[Redacted], Wilmer M., 1 Complainant,v.Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Eastern Area), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 3, 2022Appeal No. 2020004659 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 3, 2022) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Wilmer M.,1 Complainant, v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Eastern Area), Agency. Appeal No. 2020004659 Hearing Nos. 532-2019-00046X, 532-2020-00030X Agency Nos. 4C-440-0151-17, 4C-440-0138-19 DECISION On August 23, 2020, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s July 24, 2020, final order concerning his two equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. At the time of events giving rise to these complaints, Complainant worked as a City Carrier at the Agency’s Midpark Branch facility in Cleveland, Ohio. On August 5, 2017, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of sex (male) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when: 1. On May 17, 2017, he was issued a 14-Day Suspension; and 2. On August 4, 2017, and other dates to be specified, the manager refused to let him view his personnel file. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020004659 2 Complainant subsequently amended his complaint, alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the basis of reprisal when: 3. On August 10, 2017, he was issued a 7-Day Suspension; 4. On August 29, 2017, he was issued a 14-Day Suspension; 5. On September 7, 2017, he was issued 14-Day No Time Off Suspension; 6. On October 14, 2017, a supervisor approached him in his case and said, “Do you want to go outside and talk about this,” and “Don’t yell at me, I’m not one of your kids”; and 7. On February 5, 2018, he was issued a 7-Day Suspension. On September 19, 2019, Complainant filed a second EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of race (Caucasian) and reprisal when: 1. On numerous dates in 2019, Complainant was not given safety talks; 2. On May 9, 2019, a supervisor threatened to call the police on him; and 3. On August 13, 2019, he was issued a 7-Day Suspension. At the conclusion of the investigations, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing for each complaint, and the AJ joined the cases. The Agency filed a motion for summary judgment, and Complainant did not respond. On July 9, 2020, the AJ issued a decision without a hearing finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s decision. On appeal, Complainant contends that, because he is not an attorney, he did not fully understand the need to respond to the Agency’s motion. According to Complainant, when he was denied the opportunity to present his case at a hearing, he was denied the ability to present his point of view. Complainant states that he disputes some of the statements from the AJ’s decision that were labeled “undisputed material facts.” In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the 2020004659 3 factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing. The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case. An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is adequately developed. To successfully oppose a decision without a hearing, Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute or present further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. Regarding Complainant’s argument that he did not respond to the Agency’s motion for summary judgment because he is not an attorney and was unrepresented during the hearing process, the Commission’s regulations state that a complainant is responsible for proceeding with the complaint whether or not he has designated a representative. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.605(e). Complainant had an opportunity to respond to the Agency’s motion, and he did not do so. Although Complainant’s appeal generally contends that there are disputes regarding material facts, he does not specifically identify any. Upon review, we find that the AJ properly issued a decision without a hearing because there are no genuine issues of material fact. We will now consider Complainant’s discrimination claims. Complainant alleged that he was subjected to discrimination and harassment based on race, sex, and reprisal when he received suspensions, when he was told he could not view his personnel file, when he was not included in safety talks, when a supervisor threatened to contact the police, and when a supervisor asked if Complainant wanted to go outside and told Complainant, “Don’t yell at me. I am not one of your kids.” To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 2020004659 4 He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley, supra; Pavelka v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995). To establish a claim of harassment a complainant must show that: (1) he belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). Further, the incidents must have been "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [complainant's] employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 6 (Mar. 8, 1994). Reprisal claims are considered with a broad view of coverage. See Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006); see also, Carroll v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05970939 (Apr. 4, 2000). Retaliatory actions which can be challenged are not restricted to those which affect a term or condition of employment. Id. Rather, a complainant is protected from any discrimination that is reasonably likely to deter protected activity. Id.; see also, Carroll, supra. We agree with the AJ’s determination that there is no evidence in the record suggesting that the alleged harassment was based on Complainant’s race, sex, and/or prior protected activity. We also agree that the Agency provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions and that Complainant did not establish by the preponderance of the evidence in the record that these reasons were pretext for discrimination based on race, sex, and/or reprisal. Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order fully implementing the AJ’s decision finding no discrimination. 2020004659 5 STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). 2020004659 6 COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations February 3, 2022 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation