01a54268
11-07-2005
Roseanna T. Davis, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Eastern Area) Agency.
Roseanna T. Davis v. United States Postal Service
01A54268
November 7, 2005
.
Roseanna T. Davis,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Eastern Area)
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A54268
Agency No. 4C-280-0019-04
Hearing No. 140-2004-00210X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.
The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the
following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.
The record reveals that complainant, a Postmaster, EAS-18, in the Andrews,
North Carolina office filed a formal EEO complaint on January 8, 2004,
alleging that the agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex
(female) when on November 6, 2003, complainant was not selected for
the position of Postmaster, Murphy, North Carolina, EAS-20, Vacancy
Announcement Number 03-78. At the conclusion of the investigation,
complainant received a copy of the investigative report and requested a
hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing,
the AJ issued a decision finding no discrimination. The agency's final
order implemented the AJ's decision.
As an initial matter we note that pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a),
all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by
substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as
�such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding
regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual
finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).
An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review,
whether or not a hearing was held.
In the absence of direct evidence, a claim of discrimination is examined
under the three-part analysis originally enunciated in McDonnell
Douglas Corporation v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to
prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination
by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an
inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a
factor in the adverse employment action. Id. at 802; Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Here, complainant suffered an
adverse employment action when she was not selected for the Postmaster
position. As a female, complainant is a member of a protected class
who was minimally qualified for the Postmaster position. Additionally,
the applicant hired for the position was a male. Thus, complainant
established a prima facie case of sex discrimination because the facts
alone reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination.
The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). The agency stated that
complainant and selectee had substantially similar tenures with the agency
but that selectee best fit the needs of the position. The Postmaster
position required strong leadership qualities, including experience in
customer and community relations and labor relations. The position also
called for management of city, rural, and highway route mail delivery and
collection. With regard to leadership, the selecting official explained
at the hearing that selectee's non-militaristic style of management would
better serve the agency as opposed to complainant's management style.
He stated that, �[selectee] would be a manager who would lead employees
to accomplish tasks rather than pushing employees to accomplish tasks.�
In addition to selectee's management style, the selecting official noted
that selectee had improved labor relations during his tenure, evidenced
by �the atmosphere in the office changing dramatically.� Specifically,
office morale and customer service were improved under selectee's
leadership. Lastly, the selecting official stated that complainant
demonstrated limited knowledge of city delivery during her interview,
despite having past experience. The selecting official indicated that
sex was not a factor in the selection.
Once the agency has met its burden, the burden returns to the complainant
to establish that the agency's explanation was pretext for discrimination.
Complainant can prove pretext directly by showing a discriminatory
reason more likely than not motivated the agency or indirectly by
showing that the agency's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. In a non-selection case, pretext may be found
where the complainant's qualifications are demonstrably superior to
the selectee's Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F. 2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981).
However, the agency has broad discretion to carry out personnel decisions
and should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority absent
evidence of unlawful motivation. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259. In this
case, complainant failed to adequately rebut the agency's reasons for
selecting the other candidate as pretext. On appeal, complainant rejects
the agency's conclusion that her leadership style is militaristic and
disagrees about having limited knowledge of city delivery experience.
She also maintains that the record is inconsistent as whether the selectee
improved labor relations. Complainant argues that the agency's reasons
are pretext because she believes that there has been a pattern and
practice of promoting males to higher level Postmaster positions, while
females are promoted at a lower level and to lower paying Postmaster
positions. Complainant further contends that her qualifications,
training, and experience were far superior to that of the selectee.
The agency asks the Commission to affirm the AJ's decision.
We find that complainant did not offer persuasive evidence that the
agency's articulated reason for its non-selection was pretextual.
While complainant argued that the responsible management officials
(RMO) involved promoted a disproportionate number of men over women
to Postmaster positions, we are unable to reach the same conclusion.
In fact, the record reflects that the number of male and female
appointments is split almost equally. Complainant also argued that higher
paying positions go to males, but she failed to provide a time frame and
salary levels that would reflect a pattern and practice of discrimination.
We are unable to detect a pattern of sex discrimination based on the
factual evidence that complainant has provided. We further find that
complainant has not offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that her
qualifications for the position were plainly superior to those of the
selectee, or that her sex adversely affected her in the evaluation and
selection process. As we mentioned earlier, complainant and selectee had
substantially similar tenures. However, the selecting official found
that selectee's management style, past experience in labor relations,
and management in both city and rural route mail delivery and collection
all made him the best fit for the Postmaster position. We concur with
the AJ in finding that the agency's decision not to select complainant
for the position was not motivated by any discriminatory animus toward
her gender or any other protected basis.
Additionally, complainant asserts on appeal that the AJ had an improper
relationship with the agency attorney and that the AJ was biased during
the hearing process. EEOC regulations and Commission precedent provide
AJ's with broad discretion in the conduct of a hearing. See 29 C.F.R. �
1614.109; see also EEOC Management Directive 110 (MD-110), Chapter 7,
at 9-10 (1999). We remind complainant that any allegations based on the
AJ's alleged bias or unfair hearing process should be brought to the
AJ's attention during the hearing. Id. There is no record here that
complainant raised her allegations of bias with the AJ. Assuming that
complainant had raised these allegations, we find that neither the
evidence of record nor complainant's arguments produce a substantial
showing of personal bias. See Roberts v. Morton, 549 F.2d 158, 164
(10th Cir. 1977) (substantial showing of personal bias required to
obtain ruling that hearing was unfair). In fact, we note that during
the hearing, the AJ gave complainant ample opportunity to present her
case and even stated that �[she] gave [her] complainants as much counsel
as she can without crossing the line.� We also note that while the AJ
acknowledged that the agency attorney had appeared before her in the
past, her past dealings with him did not present a conflict of interest
sufficient enough to have tainted the hearing process.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the
AJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the
record and that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant
facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws.
We conclude that complainant failed to present evidence that any of
the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus toward
complainant's sex. We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision
and we AFFIRM the agency's final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
November 7, 2005
______________________________ __________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director Date
Office of Federal Operations