Reginald W. Harrell, Appellant,v.Robert E. Rubin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, (United States Customs), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 21, 1999
01973233 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 21, 1999)

01973233

06-21-1999

Reginald W. Harrell, Appellant, v. Robert E. Rubin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, (United States Customs), Agency.


Reginald W. Harrell v. Department of the Treasury

01973233

June 21, 1999

Reginald W. Harrell, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01973233

v. ) Agency No. 95-2175

) Hearing No. 360-95-8516X

Robert E. Rubin, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Treasury, )

(United States Customs), )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

Appellant filed an appeal with this Commission from a final decision of

the agency concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination,

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 701 et seq. Appellant alleges discrimination based upon race

(Black) and disability (colon cancer) when he was not selected for a

GS-1890-5/7/9, Custom Inspector position, which he applied for under

the Veterans Readjustment Act. The appeal is accepted in accordance

with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

On March 14, 1995, appellant filed a Complaint alleging discrimination as

referenced above. Appellant's complaint was accepted for processing.

An investigation was conducted and on October 10, 1995, appellant

requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ), but later

rescinded that request, through counsel, by filing a Motion for Findings

and Conclusions Without a Hearing on December 8, 1995. The agency

responded to appellant's motion and filed a cross-motion for Findings and

Conclusions Without a Hearing on December 20, 1995. On January 28, 1997,

the AJ rendered a recommended decision of no discrimination without a

hearing, pursuant to the requests of both parties.

The undisputed facts are as follows: Appellant retired from the United

States Air Force on August 7, 1991, after having served for 23 years.

On February 14, 1994, appellant applied for a Custom Inspector position

with the agency under the Veterans Readjustment Act (VRA).<1> Appellant

appeared for an interview in Del Rio, Texas on February 23, 1994.

During the interview process the two-member interview panel used a

previously prepared set of eight questions to evaluate the various

applicants' qualifications. The interview panel rated each applicant's

responses to the questions by assigning a plus (+) to indicate a favorable

impression, a minus (-) to indicate an unfavorable impression, and

a zero (0) to indicate neither a favorable or unfavorable impression.

According to both members of the interview panel, they were not impressed

with appellant's interview. In addition, the panel members summarized

appellant's responses by indicating that they did not believe appellant

possessed the qualities needed to make a good custom's inspector. Three

individuals who received much higher interview ratings were recommended

for hire and were ultimately selected by the District Director.

Prima Facie Case of Discrimination

It his recommended decision the AJ found that appellant established a

prima facie case of race discrimination. Specifically, the AJ noted that

appellant was qualified for the position and non-blacks were selected.

However, the AJ did not find that appellant presented a prima facie case

of disability discrimination. Specifically, the AJ noted that the mere

fact that appellant had colon cancer in the past, which was in remission,

was not sufficient to show that he was disabled within the meaning of

the Rehabilitation Act. In addition, the AJ noted that there was no

evidence that the interview panel knew of appellant's colon cancer until

the very end of the interview after appellant had been rated.

Agency's Response

The AJ found that the agency articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for its employment action. Specifically, the members of the

interview panel explained that appellant appeared to lack self-confidence

or make eye contact. In addition, both panel members testified that

appellant was unwilling to be placed in several possible locations which

presented the appearance of inflexibility. Lastly, the interview panel

testified that they recommended the best qualified individuals to the

District Director.

Pretext

The AJ did not find that appellant established a showing of pretext

or that the agency was motivated by race or disability discrimination

in its employment decision. Specifically, the AJ noted that appellant

alleged that he was better qualified than at least one of the selectees.

Appellant further asserted that his military background with customs

experience during the years 1974 to 1978 indicated his superior

qualifications. However, it is important to note that appellant did

not specifically dispute the ratings of the interview panel or address

his performance during the interview. Appellant also asserted that

approximately 30 Custom Inspectors were hired in Laredo District from

January, 1994 through September, 1994 and none were black. The AJ found

that appellant did not prove qualification superior to other applicants.

In addition, the AJ found the interview questions were significantly

correlated with the important elements of the job duties at issue.

Lastly, the AJ found that while no black applicants were hired as Custom

Inspectors during the period January, 1994 through September, 1994, the AJ

did not find this fact sufficient to prove pretext. The AJ specifically

noted that appellant failed to indicate how many blacks applied for

such positions during the relevant time period. The AJ also noted that

the record indicated a racial make-up of blacks in the area of 1.4%.

Accordingly, the AJ did not find appellant to have sufficiently proven

age or disability discrimination.

On February 26, 1997, the agency adopted the findings and conclusions

of the AJ and issued a final decision finding no discrimination. It is

from this decision that appellant now appeals.

After a careful review of the entire record, including arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, the Commission finds

that the AJ's recommended decision properly analyzed appellant's complaint

as a disparate treatment claim. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56

(1981); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 305 n. 19 (5th

Cir. 1981). The Commission concludes that, in all material respects,

the AJ accurately set forth the relevant facts and properly analyzed the

case using the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. Based upon

the evidence of record, the Commission discerns no basis to disturb the

AJ's finding of no discrimination.

We specifically note that appellant places great weight in the EEO

Counseling Report where it is indicated that one of the members of the

interview panel told the EEO Counselor that "[appellant] was a disabled

veteran with cancer and that customs was not interested in a person

like that." Appellant asserts that such a statement is direct evidence

of disability discrimination. We disagree. There is no independent

confirmation of the purported information contained in the EEO Counselor's

report. There is no indication in the record that the individual who

purportedly made the statement was given an opportunity to review the EEO

Counselor's report and confirm its accuracy. Furthermore, the witness'

sworn affidavit does not confirm the EEO Counselor's report, but rather

denies all allegations of discrimination. Given the circumstances of the

purported statement, we find that the EEO Counselor's report, being the

sole allegation of discriminatory animus is not sufficiently reliable

to carry appellant's burden of proving disability discrimination.<2>

It is also important to note that the informal EEO Counseling process is

designed to encourage early resolution of complaints through informal

fact gathering which is not necessarily subject to strict scrutiny.

To rely solely upon such information, without independent confirmation,

may likely discourage both the agency and complainant from supplying

such necessary information, and accordingly, restrict the likelihood of

early resolutions.

In addition, appellant argues on appeal that the AJ erred in not finding

evidence which establishes that the interview panel "regarded" appellant

as disabled. In support of his contention, appellant alleges that

the record shows that the interview panel had access to information

which indicated that appellant was honorably medically discharged

from the military. While there is no evidence which indicates that

the interview panel knew of appellant's honorable medical discharge,

such factor alone does not sufficiently prove that the interview panel

regarded appellant as disabled. In addition, the undisputed record

indicates that the interview panel became aware of appellant's colon

cancer after they rated appellant's interview. Accordingly, we do not

find this information sufficient to prove disability discrimination.

For the reasons stated above, and for reasons not specifically addressed

herein, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

to AFFIRM the agency's final decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS -- ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you

to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��

791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

6/21/99

_______________ ____________________________________

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

1There is no record of employment for appellant between his retirement

and his application for the Custom Inspector position.

2If appellant found this information compelling, it behooved him to

develop the record on this issue at a hearing which he expressly choose

to forgo.