Reecia R. Thompson, Complainant,v.Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, Department of Justice, (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 16, 2007
0120063708 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 16, 2007)

0120063708

01-16-2007

Reecia R. Thompson, Complainant, v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, Department of Justice, (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Agency.


Reecia R. Thompson,

Complainant,

v.

Alberto Gonzales,

Attorney General,

Department of Justice,

(Federal Bureau of Investigation),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01200637081

Agency No. P989509

DECISION

On June 3, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's May 4,

2006 final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked as

Assistant Director of Nursing at FMC-Fort Worth, Texas. On May 29, 1998,

complainant contacted an EEO Counselor and filed a formal EEO complaint on

July 7, 1998, alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of

race (African-American) and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity

(arising under Title VII) when:

1. She was excluded from supervisory meetings and withholding of job

related information between April 2, 1995 and May 1, 1998;

2. Her ability to participate in performance evaluations of subordinate

nurses for the period ending May 1, 1998, was removed;

3. She was not provided advance notice of a tornado drill on April 23,

1998, while White staff were given notice; and

4. She was given a low evaluation on a performance appraisal in May 1998

(lower than past evaluations of "Exceeds" and "Outstanding").

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). When complainant

did not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. �

1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.110(b) concluding that complainant failed to prove that she was

subjected to discrimination as alleged.

As to issue (1), the FAD found the following: the Director of Nursing

(DON) stated that she had significant problems working with complainant

given complainant's reticence to talk with her, and complainant's

accusations regarding other supervisors during staff meetings. The DON

stated that a big part of the conflict was due to the fact that in the

past, complainant had been in an acting role as Director of Nursing, but

did not get that position permanently. The DON stated that complainant

had only been rated higher in the past because she had intimidated

her supervisor. The DON stated that she rated complainant accurately

to reflect her performance.

As to issue (2), the FAD found the following: complainant's rating

authority over four supervisory clinical nurses was removed because the

DON felt complainant was abusive to the nurses, particularly one nurse

(N1). The DON stated for instance, that complainant called N1 "crazy",

"mentally ill", and "mentally incompetent." Additionally, the DON stated

that complainant refused to schedule N1 to work every other weekend,

despite the DON's instruction to do so. Additionally, the DON stated

that complainant called the nurses "liars" and did not support the staff.

The DON stated that in order to prevent the supervisory nurses from

leaving, she decided to do their ratings herself.

As to issue (3), the FAD found the following: tornado drills are

performed on a quarterly basis. The DON stated that although she did

not recall the drill, she did not inform the staff about the drill, nor

specifically exclude complainant. As to issue (4), the FAD found the

following: the DON stated that complainant was included in all meetings,

and job information was not deliberately withheld from her. The record

includes an email from the DON to complainant, asking if she could attend

a meeting on March 18, 1998. Some of the individuals who were interviewed

in the investigation stated that meetings were held without complainant.

N1 testified that complainant was not included in several meetings

because complainant had been given other job responsibilities that

were not directly related to nursing. N1 stated that while complainant

maintained her title as Assistant Director of Nursing, she did not retain

the same responsibilities.

As to pretext, the FAD then noted that complainant alleges that the

DON is racist because when the DON first came from Rochester to the

facility in question, she stated that this staff is "so different from

Rochester" and that she was hoping to "have a staff like Rochester."

Complainant believed this to be racist since the DON's staff at Rochester

was all White. In addition, complainant asserts that she believes

the DON is racist because of how she treated her, and how she yelled

at her and another Black nurse in front of the inmates - something

she did not do to White staff members. Complainant also asserts that

the DON introduced candidates she was interviewing to the White staff,

and not the Black staff. The FAD further notes that the DON believes

complainant is prejudiced against Whites, noting that when she first

started the job, complainant asked her how many African-Americans were

in the Rochester office. The DON stated that she felt race was an issue

for complainant from the beginning. The DON further stated that she

was ready to leave the job because of complainant; that complainant was

consistently antagonistic and did not support the staff.

The FAD further states that a nurse (N1) admitted to having made the

statement in the past that she and another employee would have to "n-----

rig it." According to the Associate Warden of Operations, however,

disciplinary action was taken against N1. The FAD found that some of

the staff (both Black and White) who were interviewed stated that they

had problems with the DON, as a manager. The FAD further found that a

Black nurse testified that she wrote a memorandum to the Associate Warden

concerning the manner in which the DON spoke to complainant; a Material

Handler Supervisor also testified that everyone the DON has problems with

is African-American; and a Religious Services Technician stated that the

DON is prejudiced against African-American women. The FAD found that

the Captain's Secretary testified that there was a personality conflict

between complainant and the DON because complainant stands up for what

she believes in. The Chief Medical Records Administrator stated that she

does not think complainant's allegations are justified. The Associate

Warden of Operations stated that he believes there are racial issues in

the Medical Department, and gave as an example N1's reference to "n-----

rigging" equipment. He also stated that the Director of Medical Records

told other board members not to hire "those types of people" where the

candidates they were interviewing were African-American. The FAD noted

that a White Supervisory Nurse apparently took some action to intervene

in the issues raised by complainant because he felt there was a racial

problem, and he was fired shortly thereafter by the DON, with approval

from the Warden.

Ultimately, the FAD found no discrimination as to the issues in this case.

Specifically, the FAD found that there are legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for the actions, and that complainant has not shown that the

actions were motivated by her race. The FAD further found that the record

supports the conclusion that there was a serious personality conflict

between the DON and complainant. As to retaliation, the FAD found that

there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the notion that

complainant's complaints about previous managers caused her new manager

(the DON) to retaliate against her. The FAD further noted that it is

clear based on the record that "there were racial tensions in the office

which influenced how people perceived certain actions. The facts here

suggest that the EEO office should evaluate and determine whether EEO

counseling and instruction may be appropriate for the employees in the

office, including [the DON]." FAD, at 15-16.

Complainant has raised no new arguments on appeal. The agency

requests that we affirm the FAD. As this is an appeal from a decision

issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the

agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, �

VI.A. (November 9, 1999). (explaining that the de novo standard of review

"requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the

factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and

that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record,

including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and

. . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of

the record and its interpretation of the law").

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of

burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging

discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973); see Hochstadt v. Worcestor Foundation

for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976),

aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to

retaliation cases). First, complainant must establish a prima facie

case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination; i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Next, the agency must articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason(s) for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the agency

is successful, then the complainant must prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that the legitimate reason(s) proffered by the agency was

a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256.

In this case, we will assume arguendo that complainant established a

prima facie case of discrimination on the alleged bases. As to (1),

the agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons;

namely, the DON denied that complainant was excluded from meetings.

Some witnesses stated that they could not recall complainant being

excluded, and others did recall that such was the case. For instance,

N1 testified that complainant was not included in several meetings,

however, she stated that this was because complainant had been given

other job responsibilities that were not directly related to nursing.

We note that the record does not clearly indicate what complainant's

responsibilities were at the relevant time and/or whether she missed any

meetings that she needed to attend to obtain job-related information.

It is complainant's burden however, to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence, that she was intentionally excluded from specific meetings

because of management's race-based hostility, and the record is simply

inadequate to make such a finding.

As to (2), the agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons; namely, the DON stated that complainant was not permitted

to participate in performance evaluations of subordinate nurses for

the period ending May 1, 1998 because complainant was abusive to

N1, complainant refused to schedule N1 to work every other weekend,

despite the DON's instruction, and because complainant called the

nurses "liars" and did not support the staff. Although it is surely

a matter of perception as to whether complainant was verbally abusive

to her subordinates, the evidence of record does not indicate that the

DON's statement that she felt complainant was abusive, and that she

removed complainant's rating duty for this reason, is mere pretext for

discrimination.2

As to issue (3), the DON has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons; namely, that staff should not be told about drills because

there would be no reason to have a drill if everyone expects it.

Complainant asserts that others knew about it, and this is corroborated in

the record. It appears however, that some of the people who were warned

about the drill were given such warning by managers other than the DON.

Here again, the record is inadequate for a finding that complainant

was intentionally not told about the drill because the DON harbored

discriminatory or retaliatory animus toward her.

Regarding issue (4), the agency has articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons; namely, concerning the evaluation rating, the

DON states that she had significant problems working with complainant

given complainant's reticence to talk with her, and complainant's

accusations regarding other supervisors during staff meetings. The DON

noted that she felt that the reason for complainant's inappropriate

conduct was that in the past she had been Acting Director of Nursing,

but the DON was selected for that position permanently instead. The DON

stated that complainant had been rated higher in the past because she had

intimidated her supervisor. The DON stated that she rated complainant

accurately to reflect her performance. The record does not indicate

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the reason is a pretext for

discrimination.

In finding that complainant has not established pretext as to any issue

in this case, we note that there is substantial evidence in the record

to indicate that the DON and complainant had a personality conflict,

perhaps due to the fact that complainant "speaks her mind" as well as

because complainant acted in the DON's position prior to this DON's

arrival at the facility. Additionally, we note that we do not have the

benefit of an AJ's findings after a hearing, as complainant chose a FAD

instead, and we can only evaluate the facts based on the weight of the

evidence presented to us. Accordingly, we cannot find discrimination

in this case. Nevertheless, we are disturbed by this record, as it

appears there are significant racial problems at this facility, and we

highly recommend that the agency implement the FAD's suggestion that

EEO training may be appropriate for the employees of this facility.

After a careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact

on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

January

16,

2007

______________________________ _________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Date

Office of Federal Operations

1 Due to a new data system, your case has been re-designated with the

above referenced appeal number.

2 We note that it is not surprising that complainant would have

difficulty interacting with N1, given complainant's knowledge of N1's

past use of the racial epithet described above. Nevertheless, that

issue is not before us in this case. The only question is whether the

DON's real reason for removing the rating duty from complainant, was the

stated reason, or was a pretext for discrimination. The record simply

does not indicate that complainant's race, as opposed to her treatment

of the nurses, was the reason the action was taken.

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0120063708

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036