QUALCOMM Incorporated

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 1, 2020

15412294 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/412,294 01/23/2017 Chun Wang 1414-297US01/160787 8540
15150 7590 10/01/2020
Shumaker & Sieffert, P. A.
1625 Radio Drive, Suite 100
Woodbury, MN 55125
EXAMINER
HARRISON, CHANTE E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2619
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com
pairdocketing@ssiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CHUN WANG
____________

Appeal 2019-003245
Application 15/412,294
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before LARRY J. HUME, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.

SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–5, 7–17, and 19–30, which are all the claims pending
and rejected in the application.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42.
Appellant identifies Qualcomm Incorporated as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claims 6 and 18 are not before us, as the Examiner has not provided any
statutory rejection or objection against those claims. Therefore, we leave it
to the Examiner to determine whether claims 6 and 18 are allowable.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The present invention relates to “techniques for performing multi-
layer image fetching using a single hardware image fetcher pipeline of a
display processor.” Spec. ¶ 4.
In one example, the disclosure describes a device configured to
display frames, the device comprising a layer buffer configured
to store two or more independent layers, and a display
processor including a single hardware image fetcher pipeline.
The single hardware image fetcher pipeline may be configured
to concurrently retrieve, from the layer buffer, two or more
independent layers, concurrently process the two or more
independent layers, and concurrently output, by two or more
outputs of the single hardware image fetcher pipeline, the two
or more processed independent layers for composition to form
one of the frames to be displayed by one or more display units.
Spec. ¶ 6. Claim 1 is exemplary:
1. A method of displaying frames, the method
comprising:
concurrently retrieving, from a layer buffer and by a
single hardware image fetcher pipeline of a display processor,
two or more independent layers, the single hardware image
fetcher pipeline including a memory dedicated to storing the
two or more independent layers for the single hardware image
fetcher pipeline;
concurrently processing, after retrieving the two or more
independent layers from the memory and by a layer fetcher of
the single hardware image fetcher pipeline, the two or more
independent layers; and
concurrently outputting, by two or more outputs of the single
hardware image fetcher pipeline, the two or more processed
independent layers for composition to form one of the frames to
be displayed by one or more display units.
Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.).
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References and Rejections3
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
References
1–5, 7–8,
11–17, 19–
20, 23–30
103 Croxford (GB 2544357; published May17,
2017)
9–10, 21–22 103 Croxford, MacInnis (US 2011/0280307 A1;
published November 17, 2011)
ANALYSIS
Obviousness
On this record, we conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting
claim 1, as discussed below.
We have reviewed and considered Appellant’s arguments, but find
them to be unpersuasive. To the extent consistent with our analysis below,
we adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in (i) the action from
which this appeal is taken and (ii) the Answer.4
Appellant contends Croxford does not teach “the single hardware
image fetcher pipeline including a memory dedicated to storing the two or
more independent layers for the single hardware image fetcher pipeline,” as
recited in claim 1. See Appeal Br. 9–11; Reply Br. 4–5. For the reasons
discussed below, Appellant has not persuaded us of error.
Turning to the Appeal Brief, Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 9–
11) are unpersuasive because they are not directed to the Examiner’s specific

3 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the (1) Final Office Action dated June
29, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) Appeal Brief dated November 26, 2018
(“Appeal Br.”); (3) Examiner’s Answer dated January 18, 2019 (“Ans.”);
and (4) Reply Brief dated March 14, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
4 To the extent Appellant advances new arguments in the Reply Brief
without showing good cause, Appellant has waived such arguments. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2).
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findings, as the Examiner cites Croxford’s display core—not layer pipelines
24A-24C or shared latency buffers 23—for teaching the claimed “hardware
image fetcher pipeline.” See Final Act. 8; Ans. 15. Further, Appellant’s
attorney arguments (Appeal Br. 10) are unpersuasive, as Appellant does not
provide sufficient objective evidence to support the arguments. See In re
Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“attorney argument [is] not
the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of
obviousness”); Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782 (CCPA 1977)
(“Argument of counsel cannot take the place of evidence lacking in the
record.”).
In the Answer, the Examiner provides further findings and
explanation as to why the disputed limitation is taught by or rendered
obvious in light of Croxford’s teachings. See Ans. 15–16. As discussed
below, Appellant fails to persuasively respond to the Examiner’s further
findings and explanation. Therefore, Appellant fails to show Examiner
error. See In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“It is not the function of this court [or this Board] to examine the claims in
greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable]
distinctions over the prior art.”).
First, Appellant argues “Claim 1 very clearly recites ‘a single
hardware image fetcher pipeline,’ leaving no room for a construction of the
subject matter of claim 1 that would include multiple hardware image
fetcher pipelines.” Reply Br. 4.
That argument is unpersuasive, because the Examiner cites a single
display core from Croxford for teaching the claimed “single hardware image
fetcher pipeline.” See Ans. 15. Further, the Examiner’s claim interpretation
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is consistent with the Specification, which repeatedly describes a single
image fetcher pipeline as one of multiple image fetcher pipelines. See, e.g.,
Spec. Figs. 1–2; ¶ 40 (“a single hardware image fetcher pipeline of hardware
image fetcher pipelines 24), ¶ 45 (“display processor . . . includes image
fetchers 24 . . . . Each of image fetchers 24 represent a single hardware
image fetcher pipeline configured to perform the techniques described in this
disclosure”). As a result, the Examiner properly cites Croxford’s single
display core, which is one of the two display cores (Croxford Fig. 3), for
teaching the claimed “single hardware image fetcher pipeline.”
Second, Appellant argues:
the Examiner has not shown where in the specification a “single
hardware image fetcher pipeline” is described as being
equivalent to a display processor, nor can the Examiner when
claim 1 itself specifically distinguishes between a “single
hardware image fetcher pipeline” and a “display processor.”
Reply Br. 4.
The above arguments are not directed to the Examiner’s specific
findings, as the Examiner cites Croxford’s display core—not display
processor—for teaching the claimed “single hardware image fetcher
pipeline.” See Ans. 15. In fact, Croxford explicitly distinguishes between a
display processor and a display core. See, e.g., Croxford Fig. 3 (showing a
display processor and a display core are two different components).
Third, Appellant argues:
The evidence that “single hardware image fetcher pipeline”
would have been reasonably understood by a person of ordinary
skill in the art to refer to a “display core” is omitted because it
is widely understood that the term “processor” as recited by
claim 1 is equivalent to a “core” [citing footnote 1].
Reply Br. 4.
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Online Article entitled “CPU definition,” updated July 11,
2014, and available at https://techtenns.com/definition/cpu
(“For many years, most CPUs only had one processor, but now
it is common for a single CPU to have at least two processors or
‘processing cores.”‘).
Reply Br. 4, FN 1.
The above arguments are unpersuasive: regardless of whether it is
authoritative, the online article is inapplicable here, because it describes
“processing cores”—not Croxford’s “core” or “display core” cited by the
Examiners.
Fourth, Appellant argues:
[T]he Examiner’s characterization in the Examiner’s Answer
reproduced above strictly avoids offering any evidence that a
“single hardware image fetcher pipeline” would have been
reasonably understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art to
refer to a “display core.”
Reply Br. 4.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because the Examiner is not
required to provide the evidence argued by Appellant. It is well settled that:
[The USPTO] satisfies its initial burden of production by
adequately explain[ing] the shortcomings it perceives so that
the applicant is properly notified and able to respond. In other
words, the PTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a
prima facie case when its rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in
notify[ing] the applicant . . . [by] stating the reasons for [its]
rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such
information and references as may be useful in judging of the
propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.
Jung, 637 F.3d at 1362 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Specifically, the Jung Court finds:
the examiner’s discussion of the theory of invalidity
(anticipation), the prior art basis for the rejection (Kalnitsky),
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and the identification of where each limitation of the rejected
claims is shown in the prior art reference by specific column
and line number was more than sufficient to meet this burden.
Jung, 637 F.3d at 1363 (emphasis added).
Here, the Examiner’s rejection clearly satisfies the requirement of
35 U.S.C. § 132 to establish a prima facie case of unpatentability. The
rejection identifies: the theory of unpatentability (obviousness); the prior art
basis for the rejection (Croxford); where the disputed limitation is shown in
the reference by page and line numbers, plus additional explanation about
why the disputed claim limitation is taught by or obvious in light of
Croxford’s features. See Final Act. 8–10, Ans. 15. In short, similar to the
Examiner in Jung, the Examiner has done “more than sufficient to meet this
burden [of establishing the prima facie case].” The burden then shifts to
Appellant to rebut the Examiner’s prima facie case.
In order to rebut a prima facie case of unpatentability, Appellant must
distinctly and specifically point out the supposed Examiner errors, and the
specific distinctions believed to render the claims patentable over the applied
reference. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b). As discussed above in our analysis,
Appellant has not carried the burden.
Because Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1, and independent
claims 13 and 25 for similar reasons.
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of corresponding dependent
claims 2–5, 7–12, 14–17, 19–24, and 26–30, as Appellant does not advance
separate substantive arguments about those claims. See 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–5, 7–17, and
19–30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 7–8,
11–17, 19–
20, 23–30
103 Croxford 1–5, 7–8,
11–17, 19–
20, 23–30

9–10, 21–22 103 Crowford,
MacInnis
9–10, 21–22
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 7–17,
19–30

FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED