Robyn Q.,1 Complainant,v.William P. Barr, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 30, 20192019001458 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 30, 2019) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Robyn Q.,1 Complainant, v. William P. Barr, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency. Appeal No. 2019001458 Agency No. BOP-2017-0413 DECISION On December 18, 2018, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s December 10, 2018 final decision concerning an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint claiming employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. BACKGROUND During the period at issue, Complainant worked as a Procurement and Property Specialist, GL-9, in Financial Management for Federal Detention Center (FDC) in Honolulu, Hawaii. The record revealed that on January 11, 2017, Complainant emailed an administrative assistant (Caucasian, national origin unspecified, male, 42 years-old) in FDC Food Services. Complainant’s email instructed the coworker (CW) to coordinate pick-up of excess FDC property auctioned-off though Government Services Administration. That morning, CW emailed the following reply to Complainant: “I made a call to this genital man and left him a massage to give me a call to schedule a time next week. will let you know when he can come in. (emphasis added)” 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2 2019001458 After she received the email, Complainant first responded “10-4. Thanks.” Six minutes thereafter, Complainant emailed CW again that “future correspondence between us shall be handled in a professional manner.” In two encounters that preceded the email at issue, Complainant perceived surreptitious sexuality in CW’s communications with her. While staring at Complainant, CW commented that she could use some cookies. CW mentioned to Complainant his wife was Filipino like her and that he enjoyed Filipino cooking. She shared her concerns about CW to other co- workers. The day after receiving CW’s email, Complainant informed her supervisor who opined that CW was off and really meant to type “gentleman” and “message.” Complainant disagreed and sought counseling from a staff psychologist who testified Complainant was upset to the point she cried and absented herself from the FDC. Upon Complainant’s return, CW’s supervisor asked if CW could apologize to her directly. Complainant refused to accept an apology from CW. On January 12, 2017, Complainant initiated the EEO complaint process with an EEO Counselor. On January 18, 2017, Complainant discussed the email with an associate warden, but the associate warden was uncertain if CW’s misspellings were deliberate. On February 2, 2018, FDC leadership initiated elevated the email incident to the Agency’s an official investigation by Office of Internal Affairs (OIA). On February 7, 2017, Complainant encountered CW while he was working as an armed guard in the FDC parking lot. According to Complainant, CW made eye-contact causing her panic. On February 9, 2017, Complainant emailed the assistant warden to request “separation or supervised contact” with CW. Thereafter, the FDC’s warden convened a group of managers to assess the situation. In a written response to the warden’s assessment group, CW claimed that he had been diagnosed with dyslexia which caused him to frequently misspell words since childhood. CW denied he emailed Complainant with purposeful misspellings. On February 10, 2017, CW’s supervisor issued him a letter to immediately cease and desist personal contact with Complainant. The letter stated CW’s failure to comply could result in discipline and reminded CW that the Agency did not tolerate unprofessional conduct. The warden stated he believed CW was genuinely remorseful and permitted Complainant to take two weeks leave. Complainant took a week of sick leave beginning on February 13, 2017, followed by a week of annual leave that ended February 27, 2017. After the Agency could not resolve Complainant’s EEO matter informally it issued her a notice of right to file a formal complaint on April 17, 2017. On April 19, 2017, Complainant filed the instant formal complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her based on race (Asian), national origin (Filipino), sex (female), and age (49) when the Agency failed to adequately respond to the allegedly harassing email. Following an investigation, Complainant did not request a hearing before an Administrative Judge, within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f). On December 10, 2018, the Agency issued the instant final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), finding no discrimination. 3 2019001458 The instant appeal followed. On appeal, Complainant addresses the email, argues that the Agency failed to react expeditiously, failed to investigate impartially, and failed to take appropriate corrective action. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency’s decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Ch. 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). Sexual Harassment / Hostile Work Environment To establish sexual harassment, Complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome conduct related to sex, including verbal or other conduct of a sexual nature; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer, in other words, did the Agency know or have reason to know of the sexual harassment and fail to take prompt remedial action. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Humphrey v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (Oct. 16, 1998). We acknowledge Complainant’s membership in EEO-protected classes and that CW subjected her to odd communications (emails and prior comments) that appear to be sexual in nature. Next we analyze the degree to which CW’s harassment made Complainant’s work environment hostile. The harasser’s conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in Complainant’s circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994). We find CW’s actions were not pervasive. A group of isolated incidents is not regarded as discriminatory harassment unless the conduct is severe. Monroe M. v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 0120172219 (Feb. 28, 2019). We further find the CW misbehavior was not severe. This Commission has consistently held personality conflicts, general workplace disputes, trivial slights, and petty annoyances do not rise to the level of illegal harassment. Lassiter v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120122332 (Oct. 10, 2012). Moreover, CW’s singular comments, while perceived as distasteful or unprofessional, are not construed as statements which would create an objectively hostile work environment. Complainant v. Dep’t of State, EEOC Appeal No. 0120123299 (Feb. 25, 2015). 4 2019001458 Moreover, the Agency eventually implemented the Agency’s appropriate zero tolerance procedures. FDC management reported the matter to Agency headquarters so that OIA would officially investigate CW for misconduct. After Complainant requested restricted contact between her and CW, the FDC warden convened the threat assessment group. The day after Complainant’s no-contact request, as a result of the threat assessment group recommendation, CW was ordered to avoid interacting with Complainant. Complainant was granted two weeks of leave to help decompress from the problems CW had caused. Since CW received the Agency cease and desist letter on February 10, 2017, Complainant did not report any more incidents where CW has bothered her. We find the Agency’s actions in responding to Complainant’s allegations were adequate. Disparate Treatment We duly considered Complainant’s disparate treatment in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s three-part evidentiary test from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, Complainant had to establish a prima facie case by demonstrating she was subjected to adverse employment action under circumstances that would support his inferences of discrimination. See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The second burden was on the Agency to articulate legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions at issue. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). If the Agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, then our inquiry proceeds to the third step—whether Complainant has shown by a preponderance of evidence that the Agency’s reasons were pretexts to mask discriminatory motivations. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); see also U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983). As discussed above, the Agency reacted appropriately once Complainant insisted management prevent contact between her and CW. We acknowledge that Complainant asserted that the Agency was more receptive to believing allegations of sexual improprieties from younger women or Caucasian women. Complainant provided no evidence of such comparators who had received more favorable treatment because of comparable events. Such arguments are speculative and unpersuasive. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the Agency’s decision as the preponderance of evidence did not establish discrimination. 5 2019001458 STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. 6 2019001458 RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations September 30, 2019 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation