01A12375
06-19-2002
Robert B. Davis, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Eastern Area), Agency.
Robert B. Davis v. United States Postal Service (Eastern Area)
01A12375
June 19, 2002
.
Robert B. Davis,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Eastern Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A12375
Agency Nos. 4-D-290-1095-95 and 4-D-291-0032-98
Hearing Nos. 140-99-8293x and 140-A0-8070x
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
This case involves two formal equal employment opportunity (�EEO�)
complaints filed by Robert B. Davis (�complainant�) against his employer,
the United States Postal Service (Eastern Area) (�the agency�). At all
relevant times, complainant was an Automation Clerk/Mail Processor at
an agency facility in Florence, South Carolina. In his first complaint,
complainant alleged that the agency had discriminated against him based
on his race (Black), his sex (male), and in retaliation (for prior EEO
activity) by, among other things, (1) threatening him with discipline if
his job performance did not improve; (2) giving him a �standard operating
procedure�; (3) assigning him a different break time than that assigned
to other employees; (4) giving female employees special treatment;
(5) denying him a �city scheme� assignment; and (6) forcing him to �bid
off� his level 5 assignment to a level 4 job. In his second complaint,
complainant further alleged that the agency had discriminated against
him based on his race by, among other things, (7) denying him annual
leave on several occasions; (8) denying changes to his schedule he had
requested on various occasions; and (9) requiring him to work six or
more hours without a 30-minute break.
With these complaints, complainant was effectively alleging that the
agency had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (�Title
VII�), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The agency processed
the above-described allegations<1> and issued separate reports of
investigation for each of the two EEO complaints underlying them.
After receiving copies of these investigative reports, complainant
requested a hearing before an administrative judge (�the AJ�) from
the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (�EEOC� or
�the Commission�). An AJ was appointed to hear the matter and the two
complaints were consolidated for adjudication. However, after reviewing
the relevant record, the AJ issued a decision on these complaints without
first holding a hearing. This AJ ruling, released on December 29, 2000,
found that the agency had not discriminated against complainant on any
basis claimed.
The agency adopted this summary judgment decision in full in a final
agency order (�FAO�) issued on January 22, 2001. Complainant then filed
a timely notice challenging this FAO, which this Commission accepted
and docketed as this appeal. We are now issuing this written decision
disposing of this appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).
EEOC is charged with reviewing the AJ's decision to grant summary judgment
in favor of the agency (and the FAO implementing it) de novo (or �anew�).
See EEO Management Directive for C.F.R. 29 Part 1614 (rev. Nov. 9, 1999)
(�EEO MD-110�), at 9-16. This essentially means that on appeal we look at
the case with fresh eyes. This Commission is free to accept or reject at
will the AJ's (and agency's) legal and factual conclusions � including
on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred,
and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination
statute was violated here.
That said, the task before us is really to determine whether the AJ's
decision to rule in favor of the agency without first holding a hearing
was proper. EEOC's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without
a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). These provisions are patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is �genuine� if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Oliver
v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is
�material� if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary
judgment is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative
proceeding, an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a
determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary
disposition.
After analyzing all the evidence in this record and considering the merits
of the underlying complaints, we find that the AJ's decision properly
summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations,
policies, and laws. We believe that there were no material facts (i.e.,
facts that would affect the outcome of the case under governing law) in
genuine dispute here with respect to any of the claims complainant raised.
Therefore, the AJ did not err by issuing a decision without a hearing.
Moreover, even if we view all record evidence in the light most favorable
to complainant (as we must to affirm an AJ's summary judgment in favor
of the agency), we could not conclude that complainant has proffered any
evidence sufficient to establish (as he must) that the agency actions
in question violated Title VII. Thus, the AJ did not err in finding in
favor of the agency here, either.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the AJ's decision, and the FAO adopting it, are affirmed.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations within thirty (30) calendar days of
receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt
of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. �
1614.405; see also EEO MD-110, at 9-18. All requests and arguments
must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036.
In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be
deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the
expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604.
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of the
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with the request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
Complainant has the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United
States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that
complainant receives this decision. If complainant files a civil action,
complainant must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is
the official agency head or department head, identifying that person by
his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of complainant's case in court. �Agency� or �department�
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or
department in which complainant works. If complainant files a request
to reconsider and also files a civil action, filing a civil action will
terminate the administrative processing of the complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If complainant decides to file a civil action, and if complainant does
not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, complainant may
request that the Court appoint an attorney to represent complainant and
that the Court permit complainant to file the action without payment of
fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial
of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a
request for an attorney does not extend complainant's time in which to
file a civil action. Both the request
and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in
the paragraph above entitled �Right to File A Civil Action.�
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 19, 2002
__________________
Date
1The agency had originally dismissed allegations 1-6 on various grounds,
and this Commission initially upheld these dismissals in Davis v. United
States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01963270 (Mar. 31, 1997). However,
in Davis v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05970759
(Feb. 26, 1999), EEOC subsequently ordered the agency to process claims
1-6, and the agency complied with this order.