RippleNami Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 29, 2020

15256218 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/256,218 09/02/2016 Philip Randall Gahn 42280-0002001 7771
20985 7590 05/29/2020
FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. (SD)
P.O. BOX 1022
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
CHEN, FRANK S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2611
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/29/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PATDOCTC@fr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PHILIP RANDALL GAHN, RICHARD JAMES HINRICHS,
and JULIANNE CONNOLLY
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218
Technology Center 2600
Before JEREMY J. CURCURI, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5, 9, and 11–17. Claims 6–8 and 10
have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
RippleNami, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a data visualization mapping platform.
Spec., Title. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
displaying in a first region on a display screen, at least a
portion of a map depicting a geographical area;
displaying a first layer of visual indications on top of the
displayed map, wherein the first layer is associated with a data
structure, the data structure contains a description of a category
of information and a description of a data set associated with the
category of information, the category of information corresponds
to a data feed, the data set includes at least a portion of the data
feed, and the first layer corresponds to the data set;
while displaying the first layer of visual indications,
receiving user input specifying a modification to the data set
corresponding to the first layer; and
in response to the user input specifying the modification
to the data set corresponding to the first layer, modifying the data
set corresponding to the first layer, storing the modified data set
in association with the data structure and the category of
information, and displaying a second layer of visual indications
on top of the displayed map, wherein the second layer
corresponds to the modified data set.
Appeal Br. 9 (Claims Appendix).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:

Name Reference Date
Windl
Aymeloglu
US 2006/0161864 A1
US 2010/0070842 A1
July 20, 2006
Mar. 18, 2010
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

3
Cervelli US 2014/0337772 A1 Nov. 13, 2014

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–5, 9, and 11–17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Final
Act. 2–7.
Claims 1–5, 9, 12–14, 16, and 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Cervelli. Final Act. 8–25.
Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Cervelli and Aymeloglu. Final Act. 25–26.
Claim 15 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Cervelli and Windl. Final Act. 26–27.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Standard for Patent Eligibility
In issues involving subject matter eligibility, our inquiry focuses on
whether the claims satisfy the two-step test set forth by the Supreme Court in
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). The Court instructs us
to “first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-
ineligible concept,” Id. at 217–18, and, in this case, the inquiry centers on
whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea. If the initial threshold is
met, we then move to the second step, in which we “consider the elements of
each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Id. at 217 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79, 78 (2012)). The Court describes
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

4
the second step as a search for “an ‘“inventive concept”’—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The USPTO has published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101 consistent with Alice and subsequent Federal Circuit decisions.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (referred to Step 2A, prong 1 in
the Guidance); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h))
(referred to Step 2A, prong 2 in the Guidance).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then move to Step 2B of the
Guidance. There, we look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

5
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Examiner’s Findings and Conclusion
The Examiner rejects the pending claims as being directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more. Final Act. 2–7. Under the
first step of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner determines the claims are
directed to the “abstract idea of collecting, displaying, and manipulating
data.” Final Act. 3. Under Alice step 2, the Examiner determines that each
of the limitations recited in claim 1 recite an abstract idea, and that “claim 1
fails to recite any limitations that amount to significantly more than the[]
abstract idea.” Final Act. 2–3. The Examiner concludes “[t]he claim
limitations, singly or in combination, fail to amount to substantially more
than that abstract idea.” Final Act. 4.
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant offers several arguments in favor of eligibility. Appeal
Br. 3–5. With respect to Alice step 1, Appellant argues the claims are not
directed to an abstract idea because they are similar to those found eligible in
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
because they address a problem that arises in computer technology. Appeal
Br. 3–4. Specifically, Appellant contends the claimed invention address
problems in “combining dynamic and static information into a visual
geospatial representation for situational and spatial comparisons.” Appeal
Br. 4. Appellant argues the solution to the technical problem is “necessarily
rooted in computer technology” because “[t]he data presented on the
graphical user interface is necessarily transformed by the operation of the
system into a visual representation.” Appeal Br. 4. Appellant further argues
the claims are not abstract because “[t]he claimed system operations cannot
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

6
be performed without a map-based graphical user interface, and thus cannot
be performed in the human mind.” Appeal Br. 4.
Under Alice step 2. Appellant contends the claims supply an
inventive concept “for resolving a computer-based information system’s
problem of enabling a user to keep track of events and resources on a map-
based graphical user interface.” Appeal Br. 4 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 3–4, 19–20).
Appellant further asserts error in the rejection because “[t]he Office has
provided no evidence to support the Office’s ‘significantly more’ analysis or
the Office’s assertion of what is routine and conventional.” Appeal Br. 4–5.
Appellant also argues that contrary to both Office Guidance and the Federal
Circuit’s decision in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the Examiner failed to
consider the subject matter of the claims as a whole. According to
Appellant, “[w]hen the specifically claimed combination of elements is
considered, the claim language clearly offers a meaningful limitation beyond
generally linking the idea of ‘collecting, displaying, and manipulating data’
to a particular technological environment.” Appeal Br. 5.
Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong One2
The Judicial Exception
Applying the Guidance, we are not persuaded the Examiner has erred
in rejecting the claims as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
The Guidance instructs us first to determine whether any judicial exception
to patent eligibility is recited in the claim. The Guidance identifies three

2 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

7
judicially-excepted groupings: (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain
methods of organizing human activity such as fundamental economic
practices, and (3) mental processes. We focus our analysis on the third
grouping—mental processes.3
Claim 1 recites the following limitations: (1) “displaying . . . at least a
portion of a map depicting a geographical area,” (2) “displaying a first layer
of visual indications on top of the displayed map, wherein the first layer is
associated with . . . a description of a category of information and a
description of a data set associated with the category of information, the
category of information corresponds to a data feed, the data set includes at
least a portion of the data feed, and the first layer corresponds to the data
set,” (3) “while displaying the first layer of visual indications, receiving user
input specifying a modification to the data set corresponding to the first
layer,” (4) “in response to the user input specifying the modification to the
data set corresponding to the first layer, modifying the data set
corresponding to the first layer, storing the modified data set in association
with the data structure and the category of information, and displaying a
second layer of visual indications on top of the displayed map, wherein the
second layer corresponds to the modified data set.” Appeal Br. 9–12
(Claims Appendix).

3 Appellant’s arguments are made to the claims generally. We treat claim 1
as representative. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (“When multiple claims subject
to the same ground of rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by
appellant, the Board may select a single claim from the group or subgroup
and may decide the appeal as to the ground of rejection with respect to the
group or subgroup on the basis of the selected claim alone.”).
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

8
We conclude that these limitations, under their broadest reasonable
interpretation, recite an abstract mental process. A claim recites a mental
process when the claim encompasses acts people can perform using their
minds or pen and paper. See, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining that a claim
whose “steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a
pen and paper” is directed to an unpatentable mental process).
The limitations set forth above recite a mental process because they
recite map-related actions that can be performed by a human being with the
aid of pencil and paper. For example, limitation (1), which recites
displaying a portion of a map depicting a geographical area could be
performed by a human by drawing a map on a piece of paper. Limitation
(2), which recites displaying a first layer over the map that includes
additional map information from a specified data set, could be performed by
a person drawing a map overlay on tracing paper and laying it over the map
as a map overlay. Similarly, limitations (3) and (4), which recite receiving
user input specifying a change to the data depicted on the first layer and
storing and modifying the displayed layer to reflect the data input, could also
be performed by a person using pencil and paper by drawing the
modifications on the overlay according to the changed data.
Appellant further argues the claims are not abstract because “[t]he
claimed system operations cannot be performed without a map-based
graphical user interface, and thus cannot be performed in the human mind.”
Appeal Br. 4. This argument is contrary to both the Guidance and the
precedent of our reviewing court. A claim recites a mental process even if
the claim recites that a generic computer component performs the acts. See,
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

9
e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a
computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention
could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); see also
Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable
interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of
generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes
category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”)
(emphasis omitted).
Accordingly, we conclude claim 1 recites a judicial exception of a
mental process, under the Guidance.
Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong Two
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
Having determined that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, our
analysis under the Memorandum turns now to determining whether there are
“additional elements that integrate the [judicial] exception into a practical
application.” See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (citing MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Under the Guidance, limitations that are indicative of “integration into
a practical application” include:
1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other
technology or technical field — see MPEP § 2106.05(a);
2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular
machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b);
3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to
a different state or thing — see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

10
4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment, such that
the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(e).
In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a
practical application” include:
1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial
exception, or merely including instructions to implement an
abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a
tool to perform an abstract idea – see MPEP § 2106.05(f);
2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use — see
MPEP 2106.05(h).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
Appellant’s claim 1 recites only two claim elements additional to the
abstract limitations identified above. These additional elements are (a) “a
first region on a display screen,” and (b) the first layer is associated with “a
data structure.” These limitations primarily relate to the computer that is
used to carry out the recited process.
We conclude that these additional elements are insufficient to
integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical application. In
particular, these additional claim limitations reflect only to the use of generic
computer hardware to carry out the abstract idea. It is well-established that
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

11
mere automation of manual processes using computers is insufficient to
integrate a claim into a practical application. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v.
Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Our prior cases
have made clear that mere automation of manual processes using generic
computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer
technology.”); see also MPEP § 2106.05(a) (“Mere automation of manual
processes, such as using a generic computer to process an application for
financing a purchase” is insufficient) (citing Credit Acceptance Corp., 859
F.3d at 1055).
Appellant argues that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea
because they are rooted in computer technology and address problems that
arise in computer technology. We disagree. The problem of combining
different types of information for “visual geospatial representation for
situational and spatial comparisons,” (Appeal Br. 4) alleged by Appellant to
be unique to computer technology, exists also in the context of paper
geographical maps. For example, the use of transparent map overlays
addresses these problems.
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claims
provide a solution to a technical problem because “[t]he data presented on
the graphical user interface is necessarily transformed by the operation of the
system into a visual representation.” Appeal Br. 4. Although not styled as
such, this argument appears to be based on the “machine or transformation”
test referenced in MPEP § 2106.05(c). We do not view the change to a
graphical user interface as a sufficient transformation to integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application. We find Trading Technologies
International, Inc. v. IBG, LLC, 921 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2019) instructive
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

12
on this point. There, the Federal Circuit evaluated claims directed to an
improved user interface for trading. The patentee argued that the claims
were “not directed to an abstract idea because they provide a particular
graphical user interface that improves usability, visualization, and
efficiency.” Id. at 1384. The court rejected this argument, determining that
“[t]he claims are focused on providing information to traders in a way that
helps them process information more quickly . . . not on improving
computers or technology.” Id. Here, claim 1 is similarly focused on
providing information more quickly to allow those viewing the maps to
process information more quickly. As such, the changed graphical user
interface does not provide a sufficient basis for integrating the abstract idea
into a practical application, and we agree with the Examiner that the claim is
directed to a judicial exception.
The Inventive Concept – Step 2B
Having determined the claim is directed to a judicial exception, we
proceed to evaluating whether the claim adds any specific limitation beyond
the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in
the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56.
Our review of the Examiner’s rejection under Step 2B is guided by the
revised examination procedure published online by the USPTO on April 19,
2018, entitled “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject
Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v.
HP, Inc.)” (“Berkheimer Memorandum”), which imposed a new fact finding
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

13
requirement for Examiners, as applicable to rejections under § 101. In our
review of the rejection under Step 2B, we consider the same “additional
limitations” as were considered at Step 2A, Prong 2. As we noted above, the
only limitations additional to the abstract idea are a display screen and a data
structure. Appellant argues there is insufficient evidence that the additional
elements are routine and conventional. We disagree.
As an initial matter, Appellant does not provide an explanation or
specific argument detailing which claim elements cannot be found to be
routine and conventional. Appellant’s Specification evidences the well-
understood, routine, and conventional nature of a display and data structure
because it describes the hardware used to implement the invention, including
the display and the memory, as generic in nature. Spec. ¶¶ 47–49. These
additional elements, when viewed in combination, add nothing further to the
equation, as they merely provide an implementation environment for the
abstract idea itself. As such, we disagree with Appellant that claim 1
supplies an inventive concept under Step 2B.
Because the Examiner correctly concluded claim 1 is directed to a
judicial exception, and because Appellant does not identify any error in the
Examiner’s determination under Step 2B of the Guidance, we sustain the
rejection of representative claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
In rejecting claim 1 under § 103, the Examiner relies on the teachings
of Cervelli. Final Act. 8–12. Appellant contends the Examiner has erred in
three respects. We first summarize the cited prior art, and then we address
these contentions seriatim.
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

14
Cervelli describes a group of vector layers which can be selected for
display. The vector layers (such as Buildings/Structures 208 and Terrain
210) are each associated with a category of map data, and the names of each
vector layer are descriptive of the map data stored for each vector layer. See
Cervelli ¶¶ 69–71, Fig. 2B. When one of the vector layers is selected for
display, it overlays the map with the map data associated with the category.
See, e.g., Cervelli Fig. 2A. The map data for the vector layers includes
subsets of data. Cervelli ¶ 71. For example, as shown in the Figure 2B of
Cervelli, the Building/Structures vector layer 208 includes subsets
Structures, Government, Medical, Education, and Commercial. Id.
Similarly, the Terrain vector layer 210 includes Vegetation and
Water/Hydrography. Id.
Appellant first argues Cervelli is deficient because it does not disclose
or suggest the limitation of “while displaying the first layer of visual
indications, receiving user input specifying a modification to the data set
corresponding to the first layer; and in response to the user input specifying
the modification to the data set corresponding to the first layer, modifying
the data set corresponding to the first layer.” Appeal Br. 5–6. According to
Appellant, the cited portions of Cervelli merely teach selecting and de-
selecting map layers, but that selecting and de-selecting layers does not
modify the underlying data corresponding to the selected or de-selected
layer. Appeal Br. 6.
We are not persuaded by this argument. In Cervelli, when a user
selects a vector layer for display, such as Buildings/Structures the category
of data including all of the subsets of data are displayed in as a layer over the
map. This initial selection is shown in Figure 2B with each box of the
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

15
subsets darkened to indicate its inclusion in the Buildings/Structures layer.
A user may deselect one or more of the data subsets for a vector layer.
When this happens, the subset of data is removed from the displayed vector
layer, thereby modifying the dataset of the vector layer. We agree with the
Examiner that the vector layers taught by Cervelli correspond to the “first
layer” recited in claim 1. When the user modifies the selected data subsets
of the vector layer, we agree with the Examiner that this action teaches “user
input specifying the modification to the data set corresponding to the first
layer” because it changes the data that will be displayed in the vector layer.
Appellant further argues there is no storing of any modified data in
Cervelli. Appeal Br. 6–7. We disagree. When Cervelli removes a subset of
data from the displayed vector layer, the system retains this setting, and then
it displays the modified vector layer. As explained by the Examiner, when
the change in selected data subsets is made, that setting is retained, which
indicates that the modification is stored.
Appellant’s third argument provides that “Cervelli does not describe
displaying a second layer corresponding to the modified data set in response
to the user input specifying the modification to the data set corresponding to
the first layer.” Appeal Br. 7. We do not find this argument persuasive
because we agree with the Examiner that Cervelli’s display of the modified
vector layer teaches “displaying a second layer of visual indications on top
of the displayed map, wherein the second layer corresponds to the modified
data set,” as recited in the independent claims.
Because we do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive of
Examiner error, we sustain the rejection of independent claims 1, 13, and 14
under § 103. Appellant does not present separate argument for patentability
Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

16
of any dependent claims. We, therefore, also sustain the rejection of the
remaining claims under § 103.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
More specifically,
We affirm the rejection of claim 1–5, 9, and 11–17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
We affirm the rejection of claims 1–5, 9, 12–14, 16, and 17 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Cervelli.
We affirm the rejection of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Cervelli and Aymeloglu.
We affirm the rejection of claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Cervelli and Windl.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 9, 11–
17
101 Eligibility 1–5, 9, 11–
17

1–5, 9, 12–
14, 16, 17
103 Cervelli 1–5, 9, 12–
14, 16, 17

11 103 Cervelli,
Aymeloglu
11
15 103 Cervelli, Windl 15
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 9, 11–
17

Appeal 2019-000190
Application 15/256,218

17
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED