[Redacted], Natalya B., 1 Complainant,v.Christine Wormuth, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Mar 20, 2023

Appeal No. 2022000422 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 20, 2023)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Natalya B.,1 Complainant, v. Christine Wormuth, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency. Appeal No. 2022000422 Hearing No. 420-2021-00137X Agency No. ARACC16MAY02260 DECISION Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s September 28, 2021, final action concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final action. BACKGROUND Prior to November 1, 2015, Complainant worked as a Procurement Analyst, GS-1102-14, Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP), Army Contracting Command (ACC), located in Huntsville, Alabama. Person A, Supervisory Procurement Analyst, was Complainant’s first level supervisor. Complainant was deployed to Afghanistan from November 1, 2015 to July 22, 2016. Throughout the duration of her deployment, Person A remained her state-side supervisor. The Agency stated while Complainant was deployed, she served as a Contract Specialist. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2022000422 2 During her deployment, Complainant worked in the Regional Contracting Center Capital (RCC- C), Expeditionary Contracting Command-Afghanistan (ECC-A) in Kabul, Afghanistan from November 24, 2015 to April 4, 2016. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) was Complainant’s in-country first level supervisor from November 2015 to April 2016. Complainant worked at the Regional Contracting Center South (RCC-S), Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) in Kandahar, Afghanistan from April 6, 2016 to July 10, 2016. Major 1, Chief, RCC-S, was Complainant’s in country first level supervisor from April 2016 to May 2016. Major 2, Chief, RCC-S, was Complainant’s in-country first level supervisor from June 2016 to July 14, 2016. Person B, Supervisory Contract Specialist, GS-1102-15, Deputy Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting, ECC-A, was Complainant’s in-country second level supervisor from November 2015 to July 2016. On August 3, 2016, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency subjected her to unlawful discrimination. In her complaint, Complainant alleged the following: 1. The Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when: a. On or about June 6, 2016, Complainant received an email from Major 2 stating that her deployment tour in Afghanistan would be terminated within 60 days of her return to Afghanistan from rest and relaxation (R&R). b. On June 30, 2016, Complainant received a “2” on her Senior System Civilian Evaluation Report, following the receipt of a Letter of Input (LOI) dated June 30, 2016, from Person B. 2. The Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American) and sex (female) when she was subjected to a hostile work environment when the following incidents occurred: a. From March 2016 to August 2016, when Complainant returned from R&R, Major 2 spoke to her in a condescending, intimidating, tone and micromanaged her. b. On an unspecified date, Person B accused Complainant of falsifying her timesheets, of using government time to take care of personal tasks, and of not accomplishing required work tasks. 3. The Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American) and sex (female) by Person B when she was subjected to disparate treatment when the following occurred: a. On April 3, 2016, Complainant was assigned to work for a person who had less experience and a lesser grade than she did. b. On April 3, 2016, when Complainant rotated from RCC-Capital to RCC-South, she was assigned as the Deputy Chief, although the previous person that held the position was the Chief. 2022000422 3 c. On June 6, 2016, Complainant's overtime approvals were delayed for weeks and she was not allowed to work overtime while others in her organization were allowed to work overtime. d. On July 2016, Complainant’s deployment in Afghanistan was curtailed, while other employees were allowed to extend past their original commitment dates, and despite two weeks later Headquarters released a request to fill several GS-1102 positions in Afghanistan. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing. On May 10, 2021, the AJ issued an Order Scheduling Telephonic Conference informing the parties of the deadlines for dispositive motions and responses to dispositive motions. The parties were informed they should be prepared to argue any pending motions and to argue why judgment should be entered in their favor at a conference on June 8, 2021.2 On May 25, 2021, the Agency filed a motion for summary judgment. On June 2, 2021, Complainant filed her opposition to the Agency’s motion. On June 8, 2021, a telephonic status conference was held and recorded by a court reporter. Both parties were afforded the opportunity to present their arguments and provide a response to arguments made by the other side. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on July 7, 2021. The Agency subsequently issued a final action on September 28, 2021. The Agency’s final action fully implemented the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. Complainant filed the instant appeal. The Agency filed a statement in opposition to Complainant’s appeal. The Agency argued Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or harassment. Further, the Agency claimed the record established that its actions were based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non- moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. 2 Originally the conference was set for June 3, 2021; however, the date was later changed to June 8, 2021. 2022000422 4 In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a)(stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review…”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO- MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (as revised, August 5, 2015)(providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). In order to successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence, and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Such a dispute would indicate that a hearing is necessary to produce evidence to support a finding that the agency was motivated by discriminatory animus. Here, however, Complainant has failed to establish such a dispute. Even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in Complainant’s favor. At the outset, we note Complainant does not challenge the framing of the claims as identified in the Agency’s final action. Further, we find the record in the present case was fully developed. Upon careful review of the AJ’s decision and the evidence of record we conclude that the AJ correctly determined that the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that Complainant was discriminated against by the Agency as alleged. As claims 1.a. and 3.d. both concern the curtailment of her deployment, we address them together. The Agency stated Complainant was sent home because a “troop to task” analysis determined some of the higher-graded positions were no longer needed. As a result of the overall reduction of the workforce, several positions were eliminated, including Complainant’s position. Person B noted that Complainant’s workload was focused on getting contracts awarded (pre-award) and there was no longer a need for a pre-award focus at RCC-S. The record reveals that other employees, including those outside of Complainant’s race, were also curtailed and or had their positions abolished at the same time. With regard to her contention that other employees were allowed to extend past their original commitment dates, Complainant stated Comparative 1 and Comparative 2, Quality Assurance Specialist, GS-1910-11, Defense Contract Management Analyst (DCMA), were both allowed to extend their tours while she was not. Complainant also noted that in July 2016, shortly after her deployment was terminated early, Person B and Person C (Colonel) sought to fill two brand new GS-1102 positions. LTC confirmed that people who stayed in Afghanistan were experts in Contract Administration. He noted the pre-award mission value for FY2016 was roughly 290 million dollars and the value of the Contract Administration work was over 17 billion dollars for FY2016. LTC stated that is the reason the positions who were extended were in Contingency Contracting Administration Service (CCAS). He noted that Complainant was not an expert in CCAS. He stated Comparative 1 was an expert in CCAS. 2022000422 5 LTC also noted that the request to fill positions, occurring after Complainant’s curtailment, would have been to fill “hire” positions and not “deployable cadre” positions and would have been lower graded positions. LTC noted that when multiple offices were consolidated down to one RCC-A, they reduced leadership positions and lower-graded positions remained, which tended to be Contract Specialists positions at the lower levels. Person B noted there were at least six employees who received extensions including two African Americans (including Comparative 1), three Caucasians, and one Asian. Of the six extended five were male and one was female. Person B stated that Comparative 1 was extended as a working level Administrative Contracting Officer, GS-1102-13. Person B stated that Comparative 2 was assigned from the DCMA as an augmented employee to ECC-A. She noted he was a Quality Assurance Specialist. Person B recalled they were in the middle of a transition from one provider to another and were awaiting the arrival of Comparative 2’s DCMA replacement. Person B stated that Comparative 2 received an extension of only a few days, not long term and noted that his work was entirely different that Complainant’s in terms of grade and series. Person B stated there was no connection with the two positions advertised after Complainant’s tour was curtailed. Person B noted they announced her (Person B’s) position, GS-1102-15, because her role was temporary. Person B also noted one of the positions they requested to fill was the Deputy Position at RCC-A that was posted as a Supervisory Contract Specialist, GS- 1102-14 position. Person B noted Complainant’s position was nonsupervisory. Person B noted that the two positions advertised were supervisory and Complainant could have applied for them. Person B stated that they could not transfer Complainant into a supervisory GS-14 position when she had not competed for a GS-1102-14 position. Major 2 noted that when contracting was consolidated, they had to reorganize everything, which meant he did not need a Deputy for contracting any longer. Major 2 noted that the CCAS mission was expanding; however, Complainant was not brought in to do CCAS work. Major 2 noted that most of the people who worked CCAS were from the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). Major 2 noted Comparative 1 expressed an interest in working CCAS, which is why he was extended since the CCAS mission was expanding. Major 2 noted Complainant never expressed an interest extending and working in CCAS. Major 2 stated Clark tried to extend but was not approved to do so. We note Complainant did not dispute the Agency’s assertion that she never expressed an interest in working in CCAS. Colonel explains after mission analysis and position cuts were completed, the employees assigned to valid positions were considered for tour extensions provided they were high- performers who contributed to mission success. Colonel affirms Comparative 1 was approved for extension because the Agency failed to complete replacement hires in a timely manner. Colonel noted that Comparative 1 performed Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) duties and as his tour was ending, the Agency needed him to provide continuity as Agency contract requirements were being replaced. 2022000422 6 Colonel affirms Comparative 2 was approved for extension by his employer, DCMA, not ECC- A, to cover a gap between his departure and his replacement’s arrival. We find Complainant failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that the Agency’s actions surrounding the curtailment of her deployment were motivated by discriminatory animus. Regarding the LOI (claim 1.b) the Agency noted that the LOI was provided by Complainant’s in- country supervisor (Person B) to Complainant’s supervisor of record, Person A, as required by Agency policy. The LOI signed by Person B had input form LTC and Major 2. The Agency noted that Complainant’s rating of record was a “1” and not a “2.” Complainant stated that her state-side supervisor, Person A, noted that she was informed that the LOI should have been considered in the form of discipline and not as part of Complainant’s performance appraisal. The record reveals that Person A prepared Complainant’s appraisal and sent it for higher level approval before receiving the LOI and gave Complainant a “1” rating. Person A then received the LOI and changed the rating to a “2” based on comments about Complainant’s attitude. Complainant refused to sign the rating. Person A explained she consulted with Human Resources (HR) who stated the conduct issue should not have been factored into the LOI. Person A stated she changed the rating back to a “1” and re-issued it to Complainant. We note that during the June 8, 2021 conference, Complainant noted she did not argue that Person B should not issue an LOI. At the conference we note that Complainant also did not dispute that her rating was re-issued as a “1.” Upon review, we find Complainant failed to show the Agency’s actions surrounding the LOI were based on discriminatory animus. Regarding claim 3.a., Complainant claimed that on April 3, 2016, she was assigned to work for a person who had less experience and who was a lower grade than she was. Complainant contended her civilian grade (GS-14) was higher than Major 2’s miliary rank (GS-13 equivalent). Specifically, she claimed that Major 2 had two years contracting experience and was Level I certified, while she had 12 years of experience and was Level II-III certified. The Commander, ECC-A, Colonel (Person C) stated that he made the decision to assign Complainant as the Deputy Chief at RCC-S one week prior to his changing command. Person C noted that it was made clear to Complainant that a Major would be the Chief and that she would be the Deputy. Person C noted they “wanted a military officer to interface with the warfighters” the organization supported. Person C noted Person D, the prior Office Chief (Asian, female) was a civilian GS- 14. He stated after a month it became obvious that they needed to put a soldier in charge of the office. Person C stated they moved Person D to Headquarters and Major 1 became the Office Chief in Kandahar. Person C noted that Major 1 went without a Deputy for some time. Person C noted as Major 1 was scheduled to rotate out, they did not make any personnel changes. Once Major 2 replaced Major 1, they moved Complainant in as Deputy. Person C noted it was possible for a Major to serve as Office Chief because RCC-S was a small office. Person C stated in larger offices a GS-14 Deputy Chief typically reported to a Lieutenant Colonel. Person C stated the Major may not have had the same level of contracting experience Complainant did, although they would have certainly had greater leadership experience. 2022000422 7 Colonel stated that although Major 2 had less contracting experience than Complainant, his role was not based solely on doing contracting work. He possessed significant maturity and professionalism as a leader. Additionally, Colonel stated Complainant was not authorized to be a supervisor (per her permanent position description), nor did she exhibit the professionalism or maturity to be one. Person B noted that military officers were groomed for leadership and command, while the technical acumen often rests with civilians. Person B stated Complainant was sent to RCC-S because of her technical aptitude writing contracts, not leading others or running an organization. Person B noted that Complainant acknowledged she was not a supervisor but refused to sign her stated responsibilities as Deputy Chief. Person B noted Complainant understood she was not moving to RCC-S to replace Person C as Chief, and it is not accurate to compare the two regarding their roles and responsibilities. LTC confirmed it was not unheard of for a Major to supervise a GS-14. LTC stated as a “Deployable Cadre” employee Complainant could not supervise in Afghanistan because her home station position description did not include supervisory duties, and Chiefs are required to supervise. LTC explained that Person C was a hired into a permanent, supervisory position based in Afghanistan. In her opposition to summary judgment, Complainant cited a signed position description in the record signed by Complainant and LTC on December 29, 2015, which she stated showed that she was a Supervisory Contract Specialist. Complainant also noted that the LOI stated that she was “responsible for the training, mentorship, management, and oversight of 35 miliary and civilian personnel,” which she argues indicated that she had supervisory responsibility. We note the position description Complainant cited in the record appears to be an incomplete document which lists Complainant’s name with the title Supervisory Contract Specialist and contains the date “Nov’15-Nov’16.” The document was signed by Complainant and LTC on December 29, 2015. Even assuming this document was meant to serve as a valid position description for Complainant’s deployment, we note the other evidence in the file indicates that Complainant did not serve as a Supervisory Contract Specialist throughout the duration of her deployment. Specifically, we note the testimony of LTC who stated Complainant was not in a supervisory position over his personnel, did not have supervisory duties in her deployment position description, and could not perform technical supervisory duties like rating civilian or military employees or approve timecards. Further, Person B stated Complainant’s position in the United States was not classified as supervisory and she was not moved to serve in a supervisory role or replace the prior Chief. Person B noted that Complainant acknowledged in an email that she understood she was not a supervisor but served a technical role. Person B noted that Complainant was provided responsibilities in writing indicating she was not a supervisor but refused to sign them. 2022000422 8 The record also contains an April 22, 2016 email Complainant sent to Person B in which Complainant acknowledged that Person B “made clear to the both of us [Complainant and Major 1] that all supervisor related duties are the [Major’s] responsibility.” Complainant further acknowledged she was the technical subject matter expert and her primary duties. In contrast, she noted Major 1 was the supervisor and was responsible for any supervisor related issues such as personnel and workload. Further, the record contains a memorandum dated June 10, 2016, signed by Person B with the stated purpose of memorializing Complainant’s role and responsibilities as the Deputy, RCC-S. The memorandum noted Complainant’s role remained as discussed via telecommunication on April 21, 2016, which was formalized in an email on April 22, 2016, and acknowledged by Complainant in a response email on the same date. The memorandum noted Complainant’s role was a non-supervisory Deputy to the RCC Chief and her role was to serve as a contracting subject matter expert. The RCC Chief was to continue to serve as the supervisor and the Chief would be responsible for personnel workload, employee production, and overall contract execution. The memorandum noted it had an attachment listing non-supervisory responsibilities. In her declaration, Person B noted Complainant was provided responsibilities in writing indicating she was not a supervisor, but she refused to sign them. Similarly, we find the June 30, 2016 LOI does not show that Complainant was in the position of Supervisory Contract Specialist while deployed. The LOI provided input on her work at RCC-C from LTC and on her work at RCC-S from Major 2. The document was reviewed and singed by Person B. The LOI explicitly notes that Complainant served as Deputy for RCC-C where she was responsible for the training, mentorship, management, and oversight of 35 military and civilian personnel assigned to the command. It was noted that while at RCC-C she performed duties as the Commander’s designated representative and provided technical direction to a mix of military contracting personnel, civilians, and contracted contract specialists. The LOI stated while serving as the Deputy for RCC-S she was responsible for the training, mentorship, management, and oversight of eight military and civilian personnel. It was noted she provided contracting support and served as the technical subject matter expert on acquisition regulations and policies. Further, the LOI noted that Complainant refused to acknowledge and sign her “contract specialist responsibilities.” Upon review, we find the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The Agency stated senior management decided to assign a military officer to the leadership position due to his leadership experience and partly due to Complainant’s ineligibility to serve as a supervisor due to her position description not including supervisory details. Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s actions were a pretext for discrimination. Regarding claim 3.b., Complainant alleged that on April 3, 2016, when she was rotated from RCC-Capital to RCC-South, she was assigned as the Deputy Chief, although the previous person that held the position was the Chief. The Agency stated that management decided to replace the prior civilian Chief with a Major since management wanted a military officer to interface with the warfighters the organization supported. 2022000422 9 Further, the Agency noted Complainant was not deployed to RCC-S to replace the prior Chief. Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. Regarding claim 3.c., Complainant claimed that on June 6, 2016, her overtime approvals were delayed for weeks, and she was not allowed to work overtime while others in her organization were allowed to work overtime. Complainant alleges Major 2 and LTC delayed or denied her 189 hours of overtime across three pay periods in June and July 2016. Although she acknowledges the overtime policy changed, Complainant asserts she always submitted her requests for overtime according to the rules which applied at the time of the request. She contends her requests were delayed and denied. LTC noted that ECC-A had three different civilian populations: hires, deployable cadre, and DCMA augmentees. Each population had different procedures for requesting and approving overtime. LTC stated that management realized there was intermingling of procedures for different groups and in an effort to get employee overtime under control, ECC-A drafted a new policy in mid-April 2016. LTC stated that almost every civilian employee experienced some delays (in days, not weeks) but nobody was denied the ability to work or the compensation they were due. LTC noted Complainant was the only employee who did not accept the evolving procedure for requesting overtime. Complainant refused to work overtime until she received official approval, which LTC noted was her right and her choice. Major 2 stated he never intentionally delayed Complainant’s overtime requests, and she was never denied overtime. He stated there was some confusion prior to the distribution of the policy on June 11, 2016. He stated that he verbally approved her requested overtime for the period of June 20-25, 2016, although she chose not to work it because the approval was not in writing. He noted as a result, everyone else in the office worked overtime on those dates, except Complainant. Next, we address Complainant’s claim of a hostile work environment. Upon review, we find that under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), Complainant’s claim of hostile work environment must fail. See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994). A finding of a hostile work environment on claims 1 and 3 is precluded by our determination that Complainant failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by discriminatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000). As for the remaining incidents in claim 2, we find that Complainant failed to show the Agency subjected her to a hostile work environment. Complainant alleged that from March 2016 to August 2016, Major 2 spoke to her in a condescending, intimidating, tone and micromanaged her. Specifically, she asserted that he made a comment asking if she was paid to mop the floor, to which she replied that she was supposed to keep her office clean. Complainant also stated Major 2 made a comment about keeping an eye on her. Complainant stated that there was an incident during a conference call where she was writing in the dry erase board, and he told her to sit down because she was distracting him. 2022000422 10 Complainant noted that she wanted to have Saturdays off because she was an Adventist and Major 2 asked why she could not go to church on Sunday like he did.3 She stated on one occasion, she was speaking with an employee and Major 2 flinched with a ball as if he was going to hit her. She also claimed Major 2 made a comment that he would force her to work for four hours and then take a 15-mintute break and then work another four hours. She stated Major 2 accused her of not completed her work and disregarded her guidance. Further, she stated that on May 2, 2015, Major 2 questioned her whereabouts and claimed she was absent from the workplace for three hours, which she stated was untrue. Major 2 noted that he and Complainant only worked together for about five weeks. He denied speaking to her in a condescending or intimidating tone. Major 2 stated he managed everyone the same way and said he did not micromanage Complainant. He claimed he engaged with her as his Deputy, sought her input, guidance, and advice at times. Major 2 did not recall a conversation about asking Complainant if she was paid to mop the floor. He noted he thought it was odd that Complainant requested to have off on Saturdays since he was under the impression everyone was working six to seven days a week, including overtime. He acknowledged he may have suggested Sunday as an alternative; however, that would have been because he did not know why she was requesting off on Saturdays. He explained Complainant eventually told him it was due to her being a Seventh Day Adventist, at which point he had no issue with it. Major 2 stated he never forced Complainant to work without a break. Regarding claim 2.b. Complainant claimed Person B accused her of falsifying her timesheets, of using government time to take care of personal tasks, and of not accomplishing required work tasks. Complainant acknowledged that she was not docked pay for the period in question. Person B stated it was suspected Complainant used government time to take care of personal needs; however, Person B never pursued disciplinary action on the issues. Complainant does not allege that she received disciplinary action regarding her timesheets. We find the incidents alleged in claim 2 were more likely the result of routine supervision, personality conflicts, and general workplace disputes and tribulations. Even if the incidents occurred as alleged in claim 2, we find such incidents insufficiently severe to constitute a hostile work environment. We also find that Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s actions were based on any of her protected bases. Upon careful review of the evidence of record, including the parties’ arguments on appeal, we conclude that the Agency correctly determined that the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that Complainant was discriminated against by the Agency. 3 Complainant noted her request for Saturdays off was approved. She stated she was not alleging discrimination based on religion. 2022000422 11 CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Agency’s final action finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. 2022000422 12 Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations March 20, 2023 Date