[Redacted], Ingeborg B., 1 Complainant,v.Carlos Del Toro, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Dec 8, 2021

Appeal No. 2020004220 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 8, 2021)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Ingeborg B.,1 Complainant, v. Carlos Del Toro, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency. Appeal No. 2020004220 Hearing No. 510-2017-00311X Agency No. 16-65886-02858 DECISION Complainant filed a timely appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s May 23, 2020, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. ISSUE PRESENTED The issue is whether the EEOC Administrative Judge properly issued a decision without a hearing finding that Complainant did not establish that the Agency subjected her to non-sexual harassment based on her sex or discrimination in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020004220 2 BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an Electronics Engineer/Avionics Team Lead at the Agency’s Fleet Readiness Center Southwest in Jacksonville, Florida. Complainant stated that starting in January 2016, she reported alleged harassment from a coworker (CW) (male) to her first-line supervisor (S1) (male) and a team lead (TL) (female). For example, Complainant stated that CW disrespected her authority; ignored assignments; sent work out without Complainant’s review and without including her; exhibited loud verbal aggression; called Complainant “Shashubaka”;2 and acted angrily regarding work assignments. Complainant stated that they took no action in response to her reports. Complainant stated that she also asked CW to stop this behavior, but it continued. Report of Investigation (ROI) at 187-90. Complainant stated that in May 2016, she assigned a Very High Frequency (VHF) radio issue to CW, and on June 24, 2016, she asked CW for a status update. Complainant stated that CW did not agree with Complainant’s approach, started pounding on the table, and threw his credit cards at her while stating that he would bet that Complainant was wrong. Complainant also stated that CW said, “you do not know what you are fucking talking about.” ROI at 191. Complainant stated that on July 1, 2016, CW became angry, loud, and intimidating when she asked for a status of an assignment. Complainant stated that on the following workday, July 5, 2016, she reported to the Cecil Field location, and called TL to inform her why Complainant was working there. Complainant stated that TL seemed irritated and stated that Complainant was acting unprofessionally. ROI at 193-5. Complainant stated that she met with TL on July 20, 2016, and that TL stated that Complainant should “drop” her EEO complaint. Complainant also stated that TL informed her that the other women “loved” CW, and TL laughed when Complainant stated that she was afraid of CW. ROI at 196-7. On August 4, 2016, Complainant’s second-line supervisor (S2) (male) informed Complainant that they were moving her to the Triton Program, in response to Complainant’s request to be assigned to another team. Complainant stated that when S2 informed her of the move, she objected because she felt that it was retaliatory. Complainant stated that S2 responded that the move was not retaliatory, but pursuant to Complainant’s request. ROI at 151, 198. On October 15, 2016, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency: 1. subjected Complainant to non-sexual harassment based on her sex (female) when: a. in January 2016, February 2016, and May 2016, Complainant made S1 and TL aware of CW’s behavior (disrespecting her authority, ignoring assignments, 2 We note that the record does not define “Shashubaka.” CW denied using the term and stated that he did not know what it means. ROI at 243. 2020004220 3 sending work out without her review and not including her, loud verbal aggression, name calling “Shashubaka,” and angry exchanges regarding work assignments) towards her and they took no action; b. on June 24, 2016, Complainant tried discussing VHF radio issues with CW, and he began pounding his hand on the chair, throwing credit cards at her, and telling her that, “you did not know what you were fucking talking about;” c. on July 1, 2016, CW became angry, loud, and intimidating when Complainant asked him about the completion of an assigned task; and d. on July 5, 2016, Complainant contacted TL to discuss her concerns about CW’s behavior (loud verbal aggression, name calling “Shashubaka” and angry exchanges regarding work assignments) towards Complainant and TL told Complainant how unprofessional she was; and 2. discriminated against her in reprisal for protected EEO activity (instant EEO case) when: a. on July 20, 2016, TL told Complainant that she should “drop” her EEO complaint because TL had spoken to all the women on the team and they “love” CW; if Complainant could not get along with CW she needed to get off the team; and stated “If you were afraid, you would not be setting [sic] at my desk, it is not like [CW] is throwing knives at you;” and b. on August 4, 2016, S2 reassigned Complainant from the Avionics Sub-Team Lead to the Triton Sub-Team Lead and the F/A-18 Production Support Engineer Team. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the ROI and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. On July 30, 2018, the Agency filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for claims 1(a)-1(d) and 2(a), which Complainant opposed. On April 13, 2020, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s motion and issued a decision without a hearing. As an initial matter, the AJ found that Complainant’s reprisal claim failed because the instant EEO complaint was her first engagement in the EEO process. The AJ also found that there was no evidence that Complainant’s interpersonal conflict with CW was based on her sex, and that the record failed to establish that she was the victim of harassment. The AJ noted that, while Complainant disputed the Agency’s assertion that she requested a reassignment, the Agency can direct work, so long as the directive is lawful. The AJ concluded that the Agency did not subject Complainant to unlawful harassment based on her sex, or discrimination in reprisal for protected EEO activity. 2020004220 4 The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. Complainant filed the instant appeal and submitted a brief in support of her appeal. The Agency opposed Complainant’s appeal. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Complainant’s Contentions Through her attorney, Complainant argues that the AJ erred in analyzing the facts and the law and therefore, the issuance of the Decision without a Hearing was in error. Specifically, Complainant states that the AJ failed to address incidents 1(a), 1(b), and 1(d), beyond a mere restatement of Complainant’s assertions, and she failed to apply the law to determine why Complainant was not subjected to harassment. Complainant also asserts that the AJ erred when she dismissed Complainant’s reprisal claim, finding that she had not previously engaged in EEO activity, but that Complainant complained of sex discrimination to her supervisors numerous times. In addition, Complainant states that a supervisor directed her to drop her EEO complaint and another supervisor violated the confidentiality of the EEO process, and such conduct clearly constituted impermissible reprisal. Complainant states that in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Agency did not move for judgment without a hearing on claim 2(b), and as a result, Complainant did not address it in her response and she was subsequently deprived of any sort of notice or opportunity to respond to the AJ’s sua sponte address of claim 2(b). Complainant states that she would have been able to provide legal authority and support for her arguments that a valid reprisal claim existed, and further address the disputed material facts that were never addressed in the Agency’s motion. Regarding the harassment claim, Complainant argues that the AJ failed to analyze the pervasive conduct that she was subjected to, beyond a cursory rehashing of the allegations, and the AJ failed to discuss why the numerous ongoing instances of discrimination against Complainant were not harassment. Complainant states that the AJ stated that Complainant reported her difficulties with CW in March 2016 and June 2016, but later stated that she did not first report her difficulties with CW until July 2016. Complainant states that she clearly reported problems with CW on earlier dates, and that the AJ was confused about the facts, and therefore failed to properly evaluate her claims. Complainant further asserts that disclosure of her pending EEO complaint by S1 to her peers was a breach of EEO confidentiality and supports her reprisal claim because a breach demonstrates violation of the “letter and spirit of EEO law.” Complainant states that she is permitted to raise such an assertion for the first time on appeal, citing to Light v. Dep’t of Veterans Aff., EEOC Appeal No. 0120111229 (Nov. 22, 2011). Complainant requests that the Commission reverse the Agency’s final order. 2020004220 5 Agency’s Contentions The Agency argues that, in her appeal brief, Complainant improperly extracts a long list of snippets from the ROI and submits them in a conclusory manner under Statement of Facts, which is both disingenuous and misleading, and that she failed to submit any material evidence beyond her mere allegations that establishes pervasiveness of conduct or discriminatory animus. In addition, the Agency asserts that any inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the dates referenced by the AJ were harmless errors which had no effect on the AJ’s analysis in her decision. Regarding Complainant’s allegation that a supervisor “directed her to drop her EEO complaint,” the Agency notes that the supervisor denied doing so and, in fact, she did not learn of Complainant’s EEO complaint from the EEO counselor until October 2016, months after the July 2016 timeframe of the incident alleged by Complainant. The Agency states that, while Complainant argues that it was an error for the AJ to decide sua sponte to grant summary judgment on Claim (2b) without first providing notice and an opportunity to respond, the AJ found no legal basis for Complainant’s reprisal claim and her legal analysis fully addressed Claim 2(b). The Agency argues that, even where the AJ erred by ruling on the agency’s motion for summary judgment prior to a response by the complainant, the Commission has upheld the administrative judge’s ruling where it reviewed the complainant’s evidence and argument submitted on appeal and found that there was no dispute of material fact. See Dow v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal 0120112629 (Oct. 11, 2011). The Agency states that, when viewed in the light most favorable to Complainant, it considered incident 2(b) to be a material fact. However, the AJ essentially determined it not to be a material fact and that the record established that Complainant unilaterally decided to remove herself from her office and locate to a different facility following her allegations of harassment. The AJ determined that the Agency investigated Complainant’s allegations and found no evidence of harassment. Complainant remained at the different facility until a reassignment was made by S2 to a lead position on another team, which the AJ acknowledged was a lateral reassignment, within management’s discretion and not a materially adverse employment action. The Agency states that, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Complainant’s version of events is accurate, and she did not request the reassignment, this does not prove, or even show, that the Agency’s reason for reassigning her was a pretext to mask discrimination. The Agency asserts that Complainant’s burden of proving pretext cannot be met by simply refuting or questioning management’s articulated explanation and she has only reiterated her perception and unsubstantiated assertion, opinion, and conclusion that reprisal was the motivating factor in management’s reassignment action. The Agency argues that Complainant raises, for the first time on appeal, an allegation of a breach of EEO confidentiality with a number of unsupported and conclusory allegations based upon a misunderstanding of the facts and circumstances of her own case. 2020004220 6 The Agency states that there was no violation of the letter and spirit of EEO law, and this new assertion should not be accepted upon appeal. The Agency notes, that as part of management’s required investigation into the alleged hostile work environment, specific employees who were witnesses to the events mentioned in the allegations were questioned, without any reference to any EEO complaint/investigation. The Agency requests that the Commission affirm its final order adopting the AJ’s decision. STANDARD OF REVIEW In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and the Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Decision without a Hearing We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing. The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case. 2020004220 7 An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is adequately developed. To successfully oppose a decision without a hearing, Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute or present further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. Here, Complainant did not identify any genuine disputes of material facts in her appeal. For claim 2(b), Complainant argues that the AJ erred when she made a finding on this claim, which was not addressed in the Agency’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or Complainant’s response, and that she was deprived of the opportunity to respond to the AJ’s sua sponte address of claim 2(b). Complainant asserts that she would have been able to provide legal authority and support for her arguments that a valid reprisal claim existed, and further address the disputed material facts that were never addressed in the Agency’s motion. While an AJ is entitled to render summary judgment findings, sua sponte, the AJ must first give notice to the parties and provide them with an opportunity to respond. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(3). We find that Complainant is correct in that the AJ improperly issued summary judgment on an issue, without first providing Complainant with notice or an opportunity to respond. However, on appeal, Complainant asserts that she would have addressed the disputed material facts, without specifying any material facts in dispute with respect to claim 2(b). Complainant provided conclusory arguments that she was retaliated against; however, mere allegations, speculations, and conclusory statements, without more, are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Lee v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No 0520110581 (Jan. 12, 2012), citing to Baker v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01981962 (June 26, 2001), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05A10914 (Oct. 1, 2001). Further, Complainant does not identify how the AJ erred in her analysis when she issued summary judgment on claim 2(b). Accordingly, we find that the AJ’s error was harmless and does not warrant a remand for a hearing. See Christeen H. v. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., EEOC Appeal No. 2019005695 (May 24, 2021); Koerner v. Dep’t of Commerce, EEOC Appeal No. 01A04453 (March 14, 2002). Therefore, the AJ’s issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate. 2020004220 8 New Claim on Appeal On appeal, Complainant alleges a breach of confidentiality when S1 allegedly disclosed Complainant’s EEO activity to her peers. However, the Commission has held that it is not appropriate for a complainant to raise new claims for the first time on appeal. See Hubbard v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 01A40449 (Apr. 22, 2004). Complainant argues that she is permitted to raise such an assertion for the first time on appeal, citing to Light v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, supra. However, the complainant in Light raised a reprisal claim in her affidavit and the agency found that she was subjected to retaliation in its final decision; Complainant is incorrect in stating that the reprisal claim was raised for the first time on appeal. In addition, we note that Complainant did not provide any explanation for why she did not raise this allegation prior to her appeal, and as such, we decline to consider this newly raised claim. Harassment Harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive that it results in an alteration of the conditions of a complainant’s employment. See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002, at 3 (Mar. 8, 1994). To establish a claim of harassment, Complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Humphrey v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (Oct. 16, 1998). We find that Complainant belongs to a protected class based on her sex and that she was subjected to unwelcome conduct. However, Complainant did not show that the complained of conduct occurred as alleged, or that it was due to her sex. For example, Complainant alleged that CW threw his credit cards at her, but a witness to the incident stated that CW took his credit cards out of his wallet and placed them on his desk, but never threw them at Complainant. The witness also stated that CW was loud, but professional and not hostile. ROI at 261. Complainant stated that she did not believe that CW would not have tried to harass male employees and that TL “acted unprofessional,” but she did not provide any evidence to support her assertion that their conduct was due to her sex. ROI at 192, 196. In addition, we note that Title VII is not a civility code. Rather, it forbids “only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). In this case, we do not find that CW’s or TL’s actions were so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of Complainant’s employment. On appeal, Complainant argues that the AJ failed to address incidents 1(a), 1(b), and 1(d), beyond a mere restatement of Complainant’s assertions, and she failed to apply the law to determine why Complainant was not subjected to harassment. 2020004220 9 However, we note that the AJ did not fail to apply the law, and she determined that Complainant was not subjected to harassment because Complainant did not show that the actions were due to her sex, but rather, they were attributable to an interpersonal conflict. Accordingly, we find that Complainant did not show that the Agency subjected her to non-sexual harassment based on her sex. Reprisal EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.101(b) provides that no person shall be subject to retaliation for opposing any unlawful discriminatory practice or for participating in any stage of the EEO complaint process. The statutory anti-retaliation provisions prohibit any materially adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). Although petty slights and trivial annoyances are not actionable, adverse actions such as reprimands, threats, negative evaluations, and harassment are actionable. Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation at II.B. A complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep’t of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000). Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant reported harassment to management officials in January 2016, we find that Complainant did not establish by the preponderance of the evidence that she was subjected to adverse treatment by the Agency. Specifically, Complainant did not show that TL told her to “drop” her EEO complaint, or that Complainant was reassigned against her wishes. Complainant bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged discriminatory acts occurred. When the evidence is at best equipoise, Complainant fails to meet that burden. See Lore v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0120113283 (Sept. 13, 2013) (complainant failed to establish that witnesses made false statements where he withdrew his request for a hearing and credibility determinations were unable to be made); Brand v. Dep’t of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 0120102187 (Aug. 23, 2012) (complainant failed to establish that his coworker made offensive comments in a “he said, she said” situation where complainant requested a final decision and an Administrative Judge did not make credibility determinations). Even crediting Complainant’s assertions as true, she did not cite to any evidence aside from her own statements, and we find that Complainant has not met her burden to show that these incidents occurred as she described. Regarding claim 2(b), S2 stated that Complainant made a verbal request to be reassigned. ROI at 236. In addition, the record includes an email from S2 to Complainant informing her of the move, “in response to your request to be assigned to another team,” and on August 5, 2016, Complainant acknowledged the reassignment and asked when she would receive a copy of her new position description so that she could become familiar with her new position. ROI at 137. 2020004220 10 Accordingly, we find that Complainant has not established that the Agency retaliated against her for reporting harassment. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order adopting the AJ’s decision without a hearing finding that Complainant did not establish that the Agency subjected her to non-sexual harassment based on her sex or retaliation for reporting her claim of harassment. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. 2020004220 11 An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations December 8, 2021 Date