Robert C. Brooks et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 20, 2020

14237293 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 20, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/237,293 02/05/2014 Robert C Brooks 83791213 5536
22879 7590 04/20/2020
HP Inc.
3390 E. Harmony Road
Mail Stop 35
FORT COLLINS, CO 80528-9544
EXAMINER
AGUILERA, TODD
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2196
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/20/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipa.mail@hp.com
jessica.pazdan@hp.com
yvonne.bailey@hp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ROBERT C. BROOKS, THOMAS J. FLYNN, and
CHARLES N. SHAVER

Appeal 2018-005327
Application 14/237,293
Technology Center 2100
Before JEFFREY S. SMITH, TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and
MIRIAM L. QUINN, Administrative Patent Judges.
QUINN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1−14 and 16−21. See Final Act. 1.
Appellant has cancelled claim 15. Id. at 2. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Hewlett-Packard
Development Company, L.P. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to power drawn by a network-powered device.
In particular, the Specification describes that a network-powered device or
“PD,” according to the standard set in IEEE 802.3af or the IEEE802.3at
type 1, expects to receive 12.95 Watts, while the power sourcing equipment
or “PSE” is required to deliver 15.4 Watts of power. Spec. ¶ 10. In the
standard set by IEEE 802.3at type 2, the PD can expect to receive 25.5 Watts
of power, while the PSE is required to deliver 34.2 Watts of power. Id.
Although the PD expects to receive either 12.95 or 25.5, depending on
which standard is followed, there may be more power available from a PSE.
Id. For the PD to draw more power than that set by the standard, the PD first
powers up and negotiates with the PSE to operate at the maximum power
that the standard sets for the PD, e.g., 12.95 Watts according to the 802.3af
standard. Id. ¶ 17. The PD uses a power circuit to set its power load to
correspond to the power it is set to receive, i.e., 12.95 Watts according to the
802.3af standard. Id. ¶ 19. The PD then increases the power load and stores
a representation of that power load in a non-volatile memory. Id. ¶ 20. The
PSE then recognizes the power load and increases power. Id. And the
incrementing process continues until a certain criteria is met. Id.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method comprising:
as part of testing to determine a power available to a
network powered device for a given standard power level,
where the given standard power level is a maximum power
level in accordance with a predetermined standard:
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setting a power load in a network powered device at an
initial power level, the initial power level being the given
standard power level;
incrementally increasing a power drawn by the power
load above the given standard power level until the power load
meets a criterion, wherein the criterion includes removal of
power to the network powered device; and
storing a representation of the power drawn by the power
load for the given standard power level in a non-volatile
memory, in response to each incremental increase of the power
drawn by the power load.
Appeal Br. i (Claim Appendix).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Veselic
Dwelley
Toebes
Louks
Diab
Geiger
George
Cheung
US 2004/0164707 A1
US 2006/0168459 A1
US 2006/0273661 A1
US 2008/0102765 A1
US 2008/0229120 A1
US 2010/0031066 A1
US 2010/0185844 A1
US 2011/0320847 A1
Aug. 26, 2004
July 27, 2006
Dec. 7, 2006
May 1, 2008
Sept. 18, 2008
Feb. 4, 2010
July 22, 2010
Dec. 29, 2011
REJECTIONS
Claims 1−14 and 16−21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112 first
paragraph as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Final Act. 6−7.
Claims 1, 2, 6, and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, Dwelley, and Louks. Id. at 8−12.
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Claims 3−5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, Dwelley, Louks, and George. Id. at 12−15.
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, Dwelley, Louks, Diab, and Veselic. Id. at 15−17.
Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, Dwelley, Louks, and Veselic. Id. at 17−18.
Claims 10 and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, George, Dwelley, and Louks. Id. at 18−23.
Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, George, Dwelley, Louks, and Cheung. Id. 24−25.
Claims 13 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, Toebes, Dwelley, and Louks. Id. at 25−29.
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, Toebes, Dwelley, Louks, and George. Id. at
29−30.
Claims 16−18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, Dwelley, Louks, and Toebes. Id. at 30−36.
Claims 19 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, George, Dwelley, Louks, and Toebes. Id. at
36−37.
OPINION
We review the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments
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for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017). Other than presenting separate arguments for
dependent claims 3−5, Appellant argues all pending claims together by
relying on the same arguments presented with regard to independent claim 1.
See, e.g., Appeal Br. 7 (arguing that the written description rejection of all
pending claims should be reversed based on arguments presented for
claim 1); 16−21 (arguing that the obviousness rejection of claims 2, 6−9, 13,
14, 16−18, and 21 should be reversed based on the presented claim-1
arguments); 15−18, 21 (arguing that obviousness rejection of claims 3−5,
10−12, 19, and 20 should be reversed based on the arguments presented with
respect to claims 1 and 3). Therefore, we resolve this appeal by addressing
the arguments presented with respect to claims 1 and 3, and except for our
conclusion and order below, we do not address any other claim.
A. Written Description Rejection
The Examiner rejected claim 1 as failing to comply with the written
description requirement because of the recited phrase “for a given standard
power level.” Final Act. 6−7; Ans. 2−3. According to the Examiner, the
Specification does not disclose determining a power level available “for a
given standard power level” or storing a representation of the power drawn
“for a given standard power level.” Ans. 2−3.
Appellant challenges the rejection by citing to various paragraphs of
the Specification: 10, 11, 17, 26, 28, 35−37, and 42−44. Appeal Br. 7−8;
Reply 1−7. Appellant concludes that the Specification portions cited reveal
that “a given standard power level” corresponds to the PD initially expecting
a specific power set by standard (read here, for example, the 802.3af
standard). Id. at 8. But that the actual power available “for the given
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standard power level” may exceed that initial expectation. Id. Thus, the
Specification describes increasing incrementally the load of power until
some criteria is met. Id. at 8−9. “Then the finally increased power load is
stored, where this increased power load is the determined power available to
the PD, where the determined power available can exceed the expected
power for the given power level, such as due to use of a less resistive cable
than expected.” Id. at 9 (internal citations omitted).
We are not persuaded that Appellant has shown support in the
Specification for the limitation “for a given standard power level” according
to the Examiner’s explanation, which we adopt and incorporate herein.
Final Act. 6−7; Ans. 2−3. We highlight that the claim recites “as a part of
testing” that the purpose of the claimed steps is to determine a power
available to a network PD “for a given standard power level, where the
given standard power level is a maximum power level in accordance with a
predetermined standard.” The Examiner notes, and we agree, that the
determined power available refers to the power level resulting from the
testing process. Ans. 3. Yet the claim thereafter recites “the given standard
power level” with respect to the method functions of setting, incrementally
increasing, and storing, as if the maximum power level in accordance with
the predetermined standard has not been determined. Such claim language
has injected into the claim an illogical and unsupported method in which the
phrase “the given standard power level” is defined as the “maximum power
level in accordance with a predetermined standard,” yet the claim requires
starting at the given standard power level, increasing that given standard
power level, and storing the power load for the given standard power level.
The Specification, as the Examiner correctly notes, describes starting at the
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given standard power level, such as the standard’s 12.95 Watts for example,
and increasing that power level until a criteria is met. Ans. 3 (citing Spec.
¶¶ 21, 28, 37, 43). Thus, although the Specification supports the recitation
of the initial power level being the given standard power level, the
Specification does not support that the given standard power level is at the
same time the maximum power level determined with the test or the power
level that is stored after the testing is completed, if that power level is not a
power level set by the standard.
Accordingly, we do not find error in the Examiner’s determination
that claim 1 fails to comply with the written description requirement.
B. Obviousness Rejection of Claim 1
The Examiner finds that the combination of teachings of Geiger and
Dwelley teaches the limitation “incrementally increasing a power drawn by
the power load above the given standard power level until the power load
meets a criterion.” Final Act. 9−10. In particular, the Examiner finds that
Geiger’s Figure 4 and associated text teach performance of load tests where
Geiger’s access point (read here the PD) increases the power load from 17
Watts to 24 Watts. Id. at 9 (citing Geiger ¶¶ 34, 39, 40, Fig. 4). The
Examiner relies on Dwelley for its teaching that it may be desirable for the
PD to request a level of power greater than the power level allowed by the
original IEEE 802.3af standard (or specification). Id. (citing Dwelley ¶ 7).
The Examiner finds that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time of the invention to modify the method of Geiger, which
discloses incrementing the power drawn by a device, by incorporating the
increase above the standard level taught by Dwelley to provide
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advantageously the means of utilizing greater power. Id. at 9−10 (citing
Dwelley ¶ 7, Geiger ¶ 42).
Appellant challenges the Examiner’s findings on the basis that (1)
Geiger’s increased power is kept “below a standard power class” (Appeal
Br. 11−12); (2) Dwelley’s increase is accomplished using a third signature,
not by incrementally increasing the power drawn by a power load (id. at 12);
and (3) the combination of teachings would have resulted in increased power
below the standard or a negotiated power above the standard, neither of
which meets the claim language (id. at 13). See also Reply 7−11.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. We adopt as our
own the Examiner’s findings and conclusions stated in the Final Action and
the Answer and only highlight below certain findings and conclusions
worthy of note. Final Act. 8−11; Ans. 3−5. The Examiner finds, and we
agree, that Geiger is relied upon for the incremental increase of a power load
test, and that Dwelley only supplies the teaching that the increment level
would be above the power classification level of Geiger. Ans. 4−5.
Appellant’s arguments focus on the references’ independent teachings
without regard for the actual combination that the Examiner relies upon. It
is irrelevant that Dwelley’s power increases use a certain “third signature”
that Appellant characterizes as a negotiation, but not an incremental increase
of power drawn.2 Geiger supplies the teaching of incrementally increasing

2 In any event, we find this contention dubious given Dwelley’s explanation
that the third signature may be presented by a PD as a power load for a
defined period of time, which would mean that the PD would increment its
power load to draw more power. Dwelley ¶ 45.
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the power load.3 Dwelley merely provides the teaching of the level above
which to increase the power drawn. Therefore, it is not persuasive for
Appellant to argue that Geiger stays below the standard power level, as
Dwelley is relied on for the level being above the standard. Nor is it
persuasive to argue that Dwelley does not teach incrementally increasing the
power drawn, because Geiger is relied on for that limitation. Thus, we do
not agree with Appellant that the resulting combination of teachings would
not meet the claimed limitation.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred finding
that the combination of Geiger and Dwelley teaches the limitation
“incrementally increasing power drawn by the power load above the given
standard power level.”
C. Obviousness of Claim 3
The Examiner finds that George teaches the limitation further recited
in claim 3: “setting a memory identifier indicating that a test mode for
setting the power load as part of the testing has been initiated.” In particular,
according to the Examiner, George teaches a status bit stored in a flash
memory for identifying the status of the power-on-self-test. Final Act. 13
(citing George ¶¶ 14 10). The status bit is set to “0” if the status of the test
was successful. Id. Appellant argues that George’s status bit indicates a
“successful boot operation,” and does not indicate the recited “test mode for
setting the power load as part of the testing has been initiated.” Appeal
Br. 15. More particularly, Appellant distinguishes George’s power-on-self-

3 We note here the Examiner is correct in finding that Geiger generally
teaches increasing to “a wattage of any value.” Ans. 4 (citing Geiger ¶ 42)
(emphasis added).
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test from the recited test, which is for setting the power load. Id. at 16; see
also Reply 13−14 (arguing that the power-on-self-test “has nothing to do
with the test that is performed in the present invention”). We are not
persuaded by Appellant’s arguments.
We adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as stated in the
Final Action and Answer, and our discussion below merely highlights or
summarizes the relevant part of the record. Final Act. 12−13; Ans.; 6−7.
For instance, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that George’s memory bit
indicates that the power-on-self-test has been initiated, but that the test mode
for setting the power load is already taught by Geiger. Ans. 6−7; Geiger
¶ 34 (describing power load tests at predetermined power levels). It is
irrelevant, therefore, that George’s power-on-self-test is not a test mode for
setting the power load, because the teaching of that particular test is supplied
by Geiger.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the
Examiner erred with regard to the obviousness rejection of claim 3.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are sustained.
More specifically, we find that Appellant did not show error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 for failing to satisfy the written description
requirement. We further find that Appellant failed to show error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 3 as obvious over the art of record. As
stated earlier, Appellant presented particular arguments only with regard to
claims 1 and 3, and, therefore, this appeal decides the outcome of all
pending claims based on the determination concerning claims 1 and 3.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1−14, 16−21 112, ¶ 1 Written description
requirement
1−14,
16−21

1, 2, 6, 9 103(a) Geiger, Dwelley, and
Louks
1, 2, 6, 9
3−5 103(a) Geiger, Dwelley,
Louks, and George
3−5
7 103(a) Geiger, Dwelley,
Louks, Diab, and
Veselic
7
8 103(a) Geiger, Dwelley,
Louks, and Veselic
8
10, 11 103(a) Geiger, George,
Dwelley, and Louks
10, 11
12 103(a) Geiger, George,
Dwelley, Louks, and
Cheung
12
13, 21 103(a) Geiger, Toebes,
Dwelley, and Louks
13, 21
14 103(a) Geiger, Toebes,
Dwelley, Louks, and
George
14
16−18 103(a) Geiger, Dwelley,
Louks, and Toebes
16−18
19, 20 103(a) Geiger, George,
Dwelley, Louks, and
Toebes
19, 20
Overall
Outcome:
1−14,
16−21

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED