RaPID Medical Technologies, LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 9, 20202019004804 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/846,882 09/07/2015 Vicko Gluncic RaPID-1B-552-12815 6427 77741 7590 12/09/2020 Brannon Sowers & Cracraft PC 47 South Meridian Street Suite 400 Indianapolis, IN 46204 EXAMINER SAINI, AMANDEEP SINGH ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2661 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/09/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docket@bscattorneys.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte VICKO GLUNCIC, GADY AGAM, MARIO MORIC, and SHIRLEY VIRGINIA RICHARD Appeal 2019-004804 Application 14/846,882 Technology Center 2600 Before ADAM J. PYONIN, JOHN R. KENNY, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s rejection. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Herein, “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as RaPID Medical Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2019-004804 Application 14/846,882 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction The Application is directed to “coordinat[ing] existing medical procedures and protocols with image detection software to integrate and enhance the identification of [implanted medical devices] and the detection of [retained surgical items] that had previously been unattainable.” Spec. ¶ 69. Claims 1–20 are pending; claims 1, 8, and 15 are independent. Appeal Br. 11–13. Claim 1 is reproduced below for reference (some formatting and emphasis added): 1. A method for performing a medical procedure on a patient by an attending physician wherein a scan is taken of the patient specifically for the identification of an implanted medical device prior to the medical procedure, the scan being taken with specific scan parameters different than that of a diagnostic scan, and an evaluation of the scan is presented to the attending physician prior to the medical procedure. References and Rejections2 Claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–19 are provisionally rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting in view of Application No. 14/846,880. Non-Final Act. 6.3 2 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Ans. 3 3 Although Appellant does not identify any appeals related to this proceeding (see Appeal Br. 2), we note a notice of appeal was filed for Application No. 14/846,880 on August 20, 2018 (prior to the filing date of the Appeal Brief in this proceeding). In view of the double patenting rejection, it appears that appeal should have been identified as a related appeal to this proceeding. Appeal 2019-004804 Application 14/846,882 3 Claims 1–6, 8–13, and 15–19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious in view of Gluncic (WO 2013/082289 Al; June 6, 2013) and Shapiro (US 2009/0252285 A1; Oct 8, 2009). Non-Final Act. 8–13. Claims 7, 14, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious in view of Gluncic, Shapiro, and Claus (US 2012/0093383 A1; Apr. 19, 2012). Non-Final Act. 14, 15. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Combination of Cited References Appellant argues “[t]he rejection of Claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Gluncic . . . in view of Shapiro et al. . . . are inadequate based on fact and law.”4 Appeal Br. 8. According to Appellant, the “Gluncic invention used ordinary diagnostic scans to analyze and identify or detect,” and provides “no disclosure, teaching, or suggestion of using a scanning power level different than a diagnostic scan to enhance the identification or detection as in the presently claimed invention.” Id. at 8, 9.5 Appellant contends the Examiner has not provided a sufficient reason to combine Gluncic with Shapiro in the manner claimed, because “an artisan 4 Claims 7, 14, and 20 are separately rejected. See Non-Final Act. 14. Appellant does not address the rejection of claims 7, 14, 20 in view of Gluncic, Shapiro, and Claus. 5 We note present claim 1 does not recite a power level. Appeal 2019-004804 Application 14/846,882 4 skilled in this art would find the diagnostic CT scan procedure of Shapiro to be incompatible with the more timely requirements of the medical procedures recited by the pending Claims, and thus the Examiner’s position lacks any reasoning to sustain the rejection.” Reply Br. 2. We are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. “In determining whether the subject matter of a patent claim is obvious. . . . [w]hat matters is the objective reach of the claim.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). Further, “the problem motivating the patentee may be only one of many addressed by the patent’s subject matter,” and “[u]nder the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” Id. at 420. Here, the Examiner finds, and Appellant does not challenge, that Gluncic teaches all limitations of the claim other than the claimed “scan being taken with specific scan parameters different than that of a diagnostic scan.” See Non-Final Act. 4; Appeal Br. 8, 9; Gluncic Fig. 6. The Examiner finds one of ordinary skill would combine Gluncic’s method with Shapiro’s teachings regarding varying power levels as scan parameters, to “allow for the configuration of the scan power to effectively image the implanted medical device.” Non-Final Act. 4; Shapiro ¶ 24; see also Ans. 6 (Finding the prior art teaches that “exposing a patient to a high power scan . . . is not necessary.”). Appellant demonstrates no error in the Examiner’s combination. Gluncic teaches using “[p]attern recognition software/algorithms . . . in the detection of objects . . . . in radiological images” (Gluncic ¶ 88), “which may impact the treatment strategy/clinical course for a particular patient” Appeal 2019-004804 Application 14/846,882 5 (Gluncic ¶ 22). See Gluncic Fig. 6, ¶¶ 9, 11; Non-Final Act. 8, 9. Gluncic, however, is silent with respect to the scan parameters (such as power levels) used in obtaining the radiological images. Shapiro teaches “emit[ting] an X- ray beam having low power relative [to] each of the other sources when used for the preliminary and/or tracking scans, and high power when used for the diagnostic scan.” Shapiro ¶ 24; Non-Final Act. 9. Shapiro, as cited by the Appellant, explains that it “is beneficial to reduce the over-all radiation dose applied to the patient.” Shapiro ¶ 57; Reply Br. 2 (“Shapiro only mentions low power for preliminary or tracking scans, scans which are used to determine the best intensity for performing the complete diagnostic scan (e.g., see Shapiro at [0056], [0057], and [0059].”). Appellant fails to provide evidence or sufficient technical reasoning to persuade us that Shapiro’s teachings are incompatible with the processes taught by Gluncic. Rather, we agree with the Examiner that one of ordinary skill would use relatively lower power scan parameters (as taught by Shapiro) in performing Gluncic’s object detection method, to configure the scan power properly without exposing a patient to a high power scan. See Non-Final Act. 4; Ans. 6. Appellant provides a Declaration, which states Shapiro “is unrelated to the detection of retained foreign objects (or RFO’s)” and “provides no insight into the best power level for an RFO scan.” Declaration of Joy Sclamberg, item 5. We note, however, claim 1 does not recite the best power level, only that the scan parameters are different from other parameters. More importantly, we do not find the Declaration persuasive of Examiner error. That Shapiro teaches using low power scans for preliminary or tracking scans (see Shapiro ¶ 24)—as opposed to identifying implanted objects in a person—is not determinative of error in the Appeal 2019-004804 Application 14/846,882 6 Examiner’s finding that one of ordinary skill would have combined Gluncic with Schapiro in the manner claimed. The consequent legal question, here, is what parameters, such as power level, an artisan of ordinary skill would have chosen when running Gluncic’s scans. Shapiro’s teachings of varying the scan power leads to the conclusion that using low power scans would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill. See Non-Final Act. 4; Shapiro ¶¶ 24, 57; cf. KSR, 550 U.S. at 424–25 (“the question was where to attach the sensor. . . . [t]he consequent legal question, then, is whether a pedal designer of ordinary skill starting with Asano would have found it obvious to put the sensor on a fixed pivot point”). Thus, we do not find the Examiner errs in finding the limitations of claim 1 to be obvious in view of the combination of Gluncic and Shapiro. We sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and of the remaining claims for which Appellant does present separate substantive arguments. Official Notice With respect to the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice, Appellant states “any alleged factual statements made in the rejections of the 03/20/2017 office action have all been challenged in Applicant's response of 06/24/2017.” Appeal Br. 9, 10. Appellant further states the Examiner’s assertions “do not put [Appellant] on notice of the basis for the grounds of Appeal 2019-004804 Application 14/846,882 7 rejection and cannot satisfy these requirements” for Official Notice. Id. at 10. Appellant does not identify the claims at issue, the particular limitations that may be missing in the cited references, or otherwise show error in the Examiner’s findings. We note the appeal “brief should not incorporate or reference previous responses.” MPEP § 1205.02. Based on the record before us, Appellant has not presented sufficient analysis that rises to the level of an argument for separate patentability of the claims, let alone present persuasive arguments showing the Examiner’s taking of official notice is in error. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); cf. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we do not find the Examiner errs. Double Patenting Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s double patenting rejection. See Appeal Br. 6–10; Ans. 10. Therefore, we summarily sustain this rejection. Claim Definiteness Claim 1 recites “A method for performing a medical procedure on a patient.” The claim, however, does not appear to actively recite any steps. Rather, the claim includes a wherein clause regarding a “scan being taken . . . prior to the medical procedure.” In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner may wish to determine whether claim 1 is indefinite for lacking sufficient clarity regarding the scope of the claimed invention. See, e.g., Appeal 2019-004804 Application 14/846,882 8 MPEP § 2173.05(q) (“Attempts to claim a process without setting forth any steps involved in the process generally raises an issue of indefiniteness.”). DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–6, 8–13, 15–19 nonstatutory double patenting Application No. 14/846,882 1–6, 8–13, 15–19 1–6, 8–13, 15–19 103 Gluncic, Shapiro 1–6, 8–13, 15–19 7, 14, 20 103 Gluncic, Shapiro, Claus 7, 14, 20 Overall Outcome 1–20 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation