Rong Zhou et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 15, 2020

13156573 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 15, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/156,573 06/09/2011 Rong Zhou 20110016USNP-
XER2663US01
5353
61962 7590 01/15/2020
FAY SHARPE LLP / XEROX - PARC
1228 EUCLID AVENUE, 5TH FLOOR
THE HALLE BUILDING
CLEVELAND, OH 44115
EXAMINER
PACHOL, NICHOLAS C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2672
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/15/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte RONG ZHOU, SUDHENDU RAI, MINH BINH DO, and
CRAIG LAMBRECHT
____________________

Appeal 2018-005211
Application 13/156,573
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1, 3–12, and 14–25. Appellant has canceled claims 2 and 13. See
Appeal Br. 41, 44. We have jurisdiction over the remaining pending claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies Palo
Alto Research Center Incorporated and Xerox Corporation as the real parties
in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 13/156,573

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention generally relates to the
planning and scheduling of print jobs across a plurality of print shops. Spec.
¶¶ 1, 5. In particular, Appellant describes a multi-site scheduler
configuration wherein the scheduling is based on a fastest completion time.
Spec. ¶ 5. One of the considerations to take into account for such scheduling
is the transportation time associated with sending the print jobs between
print shops. Spec. ¶ 24. In a disclosed embodiment, the transportation delay
is modeled as a transportation delay matrix, wherein the matrix includes an
entry for each direction of transportation between shops. Spec. ¶ 25. An
example transportation delay matrix, Table 1, is reproduced below:

Spec. ¶ 25. As shown, the delay between shops may be the same in both
directions (e.g., from A to B and B to A) or may differ (e.g., from A to C the
transportation delay is 48 hours, but from C to A, the delay is 36 hours).
Spec. ¶ 26. In addition, the transportation delay matrix may reflect
operational or security constraints as an infinite transportation delay (e.g.,
the delay from C to B). Spec. ¶ 26. In this scenario, shop B may be able to
send jobs to shop C, but not the other way around because B does not have
the same security clearance level as shop C. Spec. ¶ 26.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal and is
reproduced below with the disputed limitations emphasized in italics:
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1. A system for managing scheduling of a plurality of jobs in
a multi-site cell based shop environment comprising:
a plurality of cell based print shops having resources and
equipment to complete at least one type of job; and
a multi-site cell based scheduler configured to
automatically assign and schedule jobs to one of a home shop or
a non-home shop, based on an earliest completion time, each of
the plurality of scheduled jobs configured to specify its home
shop, wherein the home shop includes all equipment and
resources necessary for producing a job, wherein a completion
time of a job in a particular home shop is defined as an actual
time taken to complete the job and a completion time of a job in
a particular non-home shop is defined as the actual time taken to
complete the job and a transportation delay, wherein the
transportation delay is defined as a time taken to transport a
completed job from the particular non-home shop to the
completed job’s home shop, wherein resources are tentatively
allocated and a schedule is tentatively generated for both the
home shop and for the particular non-home shop to both produce
the print job in accordance with print data corresponding to the
print job, wherein the transportation delay is determined via a
transportation delay matrix generated in accordance with
symmetric and asymmetric delays corresponding to
transportation of the print job to and from each non-home shop
and the home shop, wherein at least one of the asymmetric delays
includes a security constraint such that the home shop includes a
first security clearance level and a non-home shop includes a
second security clearance level, wherein the first security
clearance level and the second security clearance level are
neither more nor less secure than the other such that the first and
second security levels are incompatible, wherein the security
constraint is enforced by modeling the transportation delay
between the home shop and the non-home shop as an infinite
transportation delay to the at least one of the home shop or the
non-home shop, and wherein the multi-site cell based scheduler
is implemented using at least one electronic processor.

Appeal 2018-005211
Application 13/156,573

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The Examiner’s Rejections
1. Claims 1, 3–12, and 14–22 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over LaVigne et al. (US
2011/0286016 A1; Nov. 24, 2011) (“LaVigne”); Komine (US 2010/0238484
A1; Sept. 23, 2010); Mizumo (US 2001/0021311 A1; Sept. 13, 2001);
Shiohara (US 6,822,754 B1; Nov. 23, 2004); and Schmidt et al. (US
2011/0010543 A1; Jan. 13, 2011). Final Act. 10–28.
2. Claim 23 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Lobiondo (US 5,287,194; Feb. 15, 1994); Shiohara;
LaVigne; Komine; and Schmidt. Final Act. 28–37.
3. Claims 24 and 25 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over LaVigne, Komine, Mizumo, Shiohara,
Schmidt, and Lobiondo. Final Act. 37–38.

ANALYSIS2
In rejecting independent claim 1, the Examiner relies on Schmidt to
teach modeling a transportation delay in the transportation delay matrix as
infinite when there are incompatible security levels between two shops.
Final Act. 15 (citing Schmidt ¶¶ 76, 117, 374). In particular, the Examiner
finds Schmidt teaches “certain devices are not authorized to interact with
others based on security levels” and that “[b]y having the inability to
communicate, then the job would never be sent to the other device and

2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
January 12, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed April 20, 2018
(“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed February 23, 2018 (“Ans.”);
and the Final Office Action, mailed July 12, 2017 (“Final Act.”), from which
this Appeal is taken.
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Application 13/156,573

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therefore an infinite transportation time would be produced.” Final Act. 15;
Ans. 33.
Appellant argues, inter alia, that “Schmidt discloses cyberspace
delays in the form of very short TCP/IP network delay on the order of
milliseconds” as opposed to the pending claims that describe “a real-world
ship delay time between two sites on the order of hours, days or times.”
Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 4.
The Examiner responds that “[t]here is no definition as to what
constitutes transportation within the claims and therefore can be interpreted
as any type of transportation, including transportation of a signal. Therefore,
measuring the delay in terms of milliseconds, still counts as measuring the
transportation delay in regards to the security.” Ans. 34.
When construing claim terminology during prosecution before the
Office, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the Specification, reading claim language in light of the
Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.
In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
However, the broadest reasonable interpretation differs from the broadest
possible interpretation. In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 2017). The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest
reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is “an interpretation
that corresponds with what and how the inventor describes his invention in
the specification, i.e., an interpretation that is ‘consistent with the
specification.’” Smith, 871 F.3d at 1382–83 (quoting In re Morris, 127 F.3d
1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Additionally, we are mindful that limitations
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are not to be read into the claims from the Specification. In re Van Geuns,
988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
When read in light of the Specification, we agree with Appellant that
the transportation delay relates to a physical-world time to traverse the
distance between two print shops, rather than a time to merely electronically
communicate between two shops. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 23–26, 33–34, 38–41,
46–49, 56. As such, we do not find that Schmidt teaches or reasonably
suggests modeling a transportation delay between two physical sites as an
infinite delay in a transportation delay matrix if the security clearance levels
between the two sites are incompatible.
Moreover, to the extent the Examiner relies on LaVigne to teach the
claimed transportation delay matrix, we disagree. Rather, we find the
Examiner has not identified sufficient evidence to support a finding that
LaVigne uses, contemplates, or suggests a transportation delay matrix. See
Final Act. 11 (reasoning that in the Examiner’s scenario of LaVigne, a
“delay in shipping [] be calculated based on multiple factors, symmetric and
asymmetric delays. This would also require a more complex analysis [than]
a simple vector analysis, which would mean utilizing a matrix.”). See In re
Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967) (declining to resort to
impermissible speculation or assumptions to cure deficiencies in the factual
bases of the rejection).
Because we find it dispositive that the Examiner has not shown by a
preponderance of evidence that the cited prior art teaches or reasonably
suggests modeling a physical-world transportation delay between two print
shops as an infinite delay in a transportation delay matrix to indicate an
incompatibility between the security clearance levels of the two print shops,
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we do not address other issues raised by Appellant’s arguments related to
these claims. See Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (finding an administrative agency is at liberty to reach a decision
based on “a single dispositive issue”).
For the reasons discussed supra, we are persuaded of Examiner error.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1. For similar reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 12 and 23, which recite commensurate limitations.
Additionally, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 3–11,
14–22, 24, and 25, which depend directly or indirectly therefrom.

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CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3–12, and 14–
25 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–12,
14–22
103(a) LaVigne, Komine,
Mizumo, Shiohara,
Schmidt
1, 3–12,
14–22
23 103(a) LaVigne, Komine,
Schmidt, Shiohara,
Lobiondo
23
24, 25 103(a) LaVigne, Komine,
Mizumo, Shiohara,
Schmidt, Lobiondo
24, 25
Overall
Outcome
1, 3–12,
14–25

REVERSED