01a03309
07-19-2000
Ronald J. Daniels v. United States Postal Service
01A03309
July 19, 2000
Ronald J. Daniels, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01A03309
v. ) Agency No. 1H-301-0021-99
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision
concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the
bases of race (Black), and age (DOB: April 4, 1942) in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �
2000e et seq.; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.<1> Complainant alleges he
was discriminated against when on November 25, 1998, he was notified
that his request for reinstatement with the agency had been denied.
The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). For the following reasons, the
Commission affirms the final agency decision (FAD).
The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was a
former employee of the agency at the agency's facility in Atlanta,
Georgia. Complainant had been removed from service on April 4, 1986.
He had applied for reinstatement and been denied on three occasions
prior to the one at issue in this complaint. Complainant alleged that
he was discriminatorily denied reinstatement when he received the notice
of denial dated November 25, 1998.
Believing he was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO
counseling and filed a complaint on January 26, 1999. At the conclusion
of the investigation, complainant requested a hearing before a Commission
Administrative Judge (AJ), but he subsequently withdrew that request
and instead requested that the agency issue a final agency decision on
the record.
Complainant claimed that two other individuals not of his protected
classes had engaged in similar offenses, and either were not fired
or were granted reinstatement. The agency concluded that complainant
failed to establish a prima facie case of race or age discrimination
because he presented no evidence that similarly situated individuals
not in his protected classes were treated differently than him under
similar circumstances. The agency found that there was no record of the
first named individual (C-1) ever having worked for the agency, and it
had no information about the second individual (C-2) ever having been
removed from the agency's service, concluding that complainant had not
shown that there were any individuals who were similarly situated to he.
It further stated that the agency had legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for not reinstating complainant, i.e. his prior removal from
the agency for just cause. Complainant had been removed on April 4,
1986 for �theft by taking�. The agency found that complainant had not
shown this reason to be pretext for discrimination.
The complainant raised no new contentions on appeal. The agency requests
that we affirm its FAD.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979). For complainant
to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination
by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an
inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration
was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567
(1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met
its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade
the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted
on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the
first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima
facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel
action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the
third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of
whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159
(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,
EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In response to complainant's claims of discrimination, the agency
presented evidence that complainant had been previously removed from
the agency for just cause, when he was charged with and found guilty of
three counts of �theft by taking.� Based on his prior employment history
with the agency, complainant's request for reinstatement was denied.
We find that the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action.
Since the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its action, the burden returns to the complainant to demonstrate
that the agency's articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination.
We find that complainant has failed to do so. Complainant did not show
that the agency had removed and reinstated either C-1 or C-2, and failed
to show that the agency official who denied his request for reinstatement
did so for discriminatory reasons. Beyond his conclusory statements that
the denial was due to discrimination, there is no evidence in the file
to show that this was the case. Therefore, the agency's determination
that complainant failed to establish that he was discriminated against
was correct.<2>
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE
DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case
in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and
not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
07-19-00
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
Date
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's
federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations
apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in
the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply
the revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where
applicable, in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as amended,
may also be found at the Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.
2 We find that the agency erred to the extent that it found that
complainant had not established a prima facie case of race or age
discrimination because he was unable to demonstrate that he was treated
less favorably than any similarly situated employee. We note that to
establish a prima facie case, complainant must only present evidence
which, if unrebutted, would support an inference that the agency's
actions resulted from discrimination. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 576. It is not
necessary for the complainant to rely strictly on comparative evidence in
order to establish an inference of discriminatory motivation necessary to
support a prima facie case. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,
116 S.Ct. 1307 (1996); Enforcement Guidance on O'Connor v. Consolidated
Coin Caterers Corp., EEOC Notice No. 915.002, n.4 (September 18, 1996);
Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1996).