Ross Haacke et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 2, 2020

14651382 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/651,382 06/11/2015 Ross HAACKE 0336-434-2/100760 6383
11171 7590 01/02/2020
Patent Portfolio Builders, PLLC
P.O. Box 7999
Fredericksburg, VA 22404
EXAMINER
LE, JOHN H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2862
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Mailroom@ppblaw.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROSS HAACKE,
GORDON POOLE, and
MARGHERITA MARASCHINI
____________

Appeal 2018-009159
Application 14/651,382
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before DONNA M. PRAISS, MICHELLE N. ANKENBRAND, and
JEFFREY R. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judges.

ANKENBRAND, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision2 finally rejecting claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellant is the Applicant, CGG Services SA, which, according to the
Brief, is a real party in interest. Appeal Brief, filed April 19, 2018
(“Appeal Br.”) 2.
2 Final Action, mailed November 24, 2017 (“Final Act.”).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Background
The subject matter on appeal relates to “methods and devices used for
processing seismic data and, more particularly, to generating models of
signal and/or noise using data-domain weights based on estimated signal-to-
noise ratios.” Specification, filed June 11, 2015 (“Spec.”) ¶ 2. According to
the Specification, seismic waves reflected from interfaces between
geological layers are used in the oil and gas industry to search for and
evaluate hydrocarbon deposits. Id. ¶ 3. Such seismic waves may be
generated from sources that are activated so signals corresponding to one
shot of a source do not overlap with signals corresponding to another shot.
Id. ¶ 8. However, shorter intervals may be provided between the activation
of sources, which causes signals created by different sources to overlap. Id.
¶ 10, Fig. 2A. Due to this, it is necessary to separate the wavelets associated
with different shots via denoising techniques. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12–19.
Appellant discloses a method for processing seismic data recorded by
receivers while exploring an underground formation. Id. ¶ 22. The method
includes, among other things, selecting a spatio-temporal block of data from
seismic data, estimating signal-to-noise ratios of data in the block of data for
a signal that is coherent with first seismic waves and a noise that is not
coherent with the first seismic waves, determining data-domain weights
associated to the data based on the signal-to-noise ratios, generating a model
of the signal and/or a model of the noise using the data-domain weights, and
creating an image of the underground formation using the model of the
signal and/or model of the noise. Id. According to the Specification,
Appellant’s embodiments yield accurate predictions in the presence of
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irregularly distributed data and/or signals that have a moderate degree of
aliasing, despite strong noise of any probability distribution. Id. ¶ 21.
Of the appealed claims, claims 1, 19, and 20 are independent. Claim
1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal, and reproduced below:
1. A method for processing seismic data recorded by
receivers while exploring an underground formation, the
method comprising:
[i] selecting a spatio-temporal block of data from the
seismic data;
[ii] estimating signal-to-noise ratios of data in the spatio-
temporal block of data, for a signal that is coherent with
first seismic waves used to explore the underground
formation and a noise that is not coherent with the first
seismic waves;
[iii] determining data-domain weights associated to the
data, the data-domain weights being determined based on
the estimated signal-to-noise ratios;
[iv] generating a model of the signal and/or a model of
the noise using the data-domain weights; and
[v] creating an image of the underground formation using
the model of the signal and/or the model of the noise.
Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App’x).
The Rejection
The Examiner maintains the following rejection on appeal:
Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent ineligible subject matter.
OPINION
After having considered the evidence presented in this Appeal and
each of Appellant’s contentions, Appellant does not identify reversible error
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with respect to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20. We affirm the
Examiner’s rejection of those claims for the reasons expressed in the Final
Action, the Answer, and explained below.
Legal Framework
In determining whether a claim falls within a category excluded from
eligible subject matter, our inquiry focuses on the Supreme Court’s two-step
framework described in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo,
566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine
what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219.
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas and, thus, patent ineligible
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20); mathematical formulas
(e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes
(e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts the Supreme
Court has determined are patent eligible include physical and chemical
processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing
India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56
U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
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view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). The
Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that
formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent
laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit
the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing
Benson and Flook); see also, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
In January 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) updated by USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility (available at https://go.usa.gov/xp88j) (collectively, “the 2019
Guidance”); see also October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84
Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying public that October update was
available). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
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organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. 2018)).
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial
exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional” in the
field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Analysis
We now apply the 2019 Guidance to the claims. Appellant does not
argue claims 2–4, 6–11, and 13–18 separately from claim 1. Thus, claims 2–
4, 6–11, and 13–18 stand or fall with claim 1. Although Appellant
separately argues claims 5 and 12, Appellant argues only that they are not
directed to abstract ideas. Accordingly, we address claims 1, 5, and 12
together. We then address separately independent claims 19 and 20, even
though Appellant does not separately argue those claims.
Claims 1, 5, and 12
Step 2A, prong 1 — The Judicial Exception
Under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
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human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes). 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54.
The Examiner concludes that the claim is directed to an abstract idea
of a mental process. Specifically, the Examiner concludes that the
limitations of claim 1 are analogous to the patent-ineligible steps of
collecting information, analyzing the information, and displaying certain
results, as in Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2016). Final Act. 2–3. We agree with the Examiner that claim 1
recites a judicial exception.
Limitations [i]–[iv] of claim 1, for example, recite the following
language:
selecting a spatio-temporal block of data from the seismic data;
estimating signal-to-noise ratios of data in the spatio-temporal
block of data, for a signal that is coherent with first seismic
waves used to explore the underground formation and a noise
that is not coherent with the first seismic waves;
determining data-domain weights associated to the data, the
data-domain weights being determined based on the estimated
signal-to-noise ratios;
generating a model of the signal and/or a model of the noise
using the data-domain weights;
Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App’x). A person can select a spatio-temporal block
of data, estimate signal-to-noise ratios of the data, determine data-domain
weights associated to data based on estimated signal-to-noise ratios, and
generate a model of the signal and/or the noise using the data-domain
weights in her mind, or using a pen and paper. See Examiner’s Answer,
dated June 1, 2018 (“Ans.”) 3. As such, the recited acts of selecting,
estimating, determining, and generating here reasonably can be
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characterized as involving mental processes, including evaluation and
judgment.
The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes mental processes as
constituting an abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Accordingly, limitations [i]–[iv] recite a judicial exception to patent-eligible
subject matter under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance.
Claim 5 recites the method of claim 1 further comprising “re-
estimating the signal-to-noise ratios based on the model of the signal and/or
the model of the noise,” “recalculating the data-domain weights based on the
re-estimated signal-to-noise ratios,” and “updating the model of the signal
and/or the model of the noise using the recalculated data-domain weights.”
Appeal Br. 12 (Claims App’x). Claim 12 ultimately depends from claim 1
and also requires re-estimating signal to noise ratios, recalculating data-
domain weights, and updating the model. Id. at 14. Appellant argues the
“re-estimating signal-to-noise ratios . . . is a step that calibrates seismic data
processing based on the physical reality of acquiring data which is an
overlap of signal and noise.” Id. at 8. However, as we explain above,
estimating the signal-to-noise ratios, calculating data domain weights, and
generating a model are mental processes. The “re-estimating,”
“recalculating,” and “updating” steps merely repeat analyzing the data and,
therefore, are mental processes. Accordingly, claims 5 and 12 also recite a
judicial exception under step 2A, prong 1 of the 2019 Guidance.
Step 2A, prong 2 — Integration into a Practical Application
Under step 2A, prong 2 of the 2019 Guidance, we consider whether
the claim as a whole integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application of the exception. Integration into a practical application requires
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an additional element or a combination of additional elements in the claim to
“apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.” 2019 Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 53–54; see also id. at 55 (setting forth exemplary considerations
indicative that an additional element or combination of elements may have
integrated the judicial exception into a practical application).
In addition to the selecting, estimating, determining, and generating
limitations that are the abstract idea, claim 1 recites: (1) in the preamble,
“processing seismic data recorded by receivers while exploring an
underground formation”; (2) that the signal-to-noise ratios are “for a signal
that is coherent with first seismic waves used to explore the underground
formation and a noise that is not coherent with the first seismic waves”; and
(3) “creating an image of the underground formation using the model of the
signal and/or the model of the noise.” These additional limitations,
however, do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
With respect to the preamble, the language reciting “seismic data
recorded by receivers” is directed to gathering seismic data with receivers.
Insignificant data gathering steps, however, “add nothing of practical
significance to [an] underlying abstract idea.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu,
LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
To the extent that the preamble attempts to impose a meaningful
limitation by reciting the abstract idea in the context of exploring
underground formations, the “prohibition against patenting abstract ideas
‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of [the abstract idea]
to a particular technological environment.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
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610 (2010) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92). In other words, the
preamble language does nothing more than generally link the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment. Similarly, the
limitations regarding the signal-to-noise ratios for a signal that is coherent
with first seismic waves and a noise that is not coherent with the first
seismic waves merely specify what signal and what noise are used in
estimating the signal-to-noise ratio, but do not apply or use the judicial
exception in a meaningful way. As with the preamble language, this
limitation merely links the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment.
Further, contrary to Appellant’s argument that the outcome of the
claimed invention is not displaying certain measured or calculated values but
an image of an underground formation explored using seismic waves,
Appeal Br. 7, the limitation “creating an image of the underground
formation using the model of the signal and/or the model of the noise”
represents extra-solution activity because it is a mere nominal or tangential
addition to the claim, i.e., a generic presentation of the collected and
analyzed data. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also SAP Am.,
Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[M]erely
presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for
presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and
analysis.”) (citations omitted).
Finally, when viewed in combination, the additional elements in claim
1 do no more than automate the mental processes used in surveying
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techniques. Thus, claim 1 appears to be no more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the judicial exception.
For the same reasons as we explain in connection with claim 1, the
“re-estimating,” “recalculating,” and “updating the model” steps recited in
claims 5 and 12 also appear to be a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the judicial exception.
Appellant argues that the claims seek to patent a particular
implementation and recite an invention with sufficient specificity. Appeal
Br. 5–7. These arguments are unpersuasive. As we explain above, the
limitations of “selecting a spatio-temporal block of data from the seismic
data,” “estimating signal-to-noise ratios of data in the spatio-temporal block
of data,” “determining data-domain weights associated to the data,”
“generating a model of the signal and/or a model of the noise using the data-
domain weights,” and “creating an image of the underground formation
using the model of the signal and/or the model of the noise,” as recited in
claim 1, are general in nature and lack a particular implementation that
would impose a meaningful limit on the judicial exception. See Final Act.
2–3. The same can be said for the limitations of claims 5 and 12, which
merely require “re-estimating,” “recalculating,” and “updating the model”
based on the data.
Appellant also argues that the claims do not have a precluding effect
relative to algorithmic aspects because they do not monopolize basic tools of
scientific and technological work. Appeal Br. 9. This argument also is
unpersuasive. The mere fact that the claims may not preempt all ways of
creating an image of an underground formation by estimating the signal-to-
noise ratios of seismic data, determining data-domain weights associated to
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the data, and generating a model, as recited in claim 1, for example, fails to
persuade us that claim 1 (or claims 5 or 12) integrates the judicial exception
into a practical application. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he absence of complete
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”); see also BSG Tech.
LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining
that a claim does not become eligible merely because “it recites limitations
that render it narrower than the abstract idea”).
Appellant additionally asserts that the absence of prior art rejections
evidences the novelty or inventiveness of the claims. Appeal Br. 6.
However, “[t]he question . . . of whether a particular invention is novel is
‘wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory
subject matter.’” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952,
961 (CCPA 1979) (emphasis omitted)); see also Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013)
(“[G]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”); Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90 (A novel and non-obvious
claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible.);
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. The search
for a § 101 inventive concept is thus distinct from demonstrating § 102
novelty.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s argument is not persuasive or error in
the Examiner’s rejection.
In sum, we find that claims 1, 5, and 12 do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. Accordingly, claims 1, 5, and 12 are
directed to an abstract idea.
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Step 2 B — Inventive Concept
Because claims 1, 5, and 12 are directed to an abstract idea, we
evaluate the additional elements of those claims, individually and in
combination, to determine whether the claims provide an inventive concept
(i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more than the
exception itself). See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. In doing so, we
consider whether the additional elements, individually and in an ordered
combination, are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Id.; see also
Alice, 573 U.S. 208 at 217.
The Examiner concludes, and we agree, that the claims do not contain
any additional elements, individual or in combination, that amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 3–4.
As we explain above, claim 1 contains the additional elements of
(1) in the preamble, “processing seismic data recorded by receivers while
exploring an underground formation”; (2) that the signal-to-noise ratios are
“for a signal that is coherent with first seismic waves used to explore the
underground formation and a noise that is not coherent with the first seismic
waves”; and (3) “creating an image of the underground formation using the
model of the signal and/or the model of the noise.”
Regarding the preamble, the language reciting “seismic data recorded
by receivers while exploring an underground formation” is directed to
gathering seismic data by receivers. The “Background” of the Specification
indicates that “[a]fter seismic waves are injected into the explored
underground structure, seismic receivers detect the reflected energy.”
Spec. ¶ 3. Nothing in the Specification indicates that the receivers are
anything other than generic receivers. Routine data-gathering steps,
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however, are “insufficient . . . to constitute an inventive concept.” Solutran,
Inc. v. Elavon, Inc., 931 F.3d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations
omitted).
The limitation regarding the signal that is coherent with first seismic
waves and noise that is not coherent with first seismic waves also fails to
recite an inventive concept. The Specification’s “Background” states that,
during underground exploration, “seismic receivers detect the reflected
energy (a signal, which may be coherent with the injected waves), and
undesirable noise.” Spec. ¶ 3. The “Background” continues that “[s]ome of
the noise is predictable and coherent with the signal in some domains, while
unpredictable and incoherent with the signal in other domains.” Id. ¶ 4. It
further explains that “[n]oise that is coherent in one domain but incoherent
in another may be attenuated using methods for removing incoherent noise,
applied in the domain in which the noise is incoherent.” Id. In view of these
disclosures, we determine that a signal that is coherent with first seismic
waves and noise that is not coherent with first seismic waves is a concept
that was merely well-understood, routine, and conventional during
underground exploration.
As we explain above, the limitation “creating an image of the
underground formation using the model of the signal and/or the model of the
noise” represents extra-solution activity because it is a mere nominal or
tangential addition to the claim, i.e., a generic presentation of the collected
and analyzed data. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also SAP
America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d at 1021 (“[M]erely presenting the
results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without
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more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an
ancillary part of such collection and analysis.”) (citations omitted).
Finally, when viewed in an ordered combination, the additional
elements in claim 1 do no more than automate the mental processes used in
surveying techniques. The additional elements, individually and in
combination, therefore, fail to provide an inventive concept such that the
claims recite “significantly more” than an abstract idea.
Appellant argues that the claims improve seismic exploration
technology in that they “yield accurate predictions in the presence of
irregularly distributed data and/or for signals that have a moderate degree of
aliasing.” Appeal Br. 8. This argument is not persuasive.
First, we note that claims 1, 5, and 12 do not recite or require
“yield[ing] accurate predictions in the presence of irregularly distributed
data and/or for signals that have a moderate degree of aliasing,” as Appellant
argues. In any event, as the Examiner finds, it appears that any
improvements the claimed invention provide are due to the judicial
exception itself. Ans. 5. “It has been clear since Alice that a claimed
invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply
the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than
that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech., 899 F.3d at 1290.
In summary, we have carefully considered Appellant’s arguments but
are not persuaded of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–
18.
Claim 19
Appellant does not present separate arguments for independent
claim 19. Appeal Br. 5–9. Claim 19 is similar to claim 1 (our analysis of
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which applies equally here) but recites an apparatus, rather than a method,
and the apparatus includes, inter alia, “an input/output interface” and “a data
processing unit.” These additional elements fail to integrate the abstract idea
into a practical application. The Examiner finds these limitations are recited
at a high level of generality and do not add significantly more to the judicial
exception. Final Act. 4. The Examiner further finds that these elements are
generic computing devices that perform generic functions. Id. at 3–4. We
agree.
The Specification does not indicate that the input/output interface and
data processing unit are anything other than generic computing devices.
Spec. ¶¶ 61–64. Using generic computer elements to perform an abstract
idea does not integrate an abstract idea into a practical application. See 2019
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Moreover, “the mere recitation of a generic
computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223; see also FairWarningIP,
LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation
omitted) (“[T]he use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or
user interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-
eligible subject matter”).
On the record before us, we are not persuaded that the input/output
interface and data processing unit of claim 19 integrates the abstract idea
into a practical application. Nor are we persuaded that the additional
elements are anything more than well-understood, routine, and conventional
so as to impart subject matter eligibility to claim 19. Therefore, we affirm
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 19.

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Claim 20
Appellant does not present separate arguments for independent claim
20. Appeal Br. 5–9. Claim 20 is similar to claim 1 (our analysis of which
applies equally here) but recites a non-transitory computer readable medium
storing executable codes that, when executed by a computer, performs a
method similar to that of claim 1. This amounts to nothing more than
instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer, which fails to
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See 2019 Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Additionally, using instructions to implement an abstract
idea on a generic computer “is not ‘enough’ to transform an abstract idea
into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. Therefore, we
affirm the rejection of claim 20 for the same reason discussed above with
regard to the rejection of claim 1.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED