QUALCOMM INCORPORATED

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 8, 2022

2021001055 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 8, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/718,930 12/18/2012 Kevin Roland Fall 1414-253US01/123050 3004 15150 7590 03/08/2022 Shumaker & Sieffert, P. A. 1625 Radio Drive, Suite 100 Woodbury, MN 55125 EXAMINER SOWA, TIMOTHY JOHN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2448 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/08/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com pairdocketing@ssiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte KEVIN ROLAND FALL ____________ Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,9301 Technology Center 2400 _______________ Before HUNG H. BUI, CHRISTA P. ZADO, and DAVID J. CUTITTA, II, Administrative Patent Judges. BUI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-3, 5, 7, 8, 10-14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 24-26. Appeal Br. 24-32. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.2 1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Qualcomm Inc. is identified as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. 2 We refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed June 8, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); Reply Brief filed December 1, 2020 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed October 2, 2020 (“Ans.”); Final Office Action mailed December 11, 2019 (“Final Act.”); and Specification filed December 18, 2012 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s Invention Appellant’s claimed invention seeks to provide “systems, methods, and device” for transmitting a media stream including “state information for a portion of the media stream for a client requesting the media stream” for media presentation. Spec. ¶¶ 7-8. According to Appellant, state information may be included in segment identifiers included in segments of portions of the media presentation, such as URLs, to control the media presentation. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. “The state information [] may be used to identify timing information for the segments (e.g., display order, download order), identity of the [] client[], previous segments presented, subsequent segments to present, and the like” in order to serve the client in a more efficient manner. Id. ¶ 52. Representative Claim Claims 1, 12, 24, and 25 are independent. Representative claim 1 is reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized: 1. A device for transmitting a media stream, the device comprising: one or more processors configured to: receive, from a client, a first request for a media presentation description (MPD) including information identifying a media stream, the request including information identifying the client, wherein the MPD describes a plurality of segments of the media stream, each of the segments comprising a respective independently retrievable file comprising media data, and wherein the MPD is separate from the segments and does not include any media data; generate a state value for at least a portion of one of the segments of the media stream based on information provided in the first request from the client requesting the media stream, Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 3 wherein the state value identifies information specific to the client; transmit the MPD including information describing the media stream to the client, the MPD including a first portion identifying the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream and a second portion including the state value; store the information specific to the client identified by the state value; receive, from the client, a second request for at least the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream, the second request including a uniform resource locator (URL) specifying the information identifying the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream, the URL further specifying the state value generated for the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream in a query parameter portion of the URL, the query parameter portion starting with a question mark (?) character in the URL, the second request being different than the first request; determine that the client is authorized to access the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream using the state value included in the second request received from the client; obtain the information specific to the client using the state value included in the second request received from the client; and generate an output media stream to present the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream, wherein the one or more processors are configured to generate the output media stream based at least in part on the information specific to the client. Appeal Br. 24-25 (Claims App.). REJECTIONS AND REFERENCES (1) Claims 1-3, 7, 8, 10-14, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 24-26 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Lewis et al. (US Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 4 2012/0047542 A1; published Feb. 23, 2012; “Lewis”), Kakadia (US 2011/0145420 A1; published Jun. 16, 2011), Burckart et al. (US 2013/0185452 A1; published Jul. 18, 2013; “Burckart”), and Rhyu et al. (US 2012/0185607 A1; published Jul. 19, 2012). Final Act. 6-27. (2) Claims 5 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Lewis, Kakadia, Burckart, Rhyu, and Davis et al. (US 2013/0060869 A1; published Mar. 7, 2013; “Davis”). Final Act. 28-29. ANALYSIS Claims 1, 12, 24, and 25 In support of the obviousness rejection, the Examiner finds the combination of Lewis, Kakadia, Burckart, and Rhyu teaches or suggests all of the limitations of Appellant’s claim 1 and similarly, Appellant’s claims 12, 24, and 25. Final Act. 6-27. Of particular relevance, the Examiner finds Lewis teaches or suggests the disputed limitation: receive, from the client, a second request for at least the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream, the second request including a uniform resource locator (URL) specifying the information identifying the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream, the URL further specifying the state value generated for the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream in a query parameter portion of the URL, the query parameter portion starting with a question mark (?) character in the URL, the second request being different than the first request. Id. at 7 (citing Lewis ¶¶ 17, 18, 36, 37, 41, Fig. 4) (emphasis added). Lewis teaches a server-client system for providing dynamic streaming media including dynamic manifest files to a client device for media playback Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 5 at the client device using dynamic manifest files included in video segments of the media stream. Lewis ¶¶ 2, 7. Lewis’ Figure 1 depicting server-client system 100 for providing dynamic media stream, is reproduced below: Figure 1 depicting server-client system 100 including media streaming and manifest file servers 110, 120 for providing dynamic media stream provided with manifest files included in video segments of the media stream to client device 150 for playback. Lewis teaches that: User 185 may navigate to a video streaming portal site accessible over network 130 to click on a link directed to dynamic manifest file server 110 for access to live video stream content. Media player application 156 may then send a request, such as a HTTP GET request over network 130 to dynamic manifest file server 110 . . . Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 6 Media player application 156 may then interpret manifest file 157 to playback video content on display 160. For example, manifest file 157 may reference live video segments 175 and ad video segments 145 on servers hosted in content delivery network 135, accessible over network 130. Thus, manifest file 157 may comprise a play list file such as a M3U8 playlist file. Media player application 156 may then request, stream, decode, and output the referenced video segments seamlessly to display 160. Lewis ¶¶ 17-18 (emphasis added). According to Lewis, a request for the live stream, such as an HTTP GET request, may include parameters “such as the client IP address, browser or operating platform, device identifiers, browser cookies or login details, screen resolution of display 160, and other device, display, or user parameters.” Lewis ¶ 37. User parameters may also include, for example, “insertion rules in real-time for [] dynamic insertion of advertisement time blocks or other content while a live event is in progress” such as inserting content “at a time offset starting or ending within a video segment, and then a cutting or cropping processing procedure [] so that the generated manifest file can insert content at any playback offset.” Lewis ¶ 37-38. The Examiner takes the position that Lewis’ “HTTP GET request” sent from the client to the server “inherently includes a question mark (“?”) indicating the query portion of the HTTP GET request URL” because “HTTP GET request” is a widely known Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) protocol for media streaming that uses components of a URL (Uniform Resource Locator) such as a query to access a resource on the server. Final Act. 8-9 (citing HTTP Methods: GET vs. POST; https://www.w3schools.com/tags/ref_httpmethods.asp). Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 7 Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings regarding Kakadia, Burckart, and Rhyu. Nor does Appellant challenge the Examiner’s reasons to combine the references. Instead, Appellant only disputes the Examiner’s findings regarding Lewis. Appellant offers two reasons that Lewis does not teach or suggest the disputed limitation of Appellant’s claim 1, including: “URL further specifying the state value generated for the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream in a query parameter portion of the URL, the query parameter portion starting with a question mark (?) character in the URL.”. Appeal Br. 11. First, Appellant argues Lewis only teaches “playback offset” and does not teach the claimed “state value.” Appeal Br. 12-13; Reply Br. 3. According to Appellant, Lewis’ “playback offsets” are not the same as the claimed “state value.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant misapprehends the Examiner’s finding regarding Lewis. Specifically, the Examiner does not equate “playback offsets” with the claimed “state value,” but rather relies on Lewis’s teachings as highlighted below. Ans. 7 (citing Lewis ¶ 37-39). For example, Lewis teaches that parameters or user parameters included in Lewis’ HTTP GET request to control the media presentation, such as, for example, “insertion rules in real- time for [] dynamic insertion of advertisement time blocks or other content while a live event is in progress,” i.e., inserting content “at a time offset starting or ending within a video segment, then cutting or cropping processing procedure [] so that the generated manifest file can insert content at any playback offset” (Lewis ¶ 37-38). Lewis’ parameters or user parameters included in Lewis’ HTTP GET request is considered as Appellant’s claimed “state value” or “state information” used to control and Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 8 insert content “at a time offset starting or ending within a video segment” or at any playback offset. As correctly recognized by the Examiner, “state information is obtained from a video playback client and a dynamic manifest file server thereby generates a manifest file for the client with state information including playback offsets.” Ans. 7 (citing Lewis ¶ 37-39). Claim terms, during examination, are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The term “state information” is described in Appellant’s Specification as information used to control media presentation, including, for example, “to identify timing information for the segments (e.g., display order, download order), identity of the [] client[], previous segments presented, subsequent segments to present, and the like” in order to serve the client in a more efficient manner. Spec. ¶¶ 25-26, 52. In light of Appellant’s Specification, the term “state information” can be broadly, but reasonably, interpreted to encompass parameters or user parameters included in Lewis’ HTTP GET request to control the media presentation, such as, for example, “insertion rules in real-time for [] dynamic insertion of advertisement time blocks or other content while a live event is in progress,” i.e., inserting content “at a time offset starting or ending within a video segment, then cutting or cropping processing Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 9 procedure [] so that the generated manifest file can insert content at any playback offset” (Lewis ¶ 37-38). Second, Appellant acknowledges Lewis’ “manifest file could simply provide URLs to the advertising segments.” Appeal Br. 14. However, Appellant argues that (1) Lewis’ URL does not necessarily “specify[] the state value generated for the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream in a query parameter portion of the URL, the query parameter portion starting with a question mark (?) character in the URL,” as recited in Appellant’s claim 1, and (2) “there is nothing in Lewis to suggest that one of ordinary skill in the art would necessarily use a URL including a query parameter portion starting with a question mark “?” character to transmit the playback offsets thereof.” Id. at 13-14. We disagree. As correctly recognized by the Examiner, Lewis’ “HTTP GET request URL sent from the client to the server [] inherently includes a question mark ("?") indicating the query portion of the HTTP GET request URL, because HTTP GET request URLs as a definitive standard must include such question mark[s] in order to signify a query portion of such HTTP GET requests.” Ans. 5 (citing HTTP Methods: GET vs. POST; https://www.w3schools.com/tags/ref_httpmethods.asp). “The inherent teaching of a prior art reference is a question of fact.” Par Pharm. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014). When the prior art does not expressly disclose a claim limitation, “inherency may supply a missing claim limitation in an obviousness analysis.” Id. at 1194-95 (collecting cases). Inherency is established in the context of obviousness when “the limitation at issue necessarily must be present, or the Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 10 natural result of the combination of elements explicitly disclosed by the prior art.” Id. at 1195-96. In this case, Lewis explains that HTTP GET request is a widely known “Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) protocol” designed to enable communications between a client device and a server for media streaming. Lewis ¶ 4. Rhyu also teaches that, for streaming service, control (state) information segment included in the media presentation includes a URL (Uniform Resource Locator) of segments to control the download from a server based on network conditions. Rhyu ¶ 33. As further recognized by the Examiner, every HTTP GET request URL sent from the client to the server “inherently includes a question mark (“?”) indicating the query portion of the HTTP GET request URL.” Final Act. 8-9 (citing HTTP Methods: GET vs. POST; https://www.w3schools.com/tags/ref_httpmethods.asp). For example, a typical URL contains a query string and that query string has a question mark used as a separator, as commonly known by those skilled in the art (see well-known definition of a URL query string at https://www.techopedia.com/definition/1228/query-string (“the query string is whatever follows the question mark sign (‘?’)”). For the reasons stated above, based on the teachings of Lewis and Rhyu, skilled artisans would understand that Lewis’ “HTTP GET request” is a request to access a resource on the server and, as such, utilizes components of a URL (Uniform Resource Locator) such as a query string including a question mark (“?”) to access the resource on the server. Given the general knowledge of those skilled in the art and the teachings of Lewis and Rhyu, we agree with the Examiner that a skilled Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 11 artisan would understand that (1) Lewis’ “HTTP GET request” is a request to access a resource on the server and, as such, utilizes components of a URL (Uniform Resource Locator) such as a query string including a question mark (“?”) to access the resource on the server, and (2) Lewis’ “URL” further “specifying the state value generated for the portion of the one of the segments of the media stream in a query parameter portion of the URL, the query parameter portion starting with a question mark (?) character in the URL” in the manner recited in claim 1 and similarly, claims 12, 24, and 25. Moreover, starting a query parameter portion of Lewis’ URL with a question mark (?) in the URL would not have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or would not have “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher- Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007); cf. Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60 (1969). For these reasons, Appellant does not persuade us of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 1 and similarly, claims 12, 24, and 25 and of their dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10-14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24-26, which are not argued separately. For the same reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 5 and 16 as obvious over Lewis, Kakadia, Burckart, Rhyu, and Davis. Claims 2 and 13 Claims 2 and 13 depend from claims 1 and 12, and further “generate the state value indicating one or more of a history of media streamed to the client, media to be streamed to the client, demographic information for a Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 12 user of the client, technical capabilities of the client, or authorization for the client.” Appellant argues Lewis does not teach that a “playback offset” is ever generated and that a “playback offset” would indicate “one or more of a history of media streamed to the client, media to be streamed to the client, [] demographic information for a user of the client, technical capabilities of the client, or authorization for the client,” in the manner recited in claims 2 and 13. Appeal Br. 21. We disagree. As recognized by the Examiner, Lewis teaches “a state value generated indicat[es] the technical capabilities of the client in the form of display screen resolution.” Ans. 9 (citing Lewis ¶ 27). For these reasons, Appellant does not persuade us of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 2 and 16. CONCLUSION On this record, Appellant does not show the Examiner erred in rejecting (1) claims 1-3, 5, 7, 8, 10-14, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 24-26 as obvious over Lewis, Kakadia, Burckart, and Rhyu; and (2) claims 5 and 16 as obvious over Lewis, Kakadia, Burckart, Rhyu, and Davis. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-3, 7, 8, 10-14, 18, 103(a) Lewis, Kakadia, Burckart, Rhyu 1-3, 7, 8, 10-14, 18, Appeal 2021-001055 Application 13/718,930 13 Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 19, 21, 22, 24-26 19, 21, 22, 24-26 5, 16 103(a) Lewis, Kakadia, Burckart, Rhyu, Davis 5, 16 Overall Outcome 1-3, 5, 7, 8, 10-14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24-26 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2019). AFFIRMED