QUALCOMM Incorporated

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 13, 2020

15040236 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 13, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/040,236 02/10/2016 Christian Oliver Thelen QCOM-2963US (153918) 6880
23696 7590 07/13/2020
QUALCOMM INCORPORATED
5775 MOREHOUSE DR.
SAN DIEGO, CA 92121
EXAMINER
TORRES RUIZ, JOHALI ALEJANDRA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/13/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
us-docketing@qualcomm.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte CHRISTIAN OLIVER THELEN and
MICHAEL MITRANI
____________________

Appeal 2019-003956
Application 15/040,236
Technology Center 2800
____________________

Before JOHN A. EVANS, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.

PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–7, 9–18, 20–28, and 30–32, which are all of the claims
pending in the application. Claims 8, 19, and 29 are canceled. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Qualcomm Incorporated as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant generally describes the disclosed and claimed invention as
relating to aerial vehicles such as multicopters and structures for charging
multicopters. Spec. ¶¶ 1, 2, 15, 21; see also Appeal Br. 3–4 (Summary of
Claimed Subject Matter).2 Appellant’s Specification explains that
multicopters may be powered by a battery that requires periodic recharging.
Spec. ¶ 2. The structures for docking a multicopter to a charging unit may
impact the efficiency and efficacy of the recharging operation. Id. ¶¶ 2, 19.
Accordingly, Appellant proposes various structures and components for
configuring and charging multicopters for improving the overall
performance of the multicopters and their charging units. See, e.g. Spec.
¶¶ 2, 22–25.
In some embodiments, a charging unit receiver of a multicopter may
be inserted into or received by a multicopter receiver of a charging unit,
where the proximal and distal portions of the charging unit receiver have
different cross-sectional perimeters. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 29, 44, and Fig.
3. Once a multicopter has docked with a charging unit, the charging unit
may use one or more charging coils to perform wireless or inductive
charging of the multicopter, such that power is delivered to one or more
charging coils of the multicopter. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 19, 35.

2 Our Decision refers to the Final Office Action mailed Sept. 6, 2018
(“Final Act.”); Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed Jan. 18, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”)
Reply Brief filed April 24, 2019 (“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer
mailed Mar. 19, 2019 (“Ans.”); and the Specification filed Feb. 10, 2016
(“Spec.”).
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Figure 3 is illustrative and reproduced below.

Figure 3 shows a charge receiving unit 212 of a multicopter that is being
inserted or docked into a multicopter receiver 222 of a charging unit, such
that charging coils 326’ and 326” of the charging unit may deliver power to
charging coils 306 of the multicopter. See id. ¶¶ 25–28, 35–36. Figure 3
also shows that the cross-sectional perimeter of the proximal portion 212’ of
the charging unit receiver 212 is shorter than that of the distal portion 212”.
Id. ¶ 27.

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Illustrative Claims
Claims 1, 12, and 23 are independent. Claims 1 and 23 are illustrative
of the subject matter on appeal and provide as follows:
1. A multicopter comprising:
a frame; and
a charging unit receiver coupled to the frame and
configured to receive a portion of a charging unit,
wherein the charging unit receiver comprises a distal
portion and a proximal portion,
wherein a perimeter of a cross-section of the proximal
portion of the charging unit receiver is shorter than a perimeter
of a cross-section of the distal portion of the charging unit
receiver, and
wherein the proximal portion of the charging unit receiver
comprises a component configured to receive a wireless charge
by the received portion of the charging unit.

23. A multicopter comprising:
a frame; and
a charging unit receiver coupled to the frame and
configured to be receivable into a portion of a charging unit,
wherein the charging unit receiver comprises a distal
portion and a proximal portion,
wherein a perimeter of a cross-section of the distal portion
of the charging unit receiver is shorter than a perimeter of a
cross-section of the proximal portion of the charging unit
receiver, and
wherein the distal portion of the charging unit receiver
comprises a component configured to receive a wireless charge
by the portion of the charging unit.

Appeal Br. 23, 27 (Claims App.).
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Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1–7, 9, 11–18, 20, 22, 31, and 32 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Meier et al. (WO 2017/019728 A1;
published Feb. 2, 2017, hereinafter “Meier”) and Kantor et al. (US
2015/0336669 A1; published Nov. 26, 2015, hereinafter “Kantor”). Final
Act. 5–12.
Claims 10 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Meier, Kantor, and Gentry et al. (US 9,527,605 B1; issued
Dec. 27, 2016, hereinafter “Gentry”). Id. at 12–13.
Claims 23–28 and 30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Sanz et al. (US 2016/0001883 A1; published Jan. 7, 2016,
hereinafter “Sanz”) and Kantor. Id. at 13–15.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1–7, 9–18, 20–22, 31, and 32
We have reviewed the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims
1–7, 9–18, 20–22, 31, and 32 in light of Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal
Brief and Reply Brief. See Appeal Br. 8–17; see also Reply Br. 2–6. Any
other arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to make, are
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). For the reasons discussed below,
Appellant’s arguments for these claims are not persuasive of error by the
Examiner. Unless otherwise indicated, we agree with, and adopt as our own,
the Examiner’s findings of fact and conclusions for these claims as set forth
in the Final Office Action on appeal and in the Answer. Final Act. 2–13;
Ans. 3–8. We provide the following explanation for emphasis.
Appellant argues the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims 1–7, 9, 11–
18, 20, 22, 31, and 32 as a group, focusing on independent claim 1. See
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Appeal Br. 5–16; se also Reply Br. 2–6. For substantially similar reasons,
Appellant argues Examiner error in the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims
10 and 21. See Appeal Br. 16–17. We select claim 1 as representative of the
group of claims pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner rejects claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness
over the combined teachings of Meier and Kantor. Final Act. 5–6.
Appellant contends that the cited references, when combined, fail to at least
teach or suggest the following limitations of claim 1:
a charging unit receiver,[] wherein a perimeter of a
cross-section of the proximal portion of the charging unit
receiver is shorter than a perimeter of a cross-section of the
distal portion of the charging unit receiver, and wherein the
proximal portion of the charging unit receiver comprises a
component configured to receive a wireless charge.

Appeal Br. 5–17. We consider these claim limitations below in view
of Appellant’s arguments.
The Examiner finds that Meier’s arrangement for recharging a
drone—where the drone may couple with a docking probe, and a base
station may then recharge the drone—teaches the entirety of claim 1,
except that “Meier does not explicitly teach the proximal portion of
the charging unit receiver comprises a component configured to
receive a wireless charge.” Final Act. 5–6 (citing Meier ¶¶ 29, 30, 55,
Fig. 1A (items 101–104), and Fig. 1B). The Examiner finds that
Kantor teaches this limitation because Kantor discloses a multicopter
with a second inductive coil in its landing gear that is in contact with a
charging surface of a charging unit and is configured to receive
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inductive charging from the charging unit. Id. at 6 (citing Kantor
¶ 48, Fig. 5C (items 220, 555–1)). The Examiner explains that
[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
. . . to have had a component on the proximal portion of tile
charging unit receiver which is in contact with a charging
surface of the charging unit in the system of Meier as taught in
Kantor to have had provided power to a battery of the
multicopter wirelessly . . . thereby not requiring a physical
connection/disconnection between the multicopter and the
charging unit.
Id. Appellant argues that the Examiner errs because: (1) Meier’s coupling
device performs only vehicle guidance and orientation, while only the base
station performs recharging; (2) the combined teachings of Meier and
Kantor would not result in a device defined by the present claims; and (3)
combining the wireless charging coils in Kantor in the docking probe of
Meier would impermissibly require a substantial reconstruction and redesign
of the Meier reference. Appeal Br. 5–16. For the reasons stated below, we
are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments.
First, Appellant argues that
[w]hen considering Meier as a whole,[] it is apparent that the
coupling device 102, 302 and docking probe 104, 303 are
taught solely for the purpose of positioning a vehicle (e.g.,
drone 101, automobile 301) into a specific location on a base
station 103, 300, and do not include any recharging/refueling
features. There is nothing in Meier to suggest that the coupling
device 102 receives any charge from the docking probe 104.
Instead, only the base station 103, 300 is taught by Meier as
being configured to perform operations on the vehicle to refuel,
recharge, change instruments or payload, load cargo, and
unload cargo.
Appeal Br. 6. In response, the Examiner explains that “[o]ne of ordinary
skill in the art would have recognized Meier inherently possesses a
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component capable of receiving the transfer of energy from the charging unit
after docking. Without which recharging is not possible.” Ans. 3.
Appellant responds that “the Examiner relies solely on assumptions about
what Meier could be interpreted as teaching, without any reliance on any
express disclosure in Meier to support such allegations.” Reply Br. 3.
Appellant also disputes the Examiner’s position that Meier’s docking probe
104 provides an electrical charge to the coupling device 102 because “Meier
expressly describes the base station 103 as a distinct component from the
docking probe 104.” Reply Br. 3–4, see also Appeal Br. 9. We are not
persuaded by these arguments.
We acknowledge that in Meier, the power being provided to recharge
the drone may originate at the base station. See, e.g., Meier ¶¶ 27 (“[T]he
base station is configured to perform at least one function selected from the
group consisting of refueling, recharging.”), 55 (“[T]he airborne mobile base
station may be employed to refuel and/or recharge the autonomous airborne
vehicles.”). But, as can be seen in Figures 1A–C of Meier, base station 103
is coupled to docking probe 104 (including shaft 105 when extended), which
may receive coupling device 102 on drone 101. Meier, Figs. 1A–C. As the
Examiner explains, “Meier discloses a docking probe (104) forming part of a
base station (103) . . . being controlled and extended from the base station to
initiate a landing/docking sequence.” Ans. 5 (citing Meier ¶ 34, Figs. 1,
1B). Given this configuration, a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have understood or reasonably inferred that a logical way for the base station
to charge the drone when coupled to the docking probe would be to direct
the charge from the base station through the docking station (including its
shaft when extended) to the point of contact with the coupling device of the
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drone. An obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court
can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 418 (2007). “A person of ordinary skill is also a person of
ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
That Meier’s base station 103 and docking probe 104 have been
labeled individually is of no moment. We find nothing in Meier’s disclosure
that precludes docking probe 104 from being a part of (or working in concert
with) base station 103. Moreover, Meier explicitly states in one of its
embodiments that the docking probe can be part of the base station. Meier
¶ 45 (“[T]he docking probe (303) of the base station.”), Fig. 3.
Second, Appellant argues that the proposed combination of references
“teaches a person of ordinary skill in the art to simply include a wireless
charging pad in the pad-configured base station 103 to charge the drone 101
through its landing gear,” which is significantly different from the claim
language. Appeal Br. 11–12; see also Reply Br. 4–5. Appellant has misread
the Examiner’s rejection. The Examiner explains that
[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
. . . to have had a wireless charging component on the portion
of the vehicle that is in contact with a portion of the base station
when docked in the system of Meier to have had provided
power to a battery of the vehicle wirelessly (Par. 48) as taught
in Kantor thereby not requiring a physical connection/
disconnection between the vehicle and the base unit during a
recharging function.
Ans. 6 (citing Kantor ¶ 48). The Examiner’s combination, therefore, does
not propose to “simply include a wireless charging pad in the pad-configured
base station 103 to charge the drone 101 through its landing gear.” Appeal
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Br. 11–12. Instead, as best understood, it proposes to modify the system of
Meier such that the inductive (wireless) charging technique of Kantor is
applied at the point of contact (or at a short distance) between Meier’s
docking probe and the coupling device on the drone. We find no persuasive
reason why an ordinarily skilled artisan, given the cited disclosures of Meier
and Kantor, would not have been led to incorporate the inductive charging
elements and techniques of Kantor in Meier’s coupling device 102 on drone
101 and on the top side of docking probe 104, resulting in an apparatus
capable of wirelessly charging the drone. Nor does Appellant point to any
evidence of record that Examiner’s proposed combination would be
“uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or
“represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters. Inc. v.
Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550
U.S. at 418–19).
Third, while it is true that the proposed combination would require a
modification to the design of Meier, Appellant has not shown that such
modification would be beyond the capabilities of a person of ordinary skill
in the art. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, 421. Appellant may have shown that
there are differences in the cited prior art references, but this does not
amount to a reconstruction and redesign of Meier sufficient to rebut the
Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness. See In re Beattie, 974 F.2d
1309, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
In particular, Appellant points to Meier’s use of a magnet or ferrous
material as potentially blocking or disrupting the electromagnetic radiation
coupling used in wireless power transfer. Appeal Br. 14–15. But, as the
Examiner explains, Meier’s use of a magnet or ferrous material “is only an
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option and other coupling systems are disclosed without the use of magnets
or ferrous material.” Ans. 7 (citing Meier ¶¶ 35, 40). Appellant’s assertion
that the charging space in Kantor is two-dimensional, whereas in Meier it is
three-dimensional, fares no better. As can be seen from Figures 5C and 5E
of Kantor, its recharging station is not merely two-dimensional, but a
real-world, physical structure that has three dimensions. See, e.g., Kantor
Figs. 5C, 5E.
Appellant further submits that substantial redesign of Meier would be
necessary to account for Meier’s particular geometric and orthogonal angles
and to determine proper trajectory and prevent reflection of the
electromagnetic field in the multifaceted space of Meier’s coupling
apparatus and docking probe. Appeal Br. 14–15. Here, Appellant cites
Roizen3 as extrinsic evidence that “[a]bsorption [of electromagnetic
radiation] in such systems is very sensitive to the geometry of the structure,”
such that “[w]ith the slightest variation in thickness or refractive indices of
the layers the absorption is no longer perfect and reflected radiation
reappears.” Id. at 15 (citing Roizen, 1) (emphasis omitted). As an initial
matter, this argument does not include any persuasive evidence to suggest
that reflected radiation would or would likely occur in Meier’s system when
combined with the cited teachings of Kantor. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Inc. v.
L’Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 595 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (determining that
argument of counsel cannot take the place of evidence lacking in the record).
Moreover, as the Examiner explains, Meier discloses that the coupling

3 Valerii Roizen, Scientists show a new way to absorb electromagnetic
radiation, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (2016),
https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2016-01/miop-ssa011416.php (last
visited June 23, 2020).
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device and docking probe may be configured with different types of
geometry, including “[a]ny configuration known to [those] of ordinary skill
in the art to be useful.” Final Act. 4 (citing Meier ¶ 39). Accordingly,
assuming there were a need to minimize reflection of the electromagnetic
field in Meier’s system, this would have prompted one of ordinary skill in
the art to find a suitable geometric configuration of the coupling device and
docking probe. If “a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the
same field or a different one.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Moreover, we find no
evidence that performing inductive charging operations in the region of
interest set forth by the proposed combination—between the top side of
Meier’s docking probe and the top internal wall within a recess of the
coupling device on Meier’s drone—would yield a result that is
unconventional or differs meaningfully from inductive charging operations
between other horizontally-oriented or parallel charging elements. See, e.g.,
Meier, Fig. 2C.
Appellant also cites Kirby,4 as extrinsic evidence that because the
system resulting from the proposed combination “would be radiating waves,
unintentional radiation could interfere with other electronic systems if not
properly controlled through filtering.” Appeal Br. 15 (citing Kirby ¶ 7).
This argument also falls short, as it does not include any persuasive evidence
to suggest that radiation would or would likely interfere with Meier’s system
when combined with the cited teachings of Kantor. See, e.g., Estee
Lauder, 129 F.3d at 595.

4 Kirby et al., U.S. 2010/0225272; published Sept. 9, 2010, (hereinafter
“Kirby”).
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Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness
over Meier and Kantor. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 rejection of claim 1, as well as the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections of
claims 2–7, 9–18, 20–22, 31, and 32.

Claims 23–28, and 30
The Examiner rejects claims 23–28 and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for
obviousness over Sanz and Kantor. Final Act. 13–15 (citing Sanz ¶¶ 74, 79,
Figs. 3, 4A, 4B; Kantor ¶ 48, Fig. 5C). Figures 3 and 5 of Sanz are
reproduced below.

Figure 3 of Sanz depicts an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 104 with main
body 302, coupled to which is a landing base 308 including a landing pad
310 that comprises a symmetrically-shaped ring positioned around a central
axis passing through the middle of the UAV. Sanz ¶¶ 64–65. A plurality of
UAV charging contacts 312 may be connected to the bottom side of landing
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pad 310. Id. ¶¶ 65, 67. Legs 314a–d of the landing frame may provide
electrical conduits between the UAV charging contacts 312 and electrical
components of the UAV. Id. ¶ 71. When UAV 104 is landed within a UAV
Ground station (“UAVGS”) and the UAV charging contacts 312 electrically
couple to corresponding UAVGS charging contacts, the UAVGS or UAV
104 may charge battery 316 using a power signal as well as communicate
data using a data signal. Id. ¶ 74.

Figure 5 of Sanz depicts a bottom-perspective view of an example landing
base 310 of UAV according to one or more embodiments. Id. ¶¶ 19, 87.
Figure 5 shows, among other things, four UAV charging contacts 312a–d,
each aligned with a respective leg 314a–d of the UAV.
Appellant argues that combining Sanz and Kantor would
impermissibly require a substantial reconstruction and redesign of Sanz.
Appeal Br. 17–20; see also Reply Br. 6–7. Appellant explains, in relevant
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part, that “the base 202 of Sanz et al. is concave, such that any transmission
of an electromagnetic field from the base 202 would result in
electromagnetic interference (EMI) between each of the other
electromagnetic fields emitted at the four charging locations of the base
202,” and that “Sanz et al. is configured such that the charging contacts 312
of the air vehicle are directly across from each other and located adjacently
in quarter circle intervals.” Appeal Br. 19 (citing Sanz, Fig. 5).5
Accordingly, Appellant asserts that “incorporating the wireless charging
mechanism of Kantor et al. into Sanz et al. would result in significant
[electromagnetic interference (“EMI”)] caused at least by the configuration
of multiple wireless chargers that direct transmitted power into one another,
as well as adjacent to one another.” Id.6
In response, the Examiner states that

5 See also id. n.5 (citing Chiuk Song et al., EMI Reduction Methods in
Wireless Power Transfer System for Drone Electrical Charger Using Tightly
Coupled Three-Phase Resonant Magnetic Field, 65 IEEE Transactions on
Industrial Electronics 6839–49 as “emphasizing the importance of reducing
EMFs and EMI in a wireless power transfer system”).
6 See also id. n.7 (citing O. Jonah and S. V. Georgakopoulos, Optimized
Helix with Ferrite Core for Wireless Power Transfer via Resonance
Magnetic, IEEE Antennas and Propagation Society International
Symposium 1040–41 (2013); T. Batra et al., Reduction of Magnetic
Emission by Increasing Secondary Side Capacitor for Ferrite Geometry
based Series-Series Topology for Wireless Power Transfer to Vehicles, 16th
European Conference on Power Electronics and Applications 1–11 (2014);
H. Kim et al., Shielded Coil Structure Suppressing Leakage Magnetic Field
from JOOW-Class Wireless Power Transfer System with Higher Efficiency,
IEEE MTT-S International Microwave Workshop Series on Innovative
Wireless Power Transmission 83–86 (2012); T. Kim et al., Evaluation of
Power Transfer Efficiency With Ferrite Sheets in WPT System, IEEE
Wireless Power Transfer Conference (WPTC) 1–4 (2017)).

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the test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed
invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of
the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art.
Ans. 10 (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413 (CCPA 1981). The Examiner
then states that “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have [found it]
obvious to utilize an element (coil) for wireless recharging in the system of
Sanz as taught in Kantor without undue experimentation, in order to supply
power without the need of alignment and connection/disconnection of
physical contacts.” Id. We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the
Examiner erred.
A proposed combination of references may not be not a proper ground
of rejection if it “would require a substantial reconstruction and redesign of
the elements shown in” the primary reference to arrive at the claimed
invention. In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (CCPA. 1959). In addition,
“combinations that render the prior art ‘inoperable for its intended purpose’
[]may fail to support a conclusion of obviousness.” Plas-Pak Indus., Inc. v.
Sulzer Mixpac AG, 600 F. App’x 755, 758 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re
Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
Here, Appellant raises a valid point that modifying Sanz’s UAV
system to include Kantor’s inductive charging technique would require a
substantial reconstruction and redesign of Sanz due to electromagnetic
interference (EMI) arising between Sanz’s charging contacts. See Appeal
Br. 19. In response, the Examiner merely cites general case law principles
and concludes that the proposed combination would have been obvious,
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without explaining how or why the combination of Sanz with Kantor would
have been feasible or operable in view of any EMI resulting from the
combination. See Ans. 10. The Examiner does not explain, for instance,
why the proposed combination would not result in significant EMI, or how
one of ordinary skill in the art would have known to make modifications to
Sanz that would mitigate the generation of EMI without the need for
substantial reconstruction or redesign. Nor does the cited prior art appear to
fill in the gaps in the Examiner’s proposed combination. For example,
although Sanz discloses that “[a]lternatively, the landing base 308 can
include additional or fewer UAV charging contacts 312 than a number of
legs 314 of the landing frame,” Sanz does not provide any further
description of such alternative embodiments, nor any discussion of how to
mitigate or avoid EMI. Sanz ¶ 89. We decline to resort to speculation to fill
in the gaps in the Examiner’s rejection. See Ex parte Braeken, 54 USPQ2d
1110, 1112 (BPAI 1999).
Therefore, constrained by this record, we determine the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness over Sanz
and Kantor. Accordingly, we decline to sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 rejection of independent claim 23. For similar reasons, we decline to
sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of dependent claims 24–28
and 30, for which the Examiner fails to provide any finding or reasoning that
cures the above deficiencies. See Final Act. 14–15; see also cf. In re Fritch,
972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[D]ependent claims are nonobvious
if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious.”).

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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–7, 9, 11–18, 20, 22,
31, and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the
combination of Meier and Kantor.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 10 and 21 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Meier,
Kantor, and Gentry.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 23–28 and 30 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Sanz and
Kantor.

CONCLUSION
In summary:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 9, 11–
18, 20, 22,
31, 32
103 Meier, Kantor 1–7, 9, 11–
18, 20, 22,
31, 32

10, 21 103 Meier, Kantor,
Gentry
10, 21
23–28, 30 103 Sanz, Kantor 23–28, 30
Overall
Outcome
1–7, 9–18,
20–22, 31,
32
23–28, 30

No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED IN PART