0120132193
09-25-2013
Robert L. Scott, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southwest Area), Agency.
Robert L. Scott,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southwest Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120132193
Hearing No. 420-2013-00011X
Agency No. 1G351002112
DECISION
On May 15, 2013, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's March 28, 2013, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The Commission deems the appeal timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Building Equipment Mechanic at the Agency's Huntsville Processing and Distribution Facility in Huntsville, Alabama.
On June 13, 2012, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the basis of race (African-American) when:
1. On February 27, 2012, Complainant was not assigned the position of Acting Supervisor (204B).
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's January 29, 2013, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on March 21, 2013. Specifically the AJ found that the Agency articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action and that Complainant had not shown the Agency's reason to be a pretext for unlawful discrimination. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal followed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate.
Upon review of the record we find that the AJ properly found that the instant complaint was suitable for summary judgment. The record is adequately developed and there are no disputes of material fact.
The allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging disparate treatment discrimination is a three step procedure: Complainant has the initial burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination; the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action; and Complainant must then prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reason offered by the employer was not its true reason, but was a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
This established order of analysis need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-14 (1983). For purposes of analysis we will assume, but do not find, that Complainant established his prima facie case of discrimination.
The AJ found that the Agency articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its action in awarding the temporary Supervisory position to another Building Equipment Mechanic (CW1: Caucasian) when Agency officials explained that CW1 had submitted a recent request to be detailed to the position and that Complainant was the most qualified and experienced Building Equipment Mechanic, especially regarding the plant air-conditioning system and giving him the detail "could adversely impact the Maintenance Operation." The record shows that the management officials who made the decision to select CW1 instead of Complainant for the position consisted of two Supervisors of Maintenance Operations (SMO1: White and SMO2: Black). SMO1 averred that Complainant;
did not make a request to [be a] 204B [Supervisor] during that time frame. But he was considered as he had worked as a 204B Supervisor before. It was decided by me and [SMO2] that his expertise were [sic] needed more on his Building Equipment Mechanic job. . . . [Complainant] was informed that he was the Building Equipment Mechanic trained for air conditioning systems and more familiar with the job then the newly promoted CW1. Also [Complainant] had been given a previous chance to [be] 204B from 3/20/2010 to 3/26/2010 which he accepted and worked. It was therefore decided that since [CW1] had a request in writing in [sic] that he would be given the next opportunity.
Report of Investigation (ROI), Affidavit B, p. 2.
SMO2 averred that
[SMO1] and I sat down to make management [sic] decision about who we could bring up to 204B Supervisor during the period of time. The decision to not bring [Complainant] up at that time was because he was the most qualified air condition employee and experience [sic] building person on the building side of the house. The decision was made for [Complainant] help [sic] train and teach the other employees.
ROI, Affidavit C, p.2.
The Agency having articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifts to Complainant to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's reason was not its true reason, but was a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.248, 252-53 (1981). Following a review of the record we agree with the AJ that Complainant failed to meet this burden. Complainant provided no evidence or argument demonstrating pretext. Instead, Complainant on appeal argues that the AJ erred in not permitting him to present evidence that he was allegedly denied details to the 204B Supervisory position in January 2011 and on two occasions in July 2011. The Agency on appeal argues that the AJ correctly denied Complainant's attempt to amend his complaint to include these alleged denials in 2011 due to untimeliness. We find that, even assuming Complainant was not seeking to raise these earlier denials as actionable claims but was only presenting them as background evidence, Complainant has nevertheless not shown that the Agency's articulated reason for offering the detail to CW1 was a pretext to mask discrimination. Nor has Complainant shown the presence of a material issue of fact.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we find that Complainant has not shown that a material issue exists, nor has he met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that discrimination occurred. We therefore AFFIRM the Agency's final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
September 25, 2013
__________________
Date
2
0120132193
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
2
0120132193