Rafael Flores, Complainant,v.Thomas J. Ridge, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 18, 2005
01a45120 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 18, 2005)

01a45120

01-18-2005

Rafael Flores, Complainant, v. Thomas J. Ridge, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Agency.


Rafael Flores v. Department of Homeland Security

01A45120

January 18, 2005

.

Rafael Flores,

Complainant,

v.

Thomas J. Ridge,

Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A45120

Agency No. I-03-C053

Hearing No. 310-2004-00050X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's

final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Supervisory Center Adjudication

Officer, GS-1801-13, at the agency's Texas Service Center, in Dallas,

Texas, filed a formal EEO complaint on February 26, 2003, alleging that

the agency discriminated against him on the bases of national origin

(Hispanic), sex (male), and age (D.O.B.4/14/41) when he was not selected

for the position of Supervisory Adjudications Officer, vacancy number

DS-2-11-152558BM. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant

received a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision

without a hearing, finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of sex or age discrimination because one of the selectees for the position

was a male and one of the selectees was in the protected age group and not

substantially younger than complainant. The AJ found that complainant

did establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination in

that the selectees, not in complainant's protected class, were selected

for the two Supervisory Adjudications Officer positions.

The AJ further concluded that the agency articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. The AJ found that the

management stated that complainant was not selected because he was number

six of six on the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Certificate of

Eligibles and only the top four candidates were referred to the selecting

officials who selected two candidates.

The AJ found that complainant did not establish that more likely

than not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask

unlawful discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found that

complainant did not establish that his qualifications were �observably

superior� to that of the selectees nor did he claim that he was more

qualified than the selectees. The agency's final order implemented

the AJ's decision. Neither the complainant nor the agency make any

contentions on appeal.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without

a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of

material fact in dispute. 29 C.F.R. 1614.109(g). This regulation is

patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held

that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that,

given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the

case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather

to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249.

The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary

judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the

non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine"

if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in

favor of the non-moving party. Chelates v. Citrate, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988).

A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the

case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence,

a hearing is required. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without a hearing only

after determining that the record has been adequately developed for

summary disposition. See Petty v. Department of Defense, EEC Appeal

No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

The record reveals that the complaint applied for the Supervisory

Adjudication Officer position on September 9, 2002. Complainant stated

in his affidavit that he was not interviewed for the position and should

have been because OPM referred his name to the agency on the Certificate

of Eligibles. He contended that �Rule of Three� was improperly applied

in that there were four candidates referred instead of three.

In a letter to complainant, the OPM Service Center Director stated

that a Certificate of Eligibles was issued for three vacancies for the

Supervisory Adjudication Officer position. He specified that complainant

rated sixth on the list and that the agency appointing official had to

make a selection for the first vacancy from the highest eligible three

candidates. He stated that the remaining vacancies were to be filled

in the same manner.

Complainant's second level supervisor stated in her affidavit that she

made the selection for the Supervisory Adjudication Officer position

along with the Associate Director for Management. She contended only

two vacancies were filled and that complainant was not referred because

of the Rule of Three. The Associate Director for Management stated that

a female (S1) (national origin unknown, D.O.B. 12/20/56) and a male (S2)

(national origin unknown, D.O.B. 10/20/65) were selected in accordance

with the Rule of Three and complainant was not eligible to be referred.

The Administrative Officer stated in her affidavit that the Rule of

Three required that the first selectee had to come out of the highest

rated three names on the OPM Certificate of Eligibles and once that

was done the fourth name became the third name. She stated that her

office referred three names on the OPM Certificate of Eligibles to the

selecting officials and later a fourth name, S2, once S1 was selected.

She stated that complaint was not referred because he was not eligible

to be on the Certificate of Eligibles.

Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses on

whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following this

order of analysis is unnecessary when, as here, the agency has articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. See Washington

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has

established a prima facie case to whether s/he has demonstrated by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions

merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States

Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).

Here, we find that the agency a articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its actions. Specifically, management stated that complaint

was not selected for either of the two Supervisory Adjudication Officer

vacancies because he was not eligible to be referred to the selecting

officials under the Rule of Three. Therefore, the application of the

Rule of Three by the Administrative Officer prevented him from being

considered for selection and, as such, made her the gatekeeper to being

selected for the position in question. Complainant has submitted no

evidence to demonstrate that the Administrative Officer was motivated by

discriminatory animus. Aside from stating that he and other Hispanics,

males and employees over 40 were discriminated against in the selection

process at the Texas Service Center, complainant submitted no specific

evidence of pretext. Complainant submitted no information showing that

the Rule of Three had been used to deny his selection and had not been

utilized when selecting those not in his protected classes. Further,

there is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the

reasons proffered by the agency were a pretext for discrimination.

Accordingly, we find that there is no genuine issue of material

fact in dispute over the issue of whether complainant should have

been selected for the Supervisory Adjudication Officer position.

Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to complainant,

we find that complainant has failed to present evidence from which a

reasonable fact-finder could conclude that any of the agency's actions

were motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's protected

classes. Accordingly, the agency's final order implementing the AJ's

decision was proper and is AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth herein.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 18, 2005

__________________

Date