Robert J. Maietta, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 5, 2000
01995397 (E.E.O.C. May. 5, 2000)

01995397

05-05-2000

Robert J. Maietta, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Robert J. Maietta, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01995397

v. ) Agency No. 1A-102-1034-96

) Hearing No. 160-98-8160X

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of

unlawful retaliation based on prior EEO activity and discrimination based

on race (White), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> Complainant alleges he

was subjected to retaliation and discrimination on May 7, 1996, when:

(1) his request for a copy of his medical unit file was denied; and (2) he

became aware that "non-medical" information had been placed in his medical

file. The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the FAD is AFFIRMED AS CLARIFIED.

The record reveals that complainant is employed as a Distribution Clerk

at the agency's Westchester P & D Center in White Plains, New York.

Believing he was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed a formal complaint on June 11, 1996.

The agency initially dismissed part of the complaint, but the Commission

vacated the dismissal and order the agency to process the remanded claim

together with the accepted claim. See Maietta v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01965622 (June 4, 1997). At the conclusion

of the investigation, complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ).

On June 2, 1999, the AJ issued a Recommended Decision (RD) without a

hearing, finding no retaliation or discrimination, and mistakenly stating

that neither party had responded to the AJ's April 13, 1999 notice of

intent to issue findings and conclusions without a hearing. On June 7,

1999, the AJ issued an amended RD, acknowledging that complainant's

submission had in fact been timely received, and finding that the

submission, duly considered, did not alter the AJ's original findings

and conclusions.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of race discrimination because he failed to demonstrate that similarly

situated employees not in his protected classes were treated differently

under similar circumstances with respect to access to medical unit

files or the placement of non-medical information in medical unit files.

The AJ concluded that complainant had established a prima facie case of

retaliation, because the agency officials at issue appear to have been

aware of complainant's prior EEO activity. However, the AJ further

concluded that the agency had proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions, namely, that (1) complainant was not denied

access to his medical unit file but rather a properly executed release

form was required in order to permit release of the file to his

representative, and (2) the alleged non-medical information at issue

was deemed relevant to his worker's compensation claim by the agency

officials who submitted the information because it addressed complainant's

credibility regarding the nature and extent of his injury.<2> The AJ

concluded that complainant had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance

of the evidence that the agency's proffered reasons for its actions were

pretextual and that the real reason was retaliation or discrimination.

The agency, having issued a FAD on June 7, 1999 adopting the original

RD, proceeded to issue an amended FAD on June 10, 1999, adopting the

amended RD.

On appeal, complainant contends, among other things, that the AJ erred

in issuing a decision without a hearing because there existed a dispute

between the parties regarding whether the agency actions at issue caused

harm to complainant, and because of the error in the AJ's original RD.

In response, the agency requests that we affirm the FAD, noting that

the AJ corrected any error by considering complainant's submission and

thereafter issuing an amended RD.<3>

Based on a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ did not err

in proceeding without a hearing. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ

to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is

no genuine issue of material fact. This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The United States Supreme Court has stated that summary

judgment is appropriate where the trier of fact determines that, given

applicable substantive law, no genuine issue of material fact exists.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Applying this

standard to the instant case, we find that the AJ correctly concluded that

a decision could be issued without a hearing. Complainant's contention

on appeal that a hearing was required because the parties dispute

whether the actions at issue harmed him is without merit. Based on the

affidavits and documents contained in the Record of Investigation (ROI),

there exists no dispute between the parties regarding the material facts

on which complainant's claim is predicated, i.e. the placement of the

documents at issue in complainant's file, the content of the documents,

the agency's communications to complainant's representatives regarding

requirements for the release of records, the absence of any comparator

employees, and so on. See, e.g., ROI Affidavits C and E; Exhibit 8.

Accordingly, the AJ properly proceeded without a hearing.

Proceeding to the merits of the case, we note at the outset that the

RD incorrectly stated that in order to establish a prima facie case

of race discrimination, a complainant must identify similarly situated

individuals outside his protected class who were treated more favorably.

This is only one means by which a complainant may establish a prima

facie case of discrimination. While comparative evidence is usually

used to establish disparate treatment, complainant need only set forth

some evidence of acts from which, if otherwise unexplained, an inference

of discrimination can be drawn. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).

Nonetheless, after a careful review of the record and applying the

proper standard, we find that the AJ did not err in concluding that

complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination,

because complainant did not present any evidence which, if otherwise

unexplained, would permit an inference of race discrimination. Moreover,

even assuming arguendo that complainant did present a prima facie case

of race discrimination, he has failed to meet his ultimate burden of

proof to establish that, more likely than not, the agency's actions were

motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's race. Similarly,

complainant has failed to establish that, more likely than not, the

agency's actions were motivated by reprisal for his prior EEO activity.

We discern no basis to disturb the conclusion reached in the

AJ's RD. Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including

complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments

and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, the FAD is

AFFIRMED AS CLARIFIED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS

OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

May 5, 2000

Date

Carlton

M.

Hadden,

Acting

Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

Date

Equal Employment Assistant

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.

2The AJ also noted that the information was removed from his medical

unit file once he objected to it, and placed in his worker's compensation

file instead, but this was not dispositive of complainant's claim.

3The agency also notes that both the AJ and the supervisory AJ addressed

this matter in separate letters to complainant's counsel dated June 11,

1999, and June 14, 1999, in response to complainant's request that the

AJ recuse himself and that the matter be reassigned to another AJ for

a hearing.