REM TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, LLC d/b/a AMBROSE AUTO & AUTOTRANS KATAYENKO

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 4, 2014

01-CA-112724 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 4, 2014)

JD(NY)–26–14
Bedford, MA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE
REM TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, LLC, D/B/A
AMBROSE AUTO & AUTOTRANS KATAYENKO
and Case No. 01-CA-112724
JORGE DAVILA, An Individual
Laura Pawle, Esq., Counsel for the General Counsel.
Alexei Kataenko, Pro Se, for the Respondent
DECISION
Statement of the Case
Joel P. Biblowitz, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard by me in Boston,
Massachusetts on April 8, 2014. The Complaint, which issued on January 31, 2014 and was
based upon an unfair labor practice charge and a first and second amended charge that were
filed on September 6, October 31 and December 19, 20131 by Jorge Davila, an Individual,
alleges that from about April 26 to about September 6, REM Transportation Services, LLC, d/b/a
Ambrose Auto & Autotrans Katayenko, herein called the Respondent, paid “seniority pay” to
Davila that was lower than it paid to other employees with similar seniority, and on about
September 6 it discharged him, all because of his union and protected concerted activities, and
because he testified at a Board hearing in Case No. 1-CA-77143, in violation of Section
8(a)(3)(4)(1) of the Act. The Respondent defends that his seniority pay was a lower amount
because when the Respondent granted it to the employees it was based upon continuous
service and as Davila had a break in his employment he was paid the lower amount. It further
defends that Davila was discharged because of the large number of accidents that he was
involved in.
I. Jurisdiction and Labor Organization Status
Respondent admits, and I find, that it has been an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act and that International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 25, herein called the Union, has been a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. The Facts
A. Background
In late 2011 the Union attempted to organize the Respondent’s employees and filed a
petition with the Board in March 2012. Davila was one of the employees who assisted the Union
in its unsuccessful organizational attempt and the Union withdrew the petition and filed unfair
labor practice charges against the Respondent. The Region issued a Complaint alleging the

1 Unless indicated otherwise, all dates referred to herein relate to the year 2013
JD(NY)–26–14
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2
unlawful discharge of one employee and the reduction in hours for Davila. At a Board hearing
conducted on December 13, 2012, Davila and a Union representative testified about his Union
activities in the presence of the Respondent’s owner, who was acting pro se for the
Respondent. During a recess of the hearing, the parties settled the case with an informal
settlement agreement.
B. Seniority Pay
On March 21, the Respondent established a Seniority Pay Program for its employees
effective in April. The Memo to employees states, inter alia: “…we have added SENIORITY PAY
to the Company payroll structure. What that means to you – employees with three years of
continuous work will have an additional item- Seniority Pay- added to your paycheck starting
April 2013. Three years of service- extra $20/week; five years of service- extra $35/week.”
Respondent prepared a list of its employees with their start day, and for Davila, it lists March 11,
2009 and $20 as his seniority pay. What caused this problem is that although Davila began
working for the Respondent in 2007, he took a leave in February and March 2009, and when he
left, he told Valery Parnas, Respondent’s Road Manager, that he “…was going to be out for a
while, for some time” and that Parnas told him to call when he returned. At Parnas’ request,
Davila signed a Resignation Notice dated February 6, 2009 and when he returned to work on
about March 11, 2009, he signed a form stating that he was beginning a sixty day probationary
period, as he had when he began working for the Respondent in 2007. The Respondent paid
Davila $20 for seniority pay, as if he had begun work in 2009, rather than 2007. Counsel for the
General Counsel alleges that since he was only away from employment for about a month in
2009, that should not have been considered a break in employment and that he had about six
years seniority and should have received $35, rather than $20, seniority pay. It is alleged that
this underpayment was due to his Union activities and testimony at the Board hearing and
therefore violated of Section 8(a)(3)(4)(1) of the Act.
Counsel for the General Counsel introduced into evidence a seniority list prepared by
the Respondent in response to a subpoena from General Counsel. Among the employees, it
lists Grisell Rosado as having a start day of March 26, 2009, and was listed for $20 seniority
pay. However, Respondent’s payroll records state that while she was hired in March 2009, she
left Respondent’s employ on March 4, 2011, although it doesn’t state why she left, and returned
to Respondent’s employ on April 28, 2011, and she received a $20 seniority pay bonus.
Eugeniy Karyakin, Respondent’s General Manager, testified: “It was my mistake.”
C. Davila’s Discharge
Davila was an active participant in the Union’s attempt to organize the Respondent’s
employees in 2011 and 2012. He attended Union meetings, signed an authorization card for the
Union, distributed cards to other employees and returned the signed cards to the Union and
spoke to most of the employees, by phone or by radio, about the benefits of the Union. The
Union filed a petition with the Board on March 6, 2012 which it later withdrew. On March 16,
2012 the Respondent, by its president Alexei Kataenko wrote a letter to each of the employees
stating, at the beginning: “Don’t vote for the Union. Teamsters withdrew their petition to NLRB
so now we can tell you the truth.” At one point the letter states: “If union wins…drivers will see
their pay go down, they will be paid $33-$44/day, depending on the route. Now you get $50-60.
Don’t vote for the Union.” The letter also states:
The truth is-if majority of employees elect union to represent them-it will hurt company a
lot, cripple it and possibly just kill it in a short period of time. Union will sue us to our
knees first, and we just lose most of our customers in that process. And who pays us
JD(NY)–26–14
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
3
salaries- union or customers? Don’t vote for union.
On about March 22, 2012, the Respondent discharged employee Carlos Carrasquillo
and on about April 10, 2012, the Respondent reduced Davila’s hours of employment. The
Region issued a Complaint on August 31, 2012, alleging that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3)(1) of the Act by reducing Davila’s hours and discharging Carrasquillo, as well as
engaging in some Section 8(a)(1) activity, including the March 16, 2012 letter to employees. At
the Board hearing conducted on December 13, 2012 on these allegations Kataenko
represented the Respondent pro se and Parnas and Karyakin were also present throughout the
hearing. Davila testified that the leading employees in the Union campaign were “Carrasquillo
and the rest of us” and that he spoke to a majority of the employees about the Union and asked
between fifteen and twenty five employees if they wanted to sign authorization cards for the
Union, and he was cross examined briefly by Kataenko. Steven Sullivan, an organizer for the
Union, testified that Carrasquillo “for sure contacted me numerous times” and Davila and others
also assisted in attempting to organize the employees. He also testified that Davila gave him an
envelope containing twenty signed authorization cards. Before the conclusion of the hearing, the
parties agreed to an Informal Settlement Agreement; Carrasquillo received backpay, but no
reinstatement, Davila received $3,000 backpay, and the Respondent posted a Notice to this
effect in January.
Davila had an accident on September 3 with the van that he was driving, which was a
different van than he usually drove. On September 6 Karyakin gave him a letter of termination,
which stated: “Please consider this letter as an employment termination notification, because of
gross violation of Company policies—during period from April 2007 up to September 2013 you
had 8 car accidents. (the last one you had on 9/3/2013). Your employment with REM Services is
terminated as of 9/6/2013.”
The issue herein is whether Davila was discharged on September 6 because of his
driving record, as alleged by the Respondent, or because of his Union activity and testimony
before the Board, as alleged by General Counsel. In order to make this determination, it is
necessary to examine his driving record, as well as the driving record of other employees.
During the period of his employment with the Respondent, from 2007 to September 6, 2003, he
had a number of “accidents” with his van. However, it should be noted that the word accident
does not necessarily mean that there was any damage to either his van or the other vehicle, nor
does it mean that any injuries resulted from the accident. Respondent defends that one reason
for Davila’s discharge was that its MART2 contract required that he be discharged. The
provision that Respondent relies upon states that drivers should not have: “…any record with
multiple or repeated violations (other than parking). At a minimum, if any of the above violations
are found within the previous 10 years, that driver or driver applicant should be prohibited from
contact with HST consumers.”
Prior to the last few days of his employment with the Respondent, Davila drove the same
van, Number 80. The drivers are permitted to take the vans home with them and return them to
the facility weekly, for the mechanics to check over and maintain. When they are involved in an
accident, they are required to call Parnas and complete an accident report form. Davila testified
that to his knowledge the Respondent did not have any policy on the number of accidents that
drivers were allowed before being terminated. If it was determined that the driver was at fault,
he/she could be responsible for the cost of repairing the damage or the insurance deductible;

2 The Respondent provides transportation for the elderly and disable pursuant to contracts
with MART, a regional transit authority.
JD(NY)–26–14
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
4
Davila had to pay for the cost of an accident on one occasion.
March 28, 2008
While backing up in a parking lot Davila did not see a car behind him. He hit the car, “but
it was not major. Just a small hit.” There were no injuries. For damage, the report states: “A little
dent.” There were no passengers in the van at the time.
July 24, 2008
Davila was stopped on the ramp to an interstate highway, when another vehicle backed
up from the breakdown zone and hit his vehicle. His vehicle damage was in excess of $1,000.
There were no passengers in the van at the time.
Davila testified that he did not receive any warning regarding his accident record in 2008.
September 28, 2009
While Davila’s van was parked in front of his residence, it was hit by another car; the
driver of that car left the scene of the accident, and Davila filed a police report about the
incident. There was damage to the driver’s side of the van. Davila had to pay the Respondent
$200 for the cost of repairing the van.3
He received no warnings about his job performance in 2009.
August 5, 2010
While his van was stopped at a traffic light, a garbage truck rear-ended his vehicle,
damaging the rear bumper in an amount exceeding $1,000. No passengers were in the van at
the time.
December 30, 2011
While his van was stopped at red light, in the right lane, another vehicle “slammed” into
the van. Apparently, there were no passengers in the van at the time and the Accident Report
does not indicate the approximate amount of damage.
February 17, 2012
While he was backing up in a parking lot he hit another vehicle. The Accident Report
states that there were no passengers in the van and that there was no damage to either vehicle.
After this accident, Karyakin told him that he should pay something for this accident, but he
refused, and did not have to pay anything, and he testified that Karyakin never said that he
would be terminated if he had another accident. Parnas did tell him, however, to be careful
driving. Karyakin testified that after this accident he gave Davila a verbal warning that if he had
another accident, he would be fired.
The accident that, allegedly, was the reason for Davila’s termination occurred on
September 3. Although his regular van was Van 80, on September 3 he was told to cover a
different route with Van number 25, which he testified was “a bit old,” and had problems with the
brakes. Unlike his regular van, with Van number 25 you had to press very hard on the brakes for
the van to stop. He was driving behind another car that stopped abruptly, and he could not stop
quickly enough, and hit the car in the rear. There was a “slight” amount of damage to the van,

3 Additionally, during his employment with the Respondent, he has paid $60 for illegal
parking, and $100 for passing a stop sign.
JD(NY)–26–14
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
5
which had no passengers, and the individual in the other vehicle may have been injured. After
the accident, he called Parnas to report the accident, and Parnas told him to come to the office
when he returned. After returning to the office, he told the mechanic that the brakes were bad
on the van and the mechanic worked on the van “for a while.” He continued driving Van 25 until
September 6, when he was called to the office and Karyakin gave him the letter stating that he
was terminated. Kataenko testified that when Davila came to the Respondent’s garage on
September 3 complaining that the brakes on Van 25 were bad, he had his two mechanics check
the brakes, and both said that the brakes were in normal condition, but the mechanics did not
testify.
Counsel for the General Counsel introduced into evidence a number of exhibits intended
to establish disparate treatment of Davila, due to his Union activities and testimony at the 2012
Board hearing. Driver Michael Karapetyan was discharged on July 23, 2010 for “having
numerous traffic accidents.” Although it is difficult to decipher from the accident reports,
Karapetyan had an accident on May 10, 2010 when he “touched” another car while changing
lanes, on May 28, 2010 where he rear ended a car in front of him, and another accident on July
20, 2010 where, it appears that he was struck by another car while changing lanes.
Edward Arroyo was discharged on March 11 for failing to pay parking tickets, using the
company vehicle for personal use, and damaging the Respondent’s vehicle, through his fault.
He had accidents on July 24, 2010, November 10, 2010, January 24, 2012, and May 19, 2012.
Amelia Martinez was discharged on May 16 for five accidents and one “incident,” where
she stepped on the brake abruptly and the client was affected by the sudden stop. The first
Accident Report lists an accident on November 6, 2011. Martinez’ notes states that as she was
making a left turn from the left lane, a car in the right lane also attempted to make a left turn and
hit her van. The next accident was January 5, 2012 where she backed into a fence after she
dropped off a client. On March 14, 2012 she was rear ended while stopped at a traffic light, and
on September 17, 2012 she rear ended another vehicle while attempting to avoid another
vehicle that was backing up. On April 2, 2013 her van was hit by another vehicle that was
attempting to turn. Her last day of employment with the Respondent was May 16. Respondent’s
records state:
On 5/16 she had an incident in the van- client fall [sic] and Mart removed Amelia
Martinez till we get drug and alcohol test. We received drug test on 6/27/13. We tried to
contact Amelia Martinez over the phone- no answer. After this on 7/23 we decided to
terminate her- accidents plus incident.
Joseph Aime was terminated on September 11. He had an accident on February 5 and,
although it is difficult to decipher his description of the accident, it appears to state that another
vehicle hit his van. There was another accident on September 11 that involved a guard rail and
Karyakin testified that the van was totaled.
Adaime Cristobal4 had an accident on February 1, 2011; while backing out of a
driveway, she hit a parked car and broke a light and damaged the bumper of the vehicle. On
August 15, 2011 while she was attempting to turn left, another car drove past her and she hit

4 Respondent alleges that she was terminated after her last accident, although it did not
produce the termination letter pursuant to General Counsel’s subpoena. On the list of
employees eligible for seniority payments that Respondent prepared pursuant to the subpoena
request of the General Counsel, Cristobal is included in the list.
JD(NY)–26–14
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
6
the right hand passenger side door of that car. On February 6, 2012, as she was waiting to turn,
a car went through a stop sign and hit her van, damaging the rear bumper. On July 9, 2012,
while she was backing out of a parking space, her neighbor bent over to pick up something in
the street and Cristobal did not see her and hit her in the shoulder, and she fell to the ground
and went to the hospital. On April 22, as she was backing out of a parking space, her van
scratched the rear side fender of another car, causing some paint to come off, but no other
visible damage.
Counsel for the General Counsel also introduced evidence of drivers who had accidents,
but were not discharged. Manual Aybar had an accident on July 19, 2012 when another car
drove through a stop sign and hit his van, and on March 3 while he was stopped at a light
another car hit the passenger side of his van. In addition, on May 7, while his van was parked
overnight near his residence, it was hit by another vehicle. Karyakin could not testify with
certainty whether Aybar was still employed by the Respondent or, if he had been terminated,
that it was due to accidents with the van. He did testify, however, that to his recollection the
drivers discussed supra were the only ones who were terminated due to accidents, but
regarding Aybar: “I don’t remember about him.”
Donald Brown’s van was damaged on October 25, 2011 while it was parked; another
vehicle came from the rear and hit the left rear bumper of the van. On March 28, while he was
stopped at a stop sign, another car rear ended his van while someone else was in his van, and
on August 20, while he was parked at the curb, the car next to his hit his van while attempting to
get out of a tight parking space. Brown is still employed by the Respondent.
Mario Martinez had an accident on June 16, 2011; while waiting at a traffic light, he
moved his van slowly and “touched the car in front” of him. On March 4, 2012 the car behind
him hit his van. On October 24, 2012, a car in front of him stopped abruptly, and he was unable
to stop his van in time, and he hit the bumper of the car, and on March 8, while he was stopped
at a light, another vehicle rear ended him.
Veronica Martinez’s van was scratched by another car while it was parked on July 25,
2012. On about January 25 the car in front of her van unexpectedly stopped, and she was
unable to stop before hitting the rear of that vehicle. On April 29, in a similar situation, she hit
the rear bumper of the car in front of her. On August 20 the car in front of her stopped abruptly
and, in order to avoid hitting that car, she turned into the right lane and hit another car. A few
days later, she was involved in another accident, but the Accident Report does not state what
occurred. Karyakin testified that he doesn’t remember if Ms. Martinez was terminated after the
August 20 accident.
Steven Ricker, who is still employed by the Respondent, had three accidents. The first
occurred on August 24, 2011 where there was some damage to the left front side of the van; the
Accident Report in evidence is incomplete. On February 13, 2012, he hit another car while
making a turn, but there was no damage to his van, and on April 22 his van rear ended another
vehicle.
Yrbin Rodriguez had an accident on May 24 where he rear ended a car that stopped
“without any reason.” His next accident occurred on July 22, 2011 when he was rear ended
while stopped at a red light, and on September 23, 2011 another vehicle hit his van while he
was turning into a gas station. Karyakin testified that he is not sure if Rodriguez was fired, but
believes that he recently resigned.
Reynaldo Rosario had an accident on October 31, 2012 when his foot slipped off the
JD(NY)–26–14
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
7
brake pedal while he was stopped at a traffic light and he stepped on the gas pedal by mistake,
hitting the car in front of him. His next accident was on July 12 when he put the emergency
brake on, thought that he put the van in Park, and stepped out of the van, which moved slowly
and hit the car in front of him. He then realized that the van was not in Park. On July 15 the car
in front of him braked sharply and he was unable to stop before rear ending that car. As to
whether Rosario is still employed by the Respondent, Karyakin testified: “I’d say no.” When
asked if he terminated him, he testified: “I don’t remember that I terminated him.”
III. Analysis
The initial allegation is that the Respondent discriminated against Davila, in violation of
Section 8(a)(3)(4)(1) of the Act by paying him $20 a week seniority pay, rather than $35, which
is given to employees with at least five years of service. Respondent defends that Davila left the
Respondent’s employ for about a month in February 2009, at which time he signed a
resignation notice, and when he returned the following month, he signed a form stating that he
was beginning a sixty day probationary period. As the announcement of the establishment of
seniority pay provides for “continuous work,” and as he “started” again in 2009, he had four
years of continuous service, not five, and was therefore only entitled to $20 seniority pay.
Counsel for the General Counsel alleges that the only reason for giving him $20, rather than
$35 weekly, was that he testified at the Board hearing and was active in the Union campaign. In
addition, Rosado was paid $20 weekly seniority pay because her two periods of employment
were combined when she returned to Respondent’s employ in April 2011, after being away for
seven weeks.
Under Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980) the initial issue is whether Counsel for the
General Counsel has made a prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference that
protected conduct was a “motivating factor” in Respondent’s decision. If that has been
established, the burden shifts to the Respondent to establish that it would have taken the same
action even in the absence of the protected conduct. Counsel for the General Counsel has
clearly established her initial burden. Kataenko’s March 16, 2012 letter to the employees
establishes Union animus. In addition, Kataenko, Karyakin and Parnas were all present at the
Board hearing on December 13, 2012 when Davila and Sullivan testified to Davila’s Union
activities in support of the Union’s attempt to organize Respondent’s employees. Further,
disparate treatment was established with Rosado, who had a break in employment with the
Respondent similar to Davila, yet received seniority pay which she was not entitled to as she did
not have three years of continuous service. I find further that the Respondent has not satisfied
its burden of establishing that Davila would have been paid $20 seniority pay even absent his
protected conduct. Respondent’s sole argument is that Davila did not have the required
continuous service as he was away for five weeks in 2009 and signed a resignation letter on
leaving, and a new probationary employee form when he returned. However, Rosado received
the seniority pay under similar circumstances and I do not credit Karyakin’s testimony that these
payments to Rosado were a mistake. I find that too often his testimony was often “selective” in
that it appeared that he remembered only what he wanted to remember. I therefore find that by
paying Davila $20 a week seniority pay, rather than $35 a week, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3)(4)(1) of the Act.
The remaining issue is whether Davila’s discharge violates the Act. As stated above,
Respondent was aware of his Union activities as Kataenko, Karyakin and Parnas were present
when he testified at the Board hearing on December 13, 2012. In order to determine whether his
discharge was pretextual and violated the Act, it is necessary to examine his driving record and
compare it with the record of other employees who also had accidents, but were not discharged.
This is not a perfect comparison for a number of reasons. For one thing, the Accident Reports
JD(NY)–26–14
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
8
are, at times, difficult to decipher and, the drivers often downplayed their responsibility for the
accidents, so it is difficult to know what actually occurred. In addition, Karyakin’s testimony
regarding whether certain employees were still employed was of little assistance.
Davila had two accidents in 2008, prior to his break in service in February and March
2009. In the March 2008 incident he was clearly at fault backing into another car, but causing
little damage. He received no warnings for these accidents and was rehired in March 2009. In
September 2009 his van was hit by another car while it was parked in front of his residence, in
August 2010 his van was rear ended by a garbage truck while he was stopped at a light, and in
December 2011 his van was hit while he was stopped at a traffic light. Clearly, none of these
three accidents could be attributable to his negligence, while the February 12, 2012 accident,
where he hit another vehicle while backing up, was his fault. I credit Davila’s testimony that after
this accident, Parnas told him to be more careful, rather than crediting Karyakin’s testimony that
he warned him that if he had another accident, he would be discharged. His final accident
occurred on September 3. Davila testified that it was caused by problems with the brakes on
Van 25 because he had to press very hard on the brakes for them to operate properly.
Kataenko testified that his mechanics checked the brakes on Van 25 and they said that they
were in normal condition, but Respondent did not call the mechanics to testify. Although I would
credit Davila’s testimony over Kataenko, it is not necessary to do so. During the six years of his
employment with the Respondent, Davila had two accidents that were clearly his fault, on March
28, 2008 and February 17, 2012, and both were minor accidents with no injuries and minor
damage to the van. I can find no record of eight accidents, as stated in the September 6
termination letter. In addition, nineteen months passed between the February 2012 accident and
the September 3 accident, and only nine months passed since Davila and Sullivan’s testimony
at the Board hearing describing his Union activities. In addition, other employees such as Mario
Martinez, Veronica Martinez, who had four accidents in thirteen months, Steven Ricker, Yrbin
Rodriguez and Reynaldo Rosario had equally bad or worse accident records and, apparently,
were not discharged. Further, Cristobal had five accidents in a little over two years, and Amelia
Martinez was not discharged until after her fifth accident in eighteen months. I therefore find that
the discharge of Davila on September 6 for the September 3 accident was pretextual, and that
he was fired in retaliation for his Union activity and testimony at a Board hearing, in violation of
Section 8(a)(3)(4)(1) of the Act.
Conclusions of Law
1. REM Transportation Services, LLC has been an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By paying Jorge Davila $20 weekly seniority pay, rather than $35 weekly, from April
through September 2013, and by discharging him on September 6, 2013, the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3)(4)(1) of the Act.
The Remedy
The Respondent having discriminatorily underpaid Davila for his seniority pay from April
to September 6 and discharging him on September 6, 2013, it must offer him reinstatement and
make him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from
date of discharge to date of a proper offer of reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as
prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New
JD(NY)–26–14
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
9
Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in
Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010), enf. denied on other grounds
sub.nom., Jackson Hospital Corp. v. NLRB,, 647 F. 3d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2011). I shall also order
the Respondent to file a special report with the Social Security Administration allocating Davila’s
backpay to the appropriate calendar quarters and to compensate him for any adverse income
tax consequences of receiving his backpay in one lump sum.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law and on the entire record, I hereby
issue the following recommended5
ORDER
The Respondent, REM Transportation Services, LLC, its officers, agents, successors
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging, or otherwise discriminating against its employees because of their
activities in support of International Brotherhood Of Teamsters, Local 25, or any other labor
organization, or because the employee, or employees, testified at a Board hearing.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Jorge Davila full and immediate reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other
rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits that he suffered as a result of discharging him and underpaying him for his seniority
pay, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this Decision.
(b) File a special report with the Social Security Administration allocating Davila’s
backpay to the appropriate calendar quarters and compensate him for any adverse income tax
consequences of receiving his backpay in one lump sum, as prescribed in Latino Express, Inc.,
359 NLRB No. 44 (2012).
(c) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from its files any
reference to the unlawful discharge of Davila, and within 3 days thereafter notify him, in writing,
that this has been done and that the discharge will not be used against him in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored

5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
JD(NY)–26–14
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
10
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Bedford,
Massachusetts copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”6 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since April 1, 2012.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 4, 2014
__________________________________
Joel P. Biblowitz
Administrative Law Judge

6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JD(NY)–26–14

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against any of you for supporting Teamsters, Local
25, or any other union, or for testifying at a Board conducted hearing, and WE WILL NOT in any like or
related manner interfere with, restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by
Section 7 of the Act
WE WILL offer Jorge Davila immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges
previously enjoyed, and WE WILL make him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting
from his discharge, and our failure to pay him the proper amount of seniority pay, together with interest.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from our files any reference to the discharge
of Davila, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify him that this has been done and that the
discharge will not be used against him in any way.
REM TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, LLC
(Employer)
Dated___________________ By______________________________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
10 Causeway Street, Boston Federal Building, 6th Floor, Room 601
Boston, Massachusetts 02222–1072
Hours of Operation: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
617-565-6700.
JD(NY)–26–14

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/01-CA-112724 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 617-565-6701.