Ray Brooks

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 1, 1952

98 N.L.R.B. 976 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
reason for denying separate representation to a relatively stable group
of plant employees. In addition we note the lack of collective bar-
gaining for this division in the past and the fact that no other bargain-
ing agent seeks to represent the Employer's Rocky Mountain division
employees as an over-all unit. For these reasons, and upon the record
as a whole, we are satisfied that a unit limited to employees of the Elk
Basin gas and repressuring plant is appropriate."
Accordingly, we find that all production and maintenance em-
ployees in the Employer's Elk Basin, Wyoming, plant, including
employees in the process, mechanical, and maintenance classifications,
but excluding professional employees, clerical employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9 (b) of the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication in this
volume.]
11 See Texas Pacific Coal and Ott Company , 96 NLRB 1330 , where the Board, for similar
reasons, found a division unit appropriate although a company-wide unit , which no one
sought to represent , was urged by the employer.
RAY BROOKS and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS FOR ITS
DISTRICT LODGE No. 727. Case No. 21-CA-1117. April 1, 195
Decision and Order
On October 29, 1951, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his
Intermediate Report in this proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in conduct violative of Section 8
(a) (1) and 8 (a) (5) of the Act, and recommending that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Exam-
iner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other
violations of Section 8 (a) (1) alleged in the complaint, and recom-
mended that such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respond-
ent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, and a supporting
brief.
The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions, the brief, and the entire record in this
'Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [ Chairman Herzog and
Members Houston and Styles].
98 NLRB No. 151.
RAY BROOKS 977
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations
of the Trial Examiner.2
Order
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Ray Brooks, Van
Nuys, California, his agents, successors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Association
of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, as the exclusive representative
of all his employees, excluding salesmen, guards, professionals, and
supervisors.
(b) In any manner interfering with the efforts of International
Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, to bargain collec-
tively with him in behalf of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate
unit.
(2) Take the following affirmative action which the undersigned
finds will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Associa-
tion of Machinists, District No. 727, as the exclusive representative of
all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit with respect to wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment,
and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in
a signed agreement.
(b) Post at his place of business at Van Nuys, California, copies of
the notice attached to the Intermediate Report and marked "Appendix
A." 3 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for the Twenty-first Region, shall, after being duly signed by Re-
spondent's representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof and maintained by him for a period of sixty (60) con-
secutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
2 In its brief , the Respondent contends that the Board is without jurisdiction in this
matter because there is no allegation or proof that the charging Union is in compliance
with Section 9 (f), (g), and ( h). We find no merit In this contention . The Act does
not, as a condition to the exercise of its jurisdiction , require pleading and proof by the
Board that the Union has complied with these requirements . N. L. R. B. v. Greensboro
Coca-Cola Co., 180 F. 2d 840 (C. A 4) ; N . L R. B. v. Red Rock Co., 187 F. 2d 76 (C. A. 5).
Moreover, we have administratively determined that the filing requirements of Section 9
( f), (g), and (h) of the Act were fully satisfied at all relevant times in this case.
2 This notice , however, shall be , and it hereby is , amended by striking from line 3
thereof the words "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner " and substituting in lieu
thereof the words "A Decision and Order ." In the event that this Order is enforced
by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words,
"Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United
States Court of Appeals , enforcing an Order."
978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region inn
writing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a com-
plaint dated July 20, 1951, based upon a charge duly filed on May 29, 1951, by
International Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, herein called the
Union, against Ray Brooks, herein called Respondent, alleging that Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the
charge, complaint, and notice of hearing thereon were duly served upon Re-
spondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged that Respond-
ent, on and after April 21, 1951, had (1) refused on request to bargain with the
Union as the duly certified representative of a majority of his employees in an
appropriate unit and (2) interfered with, restrained, and coerced his employees
by (a) attempting to influence them against the Union and (b) threatening to
withdraw rights and privileges enjoyed by the employees prior to the certification
of the Union on April 20, 1951. Respondent's answer alleged that his employees
had revoked the authority of the Union to represent them and denied the
commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on October 8 and 9, 1951, at Los Angeles,
California, before the undersigned Trial Examiner, Martin S. Bennett. The
General Counsel and Respondent were represented by counsel and the Union by
its representatives. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the
issues. At the close of the hearing, Respondent moved that the allegations of
the complaint be dismissed ; the undersigned denied that portion of the motion
relating to the alleged refusal to bargain and reserved ruling on that portion
relating to the alleged interference, restraint, and coercion The latter is
disposed of by the findings hereinafter made The parties were afforded an
opportunity to present oral argument and to submit briefs and/or proposed
findings and conclusions to the undersigned. The General Counsel presented
oral argument and a brief has been received from Respondent.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Ray Brooks, an individual doing business under that name, is a dealer fran-
chised by the Chrysler Corporation who is engaged in the sale of new Chrysler
and Plymouth automobiles at Van Nuys, California. During the year 1950,
Respondent purchased and sold within the State of California new automobiles
valued in excess of $400,000. These automobiles were assembled within the
State of California by the manufacturer from parts of which approximately
50 percent were manufactured in States of the United States other than
the State of California and shipped to that State for assembly there. The
RAY BROOKS 979
undersigned finds that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act. N. L. B. B. v. Townsend, 185 F. 2d 378 (C. A. 9), cert. denied 341 U. S.
909; Howell Chevrolet, 95 NLRB 410, and Baxter Brothers, 91 NLRB 1480.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, is a labor
organization admitting to membership employees of Respondent
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain
1. Introduction ; the representation case
Piesented foi decision herein are the issues of whether Respondent has refused
to bargain collectively with the Union subsequent to the certification of the
latter as the result of a Board-conducted election, and whether, after said
election, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees by
threatening to deprive them of privileges previously enjoyed As stated,
Respondent's defense to the claimed refusal to bargain is that the employees in
the unit have revoked the authority of the Union to represent them, thereby
allegedly destroying the representative status claimed by the Union.
The history of the representation proceeding is as follows: Respondent and
the Union entered into a consent election agreement on March 27, 1951, in
Case No. 21-RC-1805. The election was duly held on April 12, 1951, with all
15 eligibles voting. Two ballots were challenged on the ground that they had
been cast by supervisory employees; the challenges have not been resolved. Of
the 13 valid votes counted, 8 were cast for the Union and 5 against. No objec-
tions to the election were filed and the Union was duly certified on April 20,
1951, by the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region, as the representative
of the employees of Respondent.
2. The appropriate unit
The complaint alleges that the unit agreed upon by the parties to the con-
sent election agreement, including all employees of Respondent, but excluding
salesmen, guards, professionals, and supervisors, constitutes a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of
the Act. The undersigned finds that the above-described unit, the appropriate-
ness of which Respondent does not dispute herein, constitutes a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (h)
of the Act.
3 Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit
As stated, the Union as duly certified on April 20, 1951, after winning the
election held on April 12, as the exclusive representative for the purposes of
collective bargaining of the employees in the above-described appropriate unit.
Despite such certification, and the great weight uniformly attributed thereto,
Respondent contends that the Union is no longer entitled to the benefits of this
representative status, placing reliance on a document introduced in evidence
herein. This document, consisting of 1 page in longhand, was received in the
mail by Respondent on April 19, 1 week after the Union won the election and
1 day before the certification issued ; a copy was also received by the
Union at the same time.' The document bears the purported signatures of 9
1 As will appear , the Union requested and Respondent refused a meeting after receipt of
this document.
980 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the 13 employees of Respondent who cast valid ballots in the election and reads
as follows :
We the undersigned majority of the employees of Ray Brooks Chrysler-
Plymouth Dealer 6530 Van Nuys Blvd, Van Nuys Calif are not in favor
of being represented by union local no. 727 as a bargining (sic) agent. We
respectively submit this petition for your consideration.
Respondent argues that this document constitutes a repudiation of the Union
by a majority of those in the unit and that as a result the Union has lost its repre-
sentative status acquired in the election of April 12, 1951; reliance is placed
upon the decision in N. L. R. B. v. Vulcan Forging Co., 188 F. 2d 927 (C. A. 6).
The undersigned is of the belief that this argument must be resolved adversely
,to Respondent. Despite the cited decision, Board law and the great weight of
,court law adopt a contrary view. The policy of issuing a certificate as bar-
gaining representative after an election conducted by the Board is based upon
4he desirable safeguard of a secret ballot under governmental authority free
from all influence, thus obtaining the most reliable indication of the employee
.concerning his true views relative to union representation and collective bar-
gaining. The statute, if a labor organization has been selected by a majority
of the employees, then proceeds to bind the employees to their choice for a
reasonable period, normally 1 year. N. L. R. B. v. Geraldine Novelty Co., 173
F. 2d 14 (C. A. 2). A contrary view, not stabilizing the issue in this fashion,
,would create the very "litigous bedlam and judicial chaos" intended to be avoided
by these salutary principles which imbue a certification with a reasonable
.amount of permanence. N. L. R. B. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 140 F.
2d 385 (C. A. 4). See N. L. R. B. v. Worcester Woolen Mills Corp., 170 F. 2d 13
(C. A. 1), cert. denied 336 U. S. 903 and N. L. R. B. v. Prudential Insurance Co.,
154 F. 2d 385 (C. A. 6).
This principle recognizes the inevitability in a democratic plan of employee
representation of subordinating for a period of time any shifts in employee senti-
ment in favor of a reasonable period of stability in employer-employee relations.
This view is recognized and discussed in N. L. R. B. v. Century Oxford Mfg.
Corp., 140 F. 2d 541 (C. A. 2), cert. denied 323 U. S. 714, where the court stated
as follows:
The purpose of the act is to insure collective representation for employees,
and to that end section 9 gives power to the Board to supervise elections
and certify the winners as the authorized representatives . Inherent in any
successful administration of such a system is some measure of permanence
in the results; freedom to choose a representative does not imply freedom
to turn him out of office with the next breath. As in the case of choosing a
political representative, the justification for the franchise is some degree of
sobriety and responsibility in its exercise. Unless the Board has power to
hold the employees to their choice for a season, it must keep ordering new
elections at the whim of any volatile caprice ; for an election, conducted
under the proper safeguards, provides the most reliable means of ascertain-
ing the deliberate will of the employees.
The foregoing views of the courts, approving Board policy, are only strength-
ened when attention is given to the legislative history of the amendments to
the Act in 1947. The Board's 1-year certification rule was one of long stand-
ing and was presumably well known to Congress prior to the changes in the Act.
See N. L. R. B. Twelfth Annual Report, 1947, and N. L. R. B. Eleventh Annual
Report, 1946. Moreover, Section 9 (c) (3) of the amended Act proscribes the
holding of more than one valid election in an appropriate unit during a 12-month
period; this is tantamount to approval and adoption of the Board's 1-year
certification rule.
RAY BROOKS 981
As stated by Senator Taft, "The bill also provides that elections shall be held
only once a year, so that there shall not be a constant stirring up of excitement
by continued elections. The men choose a bargaining agent for one year. He
remains the bargaining agent until the end of that year." (93 Cong. Rec. 3838.)
The Senate reports reflect a similar view. As stated in one,
In order to impress upon employees the solemnity of their choice, when
the Government goes to the expense of conducting a secret ballot . . . elec-
tions in any given unit may not be held more frequently than once a year.
This amendment prevents the Board from holding elections more often
than once a year in any given bargaining unit unless the results of the first
election are inconclusive by reason of none of the competing unions having
received a majority. At present, if the Union loses, it may on presentation
of additional membership cards secure another election within a short time,
but if it wins its majority cannot be challenged for a year. (S. Rep. No.
105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 25.)
The desirability of this rule was expressly recognized by the courts in decisions
handed down after the passage of the 1947 amendments. N. L. R. B. v. Worces-
ter Woolen Mills, supra, and N. L. R. B. v. Geraldine Novelty Co.. supra.
Thus, applying these controlling views to the instant proceeding, it becomes
apparent that they involve the application of a single rather than a double
standard, as adherence to Respondent's contention herein would require. If,
the Union, or any union, had lost the election, it would then be precluded from
achieving a representative status as a certified bargaining representative for 12
months. By the same token, if the employees, in the secrecy of the voting booth,
and free from any outside interference, vote in favor of and select the Union
as their bargaining agent, this selection, as Board policy recognizes, should last
for an identical period, at least 12 months. Majwre Transport Go., 95 NLRB
311. Employees can scarcely be impressed with the solemnity of a choice which
they are permitted to forthwith repudiate.
Still another basic consideration is, in view of the undersigned, controlling
herein. Respondent has placed reliance, in disputing the union majority, on a
document received in the mail which bears the names of nine employees as pur-
ported signers thereof. No evidence was offered that the nine employees whose
names appear thereon had actually affixed their signatures thereto and none was
offered with respect to any of the circumstances of the preparation or signine
of the document. The record discloses no evidence that Respondent made a
comparison of these signatures with those of the named employees which it
presumably has on its payroll records. Not only were none of the nine called
as witnesses by Respondent, but furthermore, when one of the nine, Verner
Emrick, testified herein as a witness for the General Counsel, he was not ques-
tioned by Respondent concerning his purported signature on the document which
was later introduced in evidence by Respondent.
In sum, there has been a failure to prove that the document merits the weight
which Respondent would attribute to it.' There is no evidence concerning the
circumstances of the signing, or as to who actually affixed the signatures. By
way of significant contrast, in a proceeding where the General Counsel desires
to prove a union majority on the basis of union designation cards, rather than a
certification, he is generally required to have the signature on each card identi-
fied by the signer or by one who saw the-card signed by the signer. Schramm
2 The document was received in evidence solely as a document which Respondent received
in the mail on April 19, 1951.
998666-vol. 98-53-63
982 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Schnvieg Co., 67 NLRB 980, and The Warren Co., 90 NLRB 689. Similar
evidence of an authenticating nature is totally lacking here, and to attribute
to this document the weight urged by Respondent would again mean the appli-
cation of a double standard. This serves only to highlight the reasonableness
of the Board's policy in attributing such great weight to the desires of em-
ployees when expressed in the privacy of the voting booth.
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned rejects Respondent's contention
herein and finds that on April 12, 1951, and at all times thereafter, the Union, by
virtue of Section 9 (a) of the Act, was and now is the duly designated representa-
tive of a majority of the employees in the above-described appropriate unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment.
4. The refusal to bargain
After the Union was duly certified on April 20, 1951, Representative D. A.
Gordon addressed a letter to Respondent on April 27. He directed attention
to the certification, asked for a meeting for the purpose of negotiating a contract
-covering Respondent's employees and requested a reply. On May 1, Respondent's
counsel replied for Respondent. The reply stated that Respondent had "been
given to understand that the majority of the employees of Ray Brooks have
,repudiated the union and no longer wish to be represented by it." The letter
fuxther stated that in a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, in analogous circumstances, had held it improper to compel employees to
be represented by a repudiated labor organization ; in conclusion, the letter stated
that it would "be wiser to defer consideration of the proposed negotiations until
such time as it might appear that the employees desire to have your union repre-
sent them." There is no evidence of any other communications between the
parties.
As is apparent, there has been a refusal by Respondent to recognize the Union
and negotiate a contract. This position is predicated on Respondent's rejection
of and failure to honor the certification of the Union. However, this precise
contention has hereinabove been decided adversely to Respondent. Accordingly,
the undersigned finds that, on May 1, 1951, and at all times thereafter, Respond-
ent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union and has thereby inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed by the Act.
5. Alleged interference, restraint, and coercion
In support of this allegation, the General Counsel offered evidence of two inci-
dents. Three employees, Emrick, Cellucci, and White, testified concerning a talk
made by Ray Brooks to the employees soon after it was learned that the Union
had won the election. The versions of Emrick and Cellucci reflect nothing more
than surprise and disappointment on the part of Brooks, expressed graphically,
over the results of the election and an announcement that in the future, matters
affecting working conditions were to be handled through the union representative.
White's version is similar; but he also attributed to Brooks the statement that
Brooks would be unable to advance money and grant certain privileges (unspeci-
fied) to the employees as in the past.
Emrick also testified concerning a statement allegedly made to him by Shop
Foreman Jennings . Emrick regularly rode to work with Jennings and the Tat-
ter's wife. On one such occasion , Jennings was speaking to his wife who was
also in the front seat . Emrick , In the rear , allegedly heard Jennings state that
RAY BROOKS 983
he would not work in a shop which a union had organized and that the employees
of Respondent would be denied the existing privilege of working on their own
cars (presumably in the event of union organization). Emrick, a vague wit-
ness,- placed this talk as'occurring either shortly before or shortly after the
election. Brooks and Jennings did not testify herein.
In view of both the quality and quantity of the evidence presented herein, the
undersigned is of the belief and concludes that the record does not warrant and
-will not support a finding of interference, restraint, and coercion based on the
foregoing matters. It will be recommended that this allegation be dismissed.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent, set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with his business operations described in Section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices,
it will be recommended that he cease and desist therefrom and that he take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All employees of Respondent at his place of business at Van Nuys, Cali-
fornia, excluding salesmen, guards, professionals, and supervisors, constitute a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. International Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, was on
April 12, 1951, and at all times thereafter has been and is, the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing on May 1, 1951, and at all times thereafter, to bargain collec-
tively with International Association of Machinists, District Lodge No. 727, as
the exclusive representative of his employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit,
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
5. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, Respondent has interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced his employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
7. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by threatening to deprive his employees of rights
and privileges enjoyed prior to certification of the Union.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
984 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE No. 727, as the exclusive representative
of all employees in the bargaining unit described herein with respect to
rate of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment and, if an
understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment. The bargaining unit is :
All employees of RAY BRooiis, Van Nuys, California, but excluding
salesmen, guards, professionals, and supervisors.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of the above-named
Union to bargain collectively with us, or refuse to bargain with said union
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit set
forth above.
RAY BROODS,
Employer.
Dated -.------------------------------------ By ----------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
WILLIAM I. MOFFETT , ANNE GOLDSTEIN , CARL B.. GOLDSTEIN AND L. E.
MOFFETT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-PARTNERS , D/B/A INYO LUMBER
COMPANY and UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS
OF AMERICA , AFL. Case No. ,90-CA-360. April 1, 1952
Decision and Order
On September 6, 1951, Trial Examiner James R. Hemingway issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter the Respondents
and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report
and supporting briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case and finds merit in the Respondent's exceptions for the reasons
set forth below.
98 NLRB No. 145.