asserted that M1 verbally

awarded him the AL during the REDRESS mediation. However, this was

not memorialized in the settlement agreement. We find the language of

the agreement to be clear and unambiguous on its face; therefore, its

meaning must be interpreted from the four corners of the instrument.

In addition, we note that the settlement agreement specified that the

listed provisions were “a complete and final settlement of the subject

matter.” Accordingly, we find that the Agency did not breach the

settlement agreement.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the

Agency’s determination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____8/09/11_____________

Date

1 The record reflects that M1 is now retired from the Agency.

2 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(b) provides that the Agency may submit a response

to the Commission within 30 days of receiving notice of the appeal.

The record reflects that Complainant mailed a copy of his appeal to

the Agency on October 5, 2007, the Commission sent an acknowledgment

letter to the Agency on October 12, 2007, but the Agency did not submit

a response until April 2, 2008. The Commission declines to consider

the Agency’s April 2, 2008 response, as it was untimely pursuant to

29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(b).

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0120091461

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120080173