Ronald A. Crisp, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 26, 2001
01A03932_r (E.E.O.C. Mar. 26, 2001)

01A03932_r

03-26-2001

Ronald A. Crisp, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Ronald A. Crisp v. United States Postal Service

01A03932

March 26, 2001

.

Ronald A. Crisp,

Complainant,

v.

William J. Henderson,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A03932

Agency No. 1A-126-0036-99

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from an agency

decision dated March 15, 1999, dismissing his complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. In his

complaint, complainant alleged that he was subjected to discrimination

on the bases of sex (male) and disability (tendinitis) when:

Complainant's impairment was not reasonably accommodated resulting in

management's continuous denial of a bid job from 1991 through January

1996;

Complainant was not placed in his bid job after being awarded the job

through an arbitration decision dated June 5, 1999; and

On January 29, 1996, complainant's training on the Small Parcel and

Bundle Sorter (SPBS) was terminated.

The agency dismissed issues (1) and (3) of complainant's complaint

pursuant to the regulation set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(2),

for untimely EEO Counselor contact. Specifically, the agency noted

that complainant did not contact an EEO Counselor until June 15, 1999,

nearly 3 � years after his denial of the January 18, 1996 bid and the

termination of his SPBS training on January 29, 1996. In addition, the

agency stated that complainant failed to establish a continuing violation.

The agency stated that complainant reasonably suspected discrimination

based on his perceived disability at the time he filed his grievance in

December 1993. With regard to complainant's claim of discrimination

based on sex, the agency rejected complainant's argument that he did

not realize he was discriminated against until June 15, 1999, when his

representative informed him that disabled females were placed in their bid

assignments. Specifically, the agency noted that the females identified

by complainant were not placed into the same assignments complainant was

denied and stated that the placing of females into bid assignments on

which complainant did not bid is not relevant in determining whether

complainant reasonably suspected he was subject to discrimination.

Finally, the agency dismissed issue (2) pursuant to the regulation

set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a), for failure to state a claim.

Specifically, the agency stated that in issue (2) complainant alleged

noncompliance with a previous grievance decision.

On appeal complainant states that he did not reasonably suspect

discrimination until June 1999. Complainant states that he filed his

complaint based on the fact that an Arbitration Award dated February

2, 1998, was not being adhered to by the agency and also because he

just learned that females had been given the same disability rights he

had been denied. Finally, complainant argues that on June 5, 1999, an

Arbitration Award made it clear that his right to the bid jobs was valid

and that the agency had denied the jobs based on complainant's disability,

even though complainant had medical documentation that established that

he was qualified for the jobs.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of

discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the

matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel

action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action.

The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed

to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45)

day limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Request No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation

is not triggered until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination,

but before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have

become apparent.

EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend

the time limits when the individual shows that he was not notified of the

time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that he did not know

and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or

personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence he was prevented

by circumstances beyond his control from contacting the Counselor within

the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency

or the Commission.

With regard to issues (1) and (3), we find that the agency properly

dismissed these issues for untimely EEO Counselor contact. The record

reveals that complainant's training was terminated on January 29,

1996, and the date of the last denial of a bid job in his complaint

was January 18, 1996. The record reveals that complainant initiated

contact with an EEO Counselor on June 15, 1999. Complainant argues

that he did not recognize he was discriminated against until his

grievance was sustained on June 6, 1999. We note, however that the

use of the negotiated grievance procedure does not toll the time limit

for contacting an EEO Counselor. Schermerhorn v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05940729 (February 10, 1995). Furthermore,

in his grievance complainant alleged that he was unfairly denied bid

jobs and the opportunity to train based on his perceived disability.

Thus, we find that complainant reasonably suspected discrimination at

the time he filed his grievance.

With regard to issue (2), we find that the agency properly denied this

claim for failure to state a claim. Complainant alleged that he was not

placed in his bid job after being awarded the job through an arbitration

decision dated June 5, 1999. Complainant is alleging noncompliance

with the June 5, 1999 arbitration award. The Commission has held that

an employee cannot use the EEO complaint process to lodge a collateral

attack on another proceeding. See Wills v. Department of Defense ,

EEOC Request No. 05970596 (July 30, 1998); Kleinman v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05940585 (September 22, 1994); Lingad v.

United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05930106 (June 25, 1993).

The proper forum for complainant to have raised his challenges to actions

which occurred during the arbitration proceeding was at that proceeding

itself. It is inappropriate to now attempt to use the EEO process to

collaterally attack actions which occurred during the arbitration process.

Accordingly, we the agency's decision to dismiss complainant's complaint

was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 26, 2001

__________________

Date