Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 22, 2020

2019006467 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 22, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/789,530 07/01/2015 Sharon A. Hartman-Tinder 1003-0002 1900
171273 7590 07/22/2020
Steven J Rocci P.C. (Murgitroyd)
201 Bloomingdale Ave
Wayne, PA 19087
EXAMINER
WINSTON III, EDWARD B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/22/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
srocci@sroccilaw.com
uspto@dockettrak.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SHARON A. HARTMAN-TINDER, SCOTT A. JACOBSON,
ROBERT KOSTOSKY, DONNA M. LITWAK,
DANIEL MILLER, and SHAWNA L. MITCHELL, LYNNE M. SHIRK
____________

Appeal 2019-006467
Application 14/789,530
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ANTON W. FETTING, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.

SHAH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), the Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4–15, and 17–21, which are all of the
pending claims.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Rite
Aid Headquarters Corporation. Appeal Br. 1.
2 The Appellant waived the Oral Hearing scheduled for July 7, 2020.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The Appellant states that their invention “relates generally to a
computer user interface for aiding a user in fulfillment of a set of
prescriptions for a patient and, more particularly, to aiding a user in aligning
prescription fulfillment dates.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1, 9, 15, and 19 are the independent claims on appeal.
Claim 15 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced
below (with added paragraphing):
15. A method of interacting with a user interface presented
on a display device for filling a set of prescriptions for a patient,
the method comprising:
entering a first target date in a prescription alignment
screen within the user interface;
selecting a first at least one prescription of the set of
prescriptions for fulfillment on the first target date in the
prescription alignment screen;
entering a second target date in the prescription alignment
screen;
selecting a second at least one prescription of the set of
prescriptions for fulfillment on the second target date in the
prescription alignment screen;
selecting a medication history screen within the user
interface,
the medication history screen displaying a patient
compliance rating; and
selecting an order summary screen within the user
interface,
the order summary screen displaying contact information
associated with the order,
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the contact information being contact information
of the patient or contact information of a person who is not
the patient;
wherein, subsequent to either the step of entering the first
target date or entering the second target date, the prescription
alignment screen displays a prescription fulfillment list of the set
of prescriptions,
the prescription fulfillment list depicting for each
prescription in the set of prescriptions a number of days
between either of the first target date and the second target
date and a day on which a next fulfillment for the
respective prescription is due,
wherein the number of days depicted
includes an indication of a gap calculation,
the gap calculation enabling a user to
adjust the fulfillment amounts so as not to
provide too many or too few doses, and
wherein fulfillment dates for the
prescriptions are aligned to one of the first and
second target dates, and a fulfillment period of each
of the prescriptions is set to be a multiple of a
smallest fulfillment period.
Appeal Br. 29–30 (Claims App).

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Nadas et al. (“Nadas ‘720”) US 2009/0030720 A1 Jan. 29, 2009
Nadas et al. (“Nadas ‘608”) US 2009/0043608 A1 Feb. 12, 2009
Creswell et al. (“Creswell”) US 2013/0317840 A1 Nov. 28, 2013

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 4–15, and 17–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1, 4–15, 17, 18, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Creswell and Nadas ‘608.
Claims 19 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Creswell, Nadas ‘608, and Nadas ‘720.

OPINION
35 U.S.C. § 101
The Appellant argues the independent claims together and presents no
separate arguments for the dependent claims. We thus consider the claims
as a group with claim 15 as representative and the remaining claims standing
or falling therewith. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We will address any
differences between the independent claims as applicable.
35 U.S.C. § 101 Framework
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
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attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
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(“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1. The 2019 Revised Guidance, by its
terms, applies to all applications, and to all patents resulting from
applications, filed before, on, or after January 7, 2019. 84 Fed. Reg. at 50.4
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including
certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see
MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step
2A, Prong Two”).5 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
4 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MPEP § 2106.04(II) and also
supersedes all versions of the USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet
Identifying Abstract Ideas.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51
(“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017,
of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”).
5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2),
84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the additional elements, individually or in combination,
provide an inventive concept. Id. at 55. Among the considerations in
determining whether the additional elements, individually or in combination,
amount to significantly more than the exception itself, is whether they add a
specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, conventional” in the field or simply append well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Id.
at 56.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and Step 1 of
USPTO guidance, the Examiner makes no explicit determinations as to what
statutory category independent claim 15 is directed. See Final Act. 4–5;
Ans. 3–4. We note that the preambles of independent claims 1 and 9 state
they recite systems and the preambles of independent claims 15 and 19 state
they recites methods, i.e., statutory categories of machines and processes.
See Appeal Br. 27–29, 31. The analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is the same
regardless of category. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 216, 226–27
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and Step 2A, Prong
One of USPTO guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54), the Examiner determines
that independent claim 15 “is directed to patient prescription alignment
without significantly more” and that “under [the claim’s] broadest
reasonable interpretation, [the limitations] cover[] performance of the
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limitation in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components,
. . . [and thus] falls within the ‘Mental Processes’ grouping of abstract ideas.
Accordingly, the claim recites an abstract idea.” Final Act. 3–4; see also
Ans. 3.
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and Step 2A, Prong
Two of USPTO guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55), the Examiner determines
that “[t]his judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application” in
that the additional element of a user interface “is recited at a high-level of
generality (i.e., as a generic processor performing a generic computer
function of ranking information based on a determined amount of use) such
that it amounts no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a
generic computer component.” Final Act. 3. Thus, the interface “does not
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not
impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. The claim is
directed to an abstract idea.” Id.
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and Step 2A, Prong
One of USPTO guidance, the Appellant contends that the Examiner “errs by
misreading (and misquoting) the [2019] Revised Guidance” and “has not
demonstrated that the claim as a whole ‘covers’ performance in the mind,
nor has he demonstrated that the claim can practically be performed in the
mind.” Appeal Br. 12–13. The Appellant characterizes the claim as being
“directed to the field of computer user interfaces.” Id. at 21. The Appellant
also contends that, under Prong Two, “[t]he system and its user interface
represent physical, technological elements . . . [that] serve to integrate the
inventive user interface into a practical application.” Id. at 14–15. The
Appellant contends that the “invention is patent-eligible because it provides
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a practical solution, in the form of a GUI, to a real-world problem faced by
pharmacists.” Id. at 20. For at least the following reasons, we disagree.
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and Step 2A
USPTO guidance, we first determine to what claim 15 is directed, i.e.,
whether claim 15 recites an abstract idea and if so, whether claim 15 is
directed to that abstract idea. The Federal Circuit has explained that “the
‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light
of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed
to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active
Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the
focus of the claim is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on
a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are
invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the
Specification, including the claim language, that claim 15 focuses on an
abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or a technical
field.
Reciting a Judicial Exception
The Specification provides for a “PRESCRIPTION FULFILLMENT
USER INTERFACE.” Spec., Title. In the “BACKGROUND” section, the
Specification discusses that “[p]rescription alignment provides patients and
mail order pharmacies a way to minimize or avoid the inconveniences
associated with multiple refill schedules.” Id. ¶ 2. Further, “[i]n order to
minimize the need for multiple trips to a pharmacy or multiple monthly
package shipments, or in order to provide multiple prescriptions in
compliance packaging, the dates on which these multiple prescriptions are
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refilled may be aligned necessitating only one monthly trip to the pharmacy
or one monthly package.” Id. ¶ 18. “However, prior art systems for aligning
prescriptions present challenges for a user, such as a pharmacist, in
manipulating data in such a way that provides users and patients with
information desired for making decisions about prescription alignment.” Id.
¶¶ 2, 18. Thus, the invention aims to “aid[] in the fulfillment of a set of
prescriptions, and more particularly to aid[] a user in aligning prescription
fulfillment dates” through a computer graphical user interface (“GUI”).
Appeal Br. 1.
Consistent with the disclosure, claim 15 recites “[a] method of
interacting with a user interface presented on a display device for filling a set
of prescriptions for a patient.” Appeal Br. 29 (Claims App.). Claim 1
recites “[a] system for aiding a user in aligning prescription fulfillment dates
for multiple prescriptions of a patient” (id. at 26), and claim 9 similarly
recites “[a] system for aligning prescription fulfillment for a set of
prescriptions for a patient” (id. at 28). Claim 19 recites “[a] method of
providing compliance packaging for a patient.” Id. at 31.
We consider the claims as a whole6 giving them the broadest
reasonable construction7 as one of ordinary skill in the art would have

6 “In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent
protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.” Diehr,
450 U.S. at 188.
7 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, page 52, footnote 14 (“If a claim, under its
broadest reasonable interpretation . . . .”) (Emphasis added.)
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interpreted it in light of the Specification8 at the time of filing. Claim 15
comprises the steps of: (1) providing data, i.e., “entering a first target date”
and “entering a second target date”; (2) selecting data, i.e., “selecting a first
at least one prescription of the set of prescriptions for fulfillment on the first
target date,” “selecting a second at least one prescription of the set of
prescriptions for fulfillment on the second target date,” “selecting a
medication history screen,” and “selecting an order summary screen”; and
(3) displaying data, i.e., “the medication history screen displaying a patient
compliance rating,” “the order summary screen displaying contact
information associated with the order,” and “wherein, subsequent to either
the step of entering the first target date or entering the second target date, the
prescription alignment screen displays a prescription fulfillment list of the
set of prescriptions.” See Appeal Br. 29–30 (Claims App.). Although
claim 15 provides further details on the type of information being provided,
selected, and displayed, and an indication that some of the data is calculated,
i.e., “wherein the number of days depicted includes an indication of a gap
calculation,” the claim does not positively recite a step for calculating.
Similarly, claim 15 recites “wherein fulfillment dates for the prescriptions
are aligned to one of the first and second target date,” but does not positively
recite a step for aligning dates nor provide details on how, technologically or

8 “First, it is always important to look at the actual language of the claims
. . . . Second, in considering the roles played by individual limitations, it is
important to read the claims ‘in light of the specification.’” Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (J. Linn, dissenting in part and concurring in part), citing Enfish, 822
F.3d at 1335, among others.

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by what algorithm, such as alignment would result. We note that all of the
positively recited steps are performed manually using a user interface.
Claim 1 correspondingly recites a user interface comprising screens
for displaying information such as selection buttons, a prescription
fulfillment list, future target dates, and contact information. See Appeal
Br. 26. Claim 9 recites a user interface configured to display data of target
dates, a prescription fulfillment list, a prescription history list, and a patient
compliance rating. See id. at 28. Claim 19 recites a method comprising
entering data of a target date, selecting data of at least two prescriptions of a
set of prescriptions, and filling the at least two prescriptions in compliance
packaging. See id. at 31. As with claim 15, these claims do not recite a
positive step for aligning prescriptions to dates or how such an alignment is
performed, technologically or by what algorithm, but merely recite that the
screen displays that data. The positively recited steps of claim 19, like
claim 15, are performed manually using a user interface.
Providing/entering data is an extra-solution activity. See In re Bilski,
545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as
insignificant extra-solution activity). Selecting data presented on a screen is
a form of choosing an option, a step that can be performed mentally or by
pen and paper. See In re Rudy, 956 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“This
mental process of hook color selection based on a provided chart
demonstrates that claim 34 as a whole is directed to an abstract idea.”).
Similarly, any analyses recited in the claim can be performed mentally. See
Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (citing cases) (“we have treated analyzing information by steps people
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go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as
essentially mental processes”). Displaying the results of the selection and/or
analyses is insignificant post-solution activity. See id.; Bilski, 561 U.S. at
610–11 (“Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition against
patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the
use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding
‘insignificant postsolution activity.”’) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92).
When considered collectively and under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, the limitations of claim 15 (and of claims 1 and 9) recite a
way of interacting with a user interface for prescription alignment and
fulfillment by entering, selecting, and displaying data.9 Claim 19 similarly
recites a method for interacting with a user interface for prescription
fulfillment by entering and selecting data, and performing the resulting
action of fulfillment. These are abstract ideas of a mental process and a
“[c]ertain method[] of organizing human activity” including “commercial or
legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business
relations).” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Our reviewing court has held similar concepts to be abstract. For
example, the Federal Circuit has held abstract the concepts of customizing
information based on known user information in Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2015)

9 We note that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different
levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240
(Fed. Cir. 2016). The Board’s “slight revision of its abstract idea analysis
does not impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241.
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(“Capital One Bank”), customizing a user interface based on user selections
in Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271
(Fed. Cir. 2016), collecting, analyzing, manipulating, and processing data
and displaying the results of the analysis, manipulation, and processing in
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Capital One Fin.”), “selecting certain information,
analyzing it using mathematical techniques, and reporting or displaying the
results of the analysis” in SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d
1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and “gathering and analyzing information of a
specified content, then displaying the results” in Electric Power, 830 F.3d
at 1354.
As such, we disagree with the Appellant’s contentions that the
Examiner errs in misreading USPTO guidance in “not demonstrat[ing] that
the claim as a whole ‘covers’ performance in the mind.” Appeal Br. 12–13;
see also Reply Br. 2. The Appellant does not assert that the specific steps of
entering, selecting, and displaying cannot practically be performed in the
human mind. Rather, the Appellant refers to the specific “physical
elements” recited as support that claim 15 does not recite a mental process
and thus does not recite an abstract idea (see id. at 13) and that the claim is
directed to a computer user interface (see id. at 20). See also Reply Br. 2.
However, as discussed more fully below with respect to Prong Two of the
2019 Revised Guidance, simply reciting and requiring a computer for the
functions of the claims does not change the result that the claim recites an
abstract idea. At best, the specific physical elements “limit[] the invention
to a technological environment for which to apply the underlying abstract
concept.” Capital One Fin., 850 F.3d at 1340.
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Having concluded that claim 15 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, in determining whether the claim is directed to this abstract
idea, we next consider whether the claim recites additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
Integration into a Practical Application
Under Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised Guidance (84 Fed.
Reg. at 54), we look to whether the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception,” i.e., “integrates a judicial exception
into a practical application.” Here, the only additional element recited in
claim 15 (and claims 1, 9, and 19) beyond the abstract idea is “a user
interface presented on a display device” having screens – an element that, as
the Examiner observes (see Final Act. 3; Ans. 4) – is described in the
Specification as a generic computing element. For example, the
Specification discusses an example computer system for implementing the
method may comprise generic computer components such as “a general
purpose processors, memory, etc., configured by software instructions that
embody logic operable to perform function(s)” (Spec. ¶ 43), as well as input
devices that may be connected to a processing unit through a user input
interface (id. ¶ 46). Further, “[s]ince the state of the art has evolved to a
point where there is little difference between hardware, software, and a
combination of hardware/software, the selection of hardware versus software
to effectuate specific functions is a design choice left to an implementer.”
Id. ¶ 43; see also id. ¶¶ 44–47 (describing a generic computer); Fig. 9.
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We find no indication in the Specification, nor does the Appellant
direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in claim 15 require any
specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components,
i.e., a particular machine, invoke any asserted inventive programming, or
that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings,
Inc. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
The Appellant contends that the claimed system and user interface
that includes sub-elements, i.e., the screens with buttons, a list, and dates,
“represent physical, technological elements . . . [that] serve to integrate the
inventive user interface into a practical application.” Appeal Br. 14–15; see
also id. at 16. The Appellant also argues that the screens including the
claimed buttons, list, and dates are elements that integrate the invention into
a practical application. See Appeal Br. 16–19; Reply Br. 2–3. However,
these are not elements outside the abstract idea, but are indicia and data
displayed by the user interface. The Appellant does not contend that the
buttons used are a technological element or technologically improved.
The Appellant argues, specifically, that the claim “provides a practical
solution, in the form of a GUI, to a real-world problem faced by
pharmacists” (id. at 20) and appears to argue that the claims thus provide an
improvement to “the field of computer user interfaces” by “providing a
technological solution to the technological problem of aligning prescription
fulfillment dates” (id. at 21). See also Reply Br. 2. We disagree.
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The Appellant does not provide reasoning or evidence, and we do not
see from the claim, how the limitations claim a technological solution to
computer-based problem, i.e., a solution “necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. The problem
being addressed by the inventors of “aligning prescription fulfillment dates”
(Appeal Br. 21) is not one that arises specifically in computer technology.
Rather, as the Specification indicates, the problem existed prior to computer
technology, such as when customers physically went to pharmacies or
received prescription by mail. See Spec. ¶ 2.
Further, the purported solution comprises, at best, a generic computer
system with a user interface operating in its ordinary and conventional
capacity. See supra; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–26. The Appellant does
not contend that they invented any of the claimed components or their basic
functions or that those components, claimed generally, were unknown in the
art as of time of the invention. Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1270. The “focus”
of the claim is not “on the specific asserted improvement in computer
capabilities” (Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336), but rather on using a computer user
interface to implement the abstract idea of providing prescriptions within an
appropriate time, i.e., within aligned dates. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223
(holding that attempting to limit the use of an abstract idea to a particular
technological environment does not make a claim patent-eligible) (quoting
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC,
838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“merely limiting the field of use of
the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not
render the claim[] any less abstract”).
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Claim 15 simply provides for a user to enter information using a user
interface, and the display of information based on some analysis; there is no
improvement to the existing display or graphical user interface. Rather, the
claim here is similar to those of Trading Tech. Int’l., Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921
F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2019) that did not “solve any purported technological
problem.” Any improvement lies in the process of presenting information
(that may be calculated) for the purpose of prescription alignment and
fulfillment, the abstract idea itself, and not to any technological
improvement. Similarly, that “the claimed system and method allow the
pharmacy to operate more efficiently and to reduce consumer
inconvenience” (Reply Br. 2) is not a technological benefit or technological
improvement, but a business benefit to pharmacists and consumers and an
improvement to the abstract idea itself. To the extent the Appellant argues
that the use of the interface increases efficiency, the invention makes the
pharmacist faster, not the computer or interface. See Trading Tech., 921
F.3d at 1089–90.
The Appellant cites to numerous Federal Circuit decisions and to non-
precedential Board decisions. Appeal Br. 20–21. However, the Appellant
provides no argument or specific reasoning why the claim here is similar to
any of those decisions.10
Accordingly, we conclude claim 15 does not contain an element or
combination of elements that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract idea
that integrates the abstract idea into a practical application.

10 We note that we are not, in any event, bound by a non-precedential
decision of another panel of the Board.
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Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination
that claim 15 is directed to an abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Under the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework (corresponding to
Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance), we find supported the Examiner’s
determination that claim 15’s limitations, taken individually or as an ordered
combination, do not amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. See Final Act. 3. We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s
determination. The Appellant provides no argument or reasoning regarding
this determination. See Appeal Br. 12–21; Reply Br. 1–3.
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination
that the limitations of claim 15 do not transform the claim into significantly
more than the abstract idea.
For at least the reasons above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of independent claim 15 and of claims 1, 4–14 and
17–21.
35 U.S.C. § 103
The Appellant contends that the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 9, and 15 is in error because the prior art does not disclose
“alignment of prescription fulfillment dates,” and specifically the features
that “the fulfillment dates for the multiple prescriptions ‘are aligned to one
of said first and second target dates, and the fulfillment period of each of
said multiple prescriptions is set to be a multiple of a smallest fulfillment
period’” as recited in the claims. Appeal Br. 23. However, the Appellant
merely states “Creswell discloses a system for increasing patient adherence
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to medication treatment regimens, and Nadas ‘608 discloses a medication
management system including compliance related services to improve
medication therapy compliance.” Appeal Br. 23–24. The Appellant
provides no further argument or reasoning.
The Appellant fails to meet the burden to rebut the Examiner’s prima
facie case by distinctly and specifically pointing out the supposed error in
the Examiner’s findings that Nadas ‘608 teaches this limitation (see Final
Act. 5–6; Ans. 5–6), as well as the specific distinctions believed to render
the claims patentable over the applied references. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(iv) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim recites
will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”).
The Examiner acknowledges that Creswell does not specifically teach
this limitation but finds that Nadas ‘608 does. Final Act. 5 (citing Nadas
‘608 ¶¶34, 56, 101, 109 and bolding specific findings); see also Ans. 6.
Rather than distinctly pointing out the Examiner’s supposed errors, the
Appellant recites the claim language, characterizes the systems of Creswell
and Nadas ‘608, and summarily concludes that the references do not meet
the quoted claim language. The Appellant has not identified error in the
Examiner’s stated interpretation of Nadas ‘608 or the claim language. See
also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the
Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive
arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and
a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the
prior art.”)
The Appellant also contends that the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1, 9, and 15 is in error because the prior art does not
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disclose “wherein the number of days depicted includes an indication of a
gap calculation, the gap calculation enabling the user to adjust the
fulfillment amounts so that the patient is not provided with too many or too
few doses”as recited in the claims 1, 9, and 15. However, the Appellant
merely states “the examiner cites to Creswell paragraphs 383, 537, and
547–547 as disclosing” this limitation and that the Appellant “does not see
any teaching or suggestion of the recited ‘gap calculation’.” Appeal Br. 24.
As with the first argument, the Appellant fails to meet the burden to
rebut the Examiner’s prima facie case by distinctly and specifically pointing
out the supposed error in the Examiner’s findings. Specifically, the
Examiner finds that Creswell teaches this limitation in that the Patient
Adherence Generation Module can generate individual drug timelines for
each medication including information such as “fill date, expected fill date,
prescription end date, gap in fill date, and prescription duration.” Ans. 5;
see also Final Act. 5. The Appellant simply argues that they “do[] not see
any teaching or suggestion of the recited ‘gap calculation’.” (Appeal Br. 24),
but does not explain why the Examiner’s finding regarding Creswell’s gap
fill in date is in error.
The Appellant may well disagree with how the Examiner interpreted
and applied the references, but the Appellant offers no substantive
arguments to rebut the specific underlying factual findings made by the
Examiner in support of the ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness. And
we decline to examine the claims sua sponte, looking for distinctions over
the prior art. Cf. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the claims in greater
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detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over
the prior art.”).
In the absence of a more detailed explanation, we are not persuaded of
error on the part of the Examiner. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to
identify the alleged error in the examiner's rejections,” citing Ex Parte Frye,
94 USPQ2d 1072 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (“The panel then reviews the
obviousness rejection for error based upon the issues identified by appellant,
and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon.”)).
The Appellant presents no separate arguments against the rejection of
the dependent claims 4–8, 10–14, 17, 18, and 21. The Appellant also does
not present any arguments against the rejection of claims 19 and 20. Appeal
Br. 22.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4–15, and 17–21 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is sustained.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4–15, and 17–21 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 is sustained.

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In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4–15,
17–21
101 Eligibility 1, 4–15,
17–21

1, 4–15, 17,
18, 21
103 Creswell, Nadas ‘608 1, 4–15,
17, 18, 21

19, 20 103 Creswell, Nadas ‘608,
Nadas ‘720
19, 20
Overall Outcome 1, 4–15,
17–21

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2017).

AFFIRMED