QUALCOMM Incorporated

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 6, 2020

14331991 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 6, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/331,991 07/15/2014 Lin Chen 1212-753US01/140566 3632
15150 7590 07/06/2020
Shumaker & Sieffert, P. A.
1625 Radio Drive, Suite 100
Woodbury, MN 55125
EXAMINER
NGO, CHUONG D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2182
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/06/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com
pairdocketing@ssiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte LIN CHEN, ANDREW EVAN GRUBER, GUOFANG JIAO,
CHIENTE HO, and PRAMOD VASANT ARGADE
________________

Appeal 2019-002525
Application 14/331,991
Technology Center 2100
________________

Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges.

KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Final Rejection
of claims 1–4, 6, 9–12, 14, 17–20, 24–27, and 33. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
INVENTION
The claimed invention relates to vector scaling in computer
processing using an arithmetic and logic unit (ALU). Spec. ¶ 3. Claim 1 is
illustrative of the invention and is reproduced below:

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, QUALCOMM Incorporated is
the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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1. A method for scaling a vector, the method
comprising:
receiving, by at least one processor, an invocation of a
vector scaling instruction, including receiving indications of
components of a vector and an indication of a destination
location in memory for a first scaled component of a scaled
vector resulting from performing the vector scaling instruction,
wherein each of the components of the vector comprises at least
an exponent;

determining, by the at least one processor, a maximum
exponent out of respective exponents of the components of the
vector;

determining, by the at least one processor, a scaling value
based at least in part on subtracting, from the maximum
exponent, a result of dividing by two a difference between a
maximum representable exponent and one, wherein the scaling
value is not the same as the maximum exponent;

performing, by an arithmetic logic unit (ALU) of the at
least one processor that does not support multiplication
operations and division operations, the vector scaling
instruction to scale the vector, including for each exponent of
the respective exponents of the components of the vector:

subtracting the scaling value from the exponent; and

storing, by the at least one processor, scaled components
of the scaled vector in consecutive locations in the memory
starting with the destination location.

Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.) (emphases added to indicate additional, i.e.,
non-abstract, elements).

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–4, 6, 9–12, 14, 17–20, 24–27, and 33 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final
Act. 2–3.
Claims 1–4, 6, 9–12, 14, 17–20, 24–27, and 33 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Nystad (US 2012/0078987 A1;
published Mar. 29, 2012). Final Act. 4–8.
ANALYSIS
We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually
raised in the Briefs.2 Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not
to make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018).
SECTION 101 REJECTION
A. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,

2 Claims 2–4, 6, 9–12, 14, 17–20, 24–27, and 33 are not argued separately
from claim 1 in either of Appellant’s briefs (Appeal Br. 7–23; Reply Br. 5–
11), and will not be separately addressed.
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566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
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formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also Update at 1.

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (“Update”)
(available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
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Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the Update, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.

4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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C. The Examiner’s Rejection and Appellant’s Arguments
The Examiner concludes that the present claims recite mathematical
relationships or formulas. Final Act. 2. The Examiner further concludes
that the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application, because
the additional elements are well-known structures of a generic computer,
such that they amount to no more than mere instructions to implement the
abstract idea on a computer and recite generic computer structures that
perform generic computer functions. Id. at 2–3. The Examiner finds that
the additional elements do not go beyond what is well-understood, routine,
and conventional activity, such that they do not amount to significantly more
than the judicial exception. Id. at 3.
Appellant disagrees, contending that the claims are directed to an
improvement in existing computer technology. Appeal Br. 14–15; Reply Br.
5–10 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Spec. ¶ 15). Specifically, Appellant argues that the present claims
improve the function of a computing element, namely an ALU that does not
support the performance of multiplication or division operations, such that it
can perform vector scaling. Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br. 7–8. Appellant
argues that the claims are integrated into a practical application. Reply Br.
9–10 (citing Spec. ¶ 14). Appellant additionally argues that, like DDR
Holdings5 and Research Corporation Technologies,6 the claims recite a
specific solution for vector downscaling that overcomes a problem
specifically arising in computer technology. Id. at 17–18.

5 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
6 Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir.
2010)
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D. Step 2A, Prong 1
Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of law that is
reviewable de novo. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2012). Claim 1 requires receiving a vector scaling instruction,
determining a maximum exponent out of respective exponents of
components of a vector, determining a scaling value based at least in part on
subtracting, from the maximum exponent, a result of dividing by two a
difference between a maximum representable exponent and one, performing
the vector scaling instruction to scale the vector, subtracting the scaling
value from the exponent, and storing scaled components of the scaled vector,
and we therefore conclude the non-emphasized portions of claim 1,
reproduced above (see supra at 1–2), recite concepts relating to
mathematical relationships or formulas.
The present claims recite concepts relating to mathematical
relationships or formulas, which falls into the category of mathematical
concepts. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Moreover, those
mathematical concepts are a type of abstract idea. See id. Namely, the
claims recite features such as “a first scaled component of a scaled vector
resulting from [performing] the vector scaling instruction,”
“determin[ing]…a scaling value based at least in part on subtracting, from
the maximum exponent, a result of dividing by two a difference between a
maximum representable exponent and one,” “perform[ing]…the vector
scaling instruction to scale the vector,” and “subtracting the scaling value
from the exponent,” which are all features directed to mathematical
relationships or formulas, and therefore fall under mathematical concepts.
Nevertheless, we must still determine whether the abstract idea is
integrated into a practical application, namely whether the claim applies,
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relies on, or uses the abstract idea in a manner that imposes a meaningful
limit on the abstract idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 54–55. We therefore (1) identify whether there are any
additional recited elements beyond the abstract idea, and (2) evaluate those
elements both individually and collectively to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application. See id.
Accordingly, we proceed to prong 2.
E. Step 2A, Prong 2
Here, the only elements in the claims beyond the abstract idea are “at
least one processor,” “memory,” and “an arithmetic logic unit (ALU).” See
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The additional elements of the
present claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application
because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract
idea for the following reasons.
Appellant does not identify persuasively how the Specification sets
forth an improvement in technology. The Update addresses how we
consider evidence of improvement that is presented to us. The Update
states:
the evaluation of Prong Two requires the use of the
considerations (e.g. improving technology, effecting a particular
treatment or prophylaxis, implementing with a particular
machine, etc.) identified by the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, to ensure that the claim as a whole “integrates [the]
judicial exception into a practical application [that] will apply,
rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.”
Update, 11 (emphases added). The Update further states:
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During examination, the examiner should analyze the
“improvements” consideration by evaluating the specification
and the claims to ensure that a technical explanation of the
asserted improvement is present in the specification, and that the
claim reflects the asserted improvement. Generally, examiners
are not expected to make a qualitative judgment on the merits of
the asserted improvement. If the examiner concludes the
disclosed invention does not improve technology, the burden
shifts to applicant to provide persuasive arguments supported by
any necessary evidence to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill
in the art would understand that the disclosed invention improves
technology. Any such evidence submitted under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.132 must establish what the specification would convey to
one of ordinary skill in the art and cannot be used to supplement
the specification. For example, in response to a rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101, an applicant could submit a declaration under
§ 1.132 providing testimony on how one of ordinary skill in the
art would interpret the disclosed invention as improving
technology and the underlying factual basis for that conclusion.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
Here, the Examiner concludes that the additional elements do not
provide an improvement to computer functions or computer-related
technology. Final Act. 2–3, 7; Ans. 8–9. Consequently, we focus on any
evidence Appellant cites, as discussed in the Update.
In this case, Appellant argues that the claimed invention “improv[es]
[] an ALU so that it can perform vector scaling without the use of
multiplication operations and division operations.” Appeal Br. 16; see also
Appeal Br. 14–16, Reply Br. 6–10 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 14–15). However,
Appellant’s Specification discloses that “the ALU may often be designed to
perform only simple operations such as addition, subtraction, AND, and OR
operations.” Spec. ¶ 15. As such, the Specification discloses that the ALU
of the present claims, which does not support multiplication and division
operations, is a generic, well-known ALU. Therefore, Appellant’s alleged
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improvements are improvements in mathematical concepts for vector
scaling, which falls within the category of an abstract idea, as discussed
supra, not an improvement to technology, i.e., an ALU. “[A] claim for a
new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).
“[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered
law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the
novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent
eligibility . . . .” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, paragraphs 14–15 of the Specification are unlike the
technological improvements in Enfish.
In Enfish, the Federal Circuit considered how the invention in Enfish
was superior to the technology in the prior art. That is, the court considered
“the specification’s emphasis that ‘the present invention comprises a
flexible, self-referential table that stores data,’” “[t]he specification also
teaches that the self-referential table functions differently than conventional
database structures,” and “traditional databases, such as ‘those that follow
the relational model and those that follow the object oriented model’ are
inferior to the claimed invention.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
at 1337 (interior citations omitted). Moreover, in Enfish “‘[t]he structural
requirements of current databases require a programmer to predefine a
structure and subsequent [data] entry must conform to that structure,’ [and]
the ‘database of the present invention does not require a programmer to
preconfigure a structure to which a user must adapt data entry.’” Id. Based
on the foregoing, the court determined the claims “achieve[d] other benefits
over conventional databases, such as increased flexibility, faster search
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times, and smaller memory requirements.” Id.
Unlike the claims of Enfish, the ALU of the present claims does not
function differently than conventional ALUs. Instead, the claimed ALU has
the same functions, namely addition, subtraction, AND, and OR operations,
as conventional ALUs. See Spec. ¶ 15. The present claims recite an abstract
idea as discussed supra, or at best, improving an abstract idea—not a
technological improvement.
Furthermore, the additional elements in the present claims, namely “at
least one processor,” “memory,” and “an arithmetic logic unit (ALU),” do
not, either individually or in combination, integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. Appellant’s Specification discloses that these elements
encompass generic components, such as a generic processor (Spec. ¶¶ 14–
15, 20, 55), a generic memory (Spec. ¶ 24), and a generic ALU (Spec. ¶¶ 15,
26). Merely adding generic hardware and computer components to perform
abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical application. See
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “merely includ[ing]
instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer” as an example of
when an abstract idea has not been integrated into a practical application).
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s citation to DDR Holdings to
demonstrate that the claims “are directed to a particular solution that is
tethered to the technology experiencing the problem.” Appeal Br. 17–18.
The subject claim considered by the DDR Holdings court pertained to a
visitor of a host’s website clicking on an advertisement for a third-party
product displayed on the host’s website, the visitor is no longer being
transported to the third party’s website. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257.
In DDR Holdings, instead of losing visitors to the third-party’s website, the
host website can send its visitors to a web page on an outsource provider’s
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server that (1) incorporates “look and feel” elements from the host website
and (2) provides visitors with the opportunity to purchase products from the
third-party merchant without actually entering that merchant’s website. Id.
at 1257–58. In contrast to the claims of DDR, the present claims do not
recite incorporating “look and feel elements” from a host website and
providing visitors with the opportunity to purchase products from a third-
party merchant without actually entering the merchant’s website. Further, as
discussed above, the ALU technology of the present claims is generic (see
Spec. ¶ 15), and the improvement is instead to mathematical relationships or
formulas, an abstract idea.
Appellant’s citation to Research Corporation Technologies (Appeal
Br. 17–18) is similarly unavailing. In Research Corporation Technologies,
the claims considered by the court relate to digital image halftoning,
whereby the gray level of each of the pixels in a digital image are compared
to the corresponding threshold number in a blue noise mask to produce a
halftone image. Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 862, 864. The claimed
blue noise mask has unique first and second order properties, such that,
“[w]hen thresholded at A% of the maximum level, exactly A out of every
100 pixels will be greater than threshold value.” Id. at 864. Unlike the
claims of Research Corporation Technologies, the present claims do not
recite a unique ALU that has properties not previously known. See Spec. ¶
15.
Appellant does not make any other arguments pertaining to Step 2A,
Prong 2. Because the present claims recite an abstract idea that is not
integrated into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B.
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F. Step 2B
We agree with the Examiner that the additional elements perform
generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities. Final Act. 3. In particular, we agree with the
Examiner that the additional elements recited in the claims, namely “at least
one processor,” “memory,” and “an arithmetic logic unit (ALU)”, whether
considered alone or as an ordered combination, are well-understood, routine,
or conventional. We also disagree with Appellant’s argument that the
additional elements amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
(Appeal Br. 17–18), because the Specification explains that the “at least one
processor,” “memory,” and “an arithmetic logic unit (ALU)” are generic
computer components. Spec. ¶¶ 14–15, 20, 24, 26, 55.
For at least the above reasons, we conclude, under the 2019 Revised
Guidance, that each of Appellant’s claims 1–4, 6, 9–12, 14, 17–20, 24–27,
and 33, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea
that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an
inventive concept. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
1–4, 6, 9–12, 14, 17–20, 24–27, and 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
SECTION 103 REJECTION
We concur with the decision reached by the Examiner in the
Examiner’s Answer. We highlight the following for emphasis.
A. Whether Nystad teaches an ALU as claimed
Claim 1 recites, inter alia: “performing, by an arithmetic logic unit
(ALU) of the at least one processor that does not support multiplication
operations and division operations. . . .” Claims App. (emphasis added).
Appellant argues that “Nystad does not consider the use of an ALU
that does not support multiplication operations and division operations and
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does not address any problems associated with scaling vectors due to the use
of such an ALU.” Appeal Br. 19–20; Reply Br. 10.
The Examiner has identified the relevant portions of Nystad and has
provided sufficient explanation with corresponding citations to the reference
for teaching the above disputed limitation. Final Act. 4–5. In particular, the
Examiner finds, and we agree, that:
Nystad does not specifically disclose[] the scaling performed by
an arithmetic logic unit that does not support multiplication
operations and division operations. However, Nystad discloses
the scaling does not involve multiplication and/or division.
Thus, providing an ALU that does not support multiplication
and division for performing the scaling would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in order to
reduce circuitry.

Id. (emphases added). Notably, the Examiner finds that Nystad does not
expressly teach that the ALU does not support multiplication operations and
division operations, but determines that the claimed ALU would have been
obvious “in order to reduce circuity.” Id. Appellant’s argument that Nystad
does not teach the claimed ALU (Appeal Br. 19–20; Reply Br. 10), is not
persuasive to show error in the Examiner’s determination that the recited
ALU would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at
the time of the invention.
Also unavailing is Appellant’s argument that Nystad does not address
problems with vector scaling using the claimed ALU. The Supreme Court
in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), stated that “[t]he first
error…in this case was…holding that courts and patent examiners should
look only to the problem the patentee was trying to solve. The Court of
Appeals failed to recognize that the problem motivating the patentee may be
only one of many addressed by the patent’s subject matter.” 550 U.S. at
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420. Therefore, whether Nystad addresses problems with vector scaling
using the claimed ALU, does not apprise of error with respect to the
Examiner’s determination that the ALU would have been obvious to a
skilled artisan at the time of the invention.
Appellant’s citation to paragraph 24 of Nystad to show that Nystad
teaches multiplication (Appeal Br. 24), is not persuasive. The Examiner
rebuts Appellant’s argument, finding that the operations taught in Nystad’s
paragraph 24 are not for vector scaling. Ans. 10. The Examiner finds that
“the processor as disclosed in figures 1 and 2 of the application is a graphic
processor which should support multiplication operation and division
operation in order to perform vector normalization as disclosed in
paragraphs [0002] and [0003] of the specification of the application.” Id.;
see also Spec. ¶¶ 2–3, Figs. 1, 2. We additionally note that Nystad supports
the Examiner’s findings in this regard, because paragraph 24 of Nystad is
directed to “generating a normalized vector floating point value formed of a
plurality of normalized components.” Nystad ¶ 24.
Appellant does not provide additional arguments that Nystad does not
teach the recited ALU, and does not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s
findings and determination of obviousness regarding the claimed ALU.
B. Whether Nystad teaches the claimed scaling value
Claim 1 additionally recites, inter alia: “determining, by the at least
one processor, a scaling value based at least in part on subtracting, from the
maximum exponent, a result of dividing by two a difference between a
maximum representable exponent and one, wherein the scaling value is not
the same as the maximum exponent.” See Claims App.
Appellant argues that, although in some cases, the techniques taught
by Nystad might result in the claimed scaling value, Nystad does not teach
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the disputed limitation. Appeal Br. 21. Appellant further argues that the
value Edotmax of Nystad is not a result of dividing by two a difference
between a maximum representable exponent and one, as required by the
claim. Id. at 21–22.
In response to Appellant’s arguments (see Appeal Br. 20–22), the
Answer provides additional analysis and explanation, with accompanying
comparison to the disclosure in Appellant’s Specification, in support of the
Examiner’s finding that Nystad teaches “determining, by the at least one
processor, a scaling value based at least in part on subtracting, from the
maximum exponent, a result of dividing by two a difference between a
maximum representable exponent and one, wherein the scaling value is not
the same as the maximum exponent.” See Ans. 10–12 (citing Spec. ¶ 44;
Nystad claims 1, 2). Appellant does not respond to these findings (see,
generally, Reply Br.), and consequently, we are not persuaded of error in
them.
For at least the foregoing reasons, Appellants have not shown error in
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. Therefore, we
sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 1–4, 6, 9–12, 14, 17–20, 24–27,
and 33.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–4, 6, 9–12, 14, 17–20,
24–27, and 33 as being subject-matter ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–4, 6, 9–12, 14, 17–20,
24–27, and 33 as being obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, over the teachings of
the cited reference.

Appeal 2019-002525
Application 14/331,991
18

In summary:

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 6, 9–
12, 14, 17–
20, 24–27,
33
101 Eligibility 1–4, 6, 9–
12, 14, 17–
20, 24–27,
33

1–4, 6, 9–
12, 14, 17–
20, 24–27,
33
103 Nystad 1–4, 6, 9–
12, 14, 17–
20, 24–27,
33

Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6, 9–
12, 14, 17–
20, 24–27,
33