[Redacted], Xochitl B., 1 Complainant,v.Christine Wormuth, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Jan 31, 2023

Appeal No. 2022003064 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 31, 2023)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Xochitl B.,1 Complainant, v. Christine Wormuth, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency. Appeal No. 2022003064 Hearing Nos. 420-2019-00222X 420-2019-00228X Agency Nos. ARREDSTON17MAR00945 ARREDSTON17JUN01936 ARREDSTON17AUG03421 DECISION Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s April 12, 2022 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as Chief of the Manpower and Force Structure Division at the Agency’s Army Contracting Command (ACC) in Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2022003064 2 Agency Case No. ARREDSTON17MAR00945 (Complaint 1) On May 11, 2017, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her based on her disability (physical), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity, when: 1. on February 7, 2017, Complainant’s first-line supervisor (“Supervisor”) provided a mid-point counseling, which Complainant perceived to be disciplinary action for approved leave; 2. on February 15, 2017, the Supervisor asked if Complainant’s request for leave was to see a doctor; and 3. on February 21, 2017, Complainant had a meeting with a Chief of Staff (“Chief of Staff 1”) to report the Supervisor’s harassing behavior, but he did nothing. Agency Case No. ARREDSTON17JUN01936 (Complaint 2) On August 1, 2017, Complainant filed another EEO complaint alleging discrimination based on her disability, and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity, when: 4. on April 24, 2017, the Supervisor told Complainant that she would not support one of Complainant’s employees for a developmental assignment; 5. on April 24, 2017, Complainant received a response regarding a telework request for one of Complainant’s employees that was different from the implementation of the organization’s telework policy administered to her counterparts; 6. on May 1, 2017, a Coworker informed Complainant that one of the Coworker’s employees was selected for a development assignment, while Complainant’s employee was not permitted to interview; and 7. on May 23, 2017, the Supervisor “reprimanded” Complainant for not responding to an intern data call. Agency Case No. ARREDSTON17AUG03421 (Complaint 3) On October 31, 2017, Complainant filed another EEO complaint alleging discrimination and harassment based on her disability, and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity, when: 8. on August 14, 2017, another Chief of Staff (“Chief of Staff 2”) told Complainant that she was denied a job swap but assigned to a detail assignment outside of ACC to work for a Supervisory Management Analyst in the Army Material Command (AMC). Complainant accepted the detail assignment but decided not to complete it on the first day, prior to meeting with the AMC Deputy Chief of Staff to discuss the specific workload assignments for the detail; 9. on August 23, 2017, Chief of Staff 2 directed Complainant to report to the AMC detail assignment reporting to the Supervisory Management Analyst; 2022003064 3 10. on September 11, 2017, Chief of Staff 2 informed Complainant that the detail assignment was canceled due to Complainant’s lack of accountability and that her supervisory chain was changed with Chief of Staff 2 now as her first-line supervisor. 11. on September 22, 2017, Chief of Staff 2 issued Complainant a Notice of Proposed Suspension for five days, which was never served;2 12. on September 22, 2017, Complainant’s two leave requests were denied by Chief of Staff 2 for failure to submit the requests two weeks in advance, per the organization’s standard operating procedure (SOP); 13. on September 27, 2017, Complainant was “chastised” by Chief of Staff 2 for failure to contact him prior to taking more leave than was originally requested and approved; and 14. on October 26, 2017, Chief of Staff 2 denied Complainant’s leave request to clear Redstone Arsenal in preparation for her relocation to Virginia. At the conclusion of the investigations, the Agency provided Complainant with copies of the reports of investigations (ROIs),3 and notices of her right to request hearings before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested hearings. On October 22, 2019, the assigned AJ joined Complainant’s hearing requests. Over Complainant’s objections, the AJ granted the Agency’s motion for a decision without a hearing and issued the decision on March 30, 2022. The AJ considered the Agency’s motion, Complainant’s opposition, the Agency’s reply to Complainant’s response, and the record evidence to determine that there was sufficient information to issue a decision without a hearing because there were no material facts in dispute. The AJ concluded by granting the Agency’s motion. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal followed, and Complainant filed a brief in support of her appeal. The Agency did not respond to Complainant’s appeal. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Standard of Review The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is 2 Complainant averred that the suspension was served. ROI 2 at 662. The Agency issued a decision on the proposed suspension on November 3, 2017, and it mitigated the proposal to a one-day suspension. Complainant filed a grievance for the suspension, which the Agency denied on January 3, 2018. ROI 2 at 544-8, 542. 3 The Agency combined the investigations for Complaints 2 and 3, and we will refer to the combined investigation as “ROI 2” in the instant decision. 2022003064 4 “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non- moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a)(stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review…”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (as revised, August 5, 2015)(providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). AJ Error On appeal, Complainant asserts that the AJ erred in issuing a decision without any independent analysis, citing to Moore v. Dep’t of State, EEOC Appeal No. 01A52378 (Jun. 21, 2006). However, in Moore, the Commission found that the AJ erred in adopting the agency’s motion without making independent findings but that the AJ appropriately determined that the complainant failed to establish genuine issues of material facts. As such, the Commission affirmed the final order adopting the decision without a hearing. Similarly, in this case, while the AJ did not include an independent analysis in the decision, the AJ correctly determined that Complainant did not establish genuine disputes of material facts. Complainant also argues that the AJ erred in granting summary judgment because the Agency’s motion failed to include the claims in Complaint 1. However, we note that the Agency included its arguments in support of summary judgment for Complaint 1 in its reply to Complainant’s opposition to the Agency Motion for Summary Judgment, and the AJ specified considering the Agency’s reply in the decision. While Complainant argues that she was deprived of the ability to respond, Complainant failed to raise any disputed material facts for any of the claims in Complaint 1 in her appeal. In addition, Complainant asserts that the AJ erred in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim because the Agency failed to analyze her claims under a retaliation framework. However, the Agency included an analysis of the retaliation claims when it assumed a prima facie case of reprisal; found that management officials articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions; and asserted that Complainant did not establish pretext. Agency Motion for Summary Judgment at 15-16. For Complaint 1, the Agency also argued that there was no retaliation because Complainant was not subjected to adverse employment action. Agency Response to Complainant’s Motion in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 10. We are not persuaded by Complainant’s arguments that the alleged errors justify a reversal of the AJ’s determination that summary judgment was appropriate. 2022003064 5 Decision without a Hearing In order to successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence, and she must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Such a dispute would indicate that a hearing is necessary to produce evidence to support a finding that the Agency was motivated by discriminatory animus. Here, however, Complainant has failed to establish such a dispute. Complainant argues that there are numerous disputed material facts warranting a hearing. For example, the Supervisor denied Complainant’s contention that the Supervisor made a statement that she did not want to accept an employee due to her prior EEO activity. Complainant asserts that, due to their contradictory testimony, a hearing is needed for this disputed material fact. However, we find that this is not material because this alleged statement regarding a retaliatory motive against a different employee is unrelated to the claims in Complainant’s complaint. Complainant disputes other facts that will be addressed further below. Overall, we find that Complainant did not establish any genuine dispute of material facts, and that a decision without a hearing was appropriate. Disparate Treatment To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley, supra; Pavelka v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995). We find that Complainant did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination for claims 4-6 because Complainant did not allege that she was aggrieved. The Commission has long defined an “aggrieved employee” as one who suffers a present harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which there is a remedy. Diaz v. Dep’t of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (Apr. 21, 1994). Complainant asserted that others suffered harms in claims 4, 5, and 6, but they do not include alleged adverse actions directly suffered by Complainant. 2022003064 6 Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on her disability, and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity for claims 1-3 and 7-14, we find that the Agency proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. For claim 1, the Supervisor explained that the mid-point counseling was not disciplinary and was a discussion. The meeting occurred soon after Complainant returned from extended medical leave and coincided with the time when mid-points usually occur. The Supervisor stated that it was not specifically a mid-point counseling but a talk about expectations and things that happened during Complainant’s absence. The Supervisor averred that Complainant’s employees asked about Complainant and one employee specifically stated that they felt abandoned, and she instructed Complainant to meet with her employees. ROI 1 at 417, 423, 430-2. Regarding claim 2, the Supervisor responded that she asked if Complainant’s leave was for a medical appointment because it was a request for annual leave. The Supervisor noted that Complainant requested annual leave for February 8, 10, 14, and 15, and the Supervisor did not understand the need for the unscheduled leave. When Complainant confirmed that the leave was for a medical appointment, the Supervisor approved her request. ROI 1 at 449-51. For claim 3, Chief of Staff 1 offered a mediation session to address Complainant’s concerns of alleged harassment by the Supervisor. The meeting was scheduled to include Complainant, the Supervisor, and Chief of Staff 1, but Complainant subsequently declined the meeting. Chief of Staff 1 responded that he understood that Complainant rejected the meeting, and he encouraged her to continue an open dialogue with the Supervisor and informed Complainant that his door was always open. Chief of Staff 1 stated that he did not have the opportunity to conduct a formal investigation because Complainant soon filed her EEO complaint. ROI 1 at 532-6, 559, 115-16. For claim 7, the Supervisor responded that she did not reprimand Complainant for not responding to the data call. Rather, she informed Complainant that future data calls should be distributed for the field for input, prior to submission. ROI 2 at 672. Regarding claim 8, Chief of Staff 2 responded that Complainant initially requested a job swap, but it was denied by AMC. Complainant then agreed to a detail assignment. ROI 2 at 704-5. The Deputy Chief of Staff stated that the Supervisory Management Analyst had applied for a reassignment in another part of the country and was not available for a job swap. The Supervisory Management Analyst left her position in October for a detail position, and then was selected for a permanent position in February. The Deputy Chief of Staff averred that she arranged for Complainant’s detail assignment because she determined that they could use someone with Complainant’s skills for an upcoming project. ROI 2 at 717-18. For claim 9, Chief of Staff 2 informed Complainant that her detail to AMC was still effect. AMC required Complainant’s work on a special project and declining the detail was not an option. ROI 2 at 456. Chief of Staff 2 explained that AMC subsequently decided to cancel Complainant’s detail (claim 10), and with Complainant’s return to ACC, Chief of Staff 2 became Complainant’s supervisor due to her complaints against the Supervisor. ROI 2 at 703. 2022003064 7 Regarding claim 11, Complainant was proposed a suspension for three specifications of failure to follow supervisory instructions and one charge of lack of candor. For example, Complainant was instructed to attend a meeting with the Deputy Chief of Staff to discuss the detail assignment, but Complainant canceled the meeting and left AMC without permission. ROI 2 at 544-5. Chief of Staff 2 explained that Complainant admitted that she never met with the Deputy Chief of Staff, and he informed Complainant that she could not get an understanding of her duties without speaking with the Deputy Chief of Staff. Chief of Staff 2 later learned that Complainant scheduled a meeting with the Deputy Chief of Staff but canceled the meeting without explanation. Agency Exhibit B. Chief of Staff 2 denied Complainant’s two leave requests (claim 12) because she failed to comply with his earlier instructions regarding her leave requests. Chief of Staff 2 responded that he previously issued a notice to Complainant instructing her to coordinate any unforeseen leave directly with him. When Chief of Staff 2 received the two leave notifications in the system, he denied them because he had no notification from Complainant of any emergency or unforeseen situation, per his previous instruction. ROI 2 at 701-2. Regarding claim 13, Chief of Staff 2 explained that Complainant submitted another sick leave request for September 27th that was not in accordance with his written guidance. Chief of Staff 2 emailed Complainant to ask why he did not receive a note, email, or call for her request. Once Complainant responded to Chief of Staff 2’s email, he approved her leave request. ROI 2 at 701. For claim 14, Chief of Staff 2 denied Complainant’s leave request because there was a pending decision on the proposed discipline. Chief of Staff 2 added that Complainant’s suspension was effective November 6, 2017, and she took leave after that. ROI 1 at 700-1. We find that Complainant has not shown that the proffered reasons were pretexts for discrimination. Pretext can be demonstrated by showing such weaknesses, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the Agency’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence. See Opare-Addo v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120060802 (Nov. 20, 2007) (finding that the agency’s explanations were confusing, contradictory, and lacking credibility, which were then successfully rebutted by the complainant), request for recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 0520080211 (May 30, 2008). On appeal, Complainant argues that she was “reprimanded” by the Supervisor for taking leave in an aggressive and derogatory tone (claim 1). Complainant also asserts that the Supervisor’s request to have Agency Counsel provide legal advice and talking points prior to the meeting undermines the Agency’s claims that the meeting was benign. However, Complainant only provides her perception that she was “reprimanded” and that the meeting was not benign, and there is no evidence to substantiate Complainant’s contention that the Supervisor’s communications to Complainant on February 7, 2017, were disciplinary. For claim 8, Complainant contends that the explanation that the Supervisory Management Analyst was not available for a job swap was demonstrably false because the Supervisory Management Analyst denied applying for, or receiving, any other job, and she was not planning 2022003064 8 a permanent change of station (PCS). We note that the evidence provided by Complainant includes a text message from the Supervisory Management Analyst to Complainant’s representative sent on October 19, 2017, in which the Supervisory Management Analyst stated that she was not PCSing but on a developmental assignment until the end of the year. ROI 2 at 438-40. The record contains an email dated October 11, 2017, from the Deputy Commanding General noting that the Deputy Chief of Staff informed him that the PCS process for the Supervisory Management Analyst was in process but may not occur in the near term. As such, a job swap between Complainant and the Supervisory Management Analyst would not work. ROI 2 at 589. While Complainant avers that the Agency’s reason was false, we do not find the Supervisory Management Analyst’s statement to contradict the management officials’ explanation because the Deputy Commanding General acknowledged that any planned PCS was not imminent as of October 11, 2017. Further, Complainant provided no evidence to contradict the Deputy Chief of Staff’s assertion that the Supervisory Management Analyst left to take a permanent position in February. Complainant also disputes that the Deputy Chief of Staff arranged for, and had a need for, Complainant’s services because it was the Deputy Commanding General who reached out to the Deputy Chief of Staff to request a detail assignment for Complainant. However, the Deputy Chief of Staff averred that she arranged the detail with the Deputy Commanding General, and she never claimed to have initiated Complainant’s detail assignment or made the decision by herself. The Deputy Chief of Staff only stated that she determined that she could use Complainant’s skills for a planned project. ROI 2 at 717. For claim 12, Complainant notes that the Agency maintained that Chief of Staff 2 denied Complainant’s same-day leave requests because they were not submitted in accordance with the SOP. Complainant contends that this is false, and that advance notice is not required for unforeseen sick leave. However, the SOP confirms that Chief of Staff 2 notified Complainant that she must contact him as soon as possible for any emergency or unforeseen requests, including sick leave. ROI 2 at 471-3. Regarding the proposed suspension, Complainant asserts that it contains false accusations against her. However, the Commission has long held that an Agency has broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel decisions, and it should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority absent evidence of unlawful motivation. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981); Vanek v. Dep’t of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940906 (Jan. 16, 1997). The reasonableness of the employer’s decision may be probative of whether it is pretext, but the focus is on the employer’s motivation, not its business judgment. See Matilda C. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Appeal No. 0720140027 (Jul. 31, 2018); Eric M. v. Dep’t of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 0120162148 (Feb. 13, 2018); Glass v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 07A50068 (Jun. 15, 2006). In this case, Complainant presented no evidence to substantiate an unlawful motivation for the proposed suspension. 2022003064 9 For claim 14, Complainant argues that Chief of Staff 2’s denial of her leave request was retaliatory on its face because she raised her concerns of discrimination and retaliation in her rebuttal to the proposed suspension. However, Complainant presented her rebuttal to the Deputy Commanding General, who was the deciding official for the proposed suspension, not Chief of Staff 2. ROI 2 at 488. We find that Complainant simply conjectures that Chief of Staff 2’s decision regarding her leave request was based on her rebuttal to her proposed suspension. Complainant did not show that the proffered reasons are not worthy of belief and her bare assertions that management officials discriminated against her are insufficient to prove pretext or that their actions were discriminatory. Accordingly, we find that Complainant did not establish that the Agency discriminated against her based on her disability, or in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity. Harassment (Claims 8-14) As an initial matter, we note that Complainant only alleged harassment in Complaint 3 (claims 8- 14). ROI 2 at 90-2. The record shows that Complainant did not include harassment for Complaints 1 or 2. ROI 1 at 49-52, ROI 2 at 84-7. During the hearing stage, Complainant filed a Motion to Clarify Claims, and she attempted to add hostile work environment claims to Complaints 1 and 2, and race as a basis. The previous AJ denied her motion on June 30, 2021.4 As discussed above, we found that Complainant did not establish a case of discrimination on any of her bases for claims 8-14. Further, we conclude that a case of harassment is precluded based on our finding that Complainant did not establish that any of the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by her protected bases. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000). Accordingly, we find that Complainant did not show that the Agency subjected her to harassment based on her disability, or in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity, for claims 8-14. Even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable factfinder could not find in Complainant’s favor. Upon careful review of the AJ’s decision and the evidence of record, as well as Complainant’s arguments on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we conclude that the AJ correctly determined that the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that Complainant was discriminated against by the Agency as alleged. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order adopting the AJ’s decision. 4 We note that the Commission has the discretion to review only those issues specifically raised in an appeal. See EEO MD-110, at Chap. 9, § IV.A.3. On appeal, Complainant did not contest the denial of her motion; as such, we will not address it in the instant decision. 2022003064 10 STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). 2022003064 11 COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations January 31, 2023 Date