Romona A. Rountree, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 12, 2002
01995355 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 12, 2002)

01995355

03-12-2002

Romona A. Rountree, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Romona A. Rountree v. United States Postal Service

01995355

03-12-02

.

Romona A. Rountree,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01995355

Agency No. 1-G-787-0018-97

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant claimed that she was discriminated

against on the basis of disability (back injury) when on February 2, 3,

9, 28 and March 8, 16, 1997, she was harassed about going to physical

therapy and denied union representation.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a Distribution Clerk at the agency's Austin, Texas facility.

The record reflects that in order to settle a dispute regarding treatment

of complainant's back impairment she was sent to an outside physician for

a third opinion. The doctor ordered complainant to complete a course of

physical therapy within thirty days. A note regarding this treatment was

sent to complainant's second line supervisor. Complainant's insurance

company, however, refused to cover the prescribed physical therapy

because it believed that complainant's back injury was work related, so

complainant did not attend. Complainant was asked by management on the

above listed six occasions the status of her physical therapy attendance.

Believing she was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO

counseling and subsequently filed a formal complaint on October 8, 1998.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge

or alternatively, to receive a final agency decision (FAD) without a

hearing. Complainant chose the latter option.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant failed to establish that

she was an individual with a disability as defined by the Rehabilitation

Act. Specifically, the FAD held that complainant failed to demonstrate

that she had a physical impairment which substantially limited one or more

of her major life activities, that she had a record of such an impairment,

or that she was regarded as having such an impairment. Further, the FAD

maintained that the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its action, namely, that pursuant to a letter received by

management, complainant was ordered to complete physical therapy within

30 days. The agency maintained that complainant was questioned about her

physical therapy schedule in order to assure that she met the deadline.

Additionally, the agency indicated that union representation was not

needed for the meetings between complainant and management because no

disciplinary action was being initiated.

On appeal, complainant contends that she has been told by her physician

that her impairment is permanent and she is presently working in a

modified position in the light duty area. Complainant also contends

that the following major life activities have been affected by her

impairment: shopping for her family; experiences pain when lifting her

eight month old child; and she can not vacuum or mop a floor without pain.

The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

It is well-settled that harassment in the workplace constitutes an

actionable form of discrimination under Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank

v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Harassment of an employee that would

not occur but for the employee's race, color, sex, national origin,

age, disability or religion is unlawful if it is sufficiently patterned

or pervasive. Garretson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal

No. 01945351 (April 4, 1996); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39

(D.C. Cir 1985). The Commission's Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious

Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisor, EEOC Notice

No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999) identifies two types of such harassment:

(1) harassment that results in a tangible employment action; and (2)

harassment that creates a hostile work environment. Based on the facts

of this case, we will analyze this matter as an allegation of harassment

that creates a hostile work environment.

To establish a prima facie case of hostile environment harassment, the

complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected

class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal

or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment

complained of was based on the statutorily protected class; and (4)

the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the

purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment

and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.

Humphrey v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01965238

(October 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. � 1604.11.

For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that complainant is an

individual covered by the Rehabilitation Act. Upon our review, we find

that complainant has not established a prima facie case of harassment

based on disability. We find that even assuming complainant had

established that the questions regarding her physical therapy schedule

were related to her impairment, she has not shown that the conduct

complained of was sufficiently severe or pervasive to the point where

it altered the complainant's employment and created an abusive working

environment. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993).

We note that management questioned complainant about her physical therapy

schedule because they had received notice that she was to complete this

course of treatment within thirty days. We find that the record reflects

that complainant was initially questioned by two different supervisors who

were not aware that the other had asked complainant about her physical

therapy attendance. Further, the record reflects that one of the

supervisors was not even aware of the complainant's specific impairment

or why she needed to go to physical therapy. Additionally, although the

record does not reflect that complainant was denied union representation,

we find that since the questions regarding her physical therapy schedule

were not disciplinary in nature, union representation was not needed.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____03-12-02_____________

Date