Robert Ochiogrosso, Complainant,v.William S. Cohen, Secretary, Department of Defense Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 7, 1999
01974354 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 7, 1999)

01974354

12-07-1999

Robert Ochiogrosso, Complainant, v. William S. Cohen, Secretary, Department of Defense Agency.


Robert Ochiogrosso v. Department of Defense

01974354

December 7, 1999

Robert Ochiogrosso, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01974354

v. ) Agency No. 96-128

)

William S. Cohen, )

Secretary, )

Department of Defense )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the

basis of reprisal (prior EEO activity) in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The appeal

is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.<1> For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the final agency decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether complainant has established that

he was discriminated against on the above-referenced basis when, (1) on

November 22, 1995, he was suspended without pay for seven calendar days;

(2) on April 18, 1996, he was spoken to loudly by a management official;

and (3) on June 15, 1996, his work hours were reduced from forty hours

per week to thirty five hours per week.

BACKGROUND

Complainant, a regular part time Computer Operator with the Army and

Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), filed a formal complaint on June 27,

1996, in which he raised what has been identified as the issue presented.

The agency accepted the complaint for processing and, at the conclusion

of its investigation, issued a final decision finding no discrimination.

This appeal followed.

The evidence contained within the investigative file reveals that on

October 27, 1995, complainant, then employed as a full time Customer

Service Leader, entered his work facility during his off duty hours.

Complainant was accompanied by a friend (non-employee). The two

were let into the building by complainant's former supervisor (FS).

According to complainant, his purpose for visiting the facility during

his off duty hours was to provide FS with a statement regarding his (FS)

EEO complaint.

On November 8, 1995, about two weeks after the after hour visit, the

agency presented complainant with a proposed notice of suspension.

The proposal gave complainant seven days within which to issue a reply.

The reply had to be postmarked within the seven day time frame.

Information in the file indicates that the reply was postmarked on

November 14. On November 13, two days before the time limit for reply

expired, the agency presented complainant with a suspension letter.

Originally, the suspension was to last for a period of fourteen

calendar days, effective November 15, 1995. Later, it was shortened

to seven calendar days, effective November 22, 1995. According to the

suspension letter, and agency officials, complainant's suspension was

triggered by his October 27, 1995 after hours visit, a violation of the

agency's security rules. In affidavits provided by the agency, several

management officials stated that, pursuant to agency policy, off duty and

non-AAFES employees are not allowed to enter the premises. Complainant

believes that his suspension was triggered by his participation in FS's

EEO complaint. Management officials, however, stated that they had no

knowledge that complainant was engaging in a protected EEO activity when

he entered the premises.

On April 17, 1996, complainant, while on break, engaged in a fifty minute

conversation with FS. The next day, he (complainant) was called into the

office of the Assistant Retail Manager (ARM). According to complainant,

and another agency employee, the ARM loudly and sarcastically asked,"How

much of yesterday's lunch did you take for today while you were standing

outside talking to your friend (i.e., FS)?"<2> Complainant believes

that this constitutes harassment and the only reason he was yelled at is

because he was talking to FS, who had previously filed an EEO complaint.

The ARM contended that his intent was not to harass complainant, but

rather to point out that he (complainant) had exceeded his break limit

during the conversation and that management was aware of it.

Approximately one month later, on May 17, 1996, complainant contacted

an EEO counselor. About a month after he initiated contact with the

EEO counselor, his weekly work hours were reduced from forty to thirty.

According to management and documents submitted by the agency, complainant

was hired as a regular part time Computer Operator. Management stated,

and complainant confirmed, that he was told that the position's tour of

duty was up to thirty hours per week When he accepted the position

it was explained to him that because of all the training and work

involved (the agency had just installed a computer system), he would

be working the maximum of forty hours per week. He was told that this

would continue until everyone was trained and until management felt

comfortable with the new computer system. According to management,

time and attendance records submitted by the agency, and complainant,

other employees' hours were reduced at the same time as complainant's.

Complainant believes that, due to the amount of work available at the

time, his hours should not have been reduced.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for an

allegation of reprisal, appellant must show the existence of four

elements: (1) that he engaged in protected activity, e.g., participated

in a Title VII proceeding; (2) that the alleged discriminating official

was aware of the protected activity; (3) that he was disadvantaged

by an action of the agency contemporaneously with or subsequent to

such participation; and (4) that there is a causal connection between

the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Hochstadt

v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318,

324 (D. Mass), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Mitchell

v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Burris v. United Telephone

Co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,

459 U.S. 1071 (1982).

In the present case, we find that complainant, regarding all three claims,

has established that he engaged in protected activity. Concerning the

first claim (i.e., the seven day suspension), complainant admitted that

he never informed management officials of his involvement in FS's EEO

complaint. He believed, however that they were informed by security.

According to him, when he visited the facility during off hours on

October 27, 1995, he read his statement, which was prepared in support

of his supervisor's EEO complaint, aloud and security "could have heard

. . . and . . . could have told [management] about it." It is clear from

complainant's affidavit that he has no conclusive evidence with which to

support his claim that the alleged discriminating officials were aware

of the protected activity. As such, we find that complainant failed

to establish the existence of the second element. Because all four

elements must be established before complainant can prove a prima facie

case of reprisal, we decline to consider whether he has established the

existence of the third and fourth elements.

Concerning the second (i.e., being yelled at by the ARM ) and third

(i.e., reduced hours) claims, complainant has failed to establish

that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action. As for the second issue, he indicated

that the ARM began making comments about his (complainant's) breaks

with his supervisor well before he (complainant) participated in FS's

EEO complaint. This indicates clearly to the Commission that there was

no connection between the protected activity and the agency's action.

Similarly, concerning the third issue, the evidence in the file shows

that complainant was hired as a part time employee, that he was told

that his hours would eventually be reduced, and that other employees had

their hours reduced at the same time as complainant. We find this to be

clear evidence that the required nexus between the protected activity

and the adverse action is not present. Again, because complainant has

failed to establish the existence of the fourth element, we decline

to consider whether he has established the existence of the second and

third elements.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the final agency

decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE

FILED WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR

DAYS OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Dec. 7, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_________________________ __________________________

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

Federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.

2 According to agency documents, FS was terminated for cause in November

1995, and therefore not present at the facility from November 1995 to

the date of the incident at issue here.