0120112267
04-24-2012
Robert L. Chatman, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Great Lakes Area), Agency.
Robert L. Chatman,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Great Lakes Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120112267
Hearing No. 471200900088X
Agency No. 1J483000309
DECISION
On March 22, 2011, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's February 24, 2011, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The Commission deems the appeal timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Building Maintenance Mechanic at the Agency's George W. Young postal facility in Detroit, Michigan.
On January 13, 2009, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of age (59) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when beginning October 15, 2008, he was threatened regarding his job assignment and was issued a seven-day suspension on October 25, 2008.
At the conclusion of the investigation into these claims, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. When the Complainant did not object, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's October 20, 2009, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on January 24, 2011. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged.
In reaching his decision, the AJ relied on the following evidence established during the investigation. On October 15, 2008, an acting supervisor instructed Complainant to inspect an elevator to determine the problem with the elevator and report back. Complainant responded that he was "not going to talk," and immediately requested the presence of a union steward. Complainant stated that he felt threatened by the acting supervisor as a result of a previous incident on August 8, 2008, when he refused to follow the instructions of the acting supervisor.
Complainant requested a meeting with the Manager of Maintenance Operations ("Manager"). The Manager instructed the acting supervisor not to supervise Complainant and then asked Complainant to "check out" the elevator and let her know the status. The record indicates that later in the day, the Manager asked Complainant what was wrong with the elevator to which Complainant replied, "still troubleshooting it." Still later in the day, Complainant again met with the Manager and became upset. She instructed Complainant to calm down and then Complainant left to go to the medical unit. Complainant was so upset that he requested and was granted leave and went home for the day. Complainant was on leave until October 24, 2008.
On October 25, 2008, the Maintenance Supervisor ("Supervisor") initiated, and the Manager concurred, in giving Complainant a seven-day suspension for his failure to follow instructions to inspect the elevator on October 15, 2008. According to the Supervisor, Complainant had a record of behavioral problems since June 2008, including being rude to management officials and telling them what he will and will not do.1 The record further indicates that on March 6, 2009, Complainant's Union and the Agency agreed to reduce Complainant's October 25, 2008 suspension to a Letter of Warning. In addition, the Agency agreed to give Complainant one day of make-up overtime.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Dismissal of Amendment to Complaint
On March 4, 2009, Complainant attempted to amend his complaint to include an allegation that "the Agency is trying to force [Complainant] to retire." In a decision entitled, "Acknowledgement and Dismissal of Amendment," dated March 31, 2009, the Agency dismissed the amendment for failure to state a claim in accordance with EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1). Specifically, the Agency determined that the amended claim was triggered by a computer generated Annuity Estimate received by Complainant and dated February 23, 2009. However, the Agency further found that Complainant failed to demonstrate that he was subjected to any adverse action as a result of the Agency's conduct with respect to the terms and conditions of his employment. In that regard, the Agency found that the amended issue failed to state a claim pursuant to EEOC regulations.
We note the Complainant did not expressly challenge the dismissal of his amendment before the AJ or on appeal. Accordingly, we concur with the Agency's determination that Complainant has failed to demonstrate that he suffered any adverse action as a result of the Agency's alleged conduct regarding the amended claim and we AFFIRM the Agency's dismissal of the amended claim in accordance with EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1).
Issues on Summary Judgment
Next, we must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision on the merits of Complainant's other claims without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate.
Upon review of the record we find that the AJ properly found that the instant complaint was suitable for summary judgment. The record appears adequately developed and Complainant has not identified any material facts in dispute.
Based on this record, we agree with the Agency's finding of no discrimination. Generally, claims of disparate treatment are examined under the tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd , 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). For Complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). For instance, to establish a prima facie case of reprisal, Complainant generally must show that: (1) he engaged in protected EEO activity; (2) the Agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he was subjected to adverse treatment by the Agency; and (4) a nexus exists between his protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (September 25, 2000). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
Even assuming arguendo that Complainant satisfied the above elements to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on any alleged basis, we find that the responsible management officials articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, and Complainant failed to show that those reasons are pretext for discrimination. Complainant failed to establish that the Agency's action was based on discriminatory motives.
To the extent that Complainant alleges that these matters constituted discriminatory harassment, the Commission notes that harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or prior EEO activity is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive. Wibstad v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01972699 (Aug. 14, 1998) (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. at 3, 9 (March 8, 1994). In determining that a working environment is hostile, factors to consider are the frequency of the alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and if it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Enforcement Guidance at 6. The Supreme Court has stated that: "Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile work environment - an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title VII's purview." Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (1993).
To establish a claim of hostile environment harassment, Complainant must show that: (1) he belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on his statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance at 6.
After a review of the record, the Commission finds that Complainant's claims do not constitute discriminatory harassment. The Commission concludes that Complainant did not prove that he was subjected to conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment and that he also failed to prove that the Agency's actions were unlawfully motivated by his protected classes. Even assuming that the alleged incident would be sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment, there is no evidence that the Agency was motivated by discriminatory animus. Accordingly, Complainant has not shown that he was subjected to a discriminatory hostile work environment.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record, we AFFIRM the final agency decision finding no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
April 24, 2012
__________________
Date
1 The record indicated that most recently, Complainant was issued a Letter of Warning for repeatedly refusing to follow the instructions of a manager and giving him "the finger." The union and management settled a grievance over the warning, making the warning only effective until October 30, 2008, provided no other disciplinary action was issued.
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0120112267
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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0120112267