Robin Montague. Mathews et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 4, 2020

13156597 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/156,597 06/09/2011 Robin Montague Mathews 20110234 5419
25537 7590 02/04/2020
VERIZON
PATENT MANAGEMENT GROUP
1300 I STREET NW
5TH FLOOR
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
EXAMINER
SCHMUCKER, MICHAEL W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3681
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
VZPatent25537@verizon.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROBIN MONTAGUE MATHEWS, MICHAEL P. RUFFINI, and
TUSHAR SAXENA
____________

Appeal 2018-005006
Application 13/156,597
Technology Center 3600
____________

BEFORE ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, and
CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges.

McKEOWN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–18, 20, and 21. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Verizon Communications Inc. (“Appellant”) is the applicant as provided
in 37 C.F.R. § 1.46 and is identified as the real party in interest. Appeal Br.
2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention relates to
A network device in a customer premises network collects
profile data for a client device of multiple client devices in the
customer premises network and sends the client profile data to a
remote provider network. The network device receives, from the
remote provider network, a group of advertisement files for
targeted advertising to the client device and stores, in a memory,
the group of advertisement files. The network device detects an
advertisement insertion cue in linear program content being
streamed to the client device, selects an advertisement file from
the stored group of advertisement files, and inserts the selected
advertisement file into the linear program content being streamed
to the client device.
Abstract.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed invention and reads as follows:
1. A method performed by a local media server device in
a customer premises, comprising:
collecting, by the local media server device in the
customer premises, profile data from users of multiple
client devices in the customer premises;
sending, by the local media server device and to a
remote provider network, multiple user profiles based on
the profile data associated with the multiple client devices
in the customer premises;
receiving, by the local media server device and from
the remote provider network, mapped listings, each of the
mapped listings including uniform resource locators
(URLs) to access, from an advertising server in the remote
provider network, advertisement files that match one of
the multiple user profiles;
retrieving, by the local media server device and via
the URLs, the advertisement files to create a locally-stored
group of advertisement files for each of the multiple user
profiles;
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receiving, by the local media server device and from
one of the multiple client devices, a selection of linear
program content; retrieving, by the local media server
device and from the remote provider network, a stream of
the linear program content;
associating, by the local media server device and
using information about the stream, the linear program
content with a particular user profile of the multiple user
profiles;
detecting, by the local media server device, an
advertisement insertion cue in the stream of the linear
program content;
selecting for insertion an advertisement file from
one of the locally-stored group of advertisement files for
the particular user profile;
inserting, by the local media server device, the
selected advertisement file into the stream of the linear
program content at a time-slot corresponding to the
advertisement insertion cue;
sending, by the local media server device, the
stream of the linear program content with the selected
advertisement file to the one of the multiple client devices;
receiving, by the local media server device and from
the remote provider network, an updated mapped listing
with different URLs to access advertisement files
designated for presentation for the particular user profile;
updating, by the local media server device, the
locally-stored group of advertisement files to form an
updated locally-stored group of advertisement files,
wherein the updating comprises:
changing a status of one of the advertisement files
in the locally-stored group of advertisement files from
current to not current when the one of the advertisement
files is not designated for presentation in the updated
mapped listing, and
changing a status of a previous locally-stored
advertisement file from not current to current when the
previous locally-stored advertisement file is designated for
presentation in the updated mapped listing; and
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selecting for insertion, by the local media server
device, an advertisement file from one of the updated
locally-stored group of advertisement files for the
particular user profile.

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Wen US 2001/0047297 A1 Nov. 29, 2001
Krewin US 2002/0078444 A1 June 20, 2002
Laney US 2006/0143649 A1 June 29, 2006
Altberg US 2007/0127650 A1 June 7, 2007
Dharmaji US 2009/0204901 A1 Aug. 13, 2009
Diab US 2011/0299549 A1 Dec. 8, 2011

REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1–18, 20, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–9.
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 4, 6–12, 14–18, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Krewin, Diab, Wen, and Altberg.
Final Act. 9–31.
The Examiner rejected claims 3, 5, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Krewin, Diab, Wen, Altberg, and Laney. Final Act. 31–
33.
The Examiner rejected claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Krewin, Diab, Wen, Altberg, and Dharmaji. Final Act.
34–35.

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ANALYSIS
THE 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
Claims 1–18, 20, and 21
Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded that the Examiner
erred in concluding that claims 1–18, 20, and 21 are directed to patent
ineligible subject matter.
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014) (citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
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mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
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that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO has published revised guidance on the application of section
101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Memorandum”).2 Under that guidance, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. 2018)).
See Memorandum 52, 55–56. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception
and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we
then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or

2 The Memorandum was updated in October 2019.
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum 56.
Analysis – Revised Step 2A
Under the Memorandum, in prong one of step 2A we look to whether
the claims recite a judicial exception. The claimed invention includes
“collecting. . . profile data from users of multiple client devices in the
customer premises;” “receiving. . . mapped listings” where the mapped
listings matches advertisement files with user profiles; “retrieving. . .the
advertisement files to create a locally-stored group of advertisement files for
each of the multiple user profiles;” “retrieving. . . a stream of the linear
program content;” “associating . . . linear program content with a particular
user profile of the multiple user profiles;” “detecting . . . an advertisement
insertion cue in the stream of the linear program content;” “selecting for
insertion an advertisement file from one of the locally-stored group of
advertisement files for the particular user profile;” “inserting. . . the selected
adve1iisement file into the stream of the linear program content at a time-
slot corresponding to the advertisement insertion cue;” “sending. . . the
stream of the linear program content with the selected advertisement file to
the one of the multiple client devices;” “receiving. . . an updated mapped
listing with different URLs to access advertisement files designated for
presentation for the particular user profile;” and “selecting for insertion, by
the local media server device, an advertisement file from one of the updated
locally-stored group of advertisement files for the particular user profile.”
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In other words, the claimed invention collects user profile data,
matches advertisements to the user profiles, creates a locally-stored group of
advertisement files for each of the multiple user profiles, associates the
linear program content with a user profile, selects an advertisement for the
particular user profile from a locally-stored group of files, inserts the
advertisement into the linear program content, updates the locally-stored
group of advertisements, and selects an advertisement for a particular user
profile from an updated locally-stored group of advertisement files. As the
Examiner identifies, this claimed method is targeted advertising. Final Act.
4; see also Spec. ¶ 11 (“The systems and/or methods described herein may
provide a highly granular level of targeted advertising, down to individual
client devices within a customer premises.”). Targeted advertising is a
certain method of organizing human activity, which is an abstract idea. See,
e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363, 1369-
70 (noting that tailoring advertisements based on location or time of day is a
fundamental practice long prevalent in our system and finding abstract
claims related to customizing information based on user information and
navigation data); see also Final Act. 3–4.
Additionally, the claimed associating, detecting and selecting steps
could alternatively be performed in a human mind. Namely, a person could
associate a program with a user profile, identify where an advertisement is to
be inserted, and select the advertisement to insert for the particular user
profile. The claimed invention, thus, recites mental processes, which is an
abstract idea. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that the Federal Circuit has “treated analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical
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algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the
abstract-idea category.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that a claim whose “steps can
be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” is
directed to an “unpatentable mental process[]”). As such, the claimed
invention recites a judicial exception.
Under prong two of revised step 2A, we determine whether the recited
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception
by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the
claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional
elements individually and in combination to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application.
The additional elements recited here are a local media server and a
remote provider network, as well as “sending. . . multiple user
profiles based on the profile data associated with the multiple client devices
in the customer premises;” “receiving. . . a selection of linear program
content;” and “updating. . . the locally-stored group of advertisement files
to form an updated locally-stored group of advertisement files,” wherein the
status may be changed from not current to current or from current to not
current. Here, the additional limitations recited beyond the judicial
exception itself, alone or in combination, fail to integrate the exception into
a practical application. More particularly, and contrary to Appellant’s
unsupported assertions, the claimed invention is not (i) an improvement to
the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial
exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an
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article to a different thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other
meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See also 84 Fed. Reg. at
55.
Appellant argues that the claimed invention provides a technical
improvement. Appeal Br.15–16; Reply Br. 4–5. Namely, Appellant
maintains that the claimed invention is “directed to a specific improvement
to computer technology functionality namely, inserting advertisements into
linear content at highly granular level down to individual client devices
within a customer premises and maintaining a feedback control loop that
allows for rapid and/or dynamic advertisement targeting (see, e.g.,
Specification, para. 0011).” Appeal Br. 15–16.
As discussed above, targeted advertisements is a fundamental practice
long prevalent in our system. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 792 F.3d at
1369-70. The claimed additional limitations, particularly the local media
server and remote provider network, are merely tools to implement the
claimed judicial exception. The Federal Circuit has found that “merely
adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of the
process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea.” Id.
at 1370. See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F.
App’x 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (“Though the claims
purport to accelerate the process of finding errant files and to reduce error,
we have held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary
capabilities of a general-purpose computer ‘do[ ] not materially alter the
patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.’”); CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
incidental use of a computer to perform the [claimed process] does not
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impose a sufficiently meaningful limit on the claim’s scope.”). Moreover,
Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claim. In
particular, the claimed invention does not recite a feedback control loop.
We further note that the additional steps of receiving, storing, and
updating data are insignificant extra-solution activity. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(g); see also, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (noting that storing data is well-understood, routine, and conventional
and does not render claims eligible); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d
1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the
information over a network—with no further specification—is not even
arguably inventive.”); Elec. Power Grp., LLC, 830 F.3d at 1354 (finding
abstract steps for “gathering and analyzing information of a specified
content, then displaying the results). As such, based on the record before us,
we determine that the claimed invention is not integrated into a practical
application.
Analysis – Revised Step 2B
Under step 2B, we determine that the claimed additional limitations,
alone or in combination, does not add significantly more to the abstract idea.
Appellant argues that the claimed invention includes an inventive concept
that adds significantly more the claimed invention. Appeal Br. 18–19.
Specifically, Appellant alleges that the inventive concept is the
“implementation of a local media server device to insert advertisements into
linear content at highly granular level down to individual client devices
within a customer premises and maintaining a feedback control loop that
allows for rapid and/or dynamic advertisement targeting.” Appeal Br. 19.
Appellant further explains that the “’inventive concept harnesses this
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technical feature of network technology’ in a local media server device by
storing and serving targeted advertisements with little delay between the
content being displayed to the user and the advertisement being displayed to
the user.” Id.
We find this argument unpersuasive. As discussed above, the claimed
invention merely uses the computer as a tool to implement the judicial
exception. For example, storing data is well known, routine and
conventional. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing that
data collection, recognition, and storage is well known). Moreover, as also
noted above, the claimed invention does not recite a feedback control loop.
Moreover, as the Examiner points out, the claimed invention does
not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to
significantly more than the judicial exception because the only
other element in the claims besides the abstract ideas identified
above is a generic computer structure, ‘server’ that is merely
performing or applying the abstract ideas. Paragraphs 0018,
0019, 0031, 0062 and 0063 of the specification (US Patent
Application Publication No. 2012/0316968 A 1) detail any
combination of a generic/existing computer systems in hardware
and/or software that are programmed to perform the method.
Final Act. 7. See also Elec. Power Grp., LLC, 830 F.3d at 1355 (finding that
use of “conventional computer, network, and display technology for
gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information” does not add
significantly more to the claimed abstract idea); CyberSource Corp., 654
F.3d at 1375 (“[T]he incidental use of a computer to perform the [claimed
process] does not impose a sufficiently meaningful limit on the claim’s
scope.”).
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Accordingly, based on the record before us, we affirm the rejection of
claims 1–18, 20, and 21 as directed to patent ineligible subject matter.

THE 35 U.S.C. § 103 REJECTION BASED ON KREWIN, DIAB, WEN, AND
ALTBERG
Claims 1, 2, 4, 6–12, 14–18, and 20
Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded that the Examiner
erred in concluding that claims 1, 2, 4, 6–12, 14–18, and 20 are unpatentable
over Krewin, Diab, Wen, and Altberg.
Appellant argues that Krewin fails to mark advertisements as current
or not current and Altberg fails to teach or suggest an active or inactive
status in local storage. Appeal Br. 23–24; Reply Br. 6. For example,
Appellant contends that Altberg “fails to disclose or suggest that the locally-
stored advertisements can be marked as current or not current in local
storage.” Appeal Br. 24.
Appellant’s argument, however, fails to consider Krewin and Altberg
combined as set forth by the Examiner. For example, the Examiner
combines Krewin’s storing and updating advertisements in local storage
with Altberg’s active and inactive indicators for advertisements. See Final
Act. 15. One cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references.
See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., Inc.,
800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As such, we find Appellant’s
arguments unpersuasive.
We are similarly not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Diab is
non-analogous art. See Appeal Br. 25–26. Our reviewing court has set forth
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a two-prong test for determining whether a prior art reference is analogous:
(1) whether the reference is from the same field of endeavor as the claimed
invention, and (2) if the reference is not within the same field of endeavor,
whether the reference is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with
which the inventor is involved. In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Appellant argues that Diab “relates to energy efficient management of
services delivered to a home network (DIAB, Abstract).” Appeal Br. 25.
According to Appellant, Diab’s system for energy-efficient based services
would not be reasonably pertinent to the problem addressed by the claimed
invention, “inserting target advertising into linear program content.” Id.
We disagree, because we find a preponderance of the evidence
supports the Examiner’s findings. Notably, as the Examiner explains, both
the claimed invention and Diab are concerned with collecting and providing
services to a distributed network within a premises, namely within a home.
Compare Diab ¶¶ 61, 62, 109 (describing managing services for a plurality
of devices in a home network, including creating profiles for multiple
devices) with Spec. 11 (noting the desire to “provide a highly granular level
of targeted advertising, down to individual client devices within a customer
premises.”); see also Ans. 7. While Diab is not directed to advertising,
Diab’s method of collecting information from and distributing service to
multiple devices within a premises is at least reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which the claimed invention is involved.
Accordingly, based on the record before us, we affirm the rejection of
claims 1, 2, 4, 6–12, 14–18, and 20.
THE 35 U.S.C. § 103 REJECTION BASED ON KREWIN, DIAB, WEN, ALTBERG,
AND LANEY
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Claims 3, 5, and 13
Claims 3 and 5 depend from claim 1 and claim 13 depends from claim
9. Appellant does not present separate arguments, but instead relies on the
arguments for claims 1 and 9. See Appeal Br. 29. For the reasons discussed
above, we find Appellants argument unpersuasive. Accordingly, based on
the record before us, we affirm the rejection of claims 3, 5, and 13 as
unpatentable over Krewin, Diab, Wen, Altberg, and Laney.

THE 35 U.S.C. § 103 REJECTION BASED ON KREWIN, DIAB, WEN, ALTBERG,
AND DHARMAJI
Claim 21
Nevertheless, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 21. Claim 21 recites
21. The network of claim 17, the local server being further
configured to:
provide internal feedback to indicate whether the selected
advertisement file was successfully inserted into the stream of
the linear program content or whether an advertisement file from
the advertisement files was available that matched the
determined profile, and
generate an updated profile for the one of the multiple
client devices based on the internal feedback.
As such, claim 21 requires internal feedback that indicates (1) whether a file
was successfully inserted or (2) whether an advertisement file matching the
determined profile was available. As shown in Fig. 4B, reproduced below,
the Specification separately identifies internal feedback 470 and user
feedback 465.
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Annotated Fig. 4B Including Internal Feedback 470
and User Feedback 465
Notably, the Specification describes local media server receiving internal
feedback from internal components, such as an advertisement engine 405, an
advertisement switching module 410, and/or local advertisement manager
415, in contrast to user feedback from a client device. Spec. ¶¶ 49–50.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in relying on Dharmaji’s user
responses to satisfy the claimed internal feedback. Appeal Br. 28; Reply
Br. 8. We agree. Dharmaji describes that a “mobile viewing device records
a user's response to advertisements and reports it back to an ad serving
platform.” Dharmaji, Abstract. While Dharmaji’s user responses provide
feedback, the claimed invention requires internal feedback. See Spec. 49–50
(describing internal feedback as distinct from user feedback). In view of the
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Specification, Dharmaji’s user responses from client devices would not
satisfy the claimed internal feedback. We are, therefore, persuaded of error
in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21.
Accordingly, based on the record before us, we reverse the rejection
of claim 21.
CONCLUSION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–18, 20,
21
101 Eligibility 1–18, 20,
21

1, 2, 4. 6–
12, 14–18,
20
103 Krewin, Diab, Wen,
Altberg
1, 2, 4. 6–
12, 14–18,
20

3, 5, 13 103 Krewin, Diab, Wen,
Altberg, Laney
3, 5, 13
21 103 Krewin, Diab, Wen,
Altberg, Dharmaji
21
Overall
Outcome
1–18, 20,
21

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

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AFFIRMED