Rocco Morelli, Complainant,v.John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 19, 2002
01990248 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 19, 2002)

01990248

04-19-2002

Rocco Morelli, Complainant, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Agency.


Rocco Morelli v. Department of Justice - INS

01990248

04-19-02

.

Rocco Morelli,

Complainant,

v.

John Ashcroft,

Attorney General,

Department of Justice,

Immigration & Naturalization Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01990248

Agency Nos. I-88-5560, I-88-5562, I-88-5636, I-89-5700,

I-90-5769, I-90-5813, I-90-5866, I-90-5877,

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. � 2000e, et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405. Complainant filed nine complaints in which he claimed that

the agency discriminated against him on the bases of national origin

(Italian-Argentinian) and reprisal for previous EEO activity by not

selecting him for nine managerial, supervisory, or senior investigative

positions between 1988 and 1990. The nine complaints are identified

as follows:

Complaint No. I-88-5560 - February 23, 1988 - (Complaint 1) - VA # 87-45,

Deputy District Director, Phoenix, Arizona.

Complaint No. I-88-5562 - February 22, 1988 -(Complaint 2) - VA # 87-76,

Supervisory Special Agent, New York, New York.

Complaint No. I-88-5636 - December 23, 1988 -(Complaint 3) - VA # 88-63,

Assistant Officer-in-Charge, Rome, Italy.

Complaint No. I-89-5700 - June 20, 1989 -(Complaint 4) - VA # 89-10,

Assistant District Director, New York City.

Complaint No. I-90-5769 - February 5, 1990 -(Complaint 5) - VA # 89-30,

GS-14 Criminal Investigator.

Complaint No. I-90-5813 - July 10, 1990 -(Complaint 6) - VA # 90-14,

Deputy District Director, Rome, Italy.

Complaint No. I-90-5866 - November 13, 1990 -(Complaint 7) - VA # 90-67,

Supervisory Special Agent, New York City.

Complaint No. I-90-5877 - December 12, 1990 -(Complaint 8) - VA # 90-55,

Deputy District Director, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Complaint No. I-90-5879 - December 12, 1990 -(Complaint 9) - VA # 90-68,

Supervisory Investigator, Miami, Florida.

The agency accepted these nine complaints and consolidated them

for investigation. After conducting two investigations, the agency

notified complainant of his right to request a hearing before an

Administrative Judge. Complainant did not respond to the notice, and

accordingly, the agency issued its final decision, in which it found no

discrimination with respect to complaints (1), (2), (5), (6), and (8),

but did find discrimination with respect to complaints (3), (4), (7),

and (9). The agency awarded equitable relief, including retroactive

promotion to GS-14, back pay and other benefits, and attorneys fees.

The agency also agreed that it would post the appropriate notice.

On appeal, complainant raises three contentions. First, he challenges

the agency's no-discrimination finding on complaints (1), (2), (5), (6),

and (8). Next, he maintains that he should have been awarded retroactive

promotion to GS-15 for at least one year. Finally, he appears to be

asking for compensatory damages, in the form of lost moving expenses

and housing allowances, tuition for his children, and compensation for

losing the opportunity to move to a jurisdiction in which he would not

have had to pay taxes.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He

must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct, namely that

complainant was not the best-qualified candidate for the positions in

question. See United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983). With respect to Complaint (1), members

of the review panel who evaluated the candidates for Vacancy No. 87-45

stated that, because complainant was not promoted to GS-13 until June

of 1987, he did not meet the time-in-grade requirements for promotion

to GS-14 in February 1988, when the vacancy opened. As to Complaint

(6), the cut-off score for inclusion in the best-qualified list was 81,

while complainant's score was 74. Regarding the vacancies at issue in

the remaining complaints, the record establishes that, while complainant

made the best-qualified lists for each of those positions, the selecting

officials chose other candidates. We find that the reasons given by the

selecting officials for their choices are legitimate, nondiscriminatory,

and fully supported by the record.

To ultimately prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that the agency's explanations for not selecting

him were pretexts designed to hide a discriminatory or retaliatory

motivation. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133

(2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993);

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256

(1981). Complainant should bear in mind that agencies generally have

broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel decisions,

and should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority absent

evidence of unlawful motivation. Vanek v. Department of the Treasury,

EEOC Request No. 05940906 (January 16, 1997); Kohlmeyer v. Department

of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05960038 (August 8, 1996); Burdine,

450 U.S. at 259. Disbelief of the agency's articulated reasons alone does

not compel a finding of discrimination as a matter of law, but disbelief

of the reasons put forward by the agency, together with the elements of

the prima facie case, may suffice to show intentional discrimination.

Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; EEOC Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks (April 12, 1994); Huerta v. Department of the Air Force,

EEOC Request No. 05930802 (April 1, 1994). Complainant may satisfy this

burden by showing that his qualifications for the various positions were

plainly superior to those of the selectees. Wasser v. Department of

Labor, EEOC Request No. 05940058 (November 2, 1995); Bauer v. Bailar,

647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981).

Complainant has not done so, nor has he identified any other means by

which pretext could be established. Instead, he merely states that

he appeals from that portion of the final decision which stated, �the

totality of the record fails to sustain his claims of national origin or

reprisal when he was not selected for any of the vacancies at issue in

complaints (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), and (8).� With regard to complaints

(1) and (6), complainant has not presented any documents or sworn

statements tending to show that he was excluded from the best-qualified

lists for the Phoenix and Rome positions for any reason other than his

lack of sufficient time-in-grade experience for the former and his review

panel rating for the latter. With respect to the other complaints, the

agency provided evidence sufficient to support its determination that the

various selectees had the edge over complainant in terms of qualifications

for the position. The qualifications of the selectees were extensively

documented. For example, the selectee for the supervisory special agent

position in New York had supervised 15 agents for fifteen months, and had

headed a task force for several years before that. The selectee for the

coordinator position, also in New York, had supervised between 10 and

20 agents as an acting supervisor for approximately two years, and had

been given ratings of outstanding in his three most recent performance

evaluations. Moreover, this selectee had provided information in his

application which was specifically tailored to the selection criteria,

whereas complainant's application merely described his investigative

experience but did not address those criteria. In the same vein, the

selectee for the deputy district director position in Puerto Rico had 12

years of general management experience, 7 years of management experience

in a similar position, knowledge of program management, and demonstrated

ability to manage resources. Based upon our review of the record,

we agree with the agency that complainant has not met his burden of

proving that the agency's articulated reasons for not selecting him for

any of the above-referenced positions were pretextual. We now address

complainant's claims regarding the adequacy of relief granted.

Once discrimination is found, the agency is required to make complainant

"whole" by restoring him to a position where he would have been were it

not for unlawful discrimination. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,

424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,

418 (1975). Where, as here, the agency's discriminatory actions resulted

in complainant's failure to attain a promotion, complainant is entitled

to receive a promotion retroactive to the date of the discriminatory

nonpromotion, as well as back pay for up to two years prior to the date

that he filed his discrimination complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(c)(1).

In this case, complainant was notified that he was not selected for

Vacancy Announcement # 88-63 on December 14, 1988, and filed Complaint

# I-88-5636 two days later. The back pay period therefore begins on

December 14, 1988, and ends on the effective date of his voluntary

resignation, which according to information available in the record,

occurred in December of 1997. He is likewise entitled to interest on

his back pay award, but the period for which interest is computed runs

from November 21, 1991, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of

1991 which authorized interest on back pay awards, to the date of his

effective resignation. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244

(1994).

On appeal, complainant contends that he should have been retroactively

promoted to GS-15, and awarded commensurate back pay, for at least one

year prior to his resignation. To sustain such a claim complainant must

show that he would have been given a promotion to GS-15 if he had gotten

the GS-14 position, either competitively or through the career-ladder

promotion process. Complainant points to no evidence in the record

tending to show either that he was entitled to a career-ladder promotion

or that, in a non-career-ladder track, his performance was likely to

merit a promotion to GS-15. Without such evidence, any assumption that

complainant would have received a promotion beyond GS-14 is speculative

at best. See Ritchie v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05980501 (February 11, 1999). Accordingly, we find that complainant

has not shown that he is entitled to retroactive promotion to GS-15.

Complainant also contends on appeal that he is entitled to compensation

for lost moving expenses, housing allowances, tuition expenses for his

children, and compensation for having lost the opportunity to move to

a tax-free jurisdiction as a result of not being selected for the Rome

position advertised in Vacancy # 88-63. The Supreme Court held that the

compensatory damages provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was not to

be retroactively applied to pre-Act conduct and would preclude an award

of compensatory damages for any acts of alleged discrimination occurring

prior to November 21, 1991. Landgraf, supra. Since the acts complained

of occurred between December of 1988 and December of 1990, before the

effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, complainant would not be

entitled to compensatory damages in connection with those acts. McCaskill

v. Department of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05940312 (January 6, 1995);

Laverdure v. Department of Interior, EEOC Request No. 05931186 (June 14,

1994). Consequently, complainant is not entitled to moving expenses,

housing allowances, tuition reimbursement, or compensation for having

to pay taxes.

After a review of the record in its entirety, it is the Commission's

decision to affirm the agency's final decision and to award relief in

accordance with our order below.

ORDER (D0900)

Unless it has already done so, the agency is ordered to take the following

remedial action:

The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay, with

interest and other benefits due complainant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.501, no later than sixty (60) calendar days after the date this

decision becomes final. For the purpose of computing back pay and

benefits due complainant, the agency shall assume that complainant had

been awarded the position of Assistant Officer-In-Charge, GS-14, in Rome,

Italy, on December 14, 1998, and that he voluntarily resigned in December

1997. Back pay and benefits shall be computed from December 14, 1988

through the effective date of Complainant's resignation in December 1997.

Interest on back pay shall be computed from November 21, 1991, through

the effective date of Complainant's resignation. The complainant shall

cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and

benefits due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by

the agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back

pay and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a check to the complainant

for the undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date

the agency determines the amount it believes to be due. The complainant

may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.

The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the

Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled

"Implementation of the Commission's Decision."

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29

C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii), he is entitled to an award of reasonable

attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the agency.

The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the agency --

not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal

Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming

final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in

accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

The agency shall post at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., copies of

the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the

agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous

places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily

posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said

notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits due complainant,

including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____04-19-02_____________

Date