0120073911
08-25-2009
Roseanne Miramonti, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Great Lakes Area), Agency.
Roseanne Miramonti,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Great Lakes Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120073911
Agency No. 1J-631-0026-07
Complainant filed an appeal with this Commission regarding her allegation
that the agency had breached the terms of the May 22, 2007 settlement
agreement into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402;
29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
The record reflects that complainant initiated EEO contact on or around
March 19, 2007, alleging that she was denied a reasonable accommodation
when management did not allow her to work a day shift in accordance
with her medical restrictions. The parties subsequently entered into
a settlement agreement providing, in pertinent part, that:
(1) [Subject] to agreement of Sr. MDO on Tour II, [sic], complainant
will be assigned temporarily, effective [Saturday] 5/26/07, to work
between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
(2) This temporary assignment will be reviewed each 30 days.
Complainant shall provide doctor's statement each 30 days for review by
appropriate [management] officials.
(3) Upon determination that complainant is fit for return to full
duty, she shall return to her regular assignment on Tour III.
On or around August 15, 2007, complainant submitted correspondence to the
agency alleging that the agency was in breach of the settlement agreement
because management officials sent her home on one occasion and repeatedly
refused to allow her to work half of her shift on Tour II in accordance
with the agreement. Complainant requested that the agency specifically
implement the terms of the agreement and provide her with lost wages,
benefits, and compensatory damages.
On October 16, 2007, the agency issued a final decision finding that no
breach occurred because the agency had complied with the terms of the
settlement agreement. The agency's decision noted that complainant was
not allowed to work for a period in mid-June because she had not submitted
appropriate medical documentation, and she was otherwise provided with
work between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
On appeal, through her representative, complainant states that management
allowed her to work 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. from May 26, 2007 through June
14, 2007, but she was placed off the clock on June 14, 2007 for failing
to submit sufficient medical documentation. When her return to work was
approved on or around June 22, 2007, she was only assigned to work from
1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. She argues that she "more than met her obligations
under the Agreement" by submitting medical documentation on May 22, 2007,
June 15, 2007, August 13, 2007, August 29, 2007, and August 30, 2007.
She further argues that the agency breached the agreement by refusing to
allow her to work on June 14, 2007 and denying her an eight hour shift.
In terms of remedies, complainant seeks reinstatement to an eight hour,
daytime shift, compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and whatever other
damages the Commission deems appropriate.1
In response, the agency argues that complainant's appeal should be
dismissed as premature because it was filed prior to issuance of the
agency's final decision. The agency alternatively argues that the
settlement agreement was never breached because complainant provided
insufficient medical documentation on June 14, 2007, and, after she
submitted proper medical documentation, she was provided with work between
8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
As an initial matter, we must first address whether complainant's appeal
is properly before the Commission. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R � 1614.504(a)
provides that if complainant believes that the agency has failed to
comply with the terms of the settlement agreement, then the complainant
"shall notify the EEO Director, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance
within 30 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of
the alleged noncompliance." EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R � 1614.504(b)
further provides that the agency "shall resolve the matter and respond
to the complainant, in writing." If the agency has not responded to
the complainant or if she is not satisfied with the agency's attempt to
resolve the matter, she may appeal to the Commission for a determination
as to whether the agency has complied with the terms of the settlement
agreement or final decision. Id.
The record reflects that complainant's September 7, 2007 appeal
was premature at the time of filing since the agency had not yet
issued a final decision addressing her breach allegation. However,
since complainant notified the agency's EEO Director of the alleged
noncompliance in a timely manner, and the agency issued a final decision
while complainant's appeal was pending before the Commission, we find
that the appeal is currently ripe for review
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of
contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, complainant argues that the agency breached provision
(2) of the agreement on June 14, 2007 by not allowing her to work that
day despite the fact that she had submitted medical documentation on May
22, 2007. She argues that the agreement required her to submit updated
medical documentation every 30 days, and, as a result, she should not have
been required to submit new documentation on June 14, 2007. She further
argues that the parties drafted provision (1) of the agreement with the
intention of granting her eight hours of work each day between 8:30
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. She states that management officials breached the
agreement by completely denying her work from June 14, 2007 through June
21, 2007 and only assigning her two to four hours of work each day after
June 22, 2007. In contrast, the agency argues that management officials
determined that complainant's light duty statement only covered her from
May 9, 2007 through June 9, 2007, and she had not submitted sufficient
medical documentation on June 14, 2007. The agency's decision notes
that she was allowed to return to work after she provided additional
medical documentation as required by provision (2). With respect to
complainant's work hours, the agency argues that provision (1) only
required the agency to provide her with work between the hours of 8:30
a.m. and 5:00 p.m., and if she wanted to be guaranteed eight hours of
work she should have explicitly included this in the agreement.
In reviewing the settlement agreement, the Commission finds that its
terms are too vague and general to be interpreted with any authority.
We find that the terms of provisions (1) and (2) are ambiguous and,
based on the parties divergent interpretations of those terms, do not
represent a meeting of the minds. Specifically, the parties are unable
to specify when the 30 day time frame for complainant to submit medical
documentation began, what constituted sufficient medical documentation to
comply with the agreement, and whether complainant was guaranteed eight
hours of work between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m each day. Consequently,
we conclude that, the settlement agreement entered into on May 22,
2007, does not represent a meeting of the minds of the parties and is
void for vagueness. See Mullen v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request
No. 05890349 (May 18, 1989).
Accordingly, the agency's decision finding that the agency was in
compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement is VACATED, and
the matter is REMANDED to the agency for reinstatement from the point
where processing ceased in accordance with the ORDER below.
ORDER
To the extent that it has not already done so, the agency is ordered to:
(1) Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes
final, the agency shall resume processing the matter from the point where
processing ceased. The agency shall acknowledge to complainant that it
has reinstated and resumed the processing the previously settled matter.
(2) A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment must be sent to
the Compliance Officer as referenced below.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1208)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar
days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall
be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,
DC 20013. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,
and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.
If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant
may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �
1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action
to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following
an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,
1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant
has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in
accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil
Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for
enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject
to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of
the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1208)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0408)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date
that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant
in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time
limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
__________08/25/09________
Date
1 We note that compensatory damages are not an available remedy for
breach of a settlement agreement. Kessler v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05970446 (February 26, 1999); see also 29
C.F.R. � 1614.504(c) ("If the Commission determines that the agency is
not in compliance and the noncompliance is not attributable to acts or
conduct of the complainant, it may order such compliance or it may order
that the complaint be reinstated for further processing from the point
processing ceased.").
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0120073911
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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0120073911